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NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS—PARTS I–IV

HEARINGS

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NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS—PART I

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. George Allen presiding.

Present: Senators Allen, Brownback, and Biden.

Senator ALLEN. Welcome and good afternoon to everyone. I want to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretaries Heather Conley, Robert Bradtke, Janet Bogue, from the State Department, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ian Brzezinski from the Department of Defense to be with us. We have a number of ambassadors here from the seven NATO-aspirant countries in attendance at the hearing. And I would like each of them to rise as I state their names so they can be recognized.

First from Bulgaria, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Emil Yalnazov. Welcome.

From Estonia, Ambassador Sven Jurgenson. Around here, we say Jurgenson, as you well know, a famous quarterback.

From Latvia, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Janis Eichmanis. Glad to have you here.

From Lithuania, Ambassador Vygaudas Usackas.

And from Romania, Ambassador Sorin Ducaru. Welcome.

From Slovakia, Deputy Chief of Mission, Peter Kmec. Welcome.

And from Slovenia, Ambassador Dr. Davorin Kracun. Welcome.

Welcome to you all.

The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the qualifications and the contributions of the seven NATO-aspirant countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. It was intended to be the second of three hearings dealing with NATO enlargement. The previous session scheduled for earlier this week with Secretary Powell was postponed until next Tuesday. We understand the many pressing matters on his agenda.

There will be a followup session to this hearing to be held next Thursday at 2:30 in the afternoon. And I am going to place my entire statement in the record, along with letters from the Joint Baltic-American National Committee and the Baltic-American Freedom League. And I am going to make some remarks. And if a counterpart on the Democrat side arrives—there are different hearings going on and different meetings at this point—they will make com-

ments. Then we will hear from you. And then members will have 7 minutes for comments and questions.

From my perspective as one who looks at history, NATO has truly been one of the most successful multilateral military alliances in modern history. For over 50 years, it successfully maintained peace in Western Europe, it contained Soviet expansionism, it helped bind the United States and Europe together militarily and politically, and played an indispensable role in Europe's ability to put itself back on its feet and back together after World War II.

When I was Governor of Virginia, I was a strong advocate of the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO, and after leaving office as well. So I was very pleased that in 1999 NATO took action to ensure its continued relevance and vitality when Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic were welcomed into NATO.

Last November in Prague, NATO took the next step when all seven countries were invited to begin the accession talks with the countries that we have talked about here, and that are represented. Each of these seven nations are unique nations. They have their own heritage, their own culture, their own means of governance. But they do have certain common binds. And certainly there are criteria that they need to meet. They have acted as de facto allies, in fact, to the United States and have made significant contributions to the campaign in the Balkans, in the war on terror, and in the effort that is ongoing right now to disarm Saddam Hussein.

In addition to the military contributions they have already made, these countries have made impressive political progress as well. All have successfully implemented democratic reforms and have popularly elected governments. Political and military reforms in these countries are continuing. And they are guided in part by NATO's Membership Action Plan process, which assists countries in readying themselves for NATO membership. And NATO membership, in my view, will reinforce these reforms.

Now I would like to highlight a few of the most noteworthy qualifications and contributions of some of the seven countries that we are discussing today. In particular, I want to mention the impressive strides being made by the Baltic nations—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All have held fair and free elections and positioned themselves for future EU membership as well. And this is all since they regained their freedom.

They have small, but capable, armed forces and have contributed troops to the KFOR and SFOR missions in the Baltics. In fact, Lithuania has over 100 troops in the Balkans. They have sent forces to Afghanistan. They are supporting the U.S. military actions, along with the British and Australian and the many other countries, in Iraq.

Popular support for NATO membership is well over 50 percent in each of these Baltic countries. Bulgaria and Romania have also made great political strides and provide significant direct military support to NATO and to the United States. Both countries have deployed troops to both SFOR and KFOR and are allowing U.S. and coalition forces to use their air space and facilities in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Slovenia has a parliamentary democracy that has held free elections since their independence in 1991 and is poised to join the EU in 2004. They are also providing important support to NATO operations in the Balkans. And 66 percent of Slovenes are in favor of joining the Alliance.

Slovakia continues its efforts at political and economic reform. This country contributes troops to KFOR and SFOR and has contributed to many other peacekeeping operations as well with more than 600 troops serving in international missions around the world. Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, has sent a contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists to Kuwait, which is clearly part of the Iraqi theater.

So in conclusion, I think that all of these seven countries have had to overcome serious political, economic, and military challenges to be on the way to joining the most important political-military alliance in the world. Without a doubt, they will all benefit greatly from being in NATO. And NATO, I think, will also benefit from having their capabilities and also the vitality and the love of freedom and the appreciation for freedom that they will bring.

So I look forward to a transparent and swift consideration of these seven countries' readiness to join the NATO Alliance.

And since there is not a Democrat colleague here to present a statement after this, I think we will go to questions. But first what I would like to do is allow the Democrat Senator, whenever he or she arrives, to put a statement into the record. But we are going to start with our testimony.

[The opening statement of Senator Allen follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE ALLEN

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to Deputy Assistant Secretaries Heather Conley, Robert Bradtke, and Janet Bogue from the State Department and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ian Brzezinski from the Department of Defense. We look forward to their testimony and reviewing with them the qualifications and capabilities of the seven NATO aspirant countries. I would also like to thank the Chairman of this Committee, Senator Richard Lugar, for giving me the opportunity to take the gavel for this important and timely hearing.

NATO has been the most successful multi-lateral military alliance in modem history. For over 50 years, it successfully maintained peace in Western Europe, contained Soviet expansionism, helped bind the US and Europe together militarily and politically, and played an indispensable role in Europe's ability to put itself back together after WW II.

Many have questioned NATO's relevance in the post-Cold war world and recent events have heightened questions about the Alliance and its future. I believe that NATO can continue to play a vital role in ensuring European stability. However, there are certainly changes that need to be made to NATO to allow it to more effectively deal with threats and non-traditional missions. Some important changes are already under way such as the ongoing efforts to develop the NATO Response Force that will be a high readiness, deployable force able to rapidly respond to contingencies worldwide.

In a move that I advocated as Governor of Virginia and after my term, on March 12, 1999, NATO took another important step to ensure its continued vitality and relevance when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were welcomed into NATO. These countries have already proven themselves to be capable and contributing members of the Alliance. Last November in Prague, NATO took the next step when it invited seven countries to begin accession talks to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Each of these seven nations has made significant contributions to:

- The campaign in the Balkans.

- The War on Terror.
- The effort to disarm Saddam Hussein.

They have acted as de facto allies of the United States. For example:

- They have provided logistical support and troops in combat or peace support missions in Western Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
- Romania and Bulgaria are currently providing bases to support Coalition military operations against Iraq.
- Slovakia and the Baltic countries have provided peacekeeping troops, air surveillance support, as well as biochemical specialists.

The democratic progress these countries have made since 1991, when the communist-bloc collapsed, has been remarkable. The "Membership Action Plan" process, which assists countries in readying themselves for NATO membership, has dramatically contributed to their successful reform efforts to date. NATO membership will reinforce the invitees continuing reform efforts.

BRIEF STATEMENTS OF QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH COUNTRY

Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically elected government. Bulgaria's process of reform from communism to an open, market-oriented democracy has accelerated in recent years. Sofia has pledged to make long-needed reforms in many areas, including a reform of the judiciary, economic reforms to increase foreign investment, a reduction of rampant corruption, and measures to stop trafficking in persons and drugs. Bulgaria's armed forces are being downsized and restructured into rapid reaction forces, main defense forces, territorial defense forces, and reserves. Bulgaria has deployed troops to both SFOR and KFOR and has given permission for U.S. forces to use its airspace for the conflict with Iraq, as well as an airbase at Sarafovo, on the Black Sea. Bulgaria plans to send 150 troops to countries neighboring Iraq to protect against possible nuclear, chemical or biological attack.

Estonia. Estonia has held free and fair elections since regaining independence in 1991. Estonia has met the political and economic criteria for joining the EU; it completed membership talks at the end of 2002 and is expected to join the EU in 2004. Public opinion polls in Estonia have shown substantial support for NATO membership; a February 2003 survey showed 61% of respondents favoring NATO membership.

Estonia has about 7,200 troops in its regular armed forces and about 8,300 in a volunteer reserve force. Estonia has contributed troops to both SFOR and KFOR, sent explosives experts to Afghanistan in July 2002 and is considering a possible deployment of a small unit of several dozen troops to Iraq as part of a post-conflict peacekeeping mission.

Latvia. Latvia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free and fair elections since achieving independence in 1991. The EU has determined that Latvia has met the political and economic criteria for membership; Riga completed accession talks at the end of 2002 and is expected to join the EU in 2004. A January 2003 public opinion poll put support for NATO membership at 54.7%.

Latvia has about 6,500 men in its active-duty armed forces, and 14,400 in the reserves and plans to equip and train a light infantry battalion that would form the core of the country's army and also be capable of participation in NATO-led peacekeeping and other missions. The country is also developing specialized capabilities in air surveillance, military medics, military police, and nuclear, chemical and biological decontamination units. Latvia has deployed soldiers to SFOR and KFOR. In January 2003, the government approved plans for dispatching military medics to serve in Afghanistan. On March 17, Latvia expressed support for U.S. military action in Iraq. Latvia may send a small contingent to support peacekeepers in post-conflict Iraq.

Lithuania. Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, which has held free and fair elections since achieving independence in 1991. Lithuania has met the political and economic criteria for EU membership. It has completed negotiations with the EU and is expected to join the Union in 2004. A December 2002 public opinion poll put support for NATO membership at 59%.

Lithuania has active-duty armed forces totaling 12,100 men, and is developing a Rapid Reaction Brigade of 3,800 troops, to be ready by 2006. Lithuania plans to be able to provide a battalion-sized unit that can deploy with NATO forces overseas for combat missions and is working to develop specialized capabilities such as air surveillance, demining, and air transport. Lithuania has small contingents in SFOR and KFOR and sent 40 special forces soldiers to Afghanistan last year. The govern-

ment recently expressed support for the U.S. military campaign in Iraq. It is considering plans to deploy troops for post-conflict peacekeeping, including medical and logistics experts. Lithuania's specific contributions include:

Contribution in the Balkans

- Contributes, for six month out of every 18, a company of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR (similar deployment to IFOR). Contributed 914 personnel total since 1994.
- Maintains an infantry platoon pf 30 personnel with the Polish battalion in KFOR.
- Maintains a military transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel of 7 in support of NATO operations in the Balkans since April 2001.
- Contributed 10 medical personnel to NATO humanitarian mission "Allied Harbor" in Albania in 1999.

Contributions to the war in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)

- Offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and other support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Deployed a medical team of 4 personnel with the Czech contingent in ISAF Oct.-Dec. 2002. Redeploying medical team with the German contingent in ISAF in April 2003.
- Deployed Special Operations Forces unit of 37 personnel to Afghanistan in support of OEF in Nov. 2002.

Offers of potential assistance for war with Iraq

- Government has declared preparedness to contribute politically and with other measures to the efforts of U.S. led coalition to disarm Iraq, e.g., 10 cargo handlers, 6 medics.

Romania. Romania has held four elections, deemed free and fair by outside observers, since the fall of communism; its political scene has been fairly stable in the past three years. Although its economy has performed relatively well for the past two years, Romania continues to lag behind its neighbors; Bucharest has been urged to accelerate economic reforms and privatize large industries. According to an October 2002 poll, 88% of Romanians support NATO membership, and 86% favor joining the EU.

The Romanian's have been working to reduce the size of their military and reorganize its military structure in accordance with western standards, and has created a rapid reaction force. Romania has been modernizing its military equipment and adding new weapons systems, and has also been developing NATO "niche capabilities," including airlift, minesweeping, UAVs, counter-NBC warfare, mountain combat troops, and special forces. Romania has contributed a 122-member contingent to SFOR, 222 personnel to KFOR, 70 police officers to UNMIK, and has deployed an infantry battalion, military police and a C–130 transport to ISAF, the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Romania has offered the use of its territory—land, airspace and seaports—for the U.S.-led military action against Iraq. In response to Washington's request, Romania has dispatched non-combat troops (engineers, medics and military police), and about 1,000 U.S. troops have been stationed in Constanta, which is acting as an "air bridge" to the Gulf. Romania has deployed a biochemical unit to Iraq, and if needed, the Romanian Government will shelter up to 1,500 war refugees from Iraq.

Slovakia. Slovakia and the Czech Republic peacefully divided in 1993. The country suffered through a number of difficult years politically and with regards to its international standing. However, the new government that came to power in 2002 appears to have the country on the right track. A March opinion poll showed 48% support for NATO membership.

Since 1998, Slovakia has been reforming and restructuring its military, moving toward a smaller, more flexible and fully professional force. Bratislava aims to establish by the year 2010 a small, well-equipped and trained armed force that is integrated into NATO military structures and capable of operating in allied military operations. Slovakia is training special units in alpine combat, reconnaissance, and engineering, and is also training an immediate reaction battalion for future use by NATO. Slovakia contributes troops to KFOR and SFOR. Outside of the Balkans, Slovakia has contributed to many peacekeeping operations, with more than 600 troops serving in international missions around the world. Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, has sent a contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists to Kuwait.

Slovenia. Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free elections since independence in 1991. Slovenia has met the European Union's political and economic criteria for membership; it has completed membership talks and is expected to join in 2004. In a March 23, 2003 referendum, Slovene voters endorsed their country's NATO membership, with 66% in favor of joining the Alliance.

In 2002, Slovenia decided to move rapidly toward professional armed forces and plans to abolish conscription by 2004. Slovenia is providing military police to SFOR, as well as a medical unit and a helicopter unit. Slovenia has readied a motorized infantry company for deployment to SFOR in 2003. In March 2003, Slovenia said it would decline a U.S. request for its forces to transit Slovenia on the way to a deployment to Iraq, unless the U.N. Security Council endorsed military action against Baghdad.

CONCLUSION

These seven countries have all had to overcome serious political, economic and military challenges to get to where they are today—on the way to joining the most important political-military alliance in the world. Without a doubt, they will all benefit greatly from NATO membership and NATO will benefit from the capabilities the offer and the vitality they bring.

JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC.,
400 HURLEY AVE.,
Rockville, MD, 20850-3121, March 21, 2003.

Representing: Estonian American National Council, Inc., American Latvian Association, Inc., Lithuanian American Council, Inc.

The Honorable GEORGE ALLEN
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

DEAR SENATOR ALLEN:

On behalf of one million Americans of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian heritage, the Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc. (JBANC) asks for your support for NATO enlargement ratification during upcoming Senate deliberation. We ask for your endorsement for the seven invited aspirant countries, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In the twelve years following the restoration of their independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have carried out impressive economic, political and military reforms.

All three Baltic countries have actively participated in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and are also committed to serving alongside the United States and its Allies in the rebuilding of Iraq. As part of the coalition of the willing these countries arc committed to giving not only political but moral, material and tactical support to the United States.

We look forward to working with you in supporting the partnership and cooperation between the United States, its NATO Allies and the three Baltic countries as they integrate further with Western democratic institutions. This will help cement the security and stability so long sought after in that region.

Sincerely,

JOHN BOLSTEINS, *Chairman.*

BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, INC.,
P.O. BOX 65056,
Los Angeles, CA 90065, March 26, 2003.

The Honorable GEORGE ALLEN, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on Europe,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510

DEAR SENATOR ALLEN:

On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, I am submitting the League's statement recommending NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

We respectfully request that the statement be made part of the record of the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on amending the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

You have been a great and true friend to the Baltic American community and the Baltic countries, and we sincerely appreciate it. The Baltic American community believes that the Baltic countries are qualified for membership in NATO, and we hope that you will continue to support them in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

VALDIS V. PAVLOVSKIS, *President.*

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF VALDIS PAVLOVSKIS, PRESIDENT, BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, INC.

On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, the Board of Directors respectfully request that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee support the membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in NATO and recommend their membership in NATO to the full Senate.

Since the Baltic countries regained their independence, Congress has supported the integration of the Baltic nations in western defense structures. In support, in 1994 Congress enacted the NATO Participation Act, in 1996 it passed the European Security Act, and in 2002, by an overwhelming vote, the Freedom Consolidations Act. In addition, last year the House of Representatives passed HCR 116 and HCR 468 recommending Baltic membership in NATO.

Congress has supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO by annually providing funding through FMF and IMET for the development of Baltic armed forces. For a decade, American military advisory teams have served in the Baltic countries training the Baltic military, and hundreds of Baltic soldiers of all ranks have graduated from U.S. military schools. Baltic military forces have participated in joint military exercises with NATO forces. Recent NATO inspection teams as well as visits by U.S. Congressional delegations have concluded that the Baltic countries are qualified for NATO membership.

In the short period since they regained their independence, the Baltic countries have developed strong and responsible democratic governments, viable free market economies and transparent and democratic armed forces. OSCE, the U.S. Department of State, and various international bodies have found that the Baltic countries respect and fully comply with international standards of civil and human rights.

The early fears that Russian opposition to Baltic membership in NATO would give rise to Russian nationalism and have a deleterious effect on U.S.-Russian relations have not materialized.

Today, the Baltic countries participate in the Partnership for Peace program and Operation Enduring Freedom. Baltic troops are serving in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

The Baltic countries were one of the first to support U.S. action in Iraq, and they were the initiators of the Vilnius Ten declaration in support of the U.S., in spite of retaliation threatened by their larger neighbors France and Germany. All three Baltic countries are preparing to assist in reconstruction of a post Saddam lraq

The Baltic countries have demonstrated their willingness and capability to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership. They share our values and have proved to be loyal friends of the United States. As Americans of Baltic heritage, the Baltic American Freedom League is proud and confident to support Baltic membership into NATO. We hope that you will too.

We look forward to working with you to gain support for amending the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Senator ALLEN. So let us begin with our witnesses. Panel one.

You are here. OK. Well, let us do this. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bradtke, we would like to hear from you first.

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Then we will have Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski.

Secretary Bradtke.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: HEATHER A. CONLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS; JANET L. BOGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BRADTKE. I want to thank you for giving me and my colleagues the opportunity to testify today before you on the enlargement of NATO and the qualifications and the contributions of the seven countries that were invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit.

At the outset, I would also like to thank Chairman Lugar and the members of the committee for your leadership on the issue of NATO enlargement. Your support, your encouragement, but also the tough questions that you have asked us have helped us to refine our approach to NATO enlargement. And I also want to thank Senator Biden as well for his leadership of the committee in the past. We have worked very closely with this committee over the last 2 years.

Here before you today is the core of the interagency team from the State Department and from the Defense Department that has worked for the better part of the last 2 years on the enlargement issue. It was our job to ensure that our Principals had the information they needed to advise the President, who made the ultimate decision on whom to invite and which candidates to support.

This was a responsibility, Mr. Chairman, that we took very seriously. There is no more important commitment that one country can make to another than to pledge that its citizens are prepared to fight for the other. And when a country is invited to join NATO, that is what we are deciding.

The standards for NATO membership are high. But NATO leaders have wisely recognized that there is no single set of criteria that determines whether a country is qualified for membership. NATO needs to be able to accommodate countries as diverse as the United States and Luxembourg or Turkey and Iceland.

When the last round of enlargement occurred and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined the Alliance in 1999, NATO's leaders recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task. They created a tool to help aspirant countries to understand what was expected of them and to prepare themselves for membership. They set up the Membership Action Plan or MAP.

The MAP process has given us a strong basis by which to measure the readiness for NATO membership of the seven countries that were invited at Prague. But given the importance to the United States of NATO, the administration has carried out additional steps to evaluate each country and to encourage the hard work of reform.

In February of last year, Ambassador Burns led a team, including a number of us on this panel, which visited all the aspirant countries. In July, we met again with all the leaders of the aspirant countries in Riga on the margins of the Vilnius-10 summit. And during the summer, we conducted what we called a midterm

review of reform implementation with each of the embassies of the aspirant countries here in Washington. Finally, in October, another team led by Ambassador Burns, again including myself and others on this panel, returned to the aspirant countries to evaluate their progress.

We have held literally hundreds of meetings and traveled thousands of miles to learn as much as we could about the aspirant countries and to encourage their preparations to join NATO. By issuing the invitation at Prague to the seven countries we are talking about today to join the Alliance, President Bush and his fellow leaders signaled their belief that these intensive efforts to promote and encourage reform had been a success.

Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that should cause us to question their judgment. The evidence shows that all seven invitees have made an enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and that each is ready, both politically and militarily, to contribute to the defense of the Alliance.

All seven, as the chairman just mentioned, are already acting as de facto allies by providing overflight and basing rights and providing troops to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan or by having liaison officers with CENTCOM in Tampa.

All of the invitees acting through the Vilnius-10 group offered their political support to the United States on Iraq in a statement that was issued on November 21 and again in another statement that was issued in February of this year. All of the invitees have committed to spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. When they join the Alliance, they will bring with them 200,000 troops and important specialized capabilities.

All of the countries, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, are parliamentary democracies that have had free and fair elections, that have open market economies, and that respect the principles of free speech and free press. All have taken steps to improve governance by bolstering judicial independence and adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved their protection of human rights, including minority rights and civil liberties. And all have taken steps to restitute property and to deal with complex and difficult issues from the past.

The President this week submitted his report to Congress on the enlargement of NATO. And this report goes into greater detail on each of the countries. The President's report documents an impressive record of contributions and accomplishments by the seven countries. But just as no current member is perfect, problems do remain in the invitee countries. Issues such as corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of minorities, protection of classified information, property restitution, and defense reform will continue to need the close attention of the leaders of the seven countries.

Based on the extensive dialog that we have had with them, we are convinced of their commitment to continue their reform efforts. And we will help them to do so with our continued moral support, our technical assistance, and the systematic formal review process that NATO provides.

Mr. Chairman, one might well ask why the administration is asking the Senate, during a period of such dramatic events in Iraq, to take the time now to consider the issue of NATO enlargement.

Part of the answer lies in the leadership that the United States in the last two administrations has shown on the enlargement issue. Expeditious action by the Senate will demonstrate to our current allies and our new allies our commitment to a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even during a period of Trans-Atlantic differences. It will show our commitment to a vision of Europe, whole, free, and at peace, that President Bush put forward in his speech in Warsaw in June of 2002.

But there is one other reason, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to illustrate with a brief story. Earlier this month as the United States began to move its forces to the Bulgarian airfield of Burgas, an Iraqi diplomat traveled there. Standing outside the airbase, the Iraqi told a group of reporters that if the United States took military action in Iraq, then Bulgaria and the base at Burgas would be a target for Iraqi military strikes.

When the Bulgarian Defense Minister was asked whether he was concerned about this threat, he responded, and I quote, "This is just the normal statement of an ambassador from a terrorist state." And then the Minister added, "He will not be an ambassador when the regime in Iraq is changed."

In this willingness of the seven invitee countries to stand with us against such threats, in all that they are doing to enhance our collective security already and all that they have done to rid themselves of their totalitarian past, they have shown their abiding faith in us and their faith in our promise to open NATO's door to them. We need now to keep faith with them. We need, Mr. Chairman, to recognize them as true allies.

Thank you very much for your time, Mr. Chairman. And at the appropriate moment, we would be happy to take your questions.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much, Secretary Bradtke.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for giving me and my colleagues the opportunity to testify before you on the enlargement of NATO and the qualifications and the contributions of the seven countries invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit last November.

At the outset, I would also like to thank Chairman Lugar and the members of the committee for your leadership on this issue. Your support and encouragement, but also the tough questions that you have asked, have pushed us to look closely at our approach on enlargement, and to refine and to strengthen our arguments. I also want to thank Senator Biden for his leadership as Chairman last year when much important work was being done. We have greatly appreciated the close cooperation that we have had from the Committee and its staff over the past two years.

Here before you today, is the core of the inter-agency team, from the State Department and the Defense Department, that has worked for the better part of two years on the enlargement issue. It was our job to ensure that our Principals had the information they needed to advise the President, who made the ultimate decision on which candidates to support for membership.

I would like to assure the Committee that my colleagues and I took our responsibilities very seriously. There is no more important commitment that one country can make to another than to pledge that its citizens are prepared to fight and—if necessary—to die for the other. And when a country is invited to join NATO that is what we are deciding. NATO is not a club; it is a collective defense organization in which its members commit themselves, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, to considering an attack on one as an attack against all.

So, the standards for membership must be high, but NATO leaders have wisely recognized that there is no single set of criteria, no simple checklist that determines whether a country is qualified for membership. NATO needs to be able to accommodate members as diverse as the United States and Luxembourg or Turkey and Iceland.

As a result, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states only that:

> The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined the Alliance in 1999, NATO's leaders reflected on their experience and recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task. They decided to create a tool to help aspirant countries to understand what was expected of NATO members and to prepare themselves for membership. They set up the Membership Action Plan or MAP.

In establishing the MAP, NATO's leaders stated specifically that the MAP "cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership." Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, the aspirant countries developed an Annual National Program (ANP) to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms were focused on five key areas: political and economic development; defense and military issues; budgets; security of sensitive information; and legal issues. NATO reviewed the Annual National Programs, and each Ally provided comment and feedback. In the spring, each aspirant met with the North Atlantic Council in a "19-plus-1" format to review its progress in achieving its reform goals.

The MAP process has given us a strong basis by which to measure the readiness for NATO membership of the seven countries that were invited at Prague. But, given the importance to the United States of NATO and the Article 5 commitment, the Administration has carried out additional steps to evaluate each country and to encourage the hard work of reform.

In February of last year, Ambassador Burns led a team, including a number of us on this panel, which visited all of the aspirant countries. We met with Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, as well as with military officers and parliamentarians. We warned our interlocutors that joining NATO was an intrusive process, that as allies we would need to know everything about each other. We asked difficult questions about corruption, about property restitution and historical issues, about the treatment of minorities, about gray arms sales, and defense spending. We urged the leaders to adopt specific programs of reforms.

Later in 2002, in July we met again with all the leaders of all the aspirant countries in Riga on the margins of the "Vilnius-10" Summit. During the summer, we also conducted what we called a "mid-term review" of reform implementation with each of the embassies of the aspirant countries here in Washington. Finally, in October, another team led by Ambassador Burns, again including myself and others on this panel, returned to all of the aspirant countries to evaluate their progress. We met with every Prime Minister and with nearly every President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense. We again asked difficult questions and sought assurances that their reform processes would continue well beyond the Prague Summit, if an invitation to join NATO would be forthcoming.

As I said at the beginning of my testimony, we have taken our responsibility seriously. We have held literally hundreds of meetings and traveled thousands of miles to learn as much as we could about the aspirant countries and to encourage their preparations to join NATO. By issuing the invitation at Prague to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the Alliance, President Bush and his fellow NATO heads of state signaled their belief that these intensive, hands-on efforts to promote and encourage reform had been an outstanding success.

Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that should cause us to question their judgment. The evidence clearly shows that all seven invitees have made an enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and that each is ready, both politically and militarily, to contribute to the defense of the NATO Alliance.

- All seven are already acting as de facto allies by providing overflight and basing rights and by providing troops to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, or by having liaison officers with CENTCOM in Tampa.
- As Senator Voinovich will recall from his participation at the Prague Summit, all of the invitees, acting through the "Vilnius-10" group, offered their political support to the U.S. on Iraq on November 21. They reiterated this support in February in another V-10 statement which endorsed the U.S. position that Sad-

dam had to comply with UNSCR 1441 fully and immediately or face the military consequences.

- All of the invitees have committed to spending at least two percent of GDP on defense and should be able to make real contributions to NATO's defense. When these seven countries join the Alliance, they will bring with them 200,000 troops and important specialized capabilities, which will be further developed in accordance with the Prague Summit Capabilities Commitment.
- All have taken steps to improve their political, economic, legal, and military systems to overcome the burdens and problems inherited from decades of Communist misrule. All are parliamentary democracies with free and fair elections, open market economies, and respect for the principles of free speech and a free press.
- All have taken steps to improve governance by bolstering judicial independence and adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved their protection of human rights, including minority rights and civil liberties. All have taken steps to restitute property and to deal with complex and difficult issues from the past.

While each of the seven countries invited at the Prague Summit share these broad accomplishments, I would like to comment briefly on the particular contributions and steps that each invitee has made to qualify for NATO membership. I would note that the President's Report to Congress on NATO enlargement, submitted earlier this week, contains a more detailed analysis of each country.

Bulgaria—All segments of Bulgarian political opinion strongly support NATO membership (including all four parties represented in Parliament). Bulgaria has also given strong support for the disarmament of Iraq. On November 7, the National Assembly approved the Government's decision to support coalition action against Iraq. Bulgarian support includes: over-flight rights and the transit of U.S. and coalition forces; basing for up to 18 U.S. aircraft at Sarafovo Airport near Burgas; and the deployment of Bulgarian NBC units (up to 150 personnel) to the theater of operations. Bulgaria was an important partner of the United States in dealing with Iraq in the United Nations Security Council. Bulgaria also contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including hosting a deployment of six US KC–135 transport aircraft and 200 support personnel at Burgas, the first stationing of foreign forces in Bulgaria since WWII. Bulgaria has also provided personnel for SFOR and KFOR and donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. The Government has agreed on a minimum level of defense expenditures as a proportion of GDP, projected at higher than 2.8% in 2003 and 2004.

Since the fall of Communism, Bulgaria has clearly demonstrated the sustainability of its commitment to democracy by holding free and fair elections and the peaceful transfer of power. Basic civil liberties are guaranteed by the Constitution. Bulgarians pride themselves on tolerance, and no extremist group enjoys significant support, either inside or outside the political system. Bulgaria has made material progress on the return of private and communal property. Macro-economically, Bulgaria remains committed to the path of reforms laid out by the IMF and EU, even in the face of growing public dissatisfaction with low living standards.

Estonia—The Prime Minister stated publicly on March 18 that Estonia is ready to contribute to post-conflict operations in Iraq. Possible contributions include a light point defense platoon, an explosive ordinance demolition team, and cargo handlers. In the Balkans, 100 Estonian personnel are currently on a six-month rotation as part of KFOR. Estonia also has deployed a 21-man military police contingent with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR. Estonia has deployed two explosive detection dog teams to Afghanistan to assist with airport security, and offered overflight and landing rights in support of OEF. It has also deployed an explosive ordnance destruction (EOD) team with ISAF.

Estonia is a fully functioning democracy with a successful market-oriented economy (GDP grew by an estimated 5.7% in 2002). The Government has committed to spending at least 2% of GDP annually on defense. Estonia is working actively to integrate its Russian-speaking minority by eliminating language requirements for electoral candidates and promoting naturalization. Estonia is also taking concrete steps to deal with the past, completing its restitution process entirely and emphasizing the work of its independent Historical Commission. In January, Estonia observed its first national Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust.

Latvia—The Latvian parliament passed a bill March 19 allowing Latvian troops to take part in operations in Iraq. The bill authorizes the Government to send units of its Armed Forces to Iraq on operations "under the military command of the armed forces of the international coalition." Latvia has already deployed eight military medical personnel to ISAF, and participates in a six-month rotation every 18 months of some 100 personnel as part of KFOR (previously in SFOR). It also main-

tains a medical and military police team with the British and an SOD team with the Netherlands in KFOR. The government is committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense through 2008.

Latvia has also undertaken significant political and economic reforms. Following parliamentary elections in October, 2002, a new government was formed headed by Prime Minister Einars Repse that has demonstrated a firm commitment to combating corruption. A newly created Anti-Corruption Bureau is working to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations within government. In addition, the new government has accelerated efforts to integrate Latvia's minorities. Since 1995, 58,145 persons have become naturalized citizens. The Government has taken steps, such as reducing fees, to ease the naturalization process. The property restitution process in Latvia, which is nearly complete, is also a great success story. The Government promotes Holocaust education and public awareness, and commemorates Holocaust Remembrance Day on July 4.

Lithuania—On March 17, Lithuania reaffirmed the "Vilnius-10" group statement on Iraq of February 5, 2002. Lithuania's Parliament passed legislation on March 24 authorizing the Government to send logistical and military medical support to a possible effort in Iraq, as well as humanitarian aid. 37 Special Forces soldiers support OEF; four military physicians deployed with a Czech unit in ISAF in 2002 and will report to Afghanistan in May. Airspace and airfields in support of OEF are on standing offer. Contributions in the Balkans include a six-month rotation every 18 months of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent in KFOR (previously in SFOR) and a platoon of about 30 servicemen with the Polish-Ukrainian contingent in KFOR. The Government is committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense.

The Government has taken steps to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for combating corruption. It has successfully cracked down on corruption by customs and tax inspectors. We have seen a genuine and exemplary commitment to address the injustices of the past. The Government has returned hundreds of religious scrolls to Jewish community groups, instituted a Holocaust education program, announced plans to restore parts of the Jewish Quarter in Vilnius' Old Town, and consistently been one of the most active members of the 15-country International Task Force on Holocaust Education. A joint Government-Jewish community committee is working on an amendment to the property restitution law to allow communal property restitution.

Romania—Has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to NATO. Public support for NATO membership is about 80%, the highest of any invitee country. Romania is a staunch supporter of the war on terrorism and the effort to disarm Iraq. Romania granted blanket overflight, basing and transit rights to coalition forces for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Black Sea port of Constanta and Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase have accommodated U.S. troops en route to the Persian Gulf. Romania also has offered to deploy a 75-man nuclear, biological and chemical weapon response unit to support Iraq operations. Romania has provided robust support of OEF, self-deploying a 400-man infantry battalion to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and providing a military police platoon to the ISAF mission in Kabul. The Romanian defense budget is linked to GDP forecasts and will be based on the Government's commitment to ensure a minimum level of defense expenditures, representing 2.38% of GDP in the years 2003 to 2005.

The Romanian government continues efforts to strengthen democratic foundations, improve living standards, and create a society based on respect for the rule of law. Romania has a free press, five major political parties, and an established record of consistently free and fair elections. To further strengthen democracy and improve transparency, the Government has drafted legislation to compel the disclosure of public figures' assets, limit their ability to influence business decisions, make political party financing more transparent, and increase the openness of the government decision-making process. While Romania still has much to do in the matter of restitution, it has now drafted and passed publicly available laws to replace the former ad hoc decrees and is adjudicating thousands of claims. Economic growth resumed in 2000 after a three-year recession, with increases in GDP growth of 5.3% in 2001 and 4.5% in 2002. Decreases in unemployment and inflation represent encouraging developments.

Slovakia—Has also demonstrated its readiness and commitment to supporting U.S. national security interests by contributing to the global war on terrorism, operations in the Balkans/Afghanistan, and in Iraq. Contributions include sending 100 soldiers to Kosovo, an engineering unit to Kabul, and on February 26 a 75 person Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons unit to Kuwait. Slovak military reform is on course. Parliament is committed to joining NATO and has earmarked 2% of its budget for defense spending.

In September, Prime Minister Dzurinda's government was re-elected, firmly cementing Slovakia's democratic reforms. Former authoritarian Prime Minister Meciar's party HZDS has all but collapsed. Although economic reforms have been painful, with unemployment currently at around 18%, the Slovaks nonetheless have moved forward with privatization and financial reform, and their efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Slovakia has engaged actively with its Jewish community and with U.S. NGO's to settle outstanding restitution claims. The OECD has projected a 4% economic growth rate, the highest in the region, for FY 2003.

Slovenia—In addition to offering facilities, overflight permission, and intelligence support to the War Against Terrorism, Slovenia provided demining and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan National Army Training Program, and will help train Afghan police. Slovenia also deployed a motorized infantry company to Bosnia in January 2003, adding to troops and equipment already sent to SFOR and KFOR. Slovenia shows good progress in increasing interoperability and reforming its military, emphasizing deployable and sustainable reaction forces. It will end conscription next year and plans to have a fully professional force by 2008. Defense spending is rising steadily; the Government has committed to spending two percent of GDP by 2008.

Slovenia has a stable, multi-party, democratic political system, characterized by regular elections, a free press, an independent judiciary, and an excellent human rights record. Slovenia has a free market economy, an impressive record of sustained, broad-based growth, and a per capita GDP approaching 72% of the EU average. There is near-uniform support in Parliament for NATO membership, and 66% of participants in a referendum on March 23 voted in favor of joining NATO.

Mr. Chairman, the record of contributions and accomplishments by the seven countries is impressive. But just as no current member is perfect, problems do remain in the invitee countries. Issues such as corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of minorities, protection of classified information, and defense reform will continue to need the close attention of the leaders of the seven invited countries. Based on the extensive dialogue that we have had with these countries, we are convinced of their willingness to continue their reform efforts. As the leaders of seven countries have told us, they are continuing reforms not just to impress us in the hope of joining NATO, but because these reforms are in their own long-term interest.

This permanent commitment to reform was reaffirmed yesterday, when the Permanent Representatives of the nineteen NATO Allies signed the Accession Protocols for the new invitees at NATO headquarters. Each of the Foreign Ministers from the invitee countries submitted a reform timetable for their country at the time the Protocols were signed. These reform timetables are very detailed lists of further political, economic, military, resource, security and legal reforms that each country commits itself to. Each invitee designed its own timetable, in consultation with allies.

We and our NATO Allies will ensure that they live up to these commitments. We will also help them to do so. They will need our continued moral support and technical assistance. The systematic and formal review process that NATO provides will allow them to make further progress along the reform path while simultaneously increasing their contributions to Alliance security and values.

Mr. Chairman, one might well ask why the Administration is asking the Senate, during a period of such dramatic events in Iraq, to take the time now to consider the issue of NATO enlargement and give its approval to bringing Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into NATO. Part of the answer lies in the leadership that the United States, in the last two Administrations, has shown on NATO enlargement. Expeditious action by the Senate will demonstrate to our current allies and our new allies our commitment to a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even during period of transatlantic differences. It will show our commitment to the vision of a Europe, whole, free, and at peace, that President Bush put forward in his speech in Warsaw in June 2002.

But there is another reason, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps nothing captures it better than a story about the head of the Iraqi embassy in Bulgaria. Earlier this month, as the U.S. began to move its forces to the Bulgarian airfield of Burgas, the Iraqi diplomat traveled there. Standing outside the airbase, the Iraqi told a group of reporters that if the United States took military action in Iraq, then Bulgaria and the base at Burgas would be a target for Iraqi military strikes. When the Bulgarian Minister of Defense was asked whether he was concerned about this threat, he responded: "This is the normal statement of an ambassador from a terrorist state." And the Minister added, "He will not be an ambassador when the regime in Iraq is changed."

In the willingness of the seven invitee countries to stand with us against such threats, in all that they are doing already to enhance our collective security, in all that they have done to rid themselves of their totalitarian past, they have shown

their abiding faith in us and their faith in our promise to open NATO's door to them. We now need to keep faith with them. We need to recognize them as true allies.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you very much for permitting us this time. My colleagues and I would be happy to hear your questions and concerns.

Senator ALLEN. Secretary Brzezinski.

I will say that Ms. Bogue and Ms. Conley will not be giving statements but will be able to share with us expertise in answering questions we may have.

Secretary Brzezinski.

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak at this hearing on the enlargement. We know well the important leadership role that you, sir, and Senator Biden and Senator Brownback and this committee will play in advocating NATO enlargement. And I am eager to share with you today the Department of Defense's views of the qualifications of the seven candidate countries and how their membership in NATO will enhance the Alliance's security and military capability.

Yesterday, accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed in Brussels. This is an important milestone in this round of enlargement. And I think it might be useful to review the principles that serve as the foundation for this administration's support for enlargement and more broadly our security relationship with Europe.

The first principle is that a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. NATO enlargement is the cornerstone of that vision. An undivided Europe, whole and free, will be a better partner to the United States in global affairs.

I realize, of course, that differences between the United States and a few of our European allies regarding Iraq give some the impression that Europe and America are not natural partners. These differences are not to be minimized. But they do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic imperatives of the North Atlantic Alliance. Europe and the United States need each other. And I know that the seven invitees to NATO will stand among those most committed to the transatlantic relationship.

The second principle is that the United States and Europe exist in the same global security environment. Before them lie the same opportunities, challenges, and dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations, and terrorist states. Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor under way to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, their communications, and their sources of financial and material support.

The third principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. And NATO

promotes among its members common defense policies and doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of military integration is found nowhere else in the world.

Finally, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the forward presence for the United States military. In fact, U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe were some of the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq.

It is with these principles in mind that we advocate an enlargement and open door policy. Our support for the aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, to Operation Enduring Freedom, to the International security Assistance Force in Kabul, and more recently in the war against Iraq.

Sir, you listed many of the contributions they are making in the Balkans in these conflicts and peacekeeping operations as far as in Afghanistan. So I will not belabor those points again. And I believe a chart was handed out to outline them in detail.[1]

What can we draw from these experiences? First, over the last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto allies. They have demonstrated, by risking their own blood, that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO membership, they embrace it.

Second, these seven invitees bring real capabilities to the table. Indeed, combined together, the seven add to NATO strength some 200,000 to 230,000 men in arms. They promise to bring these capabilities that will help NATO meet shortfalls in its current force structure.

Moreover, for their contributions to NATO operations in the global war on terrorism, their defense establishments have developed a better understanding of how NATO and NATO allies conduct military operations. Clearly, there is still much work to be done to bring their militaries up to the standards we expect of our NATO members. My experience in working with these countries shaping and implementing the reform programs shows that they are making very good progress and will continue to do so.

Mr. Chairman, in the travels that I and my colleagues undertook to these democracies, we have looked at two questions. Will this candidate or that candidate strengthen the Alliance's ability to protect and promote its security, values, and interests? And second, can we be confident that this candidate's commitment to democracy and the Alliance's responsibilities and values be enduring?

From my vantage point, I believe the answer to these questions is yes for all seven. This conclusion is based on their conduct as de facto allies. It is based on their soundness of their defense reform programs, multi-year endeavors that give one some insight into out-year plans and intentions.

And it is based on the fact that these democracies still have fresh memories of foreign domination and totalitarianism. With that comes a special appreciation for what it takes to protect the core values and interests of the Alliance. It explains in part their commitment toward the responsibilities that come with membership in

[1] See page 21.

an alliance that brought down the Berlin Wall, that helped end the Soviet Union, and helped make these countries free.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am ready to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide Department of Defense views on NATO enlargement and the qualifications of the seven candidate countries that were tapped at the NATO Prague summit for membership in the Alliance. I would especially like to provide you with our perspective on how their integration into NATO will enhance the Alliance's security and military capability. I would ask that my written statement be placed in the record.

Yesterday, accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed in Brussels. As we pass this important milestone in this round of enlargement, it is useful to review the principles that serve as the foundation for this Administration' perspective on enlargement and more broadly our security relationship with Europe.

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, whole and free, and allied with the United States is America's natural partner in global affairs.

I realize, of course, that differences between the United States and a few of our European Allies regarding Iraq give the impression that Europe and America are not natural partners. These differences are not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic importance of the North Atlantic Alliance. I am confident that the seven invitees to NATO we will discuss today will stand with those most committed to the Transatlantic relationship.

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the same threats, and they both have the same opportunities in the changing global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist organizations, and terrorist states present an urgent and lethal danger to North America and Europe. Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and material support.

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. NATO promotes among its members common defense policies and doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of integration is found nowhere else in the world. Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of a forward presence for United States military forces. U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe were among the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq, ensuring not only America's security, but Europe's as well.

Throughout its history, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in the international security environment. By continuing to meet the challenges of the day, NATO has ensured its ongoing relevance and vitality. An example is the historic decision NATO took last year to support German and Dutch forces leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF III) in Afghanistan. With this decision, NATO took on not only a new mission, the support of a "coalition of the willing," but one well beyond its traditional geographic domain. For the Alliance, "Out of area or out of business" is no longer an issue.

In this spirit, Allied Heads of State and Government made important and far-reaching decisions at the Prague Summit last November, continuing Alliance efforts to adjust to the profound changes in Europe's strategic landscape and the global security environment. They approved an agenda featuring a new focused capabilities initiative, a streamlined command structure and the extension of NATO membership to seven Central European democracies. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to touch on some of these initiatives briefly before turning to enlargement.

NATO RESPONSE FORCE

The decision at the Prague Summit to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) promises to provide the Alliance the ability to quickly deploy a force capable of executing the full range of missions NATO may be called upon to undertake. If imple-

mented to the standards proposed by the U.S., the NRF will be lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice. Our goal for the NRF is an initial operational capability for training by October 2004, and full operational capability by October 2006. We expect the NRF to become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats that the Alliance faces.

PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT

That said, the future success of the NRF depends on the willingness of our Allies to meet their agreed-upon NATO defense obligations. As you know, many have consistently failed to do so. At the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to overcome longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, NBC defense equipment, and precision guided munitions (PGMs). Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess many of the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment in order to be effective. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment if the NRF is to evolve from a paper concept to a fighting force.

STREAMLINING NATO'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

At Prague, Heads of State and Government also approved the broad outline of a streamlined NATO command structure. Operational commands will be reduced from 23 to 16 commands. This will ensure the more efficient use of financial and manpower resources. More importantly, it will provide NATO commanders headquarters that are more mobile, joint, and interoperable—critical requirements in the 21st Century. And the establishment of a new functional command, Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk Virginia, will provide a new and needed engine to drive military transformation across the entire Alliance.

Let me now turn to enlargement and a discussion of the seven candidates: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Our support for the aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by, if not superceded by, their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, and ISAF. More recently, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia joined our coalition in the war against Iraq.

In short over the last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto Allies. They understand the responsibility of membership and embrace it. There is still much work to be done to further the defense reforms these nations have undertaken to make their militaries interoperable with those of the Allies. Based on our experience at helping these countries with these reforms, we believe these nations are making good progress. We will continue to work closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond to help them accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities that these nations can bring to the Alliance today to help meet capability requirements needed by NATO.

The ability of the invitees to operate alongside U.S. and Allied forces in the Balkans or in the fight against terrorism is no accident. The U.S. and NATO have been working closely with the invitees through the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that NATO established after the 1999 round of enlargement. The MAP's primary goal is to aid the preparations of those nations seeking to join the Alliance. Their participation in the MAP and in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) within NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) has enabled them to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and in enhancing the interoperability of their armed forces with NATO.

Mr. Chairman, let me provide the Committee with a few remarks about each invitee.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria's defense plans are based on a force structure review that incorporated substantial U.S. and Allied input. Much progress has been achieved in the fundamental reform of the Bulgarian military that should help them develop force structures compatible with those of Allied countries. Sofia is concentrating its resources and military training on developing such niche capabilities as: special forces units; engineer units; logistic support units; and NBC Defense units. The Bulgarian government has agreed on a minimum level of defense expenditures, projected at 2.84 percent of GPD in 2003 and 2004. Bulgaria also hosted U.S. tanker and transport

aircraft in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and is hosting U.S. aircraft in support of the war with Iraq, as well as deploying a Bulgarian NBC unit as part of coalition forces.

The illicit Terem arms-dealing scandal, which involved the attempted sale of dual use military equipment to Syria in the fall of 2002, is of great concern of the United States. The Government of Bulgaria cooperated with the U.S. government in investigating this case. Sofia continues to work on reforms that will preclude a repeat of this case. The U.S. Government does not consider the Terem case to be closed and will continue to monitor closely the Terem investigation with the expectation that all individuals involved will be held fully accountable.

Estonia

Estonia has worked hard to make the most of its defense resources, focusing its efforts on one brigade with a deployable battalion plus supporting units. It is also working to develop specialized capabilities for the Alliance, including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams and military police. Like the U.S., Estonia is outsourcing some of its logistics requirements through commercial contracts. Estonia has committed a minimum of 2 percent of GDP towards defense spending, and will focus efforts to improve the capability of its deployable units while reducing the amount of resources spent on territorial defense. Along with Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has participated in many cooperative Baltic defense projects. These Baltic efforts include BALTBAT (the Baltic Battalion), BALTNET (the Baltic air surveillance network), BALTRON (the Baltic mine countermeasure squadron), and the Baltic Defense College. An Estonian EOD team deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF and another is deploying there in support of ISAF.

Latvia

Latvia's National Security Plan, based on it's new National Security Concept, was approved by the government in July 2002. Latvia is moving defense resources away from territorial defenses and toward a brigade that will include deployable units. It is also developing specialized formations, including divers, EOD, military police, medical units, and Special Operations Forces. Formation of a Special Operations Command is also underway. Latvia's Parliament is legally committed to a minimum of 2 percent of GDP towards defense spending through 2008. Along with Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia participates in the cooperative Baltic defense projects described above. Two Latvian medical teams have deployed to Afghanistan to support ISAF.

Lithuania

Lithuania has examined its force structure in light of NATO initiatives agreed upon at the Prague Summit. Lithuania's defense modernization plans focus on a brigade with rapidly deployable units and specialized "niche" capabilities such as: engineers, medics and special forces. Lithuania's defense budget plans for 2002-2007 appear sound and affordable; all 12 major political parties are committed to defense spending of 2 percent of GDP. Along with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has partaken in the cooperative Baltic defense projects described above. Lithuania also has a special military relationship with Poland featuring a joint battalion, and a Lithuanian platoon is embedded in the Polish-Ukrainian battalion operating in Kosovo. A Lithuanian Special Operations Forces unit is deployed in Afghanistan to support OEF and a medical team is deployed with ISAF.

Romania

Romania has placed a high priority on development of specialized "niche" forces in preparation for NATO membership: mountain brigades, military police and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Its land force units are to be trained to meet NATO-compatibility requirements by the end of 2003, leading to an increase in the number of interoperational Romanian units. Romania is committed to defense expenditures of at least 2 percent of GDP. Romania has deployed—and transported with its own airlift—an infantry battalion and military police to Afghanistan in support of OEF and granted overflight, transit and basing rights for Afghanistan and Iraq operations. For the war on Iraq, Romania has provided an NBC unit, has offered peacekeepers for post-conflict Iraq and is providing basing for U.S. forces.

Slovakia

Slovakia's current defense reforms are solid and follow the "Force 2010" Long Term Plan, which is the product of a comprehensive defense review created with U.S. assistance. Slovakia's specialized "niche" capabilities include: dedicated nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) reconnaissance and decontamination capability; mobile analysis labs with modern detection and marking systems; and engineering and

special operations capabilities. Slovakia's Parliament approved 2 percent of GDP as the minimum for defense outlays, starting in 2003. Slovakia deployed an engineering unit to Kabul and an NBC unit to support the war with Iraq.

Slovenia

Slovenia's defense reform is based upon the "General Long-Term Development and Equipping Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces, 2002 to 2007." This will encompass a new force structure concept aimed at creating more mobile, capable, and deployable reaction forces, while reducing and modernizing the main defense and reserve forces. Slovenia plans to end conscription in 2004 and implement a fully professional force, based on regular active duty personnel and a voluntary reserve, by 2008. Specialized "niche" capabilities and assets that can be offered to the Alliance include: mountain warfare, special operations forces, military police units, and military field medicine. Its new force structure emphasizes deployability and sustainability. Slovenia is committed to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008. (It is currently 1.6 percent).

NATO'S OPEN DOOR

For those aspirants not invited at the Prague Summit, the door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing to participate in the MAP and to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the goal of Ukraine's integration into Europe—an integration that will not be complete as long as Ukraine remains outside of Europe's key political, economic, and security institutions.

Mr. Chairman, we believe the candidates selected by Heads of State and Government at the Prague summit hold great promise as Allies, not only because of a common set of values that helped see them through the dark days of totalitarianism and communism, but also because of their eagerness to prove themselves as good Allies. We need to have their energy and enthusiasm at the table in the councils of NATO and we need their ideas and their capability too as we grapple with the issues and challenges yet to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the Committee may have.

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Bulgaria	• Provides 185 personnel to SFOR • Provides 42 personnel to KFOR • Provides one transport AN-26 aircraft	• OEF: Hosted deployment of six US KC-135 aircraft and 200 support personnel at Burgas • OEF: Granted blanket over-flight rights, ports/bases access, refueling assistance and increased law-enforcement cooperation • ISAF: Deployed nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan • Donated and airlifted arms and ammunition to Afghan National Army	• Sent three Liaison officers sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • The National Assembly approved the Government of Bulgaria's decision to support possible coalition action • U.S. using Burgas Air Base to base transport aircraft and move troops, cargo, fuel and vehicles from Germany • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Deployment of Bulgarian NBC units (up to 150 personnel) to theater of operations; possible deployment of other specific units
Estonia	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of some 100 personnel to KFOR; an Estonian company just deployed and will be there until July 2003. (Similar deployment previously in SFOR) • Maintains a Military Police Platoon of 23 personnel with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR • Staff officer in SFOR MNB HQ • CIMIC officer in KFOR HQ	• Deployed two explosive detection dog teams of the Interior Ministry in July 2002 to assist with airport security; offered overflight and landing rights • Deployed a 6-man EOD team with the German contingent of ISAF in March 2003	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• The Government is ready to consider concrete U.S. proposals for Estonian force contribution in the event of military action in Iraq; exploring the operational readiness of a light point defense platoon, EOD team, and cargo handling team for post-conflict Iraq if requested

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Latvia	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of some 100 personnel to Danish forces assigned to KFOR (Similar deployment previously in SFOR) • Maintains Military policy and Medical Teams, 13 personnel in all, with the UK contingent in KFOR • Maintains an EOD team of 5 personnel with the Norwegian Contingent in KFOR • Until May 2002, rep involved with border observation in FYROM • In 1999 Latvia deployed a Medical Team in Albania as part of the Belgian contingent in AFOR • In 1999, sent 6 observers to the Kosovo Verification Mission	• Offered overflight and port clearances • Offered combat and special forces for OEF • Deploying two Medical Teams totaling 8 personnel with the Netherlands Contingent in ISAF in March 2003	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq • Parliament approved allowing forces to deploy to Iraq for peace enforcement and humanitarian operations	• Possible contributions under consideration: Latbat infantry company, military police platoon, medical unit, EOD, cargo handlers and specific purpose units as well as contributions to advance democratic change in post-conflict Iraq
Lithuania	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR (Similar deployment previously in IFOR and SFOR- will maintain a few officers in SFOR.) • Maintains an infantry platoon of 30 personnel with Polish battalion in KFOR • Maintains AN-26 transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel of 7 in support of NATO • Contributed 10 medical personnel to NATO humanitarian mission "Allied Harbor" in Albania in 1999	• Offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and other support for Operation Enduring Freedom • Deployed a Medical Team of 4 personnel with the Czech contingent in ISAF Oct - Dec 2002 Redeploying this team with the German Contingent in ISAF in Mar 2003 • Deployed Special Operations Forces unit of 37 personnel to Afghanistan in support of OEF in November 2002	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq • Parliament voted March 25, 2003 to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support Operation Iraqi Freedom	• Government has declared preparedness to contribute politically and with other measures to the efforts to the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq, e.g., 10 cargo handlers, 6 medics; also considering humanitarian aid

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Romania	• Contributed 122 personnel to SFOR in Bosnia • Contributed 222 personnel to KFOR • Contributed personnel to all regional OSCE missions (total of 38 people) • Deployed 115 gendarmes and 70 civilian police to UNMIK • Contributed 18 civilian police to UNMBIH • Hosts the SECI center in Bucharest for combating transnational crime	• Contributed a 411-man infantry battalion in Kandahar • Sent a 25 man military police platoon in support of ISAF in Kabul • Deployed a C-130 Hercules aircraft, including crew and maintenance personnel, to ISAF HQ in Kabul • Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted • First country to donate and airlift arms and ammunition to Afghan National Army • Provided humanitarian aid totaling $3.2 million	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Provided an NBC Unit. • Providing basing for U.S. forces at Mihail Kogalniceanu • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Willing to provide post-conflict peacekeepers and gendarmes • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces
Slovakia	• Provided troops to KFOR and SFOR (These troops have been integrated into the Czech units) • Per US and NATO suggestion, increased commitment to KFOR in February 2002, from 40 man Engineer unit to 100 man Mech Infantry Company (as part of Czech-Slovak Battalion) • Increased SFOR contribution in August 2002, from 8 staff officers to 21 personnel and two Mi-17 helicopters under Dutch Command • Granted blanket overflight clearances at the outset of the Kosovo crisis	• Offered NBC defense and engineering forces • Sent 40 person engineering unit to Kabul. Extended stay of troops, at U.S. request, until August 2003 • Immediately granted overflight, landing and refueling rights • Has maintained two Liaison Officers at CENTCOM • Budgeted for and initiated preparation of Afghan Assistance Program	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Deployed a 75 person NBC unit on February 26. The unit will be integrated into the Czech unit • Agreed to be an Intermediate Staging Base for commercial carriers carrying US troops and materials to and from CENTCOM AOR • Approved all requested rail and road transit rights • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Offered public support for all US-led initiatives in Iraq

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Slovenia	• Contributed troops and equipment to SFOR, and KFOR • Runs International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) which managed over $100 million in successful demining and victims' assistance programs • Sent motorized infantry company to SFOR, replacing NATO troops in January, 2003 • Allowed NATO overflight for bombing missions against Serbs and allowed NATO troops to rotate through port of Koper • Active in democratic and economic reform in the region, member of Stability Pact and SECI • Contribution to the Humanitarian Operation "Sun Rise" in Albania (May 14-July 27, 1997) and Humanitarian Operation Allied Harbor" in Albania (May 29-July 14, 1999) • Government decided (March 6, 2003) to send an officer to the EU HQ "Allied Harmony" in Skopje	• Provided humanitarian and demining assistance, the latter also in conjunction with UNDP, a $50 million program • Has sent one liaison officer (who will rotate in March) to OEF (CENTCOM, Fla) • Slovenia has donated three battalions worth of AK-47's, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the appropriate ammunitions to the Afghan National Army Training Project • Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted • Government decided (March 6, 2003) to send a police officer to the ISAF Mission (for training and assisting the Afghan Police)	• Sending Liaison officer to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Asked its Parliament to approve overflight clearance, and intelligence sharing in support of UNSC resolutions	• Indicated its willingness to look for ways it could contribute to post-conflict reconstruction • Willing to prepare specific humanitarian aid packages

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Secretary Brzezinski. I know you are very comfortable. We do want to welcome you back here to this committee. And both your statement and that of Secretary Bradtke, if you do not mind, we would like to make that a part of the permanent record of this hearing.

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much, because I had summarized my statement.

Senator ALLEN. I know you did. And I was just thinking that while you did not want to be repetitive, we appreciate that. But it is important that it is part of the record. We have your assessment of each and every one of these aspirant countries.

We will have 7-minute rounds. With the indulgence of my colleague, I will start and then go over to you. And if others come in, we will go that way.

The first question, and Secretary Bradtke brought this up, on the gray arms, and both of you alluded to it. And in particular, while we are all in favor of these aspirant countries joining NATO, in this love and happiness it is also important to recognize that there are problems and concerns, let us say, that still remain. In particular, in the area of gray arms, and in particular the country of Bulgaria. There have been reports that senior defense officials in Bulgaria may have been involved in a scheme to export dual-use military equipment to Iraq. Could any of you all share with us some of the efforts that have been made by these countries to combat such corruption? Are the measures working? What steps are these countries taking to deal with this gray arms sales issue? And how are we helping them improve their export controls?

Whoever wants to take that——

Mr. BRADTKE. Mr. Chairman, if I may just introduce as an answer to that question say that a number of these countries did inherit from their days in the Warsaw Pact arms industries, which were involved in export to countries that we would have concerns about. And we have worked very intensively with all those countries to try to strengthen the systems of export control in those countries, to provide technical advice to them, to share intelligence with them, to shut off such sales.

Now you raised the specific case of Bulgaria. And that is where I would like to ask my colleague, Janet Bogue, to respond in a little greater detail.

Ms. BOGUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The question of gray arms is an extremely serious issue, and one which we take with the utmost seriousness. And it is one of those challenges you referred to, Mr. Chairman, that the countries, the aspirant countries, have had to overcome from their past.

In the case of Bulgaria, I think Bulgaria's democratically elected government is tackling this issue of gray arms. And it is tackling it on the basis of recommendations we have made to the government for systemic and structural fixes to the system of export controls in the country, as well as the defense industry itself. And we are working very well, closely, and cooperatively with Bulgaria on those systemic changes.

The case to which you alluded, Mr. Chairman, the so-called Teem case, I think, has been a wake-up call for Bulgaria. There is an ongoing investigation of the case in Bulgaria. I think it would be in-

appropriate for us to comment at this stage on the outcome of that investigation, which still proceeds.

I would say that the U.S. Government, we have urged the government of Bulgaria to pursue that investigation to wherever it leads. And at the same time, as I mentioned, we are working closely with them to make fixes that will help prevent any kind of repetition of such a case.

Thank you.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. I realize some of this is sensitive information that we would not want to make public.

Secretary Brzezinski, do you have anything to add?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I guess I would just emphasize four points. First, the Terem case involved the sale of dual use materials that, according to some reports, could have ended up in Iraq. And that is——

Senator ALLEN. Would you say that again? I did not understand. Could have ended up in Iraq?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Could have. Could have ended up in Iraq. And that is, of course, at a time when we are at war with Iraq, a grave concern.

Second point is that cooperation with the Bulgarians has been very good. Now they have cooperated in the investigation with us in this. And that has been solid.

Two, the case is still open. And we expect the case to yield to a result that will ensure all parties involved were held fully accountable.

Senator ALLEN. Those are three points. What is the fourth? Could have gotten to Iraq, they are cooperating, case is still open.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. And accountability is key.

Senator ALLEN. That is at the end of the case. OK. Because I like to—when we come back months from now, I will just remember these key components.

Let me ask you all another question here with my remaining time. You know, after the NATO aspirant countries here issued the Vilnius-10 declaration, which was in support of the United States action in Iraq, there were assertions by France and by Germany, they were kind of hinting, hinting that they may oppose EU membership for the Vilnius-10 countries. What is the European position today on the Baltic membership in NATO? And will Germany veto their membership because of the Vilnius-10 declaration? And what would the U.S. position be if that were the case?

Mr. BRADTKE. I am more comfortable talking about what the American position is than what the European Union position is, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. All right. Well, you all have some intelligence. We——

Mr. BRADTKE. What I will say is that among the seven countries invited to join NATO, five of them are also on track to become members of the European Union in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are on a somewhat longer track for EU membership. We have supported the EU's efforts to bring in new numbers. We think this strengthens the European Union. It strengthens the Trans-Atlantic relationship. It helps solidify and consolidate democracy and reform in these countries. So we have been supportive of this process.

Frankly, it does distress us to read statements or hear reports that some EU countries are suggesting that because these countries have been supportive of the United States, that this might be a problem for their membership. As we look around the European Union, there are plenty of other current European Union members, including the United Kingdom with Tony Blair, of course, just here today, that are also supporting the United States' policy on Iraq.

So again, we would not want to see their candidacy for the European Union in some way being jeopardized or endangered or threatened because they have decided that on this issue they are closer to the position of the United States. And this is a point we have made to the European Union and our European colleagues.

Again, having said that, we are not looking here for these countries to be forced to make a choice between NATO or the United States and the European Union. We think this is compatible, membership in both organizations. And it strengthens the transatlantic relationship.

Senator ALLEN. Does Secretary Brzezinski or any other have any comments, insight? So have you followed up? Have they made such assertions? Most of those that I am referencing were made publicly. And they were more of hints as opposed to real threats. Have you heard any further comments on that?

Mr. BRADTKE. I would just say that this has been an issue, that we have talked to both officials of the European Union and Commission on Brussels about from the commission. And it is also an issue that we have had as a part of our bilateral conversations with a number of European Union countries.

Senator ALLEN. Well, have the French or the Germans said anything to you? Let me be direct here. Have you heard any noises, hints, assertions, assignations?

Mr. BRADTKE. We have had a variety of things said. Some of them have been said directly to the countries involved. And we have had conversations with those countries about those assertions. A number of the things have been said in public. And in response to those public comments and the comments we have heard privately, we have gone back to our European friends and said that we do not think this is an appropriate approach.

Senator ALLEN. Well, if I may. What about—it does not just have to be the United States. What about the Dutch or Italians or Spanish or British, have they also said that they were not going to make this sort of an issue as far as the EU is concerned?

Mr. BRADTKE. I have not—I am not aware of what they are——

Senator ALLEN. No. I know they are with us in Iraq. But it is not just our responsibility to talk to the French and the Germans or the Belgians.

Mr. BRADTKE. You make a very good point. This would undoubtedly be a matter of concern, not just to us——

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Mr. BRADTKE [continuing]. But to those members of the European Union that have a different position on the Iraq issue. I cannot say that I am aware of anything specific where the UK or the Netherlands or some other country has brought this to the attention of the governments of France or Germany. That may have

happened. I am just not aware of how internal EU discussions have gone on this point.

Senator ALLEN. Fair enough.

Now I would like to turn it over to the ranking member here, a man who is still our chairman and leader in so many ways, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Ian, which side is easier? Is it easier to be over there in the Defense Department, you know, doing it all or over here critiquing it? I mean, which do you like better?

You do not have to answer that question. It may prejudice you in some way.

It seems to me that NATO membership is going to serve as a powerful stimulus to an ongoing process of democratization and free market economic development in the seven aspirant countries. And it is precisely this process that I think is going to move the zone of stability to the east more than anything they add to the military prowess of NATO, although they will add, I hope.

This committee, as some of you know, takes this advice and consent responsibility very seriously. And today's hearing is, to state the obvious, devoted exclusively to detailed examination by all of you of the qualifications for NATO membership for each of these candidate countries. And there is not any doubt that the future of these countries, in my view, is in NATO. Each country has effectively utilized the MAP process to move closer toward its goal of joining the Alliance. But the MAP, however, is not a universal checklist, nor is completion of the MAP process a guarantee of NATO membership.

Ultimately, the current members of NATO have to consider whether these seven countries invited in Prague are "willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership." This requires a fair review of the military and nonmilitary qualifications. And there is a lot to cover.

To the extent possible in our limited time, I would welcome your views on some or all of the following military issues: The level and priorities of each country's military spending; the extent of the civilian control over the military, the command structure, and the sophistication of the defense planning process; the interoperability of each country's forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges; the specialty or niche capabilities of these invited countries, to the extent they have one; the collective training regimes in place and the development of English language competencies; and, very importantly, the counterintelligence capabilities and secure communications in each country, and the overall ability to safeguard NATO's classified information.

There are also nonmilitary concerns that have to be raised. I will not raise them now. I would ask unanimous consent that the entirety of my statement be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman, at this time.

Senator ALLEN. No objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Welcome. We are pleased to have such a talented panel with us here today.

The reason for this hearing, as you know, is to begin our Constitutionally-mandated process of advice and consent, specifically to consider an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 to enlarge the membership of NATO.

At the Prague Summit last November, the Alliance voted to extend invitations to final discussions on membership to seven countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for the Ratification of the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The fundamental rationale for their admittance—extending the zone of security into Central and Eastern Europe—remains, in my opinion, persuasive today.

Few would argue that the militaries of most of the seven candidate countries will greatly enhance the war-fighting ability of the Alliance, at least in the short-term.

But, it seems to me, NATO membership will serve as a powerful stimulus to the ongoing processes of democratization and free-market economic development in the seven countries. And it is precisely these processes that will move the zone of stability in Europe farther eastward.

This Committee takes the Senate's advice and consent responsibility very seriously.

Today's hearing will be devoted exclusively to a detailed examination by Administration witnesses of the qualifications for NATO membership of each of the candidate countries.

The outstanding team assembled today understands the importance of a serious examination of these issues. Each of you has visited some or all of the invited countries several times. I look forward to hearing your assessments.

I am pleased to welcome you to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. And I would like to move to a question I never thought I would ask when we were talking about NATO enlargement. And as Ian knows from working up here, because we worked closely with Senator Roth and we had the honor of sort of leading the effort to expand NATO last time, I am a staunch supporter of expanding NATO. But I have been a Senator for a fair amount of time now, or since 1973, and I have attended, I do not know, Lord knows, how many conferences on whither NATO. But this is the first time in my career, I think, there is a real question, not about expanding, about the relevancy of NATO, period.

I will go into this next week. But I am told—and I do not have this for certain—but Belgium has called for a meeting in three or four weeks, where they disinvited the Brits and the Americans, to discuss what it seems to me, Ian, to be not ESDI, but ESDI at large, a totally separate, independent of NATO, European entity. And Prodi of the European Commission immediately thought that was a good idea. We have the confluence—and I am not making a judgment—of if there was ever oil and water, it is Cheney, Rumsfeld, Chirac, and Schroeder, if I have ever seen it anywhere.

So my first question—and I am not being facetious about this—particularly from the Defense Department position, how committed is the administration to NATO? Because I have read all the neocon stuff for the last 10 years about how NATO is a drain, how we are over-extending, the extent of our commitment to NATO exceeds its capacity, how the gap is so wide in capability that it is never going to be narrowed, because clearly not now or in your careers or mine—I will speak for myself, in my career—most of you are much younger, so you have a longer time—is it likely that France or Germany is going to step up to the plate and make the commitment that they need to make to reduce that gap in capabilities?

So I have an urgent concern to expand NATO because I think it is the only thing that gives us any sort of footing to say that indi-

rectly we plan on remaining a European power, in spite of all the rhetoric I hear coming out of primarily the Defense Department folks, not the uniformed military, the civilian military.

And so I am not being a wise guy when I asked the question—if you would rather not answer it, I understand. I mean, because it, in a sense, is a phrase that—you remember, Ian, you were here—that got me in trouble with a guy who came and testified during the Clinton era, who was a U.N. inspector. What was that fellow's name?

STAFF. Scott Ritter.

Senator BIDEN. Scott Ritter. And I said that his judgments were above his pay grade. And every right-wing guy in America attacked me. Where are they now with old Scott Ritter? But at any rate, this is, in a sense, above my pay grade here. And it may be above—not above my pay grade, frankly. It may be above your pay grade to answer the question.

But really and truly, how vital is NATO in the eyes of this administration's defense establishment? For real. That is not a question that I am—it is not a rhetorical question. I am genuinely interested, if you could speak to that.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, sir. And I will try and stay within my pay grade.

Senator BIDEN. I just do not want to get you in trouble.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. First, I think if you look at the Prague summit agenda and you look how aggressive it is and how historic it is, it would erase any doubts you may have of the administration or the Department of Defense's commitment to NATO. What we are committed to is a fundamental rejuvenation of NATO. We are committed to a vision where NATO plays an even more important role, taking on contemporary challenges and future challenges that we expect to face.

At the Prague summit, we not only extended our commitments and some security guarantees to seven new democracies. We also undertook a certain amount of controversy within the Alliance itself. That is, we were pushing an agenda, an agenda that featured a NATO response force, an ability to give NATO the capability to respond on short notice, on a day's notice, to any contingency anywhere in the globe with a force capable of conducting the full spectrum of high end, high intensity military operations.

We initiated the Prague Capabilities Commitment Initiative, another effort to help the allies fill gaps and shortfalls so that the Alliance can continue to play a relevant role to our common security. We have initiated a complex, politically difficult command structure reform. We are fundamentally redoing NATO's command structure. That is a thankless task. But we are doing it because we are committed to NATO. And we envision NATO playing an important role in the future.

I would add, after September 11, that should erase any doubt in anybody's mind about the relevance of NATO in the administration, out of the administration, in the United States and in Europe.

Senator BIDEN. Why?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Why? Because they responded effectively to an attack on the United States.

Senator BIDEN. But then we responded effectively to say: Germany, keep your troops in Germany. Do not send them to Afghanistan. France, we do not need your help. Senator Lugar and I made a call to the White House. We wanted to go down to see the President right away and say: For God's sake, accept the offer. You do not need them, but accept the offer.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, we have a number of allies working with us, including the Germans and the Danes and the French.

Senator BIDEN. Where?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. In Afghanistan today through ISAF and under Task Force 180.

Senator BIDEN. All right.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. And we have NATO playing an important role in supporting the German-Dutch lead of ISAF.

Senator BIDEN. But that came after the fact, after we stiffed them on that vote of confidence by one vote.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I do not know if we stiffed anybody.

Senator BIDEN. What would you call it?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I am not sure that NATO immediately after September 11 would have rushed into Afghanistan.

Senator BIDEN. Well, the Germans actually took a vote, did they not, in their parliament? They took a vote, by one vote, to have troops out of the theater, to participate——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. And they are. And they are standing by.

Senator BIDEN. But we said no. After the fact, we got ISAF in. OK. Well, I hope you are right. I hope you are right. Because I think that—and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman. I think the entirety of America's ability to conduct its foreign policy globally depends in larger part upon the stability of Europe and us remaining a European power at its base, at our base, as any other single undertaking we have in the world. And I think we are—I hope we can turn this expansion into something more than it was intended to do in the first place.

I hope we cannot merely expand. I hope we can remedy. I hope we can heal. Because it is, as you know, all of you know—I doubt—well, I do not want to put words in your mouth. But let me put it this way: I would be surprised if any one of you in your trips to Europe in the last 8 months have met with as much skepticism or hostility as you have been in your entire careers.

It may be passing. But I am worried that as we sort of engage mutually, particularly the French and the Germans, in the sort of name calling, you know, the comments that we each make about one another, I think is corrosive. And I hope we can use the expansion of NATO as an opportunity in Prague to begin to heal. Hopefully, it is temporary, a temporary divide here in the Alliance, because I really believe the Alliance's importance and consequence exceeds its military capability.

But that is enough of my editorial comment. You all do not need that.

Mr. Chairman, I have about a dozen questions specifically directed to our witnesses that I would like to submit to them, rather than have them go through them now, submit to them and ask if they would respond in writing. They are not going to make a lot of work. I mean, tomes are not required in response. But they are

direct questions. With your permission, may I do that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator ALLEN. Yes. You have my permission. And I am sure that all of our witnesses will work on answering those questions forthwith.

Senator BIDEN. And I want to thank you, the four of you, for your professionalism, for the seriousness with which you have undertaken this effort, for both the scholarship and the political acumen that you possess. This is a difficult time in the Alliance. And I think we all have an obligation to try to repair. It may not be broke. As Ronald Reagan used to say, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." It may not be broke, but it could use a little fixing. It could use a little fixing right now. And I am glad you all are trying, because I know you are devoted to it. And I appreciate it.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Senator Biden. Indeed, the questions that you ask are very pertinent questions, some of which I would have followed up on.

And I think all the members of the committee, while everyone is scattered in a variety of areas, they are all very probative questions. And your answers, some of them were addressed in your statements, others in this committee will care to read very closely.

I have no further questions. I want to thank you all for appearing, for your assistance, for your insight and your commentary here today and in the weeks to come. I am hopeful that this committee will vote very quickly on this matter, as decisions are being made. I do want to say, as did Senator Biden, my agreement with him on the concerns that we have had and the importance of the transatlantic alliance for military—and as I said in my opening statement, I would like to see this ascension to NATO of the seven aspirant countries be able to revitalize NATO and also maybe renew the commitment that we all have to the shared values of individual rights and to our common goals.

And I want to thank the Ambassadors Jurgenson, Usackas, Ducaru, and Kracun for being with us, and the Chiefs of Missions Yalnazov, Eichmanis, and Kmec for being here. I think that you all can report back to your countries that it appears that there was bipartisan support on the Foreign Relations Committee for you to join our team. And indeed, we celebrate in the freedoms and the liberties that you all are exercising so responsibly. And we look forward to working with you in the years to come.

Thank you all. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., April 1, 2003.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

Not long ago, the very suggestion that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia would be joining NATO would have been unlikely. Too often, we are blasé about the changes that have taken deep root in Europe in such a short time. It is important to take a moment to marvel at how far we have come, and at how many positive changes we have witnessed in our world, especially at

this tumultuous and difficult time in world affairs. The inclusion of Europe's new democracies in NATO is proof that positive change is possible on a grand international scale—and a reminder that it takes hard work and vision to facilitate such change.

As NATO continues to define its role in the post-Cold War world, I believe that it will benefit from the membership of a whole and free Europe, and a strong NATO remains firmly in America's national interest. Of course, it is also in America's interest to ensure that decisions to expand NATO are responsible and provide for all NATO member states participate in burden sharing and to contribute meaningfully to the organization as a whole. Today's hearing is a valuable opportunity for exploring these important issues.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REGINA F. NARUSIS, J.D., CHAIR OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, INC.—NATO POSITION

Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. supports:

1. United States continued involvement and commitment to NATO and security in Europe.
2. The revitalization of the NATO Alliance.
3. The admission of all seven nations invited to join the NATO Alliance at Prague in 2002.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO has been since its formation in 1949 the most effective defensive alliance uniting North America and Europe. It was instrumental in winning the Cold War, in encouraging European nations to foster democracy, rule of law, free market economies and in preserving peace and stability. Pre-World War II non-engagement or isolationism has proven to be costly to us militarily, financially and in loss of life. History has taught us that the United States has been drawn into European conflicts of the 20th century because our vital interests are ultimately engaged there.

The world has changed both technologically and geopolitically since the end of the Cold War. Distances and oceans are no longer barriers to danger. Established democracies have grown stronger and more assertive, such as France and Germany. New democracies have emerged and are seeking their rightful place in world affairs. Our involvement becomes more crucial as does transatlantic cohesion to prevent conflict among its key members.

The Soviet Union no longer exists, but new threats have emerged. We have gone from the risk of nuclear exchange to multiple threats of global insecurity. The United States will not be able to sort out alone every international threat that now faces us, without depleting ourselves physically, mentally and financially. We need allies.

The countries that share our values and history are the NATO countries. The United Nations is an organization of nations that do not have the same common values and thus, as recently evidenced, are able to debate but not solve problems, much less act to correct them.

NATO has survived the test of time. It unanimously and for the first time in its history, invoked its founding principle of collective defense on behalf of the United States following the September 11th attacks. It did at first stumble when Turkey requested assistance in the event of an Iraqi attack, but it found a means to meet the Turkish request within the Alliance. The Alliance assisted Russia, the former adversary, to come to grips with reality. Moscow did sign a new cooperation pact with the Alliance in May of 2002 in Rome reaffirming the right of every nation to choose its own allies and alliances.

NATO is reorienting itself, but if it revitalizes itself by means of further expansion and restructuring of its military forces and establishing a new NATO Rapid Response Force that can be staffed and shared by all members, it will become only stronger and better.

NATO EXPANSION

The admission of the Czech Republic, Hungry and Poland was a success. The bulk of the actual costs of enlargement have been borne by the new countries. Their relationship with Russia has improved, rather than become a threat. These new members have been true allies. They have contributed to NATO operations: in NATO peacekeeping missions, sent specialized chemical warfare troops to the Gulf and hosted the Iraqi exiles for training to support United States forces. The largest

NATO exercise involving 5,000 troops, "Victory Strike", was in Poland. These new members have given united support to the bond between United States and Europe.

In 2002 in Prague the artificial Cold War division of Europe finally came to an end. NATO leaders approved the Alliance's largest expansion in its 53 year history. The expansion encompasses Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

NATO accession of these seven nations will change the way we perceive the region. With the support of the United States, these nations will take their rightful and equal place in a Europe whole and free. They will not let the Franco-German domination take root or the Russians exploit the effort to eliminate United States influence in Europe. These are the nations that understand the true meaning of freedom and democracy. Because of their enslavement and long struggle for freedom, their approach to foreign policy is different from those in Western Europe. They know that appeasement does not work and that dictators must be dealt with.

These nations have a relationship with the United States that has stood the test of time. In great part, thanks to the United States, Europe rid itself of three forms of tyranny—Nazism, Communism and Fascism. They see America as the only real guarantor of their security. History has taught them, that neither France nor Germany can be trusted to put European interests ahead of their own. The supportive letter from the Vilnius 10 members proves their loyalty to NATO. These nations are dynamic, full of new energy and most of all are becoming increasingly assertive. These countries are also entering the European Union and will change that organization from within. We all need a united Europe, not a Western Europe (so called "old Europe") or Central and Eastern Europe ("new Europe"), but a Europe where all nations are equal and are so treated. Continued United States involvement can help bring this about. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want NATO to be strong and to keep a United States presence. The American influence through the process of enlargement will only grow. Through enlargement of NATO all of Europe will be more balanced and reinvigorated. Enlargement makes strategic sense for the United States and will prove to be the greatest strategic and political gain for the Alliance.

Though not yet members of the Alliance, the seven invitees to NATO, have already contributed to NATO, thus have proven their commitment and worth. They all have sent troops to preserve peace in the Balkans, they all have supported the United States in the war against terrorism and made their airspace and bases available to the U.S.-led coalition. They have joined the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and are contributing highly skilled troops. These countries have issued a joint statement early on supporting the United States efforts to disarm the Iraq regime. Their governments have declared preparedness to contribute politically and with other means to the efforts of the United States led coalition against Iraq. Slovenia is contributing mountain units. Slovakia is contributing chemical and biological expertise. Romania sent a battalion of troops to the war zone. Bulgaria is sending chemical warfare specialists to the Gulf. The Baltic nations are contributing special units as well as cargo handling and medical teams.

Lithuania alone has sent 914 military personnel, maintained an infantry platoon with the Polish battalion in KFOR, provided An-26 transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel and contributed medical personnel to preserve peace in the Balkans. To the war in Afghanistan, Lithuania has offered use of its airspace and airfields, support for "Operation Enduring Freedom", deployed medical teams with the Czech contingent in ISAF in 2002 and German contingent in 2003 and deployed Special Operations Forces unit in support of OEF. To the war in Iraq, Lithuania has sent its liaison officer to CENTCOM, signed the V-10 statement compelling Iraq to disarm, offered overflight and transit rights to United States and coalition forces and offered cargo handlers and medics.

FOREIGN POLICY IS AND SHOULD NOT BE A PARTISAN MATTER

In l993 the Clinton Administration made the decision to invite new members. The l994 "Republican Contract with America" supported NATO enlargement. On April 30, 1998 United States Senate ratified the last NATO expansion by a 80 to l9 vote.

The Democratic and Republican Party Platforms of 2000 supported NATO enlargement, as did both presidential candidates.

On April 5, 2001 seventeen United States Senators, both Republican and Democrat leaders, wrote a letter to President Bush urging the Bush administration to "ensure" that NATO invites qualified European democracies to begin accession negotiations at the 2002 Summit in Prague.

NATO enlargement and ratification is and should remain a non-partisan issue.

For all the reasons aforesaid, NATO enlargement will support and increase the security and international interests of the United States.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

BULGARIA

Question 1. The level and priorities of military spending:

Answer. The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) has decided to spend no less than 2.84% of GDP on defense in 2003 and 2004. Priorities for Bulgaria's defense spending have focused on funding defense reform efforts, infrastructure upgrades and strategic command and control.

Question 2. The extent of its civilian control over its military, the efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of the defense planning process:

Answer. Bulgaria exercises civilian control over the military, although it is experiencing difficulties (like many nations) building a Ministry of Defense with professional civilian staff. Recent reform and reorganization has greatly streamlined the Bulgarian command and force structure (based on a force structure review incorporating substantial U.S. and Allied input). However, while improved over the past few years, Bulgaria still has problems in command and control due to the lack of interoperable communications equipment. Elimination of excess Warsaw Pact era equipment and ongoing upgrades of command and control systems will likely further streamline the command structure. In 1997, with U.S. assistance, the Ministry of Defense put into place a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). As the Bulgarians become more experienced with the process it should make more effective, efficient and rational the allocation and control of defense expenditures and ensure that plans are more closely linked to available resources in the future.

Question 3. The interoperability of Bulgaria's forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Current interoperability with NATO remains low, but should improve as Bulgaria moves to a completely professional force by 2010. Though burdened by a large excess of Warsaw Pact era heavy equipment, Bulgaria is attempting to develop a smaller, lighter and more mobile force structure (Bulgaria has downsized its force structure approximately 50% since 1997). Its reform program emphasizes the creation of a rapid reaction force based in the center of Bulgaria able to respond to a deployment order within 30 days. Bulgaria has demonstrated gains in interoperability with Allied forces as shown by its participation in SFOR, KFOR and ISAF. Bulgaria's focus on the development of specialized niche categories such as special operations, engineer, and NBC Defense are indicative of its effort both to address the challenges of a changing security environment and to help NATO reverse existing capability shortfalls.

Question 4. Any specialty or "niche" capabilities it has, or is developing.

Answer. Bulgaria will concentrate its resources and military training on providing the following capabilities to NATO:

- special operations forces
- engineers
- NBC Defense
- helicopter and transport aviation

Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the development of its military's English-language competencies.

Answer. Bulgaria actively participates in several annual NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) training exercises. Given limited training funds, priority of resources tends to support a small, select number of units declared ready for PfP or which will be declared ready in the near future. Battalion/brigade level operations have suffered from the lack of resources and training time in the past three years but Bulgaria plans to focus more on collective training. The Bulgarian Air Force and Navy require substantially more flight hours/at sea days. Overall, Bulgaria's English language training program is progressing well but requires continued emphasis. A relatively small but growing number of officers are proficient in English. English language training for NCOs remains a shortfall and will remain a priority.

ESTONIA

Question 1. Level and priorities of military spending.

Answer. The Estonian defense budget in 2002 was 1.9% of the country's GDP and is projected at 2% in 2003. As with other Baltic militaries, spending has focused on developing basic infrastructure and training of these recently established armed forces, with acquisition of more sophisticated weapons taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force Goals process and an ongoing Estonian Force Structure Review will further shape priorities.

Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military, efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its defense planning.

Answer. Estonia exercises full civilian control over the military and is steadily developing a cadre of civilian professionals. The current command structure is a result of a 2001 Force Structure Review that had considerable U.S. and Allied input. It provides for a Joint Operational Command to direct land, maritime and air components, including wartime augmentations such as the Border Guard. The capabilities of this joint organization are being developed as the service components themselves flesh out their force structure. The invitation to join NATO has resulted in the initiation of another Force Structure Review to be finished in early 2004. Estonia has been refining its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System since 1998.

Question 3. The interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Estonia, as the other Baltic states, has been developing its military from scratch. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process has been invaluable in shaping the formation of the new units in ways that promote maximum interoperability with NATO forces. NATO standards shape the way the Estonian navy and air force air surveillance units train.

Estonia's contribution to SFOR, KFOR and ISAF demonstrate that Estonian units have reached a level of proficiency that allows them to work with Allied forces in the field. These deployments also accelerate Estonia's interoperability efforts through the provision of real experience. Estonia has contributed a company on a rotation basis (six months out of every 18) to SFOR and KFOR. It also maintains a military police platoon with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR. Estonia has also deployed an EOD team with Germany as part of ISAF.

Initially, Estonia's military was built around a mobilization structure suited for territorial defense. The post-Prague Summit Force Structure Review now underway will shift priority to deployable, sustainable forces that can more effectively contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

Question 4. Specialty capabilities being developed.

Answer. Specialty or "niche" capabilities being developed for NATO use include:

- Military Police
- EOD
- Mine Countermeasures.

Question 5. Collective Training Regime and Development of English Language Competencies.

Answer. Shaped by U.S. and Allied bilateral assitance as well as advice from NATO defense planners, Estonia's collective training regime is being tailored to reflect a regime more appropriate for the current size and level of development of its armed forces. Its first battalion-level exercise, using composite units, will be held this May. Nevertheless, the training needs to be improved for its deployable units. Estonian English-language training is proceeding apace.

LATVIA

Question 1. Level and priorities of military spending.

Answer. The Latvian defense budget in 2002 was 1.8% of the country's GDP. Parliament has passed legislation mandating spending of 2% of GDP during 2003-8. As with other Baltic militaries, spending has focused on the basic infrastructure and training of Latvia's newly-developed armed forces, with more sophisticated weapon acquisition taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force Goals process and an ongoing Latvian Force Structure Review will further shape priorities.

Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military, efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its defense planning.

Latvia exercises full civilian control over the military and continues to develop its cadre of civilian professionals. The current command structure is a result of a 2001 Force Structure Review having considerable U.S. and Allied input. It provides for a Joint Operational Command to direct land, maritime, air and Special Operations components that includes wartime augmentations such as the Border Guard. The capabilities of this joint organization are being developed as the service components themselves flesh out their force structure. Latvia has also established a National Crisis Management Center and is developing a National Military Command Center in order to respond more quickly to emergency situations (both foreign and domestic) and more effectively employ military forces if required.

The invitation to join NATO has resulted in the initiation of another Force Structure Review to be finished in late 2003. Latvian planning has proven adaptable to changing circumstances, assisted by a Planning, Programming and Budgeting System it has used since 2001.

Question 3. Interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Latvia, as the other Baltic states, has developed its military structure from scratch. The MAP process has been invaluable in shaping the formation of the new units in ways that promote maximum interoperability with NATO forces.

Latvia's contribution to SFOR, KFOR and ISAF demonstrate that Latvia's units have reached a level of proficiency that allows them to work with Allied forces in the field. These deployments also accelerate Latvia's interoperability efforts through the provision of real experience. A Latvian company is embedded with Danish SFOR forces for six months out of every 18, military police and medical teams are attached to the UK contingent in KFOR and an EOD team works with a Norwegain contingent in KFOR. Latvia will also deploy two medical teams with the Dutch contingent in ISAF.

NATO standards set the pace for the training of Latvian navy and air force air surveillance units. Latvia's previous force structure was primarily a mobilization structure suited for territorial defense, but the post-Prague Force Structure Review now underway should shift priorities to deployable, sustainable forces that can more effectively contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

Question 4. Specialty Capabilities being developed.

Answer. For its size, Latvia is developing a wide range of specialties comprising:

- Military Police
- EOD
- Medical
- Special Operations Forces
- Divers
- Mine Countermeasures.

Question 5. Collective training regime and development of English language competencies.

Answer. Latvia's collective training regime is developing into one that is appropriate for the current size and mission of its armed forces. The full professionalization of its national infantry battalion will further increase the proficiency of this unit. Nevertheless, training needs to be improved for its deployable units. Its English-language training is proceeding well, being in the forefront of Baltic efforts.

LITHUANIA

Question 1. Level and Priorities of military spending.

Answer. The Lithuanian defense budget in 2002 was 2% of the country's GDP, and Lithuania has committed itself to remain at this level at least through 2004. As with other Baltic militaries, spending was initially focused on the basic infrastructure and training of these newly-developed armed forces, with more sophisticated weapon acquisition taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force Goals process and an ongoing Lithuanian Force Structure Review will further shape priorities.

Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military, efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its defense planning.

Answer. Lithuania exercises full civilian control over the military, with a Ministry of Defense and a small cadre of civilian defense officials. The current command structure is a result of a 2001 Force Structure Review that had considerable U.S. and Allied input. A new National Security Strategy was approved in 2002 and a new Military Defense Strategy has been drafted. The effectiveness of the Lithuanian

command structure will be increased by the creation of a streamlined Homeland Security Command and a Special Operations Command. The invitation to join NATO resulted in the initiation of another Force Structure Review, to be finished in late 2003. Lithuania has been refining its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System since 1998.

Question 3. Interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Lithuania, as the other Baltic states, has developed its military structure from scratch. The MAP process has been invaluable in assisting Lithuania's military structure to become fully interoperable with NATO forces.

Lithuania's contribution to KFOR, SFOR, ISAF, OEF and OIF demonstrate that Lithuanian units have reached a level of proficiency that allows them to work with Allied forces in the field. These deployments also accelerate Lithuania's interoperability efforts through the provision of real experience. A Lithuanian company is deployed with a Danish SFOR contingent for six months out of every 18, an infantry platoon is deployed with a Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in KFOR, and Lithuania also maintains AN-26 transport aircraft with crew and maintenance personnel in support of NATO operations. For ISAF, Lithuania deployed a medical team with the Czech and then the German ISAF contingents. Special Operations Forces were also deployed to Afghanistan and are working with U.S. troops in support of OEF. Finally, the Lithuanian Parliament voted in March to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. Training for the Lithuanian navy and for its air force air surveillance units are also shaped by NATO standards. Much of the Lithuanian reform efforts have focused on those units dedicated to participating in NATO-led operations, especially its "Iron Wolf" Brigade. Lithuania's previous force structure was heavily focused on territorial defense, but priority is now shifting to more effective, deployable, sustainable forces that can contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

Question 4. Specialty capabilities being developed.

Answer. Lithuania is developing the following special or "niche" capabilities for NATO use:

- EOD
- Medical
- Engineer
- Special Operations Forces
- Mine Countermeasures.

Question 5. Collective training regime and development of English language competencies.

Answer. The U.S. and other Allies, as well as NATO defense planners, have emphasized the importance of developing a collective training regime that is appropriate for the size and level of development of its armed forces. Its national battalion was certified as operational in fall 2002 by a joint Danish-Lithuanian team. Lithuania is making progress in this area, but training still needs to be improved for its deployable units. Its English-language training is proceeding apace.

ROMANIA

Question 1. The level and priorities of military spending:

Answer. The Government of Romania remains committed to defense expenditures at a level of at least 2% of GDP in the years 2003-2005. Priorities for Romania's defense spending have focused on funding defense reform efforts, increasing operational capabilities and readiness, and increasing NATO interoperability.

Question 2. The extent of its civilian control over its military, the efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of the defense planning process.

Answer. Romania exercises strong civilian control over its military, aided by a well-regarded National Defense College which has trained a robust cadre of civilan defense experts. As an example of civilian control of the military, the President of Romania relieved an acting Chief of the General Staff as a result of the General's statements and activities honoring the memory of World War Il-era dictator Ion Antonescu.

Romanian defense plans are based in large part on a force structure review that incorporated substantial U.S. and Allied input. Subsequent reform and reorganization has resulted in a greatly reduced and streamlined command and force structure that has increased efficiency and permitted a corresponding increase in readiness

of select units. (For example, the Romanians are working hard to complete the development of a deployable Brigade HQ).

In previous years, Romania has experienced a considerable gap between the demands of military requirements and the resources allocated. However, following successful introduction of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in 2001, the allocation and control of defense expenditures now seems to be more effective and more closely linked to available resources.

Question 3. The interoperability of Romania's forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Currently, Romania's overall interoperability with NATO is low, though some key land force units have attained a sufficient level of interoperability to participate in NATO-led operations. For example, several infantry units have performed exceptionally in NATO peacekeeping missions such as SFOR or in combat missions with the U.S. in Afghanistan. Training is currently underway to help Romania's land force units meet NATO-compatibility requirements; this should increase the number of interoperable Romanian units within the next five years. Romania has undertaken a restructuring program to move from a large, heavy Warsaw Pact era force structure towards a smaller, lighter and more mobile capability. For example, they are demonstrating deployablity by using their C–130s to deploy Romanian combat troops to Afghanistan for OEF. Romania's focus on development of special operations, reconnaissance and airlift capabilities are indicative of Romania's effort to address the challenges of a changing security environment and to help NATO meet capability shortfalls.

Question 4. Any specialty or "niche" capabilities it has, or is developing.

Answer. Romania is placing a high priority on development of specialized "niche" forces in preparation for NATO membership, especially:

- airlift
- military police
- unmanned aerial vehicles.

Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the development of its military's English-language competencies.

Answer. Romania actively participates in several annual NATO PfP training exercises. Given limited training funds, priority of resources tends to support those active units declared ready for PfP or will be declared ready in the near future. Individual soldier skills are quite good; in fact, Romanian forces fighting alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan were recognized both by the Secretary of Defense and by comrades in the 82nd Airborne for their skills. Battalion/brigade level operations have suffered from the lack of training time in the past three years but Romania is striving to address this shortfall. The Romanian Air Force and Navy require substantially more flight hours/at sea days. Overall, Romania's English language training program is well managed and supported with instructors who are fluent in English. A large number of officers and professional NCOs are proficient in English.

SLOVAKIA

Question 1. Level and Priority of Military Spending.

Answer. In 2003, defense spending in Slovakia is expected to be approximately 2.0% of GDP, a level the Government of Slovakia is committed to keeping through 2006. Defense spending priorities are in the following areas: Modernization (to include upgraded C31 systems and aircraft modernization programs); Restructuring (to reflect a smaller structure based on battalions); and Interoperability (with an emphasis on English language training and secure communications).

Question 2. The extent of civilian control over the military, efficiency of command structure and sophistication of Defense Planning.

Answer. Civilian control over the Slovak military is well established, to include a strong Ministry of Defense and subordinate General Staff. The Slovak military command structure is being streamlined and strengthened under the Force 2010 reform plan. Force 2010 was developed using U.S. assistance and is assessed to be a solid defense plan. Implementation of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is improving the allocation and control of defense expenditures which now seems to be more effective and more closely linked to available resources.

Question 3. The interoperability of Slovakia's forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Slovak interoperability is hindered by obsolete equipment and weakness in English language training. Slovakia is working aggressively to overcome these hindrances, using U.S. bilateral assistance such as FMF and IMET. Participation in PfP exercises and international peacekeeping and coalition operations have helped, as have prudent use of their FMF and IMET budgets. The participation of Slovak units in SFOR and KFOR, as well as the deployment of a chem-bio unit in Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates progress in interoperability is being made. A centerpiece of Slovak reform is the immediate reaction brigade (5th Special Forces), which is already dedicated to participating in NATO-led operations.

Question 4. Any specialty or "niche" capabilities it has, or is developing.

Answer. Slovakia possesses niche capabilities useful to NATO, to include:

- Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear (CRN) Defense
- Special Operations Forces
- Combat Engineering

Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the development of its military's English-language competencies.

Answer. Slovakia is receiving help from NATO member neighbors in bolstering its collective training regime to NATO standards. Top leadership is typically well trained, but overall training levels vary. Conscription is being phased out, with the last conscripts leaving by 2006. The transition to a professional military will result in better trained Slovak soldiers at all levels. Slovakia has a good English language training program being made better through use of IMET and FMF funds.

SLOVENIA

Question 1. Level and priority of military spending.

Answer. Today, defense spending in Slovenia is approximately 1.6% of GDP; however, Slovenia intends to raise defense spending incrementally to 2% of GDP by 2008. Defense spending priorities include: modernization (especially aircraft upgrades and communications equipment); restructuring (to create smaller, lighter units); and, interoperability (English language training).

Question 2. The extent of civilian control over the military, efficiency of command structure and sophistication of Defense Planning.

Answer. Civil control of the military is firmly established in Slovenia. In 2002, Freedom House examined 27 Central and Eastern European nations in transition and ranked Slovenia #2 (behind Poland) in terms of rule of law. The Slovene command structure has been reformed to closely mirror NATO command structures. It is efficient, but improvements continue, especially efforts to reduce a top-heavy officer corps. Defense planning is improving, assisted greatly by Slovenia's aggressive participation in MAP and PARP. Slovenia's military reform plan extends through 2007.

Question 3. The interoperability of Slovenian forces with NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to better address modern security challenges.

Answer. Like many of the candidate nations, Slovenia has much work ahead to shape its force structure to become better interoperable with NATO forces. Slovene interoperability is improving, aided by participation in PfP exercises, funding to purchase modem equipment and the achievement of high levels of English proficiency. Implementation by Slovenia of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is improving the allocation and control of defense expenditures, making them more effective and more closely linked to real resources. Slovenia's participation in SFOR (motorized infantry company) and KFOR demonstrate that Slovene forces have achieved a useful degree of interoperability with NATO forces. These contributions will also help accelerate, through Allied interaction, improvements in interoperability. The focus for much of the Slovene reform effort is the 10th Battalion, which is the unit Slovenia has dedicated to participating in NATO-led operations.

Question 4. Any specialty or "niche" capabilities it has, or is developing.

Answer. Slovenia possesses useful niche capabilities that they can bring to NATO upon accession, to include:

- special operations forces
- CBRN defense
- military police.

Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the development of its military's English-language competencies.

Answer. Slovenia is transitioning to a fully professional military force. As it does so, it is revamping its military training program to build up the competence and professionalism of its soldiers and aid in retention by offering opportunities for career soldiers. The English language training program in Slovenia is particularly strong, helped greatly by IMET and FMF funds. In addition to Slovene military personnel, Slovenia also trains personnel from PfP countries in English and other NATO languages.

QUALIFICATIONS OF INVITEES

Question 1. Did the introduction in 1999 of the MAP and DCI effectively raise the bar for NATO membership? If each of the seven candidates is measured rigorously against its own MAP criteria, do all of them pass muster? Is there a hierarchy of qualifications, i.e. are some weighted more heavily than others? How would you assess the qualifications of these candidates compared to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary?

Answer. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) did not raise the bar for NATO membership, but rather it created an intensive program of preparation at NATO in which the Alliance worked with the aspirants to encourage political, economic, and military reforms.

All seven invitees have reformed and modernized their defense establishments with the intent to strengthen NATO's collective defense capabilities. All have demonstrated a firm commitment to NATO's community of values. They are addressing such issues as corruption, minority rights, regional relations, trafficking in persons, the legacy of the Holocaust, property restitution, and good governance. All have responded positively and constructively to a very intrusive U.S. examination of their efforts, often beyond the rigors of NATO's Membership Action Plan. None of the qualifications are weighted more heavily than others.

We are confident that the accession of these seven invitees will strengthen NATO in the same way that membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic strengthened the Alliance. Moreover, these seven democracies bring to the table experience with U.S. and NATO operations attained through their contributions to NATO peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan—missions that occurred after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance.

Concerning input of DCI into NATO membership, Allies decided that Partners should not participate in DCI; therefore, DCI goals did not play in assessing candidates for membership.

Question 3. Would the accession of each of these seven countries to NATO constitute a net increase in the "security of the North Atlantic area" as Article 10 specifies?

Answer. Yes, each of these seven countries are "in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" as specified in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This positive assessment is based on our involvement in the development of each invitee's defense reform plans and our expectation that each invitee will be able to contribute niche capabilities to reinforce the Prague Capabilities Commitment. More importantly, the contributions these seven countries have already provided to SFOR, KFOR, Operation Enduring Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have concretely demonstrated that they can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area and beyond. They have, for several years, been acting as *de facto* Allies.

CONTINUATION OF REFORM

Question 5. Do you believe that the candidate states will continue reforming their armed forces after membership? How soon will they be able to provide mobile, quickly deployable troops that will be useful during a conflict as well as for post-conflict peacekeeping? Will the "niche" capabilities the candidate states are developing provide a meaningful contribution to NATO's military effectiveness?

Answer. Yes, we expect that the candidate states will continue to reform their armed forces after acceding to the Alliance. This assessment is based on our experience assisting their Defense Ministries develop and implement multiyear defense reform plans. Prior to the signing of the accession protocols on March 26th each of the Invitees submitted to NATO *Timetables for the Completion of Reforms* committing themselves to specific reform measures that will improve the mobility and lethality of their forces as well as their interoperability with Allied militaries.

The NATO invitees have already demonstrated a strong degree of ally-like behavior by providing military units in support of Coalition and NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples include:

- Bulgaria is providing mechanized infantry and engineers for KFOR.
- Estonia, Romania and Slovakia are also providing company level or larger units, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are rotating a company-level unit.
- Slovenia is providing a mechanized infantry company for SFOR.
- Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are also providing units.
- Romania deployed an infantry battalion, MPs and C–130 transport aircraft to Afghanistan.
- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have also provided forces.
- Slovakia and Romania deployed NBC units in support of OIF.
- Bulgaria has also deployed forces, Lithuania has deployed logistical and military medical personnel, and other invitees are offering overflight and other assistance.

Among the niche capabilities that these countries are developing that provide real capabilities to the Alliance are NBC defense units, Military police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

NATO ENLARGEMENT—PART II

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Enzi, Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is called to order.

We are especially fortunate to have a distinguished set of witnesses with us today. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional Democracies; and Ronald Asmus, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

Mr. Ambassador, given the heightened responsibility required of you and your staff in Brussels during the ongoing campaign in Iraq, we especially appreciate your willingness to come and participate in our hearing today.

As our thoughts and prayers continue to be with our troops in Iraq, we in Congress must examine the broader context of the fight against terror and weapons of mass destruction. The subject we take up today is important to our men and women in the military and to the well-being of our country. The Atlantic alliance is a key component of the fight against terrorism and we must attempt to maximize the utility of NATO in prosecuting that war.

This hearing will examine the future of the Atlantic alliance, plans for NATO enlargement, and how we can work with our European allies to establish greater security in an era of global terrorism. The debate over Iraq exposed a division within NATO over the best methods to combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This has strained some of our traditional alliances, but it has not broken them. The United States has more at stake and more in common with Europe than any other part of the world. These common interests and shared values will sustain the alliance if governments realize the incredible resource that NATO represents. When President Bush made his first trip to Europe in June 2001, he articulated his vision of the united Europe at peace, and he threw his full weight behind NATO enlargement, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. As the leader of NATO, we have no intention of shirking our commitments to Europe.

Fifty years ago, NATO's founders made a political decision that the United States and Europe needed a common strategy to meet common threats. That need has not dissipated. As President Bush told the German Parliament this year, "NATO's defining purpose, our collective defense, is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror."

At the Washington summit in 1999, NATO heads of state declared that they wanted the alliance to be as relevant to the threats of the next 50 years as it was to the threats of the past 50. Part of their vision was realized that day, when NATO officially welcomed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance. At that moment, NATO was engaged in a successful military campaign in Kosovo, which demonstrated that the alliance could operate in a complex combat situation. Two years later, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. This article declares that an attack on one member is an attack on all. And the United States remains grateful for that swift and unquestioning expression of solidarity.

But the September 11 attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism have led to a debate on NATO's post-cold war role that has forced heads of state to reevaluate NATO's mission in the 21st century. When NATO was founded in 1949, its purpose was to defend Western democracies against the Soviet Union. But the demise of the Soviet Union diminished the significance of NATO's mission, and we began to debate where NATO should go and what NATO should do. In early 1993, I delivered a speech calling for NATO not only to enlarge, but to prepare to go out of area. And at that time, many people were skeptical about enlarging NATO's size and mission. Those of us who believed in NATO's enlargement prevailed in that debate. I believe that events have proven us right. But NATO requires constant maintenance and adjustment. No one should expect an effortless Atlantic alliance, devoid of disagreement.

This is the second of four hearings that the Foreign Relations Committee will hold on NATO. The immediate goal of these hearings is to determine which of the seven candidate countries should be invited into the alliance. As we consider this new enlargement, it is clear that the last round has been highly beneficial. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are among the most dynamic countries in Europe. They are deeply interested in alliance matters, and they have sought to maximize their contribution to collective security. The prospect of NATO membership gave these countries the incentive to accelerate reforms, settle disputes, and cooperate with their neighbors. And their success in turn has been a strong incentive for democratization and peace among Europe's other aspiring countries.

I believe that the candidate countries, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are ready to assume full membership responsibilities and contribute to European stability and security. I am fully confident that these countries have made an enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and they will stand with those most committed to the transatlantic relationship. The candidates have worked hard to improve their military capability. They have taken steps ranging from developing

a peacekeeping capacity to acquiring the equipment and skills necessary for high-intensity conflict. All seven have been supportive of coalition military efforts in Iraq. I will urge the Senate to vote in favor of bringing the seven candidate nations into NATO.

As we consider new members, we must simultaneously reconsider NATO's purposes. In my view, the major security challenge we face today is the intersection of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. NATO enlargement should be pursued as part of a broader strategic dialog aimed at establishing common transatlantic approaches to meet this challenge around the globe.

Although NATO's mission no longer centers on Russia, the debate over NATO enlargement must include a discussion of Russia. Since September 11, 2001, Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, particularly Baltic membership, has eased. The Russians have recognized that enlargement is not directed against them. Stabilizing democracy in Eastern Europe does not threaten democracy in Russia. In fact, a stable and peaceful Europe will benefit the entire continent, including Russia. I fully supported the establishment of the NATO-Russian Council at the Rome summit last spring, which opened a new cooperative chapter in NATO-Russian relations.

NATO is a remarkable institution bound by military strength and a common vision. But NATO will be reduced to a housekeeping role in Europe if it does not tackle the most pressing security threats to our countries today. We must complement NATO expansion with a plan to transform the alliance into an important force in the war on terrorism.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

We are fortunate to have an especially distinguished set of witnesses with us today. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; Bruce Jackson, President of the Project on Transitional Democracies; and Ronald Asmus, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Mr. Ambassador, given the heightened responsibility required of you and your staff in Brussels during the ongoing campaign in Iraq, we especially appreciate your willingness to come before us today.

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The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Burns, Mr. Jackson, and Dr. Asmus, we look forward to your insights on these issues. And before I ask you for those insights, I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. It is an honor to have you here. Thanks for making the trip. Welcome home. And Ron and Bruce will be following you. We indeed have a distinguished group of witnesses this morning.

As all of you know better than most of us, this Friday marks the 54th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization treaty. In the alliance's 54 years, 30 of which I have been sitting here in the Senate, I do not believe I have seen such—I want to choose my adjectives correctly—such a concern, in some quarters rancor, dissension.

I have attended so many conferences on whither NATO. Most of them I have brushed off over the years as part of the necessary national inclinations of each of the countries responding to their political needs of the moment. But I think this is different.

To illustrate this turn of events and their consequences, I want to recall a few important facts.

During several weeks in January and February, France, Germany, and Belgium blocked consensus in the North Atlantic Council for providing assistance to fellow member Turkey which requested help under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty because it feared an attack by Iraq in the event of a war.

Commenting on that bit of theater, just last week the head of an important French think tank made the following statement, "that NATO was unable to meet the challenges of the age came as no great surprise to close observers of the organization. In the Kosovo war, its military structure was shown to be too American-dominated to satisfy European needs. And while its political side could be used by the Europeans to constrain U.S. power, that made NATO too multilateral for the Americans. Its future as an effective and viable body has been very much in doubt ever since."

Next month the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium, and other European countries, but not the United Kingdom, which was not invited, will meet to assess the prospects for an EU-based military alliance outside of NATO. The President of the Commission of the European Union, Mr. Prodi, praised this initiative calling it "timely and good," and with regard to transatlantic relations, he added, "it is evident the Iraq crisis has brought us to a new crossroads. We must choose a different path."

Prodi said that a non-NATO military alliance would give Europeans more clout on the international stage and prevent them from being, "left out from the management of world affairs."

Now, I am well aware that there is a "yes, but" response to each of these events.

First, thanks largely to the skillful work of you, Mr. Ambassador, the question of the Article 4 assistance to Turkey was moved from the NAC to NATO's Defense Planning Committee where France is not a member. And the alliance, at least temporarily, survived this crisis.

Second, commentators, however articulate and provocative they may be, are just that, commentators, not people who have to make the tough decisions.

And third, I met last year with Mr. Prodi, and I have tremendous respect for him, but he is not a political military strategist. Moreover, he may be President of the Commission of the European

Union, but he does not speak for the entire EU, as the governments of the U.K., The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and perhaps others will attest. Moreover, to put it somewhat crudely, talk is cheap.

The idea that the Parliaments of all EU members states would suddenly have a security epiphany and appropriate the considerable sums of money necessary to bring their militaries into the 21st century at a level with those of the United States is, I would submit, not something you would like to bet your mortgage on.

Nonetheless, these events and many others over the last several months do point, in my view—and I hesitate to use this phrase, it has been so overused over the years—to a crisis in NATO that is unlike anything I have experienced since I have been here.

We are faced with a quandary and a quantitatively new decision and a new situation in which the very fundamentals of the alliance I think are being questioned unlike any time before, and I think we had better figure out how to respond to it. We are going to reach an immediate crisis, God willing, with a swift victory in Iraq. We are going to face this crisis fairly quickly about how and if we internationalize the responsibility for Iraq after Saddam is gone.

It is within this context, it seems to me that, we have to assess the strategic benefits of further enlarging the alliance, which I support. At our last hearing, we heard from administration witnesses on the qualifications and contributions of each of the seven candidate countries, and we will continue our examination in another hearing on Thursday. And I agree with the chairman. I will join him on the floor in moving for the accession of the candidate countries.

But today I'd like to address the more fundamental question on the nature and the direction of the alliance that these seven countries will soon be joining, hopefully.

Mr. Ambassador, you are deeply engaged on a daily basis in what I believe are critical debates about the evolution of NATO. I would welcome your views on some or all of the following questions. And you may think I am being provocative with the first one, but I mean it sincerely.

Is the Bush administration truly committed to NATO? For many who have top positions in the administration have for the previous 6 to 8 years been talking about how we are overextended in Europe, how it is not the most critical responsibility we have, and that NATO does not have the utility it once had.

I would also like to know if the political structures of the alliance have become too multilateral for us as is asserted by our French colleagues.

Will we bypass NATO structures in the future in favor of coalitions of the willing if future political discussions become too difficult for us?

Would we support changes in the decisionmaking process of the NAC to facilitate action?

Five years ago, I, and I think the chairman as well—I do not want to tar him with the same brush—opposed successfully an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification calling for the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism in the NAC. I still see this approach as a cure worse than the disease, but I would ask you, Mr.

Ambassador, from your experience in Brussels, how do you anticipate the accession of seven countries invited at Prague would affect decisionmaking in the NAC and discussions on the various NATO committees?

Finally, Mr. Ambassador, I invite you to share with us some of the strategic thinking currently going on among our allies. Are they engaged in similar debates on how to improve the alliance structures and capabilities?

I am also very pleased that both Ron Asmus and Bruce Jackson, who have been here many times and on whom we have relied over the years, are here to join us to contribute to this important discussion. Both Ron and Bruce have personally played key roles in the conception and implementation of the last two rounds of NATO enlargement. They are two of the most astute observers of the alliance in my view, and I am eager to hear their views on a broad range of questions regarding the possible directions NATO will take in the future.

Once again, let me say, Mr. Ambassador, how delighted I am to welcome you. My questions are not—I hope you know me well enough to know are not meant to be confrontational. I mean them sincerely. I think that without—let me put it another way, and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, right after I saw our good friend, the Senator from Nebraska, outside the Foreign Relations Committee room over outside the Senate yesterday, I walked upstairs, Chuck, and was greeted by two of our colleagues who are both very bright, enlightened guys. And they immediately started on me about what are we going to do to teach the French a lesson and what are we going to do to teach the Germans a lesson and, by the way, Turkey. And it dawned on me that these were not people who do not think a lot about this. This was not just a knee-gut reaction coming from a guy on the street who is angry because of what is going on.

All I could think to say was—I said, let me ask you a rhetorical question. How secure and well-off do you think we will be if 10 years from now we do not have close relations with Germany, France, and Turkey? And they looked at me like why in the devil would I ask that question. That is unfair.

But there is a feeling here, a feeling that worries me. And I would like to get some sense from you whether that feeling is felt in Brussels among our NATO allies, that we may, as my dear mother, God bless her—she is alive and well and strong at 85 years old, has an expression that she has reminded me of. I guess it is the Irish in me. From the time I was a kid when I would get angry, she would say, Joey, don't bite your nose off to spite your face. To be purely colloquial, I think we may be close to biting our nose off to spite our face here if we do not get this straight.

So you have got a tough job, Mr. Ambassador.

I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for going longer than I should have, but I cannot think of anyone who is more appropriate or more knowledgeable to have here this morning to discuss some of these topics with us than Ambassador Burns. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me mention, for information of the committee, that it would be my hope that when 10 of us around the committee table are

present, that at some point we could break into the discussion of NATO to consider the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management. This is a request of Senator Abraham, and this assent is needed for the United States to participate in a very important conference on April 6. We have 6 members now, and hopefully we will have 10 at some point.

But I ask if members are not acquainted with the spent fuel treaty, please ask your staffs to put the memo in front of you so that you will be up to speed when we come to that point.

Now, second, I just recognize in the audience the friendly faces of many distinguished ambassadors who are good friends of the committee. I do not want to embarrass any of you, but I am going to anyway, by asking you to identify yourselves as I go through the roll of the aspirant countries to see who is here.

The Ambassador from Latvia.

VOICE. I am afraid the Ambassador is not here. I am the DCM.

The CHAIRMAN. Excellent. I am pleased that you are here, and other members of the staff likewise are recognized and welcomed today.

Lithuania. The distinguished Ambassador from Lithuania.

Estonia. Excellent.

The Ambassador from Slovenia. Good to have you here, sir.

And I see the Ambassador from Slovakia, and likewise from Romania, and the distinguished lady from Bulgaria. We are delighted. Thank you so much for coming today for this important discussion.

Finally, we look forward to hearing from you, Ambassador Burns, after indulging the preliminaries, but as you can tell, Senator Biden and I are deeply committed, as is this committee, to the future of NATO. I agree with Senator Biden. There is nobody better able to articulate from hands-on experience, which you have had as our distinguished Ambassador.

I appreciated especially your hospitality a year ago January at the workshop meeting which you invited me to meet with the working members there. It was an educational experience for me. It was very important. And I have appreciated your returning to the United States frequently to infuse us with enthusiasm as well as information.

The floor is yours. We look forward to your testimony, and the entirety of your statement will be made a part of the record. If you wish to go through that, fine, or summarize, it would be fine likewise.

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me here today. It is a pleasure to be with all of you, all the members of this committee and of the Senate.

I did submit a statement for the record and I will not read that so that we can get to questions sooner. I do have a very brief statement I thought I should make to summarize the views that our administration would like to put forward.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your leadership on this issue of the U.S. commitment to NATO for your entire career

in the Senate. I do remember very well the trip that you made to Brussels a year and a half ago. It was important for us and we appreciated the guidance you gave us. All of us in the United States Foreign Service appreciate the commitment you have given and the very sensible advice you have given many administrations on this issue.

I would like to say to Senator Biden, thank you very much for your chairmanship of this committee last year and your commitment that you gave to us before the Prague summit as we tried to think through how we would restructure the alliance and as we began to debate the issue of NATO enlargement as well. And I appreciate the participation this morning of all the members of this committee.

Senator, I just wanted to say to begin that I am very happy to take the questions that Senator Biden has given me. I list six and perhaps when we get to the question and answer period, if there are some that you would like me to answer especially this morning, I am happy to do that because I take them in the best possible way and I think they are the questions that we need to think about, about the future of this alliance. It is an alliance in transformation and it does require us to be willing to seek changes when they are necessary.

Mr. Chairman, we are meeting at a time of momentous challenges for the United States overseas. America's soldiers and our coalition soldiers are in harm's way in Iraq and they are attempting to undertake by force what Saddam Hussein has refused to do peacefully for the last 12 years and that is to disarm.

As Senator Biden mentioned and as you mentioned, we also have a number of differences with our longstanding allies over how to deal with the grave threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and that has put a serious strain on the transatlantic relationship. Just as we are going to have to rebuild Iraq, we are going to have to bring NATO back to the consensus and unity that marked the Prague summit 4 months ago when we agreed that NATO should take in new members and seek new military capabilities and build those new relationships, Senator, that you talked about with Russia, Ukraine, with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus that are so important to us as we try to meet the threats of the 21st century.

Last week on March 26 in Brussels, I had the honor of signing on behalf of the United States the Protocols of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I certainly strongly encourage the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of those Accession Protocols. I am convinced that bringing these seven nations into the alliance will make NATO a stronger collective defense organization and I am convinced they will help us to increase the security of the United States.

When President Bush and the NATO leaders invited the seven countries to begin accession talks with the alliance at the Prague summit, it was a historic step forward because the greatest strategic goal of the United States and all of our European allies since the fall of the Berlin Wall and since the fall of communism in the late eighties and early nineties has been the construction of a Eu-

rope that would be whole, free, peaceful, and secure. That is what President George H.W. Bush believed when he worked with Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand and Prime Minister Thatcher. It is what President Clinton believed in the 8 years of his administration, and it has certainly been the hallmark of President Bush's European policy over the last 2 years.

I think that this enlargement of NATO, coupled with the simultaneous enlargement of the European Union, will move Europe beyond the divisions and instability that made the 20th century one of the bloodiest in human history. And this is a very profound achievement for the United States and for our European allies. And it is the transatlantic relationship encapsulized that we need to preserve for the future.

We have pushed the seven countries very hard to be ready for the requirements of membership. Since the end of the cold war, but particularly since they announced their candidacy, the seven nations have joined Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in consolidating democracy and free markets in that half of Europe, which was closed behind the Iron Curtain during the cold war. And the prospect of bringing these countries in has helped to erase old dividing lines and it has had the benefit of shifting Europe's center of gravity and NATO's center of gravity eastward, thereby broadening security on the continent.

Twice last year, Mr. Chairman, in February and again in October, I led a U.S. interagency team to these seven countries, along with Albania and Macedonia. We tried to assess their readiness for membership in anticipation of sending the adapted treaty to the Senate, and we had over 100 meetings with the Presidents and the Prime Ministers and the Foreign and Defense Ministers of these countries during that time, and we urged them to press ahead with the reforms that they and we felt were important to make them candidates for NATO.

Based on those meetings and based on all the other contacts that we have had, I believe that these countries are ready for NATO membership. All of them have reformed. All of them have modernized their defense establishments. That will add to the collective defense capability of the alliance. All have demonstrated a very firm commitment to NATO's values. They have addressed issues as diverse as corruption, minority rights, trafficking in women and children, the legacy of the Holocaust, and good governance, and they have all responded positively and constructively to the concerns we have put before them.

I think most notably for this committee all seven of these countries have served with us in Bosnia and in Kosovo. All seven have been in Afghanistan to help us with that very difficult problem since September 2001, and all seven have spoken up publicly in support of the coalition in Iraq. And six of the seven countries are members of the current coalition in Iraq. So I think that they have been de facto allies and have shown in deed, as well as in word, that they are ready to join our alliance.

When I first took up my assignment a year and a half ago, the conventional wisdom in the summer of 2001 was that perhaps one to four of these countries might be ready for membership at the Prague summit. Certainly you did not find many people, perhaps

present company excluded, Senator, who believed that all seven were ready for membership. It was President Bush's vision, which he articulated in the speech you referred to, the Warsaw speech of June 2001, that we should try to create an alliance from the Baltics to the Black Sea that began to shift thinking in the alliance in favor of robust enlargement. And I think it is fair to say that from the very beginning, it has been the United States—and that is the Clinton administration, as well as the Bush administration—that has championed the idea of an expansive enlargement, a fact that has not been lost on the invited countries themselves. They know that if it were not for the leadership of the last two American Presidents and the leadership of many Members of the Senate, NATO membership might not have been possible for them in 2002 and 2003. So I think they can thank President Bush and his predecessors, but also members of this committee and of the Senate for that distinction.

We think these countries will value their NATO membership. They will never take it for granted. And I believe, as I sit around the conference table with our 19 allies many times per week, that when these seven countries, Senate willing, take their place in May 2004, they will become immediately among our strongest allies when they become members of the alliance.

Mr. Chairman, some European leaders have said that these seven countries should be seen and not heard, and the United States differs with that view. We believe these nations deserve our respect and our support for everything they have done to reassert their independence and their sovereignty over the last 12 years. They know the meaning of democracy because it was denied to them for a very, very long time. And so they do not just bring military capabilities to the table, they bring a strong sense of political will which, combined with ours, we think will keep NATO strong.

We think in this sense that we ought to look at NATO enlargement not as how many countries we are obligated to defend, which of course was a pertinent question that we had to ask and that Senators had to ask in decades past during the cold war, but rather how many countries can we count on to stand with us when the going gets tough as it was in Afghanistan and as it currently is in Iraq. In this sense, the size of a country, the geography and population count for less than the political will to defend our principles and our collective security.

These seven countries, as you said, Mr. Chairman, understand they are joining an alliance in transformation and in transition. They understand the threats to us are different than in times past, and we think that they understand one of the principal lessons of September 11 and that is that NATO's future is not just in the defense of Europe, but NATO's future has to be to defend us from threats wherever they arise. NATO has to go wherever it is needed, and as you said very famously, Mr. Chairman, NATO is either going to be out of area or out of business. You said that a very long time ago, but it was prescient because that is exactly the decision that our Foreign Ministers made at the Reykjavik meeting last year and the primary sentiment that is now fueling the future of this alliance.

If NATO's past was centered in countering the Soviet threat to western Europe, its future must be devoted to meeting the greatest security challenge of this generation and that is the toxic mix of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction far from Europe's shores. NATO needs to pivot from an inward focus on Europe, which was necessary and appropriate during the cold war, to an outward focus on the arc of countries where most of the threats are today, in the Middle East and Central Asia and in South Asia. And that is why the United States believes that NATO should play a larger role in Afghanistan as we begin to think about the next iteration of the peacekeeping force there, and it is why we believe that NATO ought to be playing a role in Iraq after that conflict is over on weapons of mass destruction, on reconstruction, and in peacekeeping. These are some of the issues that Secretary Powell will address when he arrives at NATO tomorrow night for his meetings with NATO leaders on Thursday in Brussels.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are asking our European allies to spend more on defense, to fill NATO's shortfalls in areas such as heavy air- and sea-lift, air-to-air refueling, precision-guided munitions, and advanced communications, and these are precisely the military capabilities that are so much in need and so evident in our own application of force in Iraq. We have launched a wholesale transformation of our alliance military structure with the NATO Response Force, with a new command structure.

Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Biden mentioned the divisions within the alliance over the last couple of months, particularly in the debate that we had in January and February on the defense of Turkey and Article 4, and I thought I should give you my views on why that happened and what it means for the alliance.

First let me say I think we need to keep divisions with our European allies in some historical perspective. If we remember Suez in 1956 and the debates we had with the Europeans, the debates over Vietnam with our European allies, the debates about the introduction of Pershing missiles in the 1980s, the debates over Bosnia in the early nineties, Kosovo in the late nineties, these were all issues that divided in one way or another the United States from its European allies. I think that we will survive this present transatlantic debate and we will be the stronger for it.

Having said that, it is also important to remember that when we debated the defense of Turkey last month, the great majority of the allies were with the United States. There were 16 of us who felt it was a fundamental obligation of the alliance, in essence, a matter of principle, that we should come to Turkey's aid. The actions of France, Germany, and Belgium led to a crisis of credibility within the NATO alliance because their narrow efforts violated the core fabric of NATO, which is that all of us come to each other's assistance in time of need.

In the end, Germany and Belgium did the right thing and NATO did meet its commitment under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, and we have deployed AWACs and Patriot missile systems, and chemical and biological teams as an alliance to Turkey, and the presence of those forces has helped to deter and defend Turkey at a very critical time in the midst of the war in Iraq.

But our final success in breaking the impasse was only made possible by the decision that our administration made to meet in NATO's Defense Planning Committee at 18, which is without France.

One of the bright spots, in an otherwise very, very frustrating month for me and for my colleagues at NATO, was when the Ambassadors of the seven invited nations visited me in my office to tell me that they were with us, that they would have supported aid to Turkey had they been part of our deliberations, and I certainly would have liked to have had them at the table with us that week, and I look forward to the day when they will be with us at that table.

Senator Biden mentioned some of the issues that have arisen since that debate. Can NATO make decisions effectively if we grow from 19 members to 26 members? Does the consensus way of decisionmaking still make sense for NATO? And I would be very happy to address that question, Senator, and from any other Senator during the question and answer time.

Senator, let me just conclude by saying that, as we look to the future, I think we do have some major challenges ahead of us, and I would count six priorities for us.

First, we need to strengthen NATO's role in meeting threats outside of Europe, thus our wish that NATO play a larger role, as I have said, in Afghanistan and in Iraq post-conflict.

Second, we need to complete the transformation of the military side of the alliance that we began at Prague—and Senator Voinovich was there with us at the Prague summit—a new command structure, NATO Response Force, asking the European allies to do more, to spend more and to spend more wisely to create a better and stronger military capability.

Third, we will need to integrate these allies into the alliance if the Senate gives its advice and consent, and we need to keep our door open to future enlargement in the years ahead as other European countries seek membership and are capable of meeting the obligations.

Fourth, Senator Lugar, you mentioned Russia. Russia, Ukraine, and the countries of Central Asia are on the front lines of the war against terrorism. We have new NATO relationships with them and we have to give them our full support.

Fifth, Senator Biden mentioned the issue of NATO and the European Union. We have had some success. We now have a new NATO-EU arrangement which allowed the EU to take over yesterday NATO's peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, which is a step forward, and we would like to see the European Union continue to cooperate with us, use NATO resources, not to build their own on their own missions.

Senator Biden also mentioned the fact that on April 29 it has been announced that Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg will have a summit to discuss the possibility of building a separate European military command. You mentioned President Prodi of the EU. I was with him last week and I gave him my advice that we thought that any meeting that would discuss a European command separate from NATO would be a mistake and would be dangerous to the fabric of the transatlantic relationship and of NATO itself.

One of the Europeans present said, well, Mr. Ambassador, the problem is we need a strong European defense. I said, you have it and it is called NATO and you have had it for 54 years. And we cannot give up on that.

Our sixth priority should be to maintain our commitments that we have got in Bosnia and in Kosovo. They are still commitments we have to meet and there is still a transition that has not been completed.

Senator, let me just finish and say that we need to remain engaged with our allies through NATO. We need to remember that NATO has been there with us and for us for 54 years. I am firmly of the view that the United States should not operate alone in the world, that we need friends and allies, that we need a permanent alliance, and that we need to build that relationship and rebuild it after the strains of the last several months. NATO is vital because it is America's only permanent bridge to Europe. It is the expression of our commitment to their defense and of them to ours. It is a vehicle through which we continue to provide the nuclear and conventional defense of Europe and by which we must now address threats outside of Europe in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. And as we reaffirm and rebuild our sometimes troubled transatlantic ties from the debates of the past few months, NATO has to be one of our key instruments. We should continue to depend on NATO and to believe in it as a guidepost for our policies in Europe.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for listening to me. I am very happy now to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today. I am honored to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the future of NATO, our most important Alliance and a central pillar of U.S. foreign and defense policy. America needs a permanent Alliance willing and able to take on the dangers posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other new threats. The Administration's policies are designed to ensure that NATO can continue to meet this challenge.

Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge your leadership in defining a sensible American policy on NATO. I very much appreciate the advice and guidance that my team received from you when you visited us in Brussels last year. Your commitment to NATO throughout your Senate career has been steadfast and very much appreciated by all of us in the United States Foreign Service.

I would like to thank Senator Biden for his leadership of this Committee last year, when the Senate supported both NATO's transformation and NATO enlargement in preparation for the Prague Summit.

Let me also say that I greatly appreciate the participation of the Congress in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are proud that Congressman Doug Bereuter now serves as President of this important forum.

Mr. Chairman, we are meeting at a moment when the United States faces momentous challenges overseas. American and coalition soldiers are in harm's way in Iraq, undertaking by force what Saddam Hussein refused to do peacefully—to disarm as demanded by the international community for over 12 years.

Differences with a number of our long-standing Allies over how to deal with the grave threat posed by Saddam have put a serious strain on Trans-Atlantic ties. Just as we will have to rebuild Iraq, we will have to bring NATO back to the consensus and unity that marked the Prague Summit just four months ago, when we agreed that NATO needs new members, new capabilities and new relationships to meet the threats of the 21st century.

Today I would like to give you a view from Brussels on where NATO is right now, where we want it to go, and how we believe the seven invited nations will help us get there. I will try to make the case today that the seven invited nations are ready to become full NATO members, and that their accession is in the best interests of the United States. I will also tell you why I believe NATO remains our most important Alliance, and how we seek to transform it to meet the new threats so evident after September 11, 2001. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will give you my thoughts on the key challenges that NATO faces in the period ahead.

THE U.S. ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY

Mr. Chairman, last week, on March 26, I had the honor of signing on behalf of the United States in Brussels the Protocols on the Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. I strongly encourage the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of these protocols. I am convinced that bringing these seven nations into the Alliance will make NATO a stronger collective defense organization and will increase the security of the United States.

When President Bush and NATO leaders invited the seven countries to begin accession talks with the Alliance at last November's Prague Summit, it was truly a historic step forward. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and communism more than a decade ago, the U.S. and our Allies have pursued the strategic aim of creating a Europe whole, free, secure and at peace. This has been President George Bush's objective as it was of President Clinton and of President George Herbert Walker Bush, with wide bipartisan support—to firmly anchor the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in both NATO and the European Union.

NATO's enlargement, coupled with enlargement of the EU, will move Europe beyond the divisions and instability that made the 20th century one of history's bloodiest. This is a profound achievement for the United States and our European Allies.

We have pushed these countries hard to be ready for NATO membership. Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since becoming candidates for NATO membership, the seven invited nations have joined Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in consolidating democracy and free markets in that half of Europe closed behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. The prospect of Alliance membership has helped to erase old dividing lines and shift Europe and NATO's center of gravity eastward, broadening security and stability on a continent that has seen too little of both.

Mr. Chairman, my recommendation of ratification is based on months and years of work by our government with the invited countries. Twice last year, in February and in October, I led a U.S. interagency team to the seven invited nations—as well as to Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—to assess their readiness for NATO membership. During these visits, as well as in Brussels and at the Vilnius-10 Summit in Riga last July, our team met with every President, Prime Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister of the seven nations—in well over one hundred separate meetings. Our goal was to learn as much as we could about these countries' readiness for NATO membership, and to encourage them to press ahead with their historic reform efforts.

Based on these meetings and visits, and on our wide-ranging contacts with these nations at all levels of the U.S. Government, I believe that all of the invited nations meet NATO's high standards for membership. All seven are reforming and modernizing their defense establishments to add strength to NATO's collective defense capabilities. All have demonstrated a firm commitment to NATO's community of values by addressing such issues as corruption, minority rights, regional relations, trafficking in persons, the legacy of the Holocaust, property restitution, and good governance. All have responded positively and constructively to a very intrusive U.S. examination of their efforts, often beyond the rigors of NATO's Membership Action Plan that all of the invited nations have endured since 1999.

This is not to say that the invited nations have solved all their problems. Despite the remarkable progress we have seen, each of them remains a society in transition from communism to an open democratic and market-oriented system. Their levels of progress differ, and many challenges remain. Together with our Allies, we will need to continue to encourage and support their reform efforts in the years ahead.

The invited nations are the first to recognize that the job is not done. They are committed to reform. Their efforts have not slowed, but rather accelerated, in the months since NATO's historic decisions in Prague. Each of the Invitees has made new commitments in writing, at the highest level, to specific reform measures on a range of issues. These individual *Timetables for the Completion of Reforms* were submitted to NATO prior to the signing of Accession Protocols on March 26. They

constitute important political commitments that will guide their efforts throughout the accession period and beyond—and will help inform Allied parliaments about the status of these nations' preparations for membership.

Take a look at Romania's reform timetable and you will find budgetary commitments to enable its anti-corruption office to do its work. Read Bulgaria's and you will see specific steps that the government is taking to curb illicit arms sales and safeguard NATO secrets. The timetables of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania outline their strategies for educating their children about the Holocaust and restituting communal property. Read Slovenia's timetable and you will find a specific commitment to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008. See Slovakia's for a detailed description of the government's efforts to improve the situation of its Roma minority.

THE INVITEES

Mr. Chairman, the President's report to Congress on NATO enlargement, which was submitted last week, contains a detailed analysis of each of the invited nations. Rather than review all the findings of that report, let me try to give you a brief snapshot of these seven countries, each of which brings a different set of strengths to the NATO table. Their participation in the MAP and in the Partnership for Peace "PfP" program has enabled them to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and in enhancing the interoperability of their armed forces with NATO. Furthermore, each of these countries has also made important political and military contributions to the security challenges we face—in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in some cases in all three theaters.

Romania, the largest of the invited nations, self-deployed over 400 combat troops to Afghanistan and now has a 70-strong nuclear/biological/chemical defense team on the ground in Kuwait in support of the coalition, with more personnel en route. Again and again, Romania has demonstrated the ambition, and the means, to play a major role in NATO as a close Ally of the U.S. The government is also showing a clear commitment to tackling its remaining reform challenges, including corruption and cementing the rule of law, where much work remains to be done.

Like Romania, Bulgaria has been with us every step of the way on Iraq—despite calls from some other parts of Europe to remain on the sidelines. Bulgaria has played a key role in UN Security Council deliberations, joined our Coalition, and contributed a nuclear/biological/chemical defense team to the Iraqi theater of operations as well as airfields for our movements to and from Afghanistan. Bringing Bulgaria and Romania into NATO would further extend stability into Europe's most troubled region—southeast Europe. Bulgaria's government has taken numerous painful steps on defense reform, including destroying its SS-23 and SCUD missiles and reducing the size of its armed forces by the thousands. Moreover, Bulgaria is working closely with us to tighten export controls and protect NATO classified information. These are tough challenges, but I am confident that the government will succeed on both counts.

Like Bulgaria and Romania, Slovakia has faced the challenge of reducing a large, antiquated military machine inherited from its Warsaw Pact past—and is accomplishing this task with success. Slovakia's military is capable of making a significant contribution to Alliance defense, including through its mechanized infantry battalion for NATO-led operations and its nuclear/biological/chemical defense team now on the ground in Kuwait in support of the coalition. Slovakia is also on a very positive political and economic trajectory, having put the autocrat Vladimir Meciar out to pasture in last September's elections, and is making good progress on remaining problems such as integration of the Roma and fighting corruption.

One week ago, Slovenia surprised many by winning its referendum on NATO membership by a two-to-one margin, a tribute to the efforts of its government and—I believe—to the wisdom of its people. The mandate that the government has received bodes very well for Slovenia's future contributions to the Alliance. With its model democracy and strong economy, we can expect Slovenia to continue to serve as a leader in the Balkans, in areas like de-mining and mountain warfare training. We welcome the government's commitment to raise defense spending every year from now until it reaches 2 percent of GDP by 2008.

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are well prepared to take up the responsibilities of NATO membership. Though small, they have worked hard for a decade to develop niche military capabilities to fill Alliance shortfalls, and we can expect continuing staunch support from them for U.S. objectives. All three have contributed troops to NATO-led operations in the Balkans and all three are on the ground with us in Afghanistan. All three have joined the coalition to disarm Saddam Hussein, and all are taking steps to deploy military personnel to the theater for purposes of peace-

keeping and reconstruction. The Senate and successive U.S. Administrations deserve credit for having been true and loyal friends of the Baltic States. The U.S. never recognized their illegal annexation by the Soviet Union and stood by them as they built their new democracies. These are truly admirable countries, freed forever from totalitarianism, and ready to enjoy the benefits of freedom and security that they surely deserve.

A MORE ATLANTICIST ALLIANCE

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to consider not only the objective qualifications of the seven invited nations, but also the factors that have led them to seek membership in NATO, what kind of Alliance they are interested in joining, and how this affects more broadly U.S. national security interests.

In the thousands of miles that my colleagues and I have traveled, and in the hundreds of meetings that we have held—not only with government officials but with members of the opposition, public opinion leaders, and civil society as well—we have heard time and again how grateful the invited nations are for the leadership that the U.S. has shown on enlargement and in strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

When I first took up my assignment in Brussels in the summer of 2001, the conventional wisdom at NATO was that somewhere between one and four nations might receive Prague Summit invitations—certainly not seven. It was President Bush's vision—first articulated in Warsaw earlier the same year of an Alliance stretching "from the Baltics to the Black Sea"—that shifted the balance at NATO in favor of a robust enlargement. The horrible events of September 11, 2001 further convinced many at NATO that the Alliance should expand its ranks with those countries willing to take risks to win the war on terrorism.

From the very beginning, it was the U.S. that championed the most robust possible enlargement—a fact that has not been lost on the invitees. They know that if not for U.S. leadership, NATO membership might not have happened for them. They can thank President Bush and his predecessors as well as the Senate for this achievement.

Let there be no doubt—these are nations that understand the value of NATO membership and they will never take it for granted. They will be among our most committed Allies when they walk through NATO's doors as full members. Senator Voinovich of this committee, who attended the Prague Summit, will recall the remarkably eloquent words of Latvian President Vike-Freiberga at the North Atlantic Council meeting following her country's invitation to join the Alliance. She said,

> Our people have been tested in the fires of history, they have been tempered by suffering and injustice. They know the meaning and the value of liberty. They know that it is worth every effort to support it, to maintain it, to stand for it and to fight for it. We make a solemn pledge and a commitment here today, on this historic and solemn occasion, that we will strive to our utmost to do our part to contribute not just to the strength of the Alliance but to do whatever needs to be done to create a world where justice and liberty are available to all.

Hearing those words again, it is easy to understand why President Bush said at Prague that he expects the invited nations to "refresh the spirit" of NATO itself.

Some say these nations should be seen and not heard. The U.S. believes these nations deserve our respect for all they have done to reassert their own independence and freedom. Theirs is one of the most dramatic and hopeful stories of our time. We need to hear their views on the issues of the day, including on NATO's future. These nations know the meaning of democracy, having been denied it for so long. They know the value of freedom, having had theirs crushed by Soviet communism and totalitarianism. They don't just bring new capabilities to the table; they also bring strong political will to defend our way of life.

Mr. Chairman, in this new century, we should look at NATO enlargement not as how many countries we are obligated to defend, but rather how many countries we can count on to stand with us when the going gets tough. Size and geography and population count less than the political will to defend our principles and collective security.

NEW THREATS/NEW CAPABILITIES

Mr. Chairman, the seven nations that received invitations at the Prague Summit understand that the threats we face today are fundamentally different from those of the last century—that the threats of today come not from strong states within

Europe, but from unstable failed states and terrorist organizations far from Europe's borders.

As NATO Secretary General George Robertson has said in his inimitable fashion, "geography will no longer act as our shield," because the current and future security environment "does not afford us the luxury of fighting theoretical battles about what is 'in' and what is 'out of area.'" In other words, as you famously said, Mr. Chairman, NATO is either "out of area or out of business."

This was the lesson the United States derived from the tragic events of September 11—that the gravest threats to our security can come from anywhere on the globe. NATO's future is thus the defense of peace not just in Europe but wherever threats arise to all of us in the Euro-Atlantic community. In fact, NATO is already operating well beyond the borders of our member states, and that is where NATO belongs. The old "out-of-area" debate is indeed dead.

Today in Afghanistan, troops from fourteen NATO, and fourteen NATO Partner, countries make up the vast majority of the 4,500 strong International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF). In addition, NATO itself has assisted current ISAF lead nations Germany and the Netherlands with force generation, planning, intelligence, coordination and information sharing, and communications.

If NATO's past was centered in countering the Soviet threat to Western Europe, its future must be devoted to meeting the greatest security challenge this generation faces—the toxic mix of terrorism, states that sponsor terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction far from Europe's shores. NATO needs to pivot from its inward focus on Europe—which was necessary and appropriate during the Cold War—to an outward focus on the arc of countries where most of the threats are today—in Central and South Asia, and in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, our transformation agenda for NATO is an ambitious one, and there are many challenges to overcome. But at the Prague Summit last November, President Bush and his fellow Heads of State and Government took historic decisions to set this process in motion.

The Prague vision was both simple and far-reaching—to launch a wholesale transformation of the Alliance for the 21st century. The old NATO served us well, but because the threats to our common security had changed, Allies agreed that NATO had to change with them.

At the Summit, Allies agreed to a three-part reform effort—to build new military capabilities to fight terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to keep the peace; to take in new members to broaden NATO's reach; and to nurture new relationship with Russia, Ukraine, our Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and our partners in the Partnership for Peace, particularly with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus to extend security across Eurasia.

NATO's goal of new military capabilities was expressed in the Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which our European Allies committed to fill NATO shortfalls in areas such as heavy air and sealift, air-to-air refueling, precision guided munitions, and advanced communications. In recent months, Allies have begun implementing the Prague decisions, pooling their resources by establishing a number of multinational consortiums aimed at acquiring these capabilities.

Our challenge between now and the next NATO Summit in mid-2004 is to ensure that our Allies follow through on these commitments in a tight budget climate. At NATO, we are keeping the heat on—both through bilateral pressure and peer group pressure within the North Atlantic Council. Our most effective lobbying tactic is through leadership and example. As demonstrated so vividly again in Iraq, Congress has funded the strongest military in the world. Allies know what they have to do to catch up.

In Prague, our Allies also agreed to a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force to allow us to move more quickly and flexibly wherever needed. This will be a rotational force that is technologically advanced, lethal, and has trained and exercised together as a combined and joint force. The NATO Response Force was Prague's capability headline; it will also be the most visible determinant of our success on this front.

This cutting-edge NATO force needs to be matched by similar streamlining in the NATO command structure, with new technologies and military doctrines designed to address 21st century threats. We are making good progress in transforming NATO's structure and should be able to agree on the key elements by the June Defense Ministerial.

DEFENSE OF TURKEY IMPASSE

Mr. Chairman, earlier in my remarks I mentioned the very difficult debate that we had in Brussels several weeks ago regarding the defense of Turkey. I know that

this is an issue of concern to this committee so I think it is important that I address it.

This was not the first time that NATO members have disagreed vocally, and publicly, on a difficult issue. The Suez Crisis and Vietnam were bitter, as was President DeGaulle's decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure. NATO debate leading up to the 1979 Two-Track Pershing Missile decision that eventually led to the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe was coupled with public demonstrations that rivaled those we have seen during the last month.

My point, Mr. Chairman, in providing this historical perspective, is that NATO has survived crises in the past, and NATO will survive this latest episode.

Mr. Chairman, we should also remember that in this latest disagreement, only three of our Allies opposed the wish of the majority to respond immediately and positively to Turkey's request for contingency measures to assist in its defense. Sixteen Allies supported the proposal, and the divisions were as deep within Europe as they were across the Atlantic.

For the 15 Allies who stood with Turkey, it was a fundamental obligation of the Alliance—a matter of principle—to come to Turkey's aid. The actions of France, Germany and Belgium led to a crisis of credibility in the Alliance because their narrow efforts violated the core fabric of NATO—that we come to each other's assistance in times of need.

In the end, Germany and Belgium did the right thing, and NATO met its commitment under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty by deploying AWAC surveillance aircraft, Patriot missile systems, and biological and chemical response units to Turkey in order to deter and defend against Iraqi aggression. Our final success in breaking the impasse was only made possible by the decision to meet in NATO's Defense Policy Committee and decide to help Turkey "at 18"—that is, without France, which withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966.

One of the bright spots in that otherwise frustrating week was when the Ambassadors of the seven invited nations visited me in my office to tell me they were with us and would have supported aid to Turkey if they had been part of the deliberations. I would have liked to have had them at the table with us that week, and I look forward to the day when they will be. The seven invited nations are expecting to join NATO as equal members on an equal footing, and to have their voices heard and respected when we differ.

Privately, a few of these Ambassadors told me that their publics back home were wondering whether NATO's collective defense commitment was still reliable. I assured them that the U.S. would always insist that NATO live up to its core responsibility and meet its commitment to its members—as we will for them once they become members.

An Alliance that keeps its word is the kind of Alliance that the seven invited nations want to join. It is the kind of Alliance that they are dedicated to preserving. These are countries that understand the value of freedom and see NATO as the way to maintain that freedom.

Some commentators have suggested that enlarging the Alliance by seven will make decision-making more cumbersome and difficult. I agree that this will be a challenge but one that we can manage well. Gaining consensus did not become more difficult with the accession of the trans-Atlantic minded Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in 1999. On the contrary, NATO's newest members have shown themselves to be the least likely to block consensus and among the most likely to seek it. The issue is not the number of nations at the table, but rather the will to act collectively and decisively in our common interest.

SIX CHALLENGES

In summing up, Mr. Chairman, as we look toward the next NATO Summit in mid-2004, we hope the Senate and NATO's other eighteen National Parliaments will ratify the Accession Protocols so that we can strengthen NATO with seven new members. We need these nations with us as we pursue a NATO agenda that is both clear and complex. Here are the six main challenges for NATO as I see them:

Our first order of business should be to strengthen NATO's role in meeting threats outside of Europe. In Afghanistan, NATO is already providing support to German and other Allies participating in the International Stabilization and Assistance Force. We are prepared to favorably consider having NATO provide additional support should participating Allies request this. Lord Robertson and some of our Allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF. This makes sense to me.

We believe that NATO should also consider a role in rebuilding Iraq, including WMD destruction, civil-military reconstruction and contributions to peacekeeping.

Rebuilding Iraq will require a broad coalition and NATO should play its part—ideally as a collective contributor, but at least as a facilitator of individual Allied contributions.

NATO's second challenge is to complete the military and defense transformation of the Alliance that we started at Prague, including implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, establishing a NATO Response Force, and streamlining our command structure, to create a more nimble, expeditionary Alliance capable of addressing the new threats we face today.

Our third challenge is to integrate the seven new members into the Alliance, provided the Senate and NATO's other parliaments give their advice and consent to the Accession Protocols. We intend to work closely with our new members to ensure that they strengthen Alliance defense capabilities and are on the cutting edge of NATO's transformation. At the same time, we will continue to emphasize that NATO's door remains open, including for Albania, Macedonia, Croatia and others who may apply for membership in the future, as we pursue our strategic aim of building a unified and peaceful Europe.

Our fourth challenge is to lift the quality of NATO's relations with Partner nations, to realize the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council and to further support reform in Ukraine. We also want to make a major push this year to jumpstart NATO's interaction with Partners in Central Asia and the Caucasus on the front lines of the war against terrorism. In addition, we should do more with Middle Eastern countries through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.

Our fifth challenge is to work more effectively with the European Union. The recent NATO-EU breakthrough on Berlin-plus arrangements sets the stage for greatly enhanced strategic security cooperation. We now have the opportunity for a cooperative—not competitive—relationship. Just yesterday, Mr. Chairman, NATO handed over its peacekeeping operation in Macedonia to the EU, on the basis of these arrangements. We should seize this opportunity while recognizing that NATO will remain Europe's preeminent security organization. We must preserve and protect NATO's interests as we move ahead with the EU.

Sixth, we should be true to NATO's commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo. The recent tragic assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic reminds us of the risks that reformers take each day to secure a better future for their nations. We must continue to support their efforts. At the same time, we should look for additional opportunities to integrate the nations of this troubled region into the Euro-Atlantic community. This should eventually include the transformation of the Alliance's role in Bosnia and Kosovo to civilian authorities.

PRESERVING THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK

Mr. Chairman, let me close with just a few words about why I believe the United States should stay engaged with our Allies through NATO.

While it may sometimes be necessary to go it alone in the world, it is always preferable to act with our Allies and friends. As Churchill said, "the only thing worse than fighting with Allies is fighting without them."

For more than a half-century, NATO has been our most important Alliance and the strongest bridge across the Atlantic, linking North America and Europe in a community of shared democratic traditions and values. We should continue to ask NATO to play this role, and to adapt to help us meet the new threats of the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, we will continue to rely on our Allies to share the risks with us in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and to work with them in the war against terrorism. Their contributions make us a stronger nation, and will give us a more secure and peaceful world.

I do not underestimate the challenges that lie ahead, but I am confident that we are on the right path and that the seven invited countries will strengthen the Alliance, refresh its spirit and infuse it with a stronger political will.

Amid all that has happened since September 11, 2001, many have asked if NATO still has a future and is still relevant to the U.S. and its Allies. Mr. Chairman, I am firmly of the view that NATO will remain central to American national interests and to those of our European Allies for as far into the future that we can see. NATO is vital because it is America's only permanent bridge to Europe; it is the expression of our commitment to each other's defense; it is the vehicle through which we continue to maintain the peace in Europe and by which we must now address threats outside of Europe. As we reaffirm and rebuild our sometimes troubled Trans-Atlantic ties from the debates of the past few months over Iraq, NATO is one of our key instruments. We should continue to depend on NATO and to believe in it as a guidepost for our future in Europe and beyond.

Mr. Chairman distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you very much for inviting me here. I will be happy to respond to any questions or comments that you have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Burns, for your testimony.

We have a good attendance and we have a distinguished panel following, so I am going to suggest we have on the first round 5 minutes for questions of members. I will start and ask really two questions to give you the maximum amount of time, Ambassador Burns, to explore these questions.

What is the status of progress on the Prague Capabilities Commitment [PCC] and the NATO Response Force [NRF]? Does our administration expect candidate states, if they join the alliance, to participate in the PCC and the NRF, and are they capable of giving a militarily significant contribution to each?

Now, second, to what extent are we moving toward a division of labor in NATO between states able to undertake combat missions and those able to undertake only peacekeeping missions? And how does that gibe with our expectations with regard to candidate states joining the PCC and the NATO Response Force?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much. On your first question, as you remember, at the Prague summit, the centerpiece of that summit was the reconstruction of NATO's military capabilities because for many decades we had an alliance that was facing a Soviet conventional and nuclear threat in Europe, and we were structured and equipped to counter that threat. The new threats, of course, are threats that take place far from Europe's shores and America's. They are in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So we need to have an expeditionary quality to our NATO defense doctrine. We need to have airlift that will bring forces to the area, precision-guided munitions that we have used so effectively over the last 2 weeks in Iraq, air-to-air refueling, secure communications. And these are deficiencies that are present in most of our allied forces.

Just to give you a sense of the context of this problem, the Congress has appropriated close to $380 billion for America's national defense this year. Our European allies and Canada will spend roughly $140 billion on their defense. That is 18 allies versus $376 billion. So we are outspending our allies by a very long margin.

We are getting more from our $376 billion, I would wager, than most of our allies are getting from their $140 billion, because we have made the investments in military technology. We spend a greater percentage of our budget on R&D and on technology and less on keeping up, maintaining the force in terms of the personnel costs. So in Prague what we said to the allies, what President Bush said was we have got a big gap that is separating the United States from all of its allies militarily. We want to see that gap narrowed.

So we have asked the allies to see if by June of this year, when our Defense Ministers meet—and Secretary Rumsfeld will be at that meeting in Brussels—can we make some real progress. Can a consortium of our allies agree to lease or to purchase strategic airlift for the future? You have seen what the C–17s have been able to do in Iraq in ferrying our forces and equipment there. The Euro-

pean allies have exactly four C–17s available to them across the European continent, and we have several hundred. You have seen what the PGMs can do. And so we have created these separate groups of allies that are working for progress in each of these critical areas, Senator, and we hope that there can be progress.

What we have said to the smaller nations, including the seven nations that are at issue today, the invited nations, is that in the future, smaller nations need not feel that they have to have fully fledged and fully constructed armies, navies, and air forces, that they might want to concentrate on niche military capabilities. So, for example, the Czech Republic has specialized in chemical and biological weapons decontamination units, and they are in Kuwait serving the coalition right now. And that is a specialty that is a shortcoming in the NATO alliance and that we need more of. Norway is specializing in special forces. So we think that some of the smaller allies ought to focus on niche capabilities and they ought to pool their resources, four or five or six of them, to purchase some of these military capabilities that they could not on their own.

In terms of your second question, a division of labor in NATO, we do not want to see it develop. We do not want to see a two-tiered alliance where the United States is uniquely capable of projecting force, of doing the fighting, and our European allies cannot be with us. Certainly the United Kingdom and France have the kind of military capabilities that make them expeditionary, but most of our allies do not. So that is why the emphasis on spending more money, for our European allies spending more wisely, arriving at niche capabilities is the focus of our efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Nick, I know I gave you a whole bunch of questions there. I hope I get a chance maybe to get you alone and talk about some of this. I do not expect you to be able to do that now, especially since we have so many members anxious to speak.

I would like to focus on, in the brief 5 minutes we have, on two points. But I would like to make a point to you as well.

I hope the administration is prepared to support some of us who want to push back on this $150 million slush fund at the Defense Department with no oversight by State or Congress.

Second, this new office in the White House to receive and distribute most of the supplemental moneys that we are now giving directly to State and USAID. I want to talk to you about that later. That is just a little red flag going up here. We pushed back on it twice, and I hope we succeed in doing it again. But we are going to need some inside help on this one.

Let me go to my two questions. I could not agree with you more about how prescient my chairman was and is, as well as the need for a wider role for NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, Nick, I am not sure how to get from here to there. I do not think you would find much disagreement among us up here that that is needed.

I recall, as the chairman said in his opening statement, when immediately after 9/11, Article 5 was invoked, the first time in NATO's history, when headlines of Le Monde said we are all Amer-

icans, when Schroeder literally risked his government by a vote of confidence to send, I think it was, 1,000 crack German troops. I forget the number now. Was it 1,000, Michael? I think it was 1,000 to Afghanistan out of country. He won by one vote. And then we immediately stiff-armed him and said we do not need you.

The French also committed forces. I do not want to get my chairman in trouble, but I think we had a discussion and we both made it clear to the administration we thought whether or not we needed those troops, politically we needed those troops. And it was very important. We made a plea to the President, at least I did, and I think the chairman did. Saying please accept their help for God's sake. NATO—this matters. Pride matters. Humiliation is not a real good tool to use, even if it is unintended, in foreign policy.

So how the heck do we get from here to there? Initially the State Department supported an expanded ISAF with NATO components in it. Now, I know you are not talking about the same precise thing. You are not talking about ISAF necessarily being expanded. Quite frankly, I am not sure what you are talking about other than an expanded role for NATO. But how do we get there, Nick?

What is the chemistry that makes the Germans and the French and a number of our NATO allies who were—skeptical is not the word—hostile to our actions in Iraq—how do we get them in the deal in Iraq, which I think is critical, without engaging them in a way where they have some say, impact, input in what this transition government will look like? Because there is an intense debate we hear about—I will speak for myself—I hear about—between the—my phrase, no one else's—the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis and the uniform military-State Department axis that says that on the one side, we do not want anybody, we will take care of security, which I understand. And by the way, we are going to make sure of the transition. We are going to pick the transition government. We are going to pick the makeup. We are not going to have NATO or anyone else involved. And last, we are not going to have anybody, especially the French, engage in any of this reconstruction effort.

Tell me, what elements do you have to have available to you to convince your colleagues that NATO should be engaged militarily in Afghanistan and in Iraq, larger in Afghanistan initially and for as long as it take in Iraq?

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. First, let me say I would be very happy to sit down, whenever it is convenient to you, to address the questions you asked before at the beginning of the hearing.

I would just like to say one word on your first question. I am absolutely convinced of the commitment of this administration to NATO. I think we have obviously gone through a lot in trying to think through how to adapt a cold war institution to be effective in a very changed world where the strategic threats are different and the requirements are different. And President Bush's participation in the Prague summit was the culmination of that where we essentially wrote and decided on a new foundation for the alliance militarily as well as politically. So I think that the United States has shown the right leadership in rebuilding the alliance.

What we need now are two things. We need the Europeans to have greater military capabilities, but we also need—and this gets

to your specific question on Afghanistan and Iraq—we need a common sense of political will that we have got to go out and meet these threats of this nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

On Afghanistan, there really is no debate in NATO about whether or not NATO should be present. We are present. As you know, the U.K. was the first lead of the peacekeeping force; Turkey, the second. And now Germany and The Netherlands are co-leads of the third iteration of ISAF. NATO is playing a support role already to Germany and The Netherlands with planning and logistics and with special military advice. The question for us, as we look toward the summer, is should NATO continue to play a support role to individual country leads in ISAF or should NATO become the peacekeeping mission itself and take it on as we took on Bosnia and Kosovo so successfully. The United States believes that we have got to now engage in a debate on that issue and make a decision in the next month or two, and we are open to either option. We could certainly support either option.

Senator BIDEN. What is in it for our NATO allies? I apologize, Mr. Chairman. What thinking process do they have that said this makes sense for the alliance to take on a more formal role, which I strongly support? What ingredient? I mean, what is the thought process? What do you have to convince them that that makes sense or for them to conclude that? That is what I am trying to get at.

Ambassador BURNS. Seventeen of our 18 NATO allies made it to Afghanistan after October 2001 when we initiated military action in Afghanistan. Thirteen remain there. Some of them are in Operation Enduring Freedom in the combat force, and some are in ISAF.

I think what binds us together with them in Afghanistan is they see the same threat that we do. What threatens Germany and France and Belgium, just to choose three NATO members with whom we have had a disagreement over the last couple of months, in Afghanistan is this threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism that they know could hit them, as it hit us on September 11, 2001. So we have never had any kind of divisiveness in the alliance about whether we should be in Afghanistan.

The issue now is should NATO go all the way and take the lead, take over the peacekeeping force. There are some countries that say, well, NATO should not be that much out of area or are we ready for that kind of commitment. Other countries say only NATO can do it, to establish a command with SACEUR's authority and the political control of the North Atlantic Council and the ability to draw upon the 2 million troops that our 19 nations bring to the table. So I think it is common and shared interests, Senator, that binds us together with our allies.

The discussion on Iraq is quite different than Afghanistan, very different. When Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz came to NATO 3 months ago, he suggested to all the allies that NATO think of a role for itself in Iraq post-conflict. It obviously was not going to be possible for the alliance to be part of the coalition because Germany and France and the other countries had made it clear they would not participate in offensive military action. So Paul Wolfowitz suggested how about a role for NATO once the

fighting stops. We will need many, many troops for peacekeeping, for reconstruction, for humanitarian assistance. We have to locate where the chemical and biological weapons are. We have to take custody of them and then begin to destroy them. So those options are still on the table and the United States is prepared to discuss with our allies whether or not they would like to come into Iraq after the conflict has ended.

Most of the allies are telling us that they will need some kind of legitimizing U.N. Security Council resolution so they can go to their Parliaments, as all democratic governments need to do, to where the power is and say, this is why we should be in Iraq because the international community has decided these are legitimate functions.

Senator BIDEN. Godspeed, Nick.

I have taken too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Temporarily the hearing will be suspended and the committee will move into a business session.

[Whereupon, at 10:33 a.m., the committee was recessed to proceed in a business session, and reconvened at 10:36 a.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel, you are recognized for your questions.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Ambassador Burns, welcome. We appreciate your good work and leadership at a difficult time.

I particularly appreciated your presenting some perspective in your testimony as to the differences over the years that we have seen within NATO. They are very relevant I think to our discussion today and what will continue as very important discussion as to the role of NATO, the role of individual members, the collective responsibilities of NATO, in particular as we look to bring in seven new members. So thank you for that.

Some of the more interesting parts of your testimony, in my opinion, focused on what is going on in the world today. Senator Biden has just discussed some of that with you, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. I would like to followup on a couple of points.

In your testimony you reference what you and Senator Biden have been discussing, a role for NATO in Afghanistan, quoting Lord Robertson, and this is from your testimony. "Lord Robertson and some of our allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF." Then you add, "That makes sense to me." Are you speaking for the administration when you say that or for Ambassador Burns?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I am speaking for the administration obviously.

Senator HAGEL. Does that include then our consideration of U.S. troops in ISAF if we broadened that responsibility?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir. As you know, we have troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. One of the questions that we would have to face if we did decide that NATO should take on full responsibility for ISAF would be, how many troops could you raise and could you raise from NATO 2 million and from which countries?

But let me just say that when Lord Robertson visited Washington in February, this issue was discussed in the White House.

It was discussed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the administration believes that NATO should play a larger role. That is our policy.

Senator HAGEL. Including ISAF. And the policy of our government would be to be part of that, would be enlarging our efforts in Afghanistan with American troops in an ISAF force.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, we have not addressed that question specifically. The question before us—and I think this will obviously be an issue that will come up when Secretary Powell visits on Thursday with the NATO allies in Brussels, and we have got to have a good debate on this over the next month or two and make an early decision because the German-Dutch lead expires in August of this year.

The question is, can we find a NATO country or countries that would provide most of the forces and NATO would provide then support to that? Or should NATO—the second option, as I said to Senator Biden—assume full responsibility? In the latter case, then each country would have to make a decision as to whether or not they were willing to contribute their own national forces. As to what the United States would do, we would certainly support either option, but in terms of committing troops, that is a decision that only the President and the Secretary of Defense can make.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Moving to Iraq—and you pursued this a bit in your testimony as well as your exchange with Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden. NATO's participation in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. First, are you involved in any of this discussion within our government, the U.S. Government, as our representative to NATO?

Ambassador BURNS. That would be the discussion over the shape that the post-conflict international——

Senator HAGEL. The reconstruction effort. General Garner, I understand, reporting to the Defense Department, that is where it resides, my understanding is. Have you been asked to participate as reflecting on where NATO might be in this?

Ambassador BURNS. I have not been centrally involved in those discussions. They have taken place back here in Washington, Senator. I have been out in Brussels for the last few months.

But I have been involved in one slice of it, and that is, could NATO be part of the piece of the puzzle of putting together an international presence in Iraq post-conflict. As I mentioned, that debate started when Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz came to NATO on December 4, 2002. He put these ideas on the table to the 18 NATO allies.

We have had a lot of discussions at NATO since then.

Senator HAGEL. But actually you have not been a part of that. As you know, there is a rather significant debate going on, at least if I understand this correctly, between the State Department, Defense, and other elements of the administration over agreeing and disagreeing. There is a story in the Washington Post this morning supposedly that the Secretary of Defense dismissed the eight nominees from the State Department to be part of that effort. I do not expect you to know all that.

But again, you have had no involvement there in any of that discussion or that debate.

Ambassador BURNS. That is correct, Senator. I have not been involved in that particular debate.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Following up on Senator Hagel's comment, some of the information that we have gotten incorrectly about the amount of resistance that we would expect in Iraq has come from Iraqi exiles, of which we have sought their opinion, and that has turned out to be inaccurate information. So when you project that into a post-war Iraq and who is going to be running the country, you wonder about the capability of some of the exiles being brought back in at a time when we are going to be struggling transitioning from a military to a civilian type of structure there to run the country.

So thank you very much for your comments.

I am concerned about our relationship with Turkey. The Turks have hurt us by not allowing us to bring in that heavy division so that we could be moving in a pincer movement from the north to the south right now. And American lives are going to be lost as a result of us not having that ability to come at Baghdad from the north.

And the relationship with Turkey has been a longstanding one of half a century, and it has been very good and now it is not very good. I would like your comments.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much. You will appreciate the fact that I am not Ambassador to Turkey and I am, of course, working with the Turkish Government at NATO every day. I have that perspective.

Secretary Powell is now en route to Turkey today. He is flying in tonight. He will be meeting with the leadership tonight and tomorrow. So I would not want to say anything that would prejudice his trip.

But let me just say that we think that we did the right thing at NATO in mid-February by responding to Turkey's request for Article 4 assistance with the Patriot missile systems and the AWACs and the chemical and biological units. We showed Turkey that we are a nation that meets our commitments. We went the extra mile by effectively getting around the French problem by electing to go to the Defense Planning Committee, which we believe was the right decision, and we would do that again if necessary. If we were in a position where NATO was 18 countries wanting to go ahead and France did not, we would use the Defense Planning Committee to make sure that NATO can act because NATO always has to act.

As a number of the administration leaders have said, we were very disappointed in the fact that the Turkish Parliament did not vote positively to allow the 4th Division and the other U.S. forces to be present on Turkish soil and to use it to be able to cross the border into northern Iraq. So we would agree with you, Senator, in that great disappointment that the administration felt.

Senator NELSON. Well, what do you pick up when you talk to your Turkish representatives in NATO about the impression that they were dealt with in too much of a bullying manner? Do you get that sense?

Ambassador BURNS. I have not gotten that sense from the Turks with whom I work at NATO headquarters. The Turkish Ambassador and members of his delegation have not made that charge. What they have said and what others have said is that, of course, this was a democratic vote of the Turkish Parliament. It is a new government. The government did take the proposition to the Parliament and seek to have it approved. It did not do that.

I guess if you are looking for a silver lining in what admittedly is a cloud—and I agree with you that it would have been far preferable if we had had the ability to have a second offensive from Turkey in northern Iraq—is that Turkey is a democracy. NATO is not the Warsaw Pact. We are a collection of democracies and sometimes our individual members go in directions that we would not care for them to go. But we have to respect that democratic vote, and I think now we continue to build the strongest possible relationship with Turkey that we can. That is one of the reasons, obviously, for Secretary Powell's trip there today and tomorrow.

Senator NELSON. Let me shift to Bosnia. We still do not have those two main war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. Tell us about that.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, we believe that Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, the leader of the Bosnian Serb military, are war criminals. Between July 11 and July 18, 1995, they ordered the extermination, the massacre of 8,500 men and boys at Srebrenica, and we believe that they ought to be extradited to The Hague. They ought to face trial as Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Milutinovic have faced trials. This ought to be a priority for all NATO countries to pressure them, to pressure the Bosnian Government, to see that these two leaders are brought to trial.

Senator NELSON. Well, undoubtedly that is our policy and that is what we believe. Why do we not have them?

Ambassador BURNS. They are two different cases. In the case of General Mladic, from my understanding, he is someone who—I should, let me just go back and correct the record. I believe, pressure the Bosnian Government. We want to pressure Serb Government. That was a slip of the tongue.

In the case of General Mladic, he has been seen in Serb military hospitals in Belgrade. He has been seen in restaurants. We believe he has enjoyed the protection of certain elements of the Serb military. And we have made it a point in talking with that government very recently of saying that before we can have a full normalization of Serbia's relationship with NATO—Serbia is seeking membership in the Partnership for Peace. Serbia would like one day even to apply for NATO membership. But this issue of General Mladic has to be resolved and he has to be sent to The Hague.

Mr. Karadzic is more elusive. We are not quite sure always where he is. NATO forces are trying to track him down. There is a very large effort being made to do so. Obviously, we have been unsuccessful for a number of years. We want to be successful, and we will not rest until these two people are brought to justice.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Ambassador. Chairman Lugar, in his opening statement, talked about Russia and he said although NATO's mission no longer centers on Russia, the debate over NATO enlargement must include a discussion of Russia. I am curious as to the relationship at present between NATO and Russia and their views toward this expansion of these seven new countries.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

Russia's attitude in general has been far different for this round of enlargement than in the last round in the late 1990s. President Putin went to Brussels in October 2001 and essentially said that NATO enlargement was NATO's business. We have not seen any kind of demonstrable attempt by the Russian Federation to stand in the way of these seven countries becoming members. I cannot say the Russians are pleased about it. They are clearly not pleased about it. They are particularly sensitive, of course, to the three Baltic countries whom we strongly support for membership. But Russia has not mounted any type of campaign to stop it, and I think Russia understands that it is the right of the NATO allies to make this decision under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I should also say, Senator, that we have worked very, very hard in the last two administrations, beginning with President Clinton and now with President Bush, to make sure that we have a good NATO-Russia relationship. We have a new NATO-Russia Council which we inaugurated under President Bush's leadership last May. It is working well. I sit in it. Every month we have a meeting of the 20 Ambassadors, the 19 NATO Ambassadors and the Russian Ambassador. We have been working on theater missile defense to see if there are synergies between us that would lead us to cooperate in theater missile defense in Europe. We have worked on WMD proliferation, on the counter-terrorist threat. We have worked in trying to help protect our civilian populations from chemical and biological attacks. So these are real projects. We think the NATO-Russia Council is off to a good start and we think in general the NATO-Russia relationship is very healthy right now.

Senator CHAFEE. You mentioned their hesitancy about the three Baltic countries. Why is that?

Ambassador BURNS. Among the seven countries that are seeking membership in the alliance, the three Baltic countries were illegally occupied by the Soviet Union between May 1940 and September 1991. So some Russians tend to be either wrongly nostalgic for that period or they are sensitive because these three countries are contiguous to western Russia.

It is our very firm belief that these are three of the strongest candidates for membership, that they are superbly well qualified, and obviously, given their democratic dispositions, the democratic base of all three countries, they represent no threat whatsoever to the Russian Federation, and I think the lack of a Russian campaign here to try to derail NATO enlargement, either before the Prague summit or during this period of ratification, is testimony to the fact that the Russians do understand that these countries can be friends and partners of Russia in the future.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. So you 20 Ambassadors meet monthly. Is that right? Is that what you said? Monthly?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir, we do. Under the new NATO-Russia Council, we meet monthly, and actually we have meetings every day at various levels at NATO among Russian and NATO diplomats on all the issues that I mentioned.

Senator CHAFEE. I would like to switch course a little bit. In your opening statement, you said just as we will have to rebuild Iraq, we will have to bring NATO back to the consensus and unity that marked the Prague summit just 4 months ago, obviously alluding to the fractures that exist in the last few months. How bad are those fractures?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I think that the deliberations that we had over the defense of Turkey were very damaging to the alliance. As Secretary General Robertson said in his inimitable fashion, NATO took a hit, but it was above the water line not below the water line. But we took a hit and there is still smoke coming from that hit.

Because the essence of NATO, of course, is Article 4 and Article 5. When our allies are in trouble, we come to their assistance. We do not debate it for 2 months. We do not say, well, we will do it next time. We do not say we will do it later. We come to their assistance, and that is what the United States felt, that we had a question of principle here. We were very strongly opposed to the view of France and Germany and Belgium. We thought that the fact that they held out and they blocked the discussions, we thought that was dangerous and obstructionist.

I think now we have got to repair that frayed fabric that has held NATO together for 54 years. This is one of the reasons why Secretary Powell will be going to Brussels tomorrow night and Thursday to begin a discussion to try to bind up these fissures and to try to make sure that we are all going off united to tackle the very important problems that a number of the Senators and that you have mentioned as well. We think that can be done.

But France, in particular, has got to decide how it can show us that it wants to be part of the future of the alliance, that it wants to work with us, that it wants to be part of the solution, a country that can say yes at NATO, not just a country that can say no. I think that is an obligation that France has now. We have had these discussions with the French Government and we think we will be stronger if the French Government would play a full role in NATO, if we can operate at 19. But we are prepared to operate at 18, should that be necessary.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. I see my time has run out. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

I want to recognize now Senator Allen. Perhaps as you now know, Ambassador, Senator Allen, as the chairman of our Subcommittee on European Affairs, has already been working through the hearings on European matters. So I appreciate that and wanted to sound that note in recognizing him this morning.

Senator ALLEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We did have a very good hearing on the 27th of March. It is good to see Ambassadors Jurgenson, Usackas, Ducaru, and Kracun with us, as well as the DCMs Kmec, Eichmanis, and Yalnazov here.

VOICE. And the Ambassador is here. I am here.

Senator ALLEN. And the Ambassador is here this time as well.

The seven aspirant countries and their Ambassadors and DCMs are very much like associate members of this committee as we discuss the issues of NATO expansion.

I look on our second panel, Bruce Jackson here—and I mentioned this in the last hearing that when I was Governor of Virginia, I worked with Bruce and after my term, in advocacy of the expansion of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. As Senator Biden was ranking member at that hearing, we have all looked at that as very positive for our country. And the seven aspirant countries have met all their criteria. In fact, reading through Bruce Jackson's remarks, they are pretty much my extended remarks from the previous hearing. So we are still in agreement.

The State Department and the Defense people who testified all recognize the value politically and militarily of NATO with the expansion of these seven aspirant countries and how they are already, de facto members and how they are helping politically in the war on terrorism, some sending actual troops and capabilities into Afghanistan or into the Balkan area.

This country, and I think in particular with you, Mr. Ambassador, listening to you with your steadiness, with your knowledge, and your articulate diplomacy, is very, very well served. Your patience with some of these difficult issues on this bridge, this Atlantic Brücke, our German friends might call it, cannot be frayed. We are doing what we think is right to serve and protect the security of our country, and it is important to note that the vast majority of European countries and NATO countries are on our side helping us out.

Now, what I would like for you to share with us—and I think it was in response to Senator Hagel is expound on the scenario of the likelihood of NATO's involvement in the rebuilding of Iraq. What will be the issues in making the decision, and what role would they take? When we talk about just the problems we ran into in the decision to eventually defend Turkey, regardless I think this is going to be a much more difficult situation. What would you foresee as the issues, the decisionmaking process?

And once the military action is concluded, it is not going to be a situation where the consensus building can drag on for weeks and months. Action is going to need to be taken quickly. So if you could share with us a scenario whereby and the issues that will arise in making a decision by NATO to actually participate in the reconstruction or rebuilding of Iraq.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much. Let me just say first, as I answer that question, that six of the seven invited countries are a part of our coalition in Iraq, and all seven were signatories of a letter of the Vilnius-10. You remember that letter from February supporting the position of the United States during the United Nations debate. So we very much value what they have done.

A number of the countries that are at issue today for membership in the alliance have also taken decisions in their Parliaments that when the conflict ends, they will be present. And we would think that that would be an opportunity for them, if NATO does go in, for them to be present with NATO. So we very much would

like these countries to be with us, and I think the results are good so far.

Of the 18 NATO allies of the United States, 12 are members of the coalition, and that is no coincidence because we train together. We are interoperable, but we have a common political vision. We have suggested that once the conflict ends, NATO should be present in Iraq because there will be a long-term commitment that all of us in the international community will have to make to that country.

Think of the requirements. We will certainly need peacekeeping. We will need, as I said before, to think about reconstruction of the country and delivery of humanitarian supplies to the people of the country. There will be a need to find and secure and dispose of the weapons of mass destruction.

No one is suggesting from our government that NATO can take on this responsibility in totality. Obviously, the United States and our coalition partners are going to have a major responsibility for what happens in Iraq after the conflict has ended. President Bush has spoken—he did in the Azores summit—about the need for U.N. Security Council resolutions. Most of our NATO allies are telling us that they would need to see and to have some kind of umbrella U.N. Security Council resolution that would, in essence, allow them to make the decision to be part of any effort.

But, Senator, I must tell you it has been interesting. Since Paul Wolfowitz put these ideas on the table at NATO in December 2002, some of our allies have been reluctant to even bring it to discussion, and that is because the French and the Germans and the Belgians and some others were linking what was happening in the U.N. Security Council in January, February and March to what was happening at NATO, and they did not even want us to begin a discussion because they thought that would hurt what they were trying to accomplish, we felt wrongly, in the U.N. Security Council.

So now that that debate is past and that the coalition is taking action, and that we soon have to face our responsibilities to help the Iraqi people recover from a Saddam regime and from the war, we would like NATO to get to that debate as soon as possible.

As to whether or not we can be successful, I frankly do not know. I think it will be up to some of those countries that have resisted the conversation until now to decide if they want to use NATO in part as one of the international participants in the reconstruction of Iraq. We hope that they will be willing to do that because we think the alliance is always stronger when we work together. But that is a question really for them, and we look forward to discussing this with them I think quite intensively in the weeks ahead.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

I recognize now Senator Voinovich who, as you have already acknowledged, has been present at the Prague summit, and who was a very active participant even prior to his coming onto this committee. We are grateful that he is with us now, and I recognize him for his questions.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador. I recall what a wonderful meeting we had in May of last year when I visited Brussels after visiting Slovakia and Slovenia and being at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Bulgaria.

I also appreciate your giving me an opportunity when the chairman spoke to the NATO Ambassadors that you brought here to Washington last June, if you recall, I kind of was like a Dutch uncle and suggested to them that they needed to step up to the table and fulfill their commitments to NATO, that we were doing our fair share, but some of them were not fulfilling their obligations to NATO.

I think at the Prague summit, there was a consensus that the DCI did not work; and they came back with some recommendations called the Prague Capabilities Commitment. At that meeting, the heads of state said NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.

In discussing NATO's future contributions, how does the NATO Response Force factor into that? Really, what I would like you to comment on is, has NATO defined the responsibilities of the member countries and the aspirants and identified what the commitments will be? Has that been worked out yet, or are we kind of doing it on an ad hoc basis? I know the aspirants are participating. They have helped out with Afghanistan and they hopefully will be helping with Iraq. But the real issue is, are we doing this by just responding to situations and developing capabilities as we move along? Or has anybody sat down and looked at the big picture and said, here is what respective countries can participate in? Do the aspirant countries have any idea at all about what niche they would play in this new NATO capability?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you very much. I remember very well your visit to NATO, and we appreciated the fact that you took the time to come to Brussels and spend time with us and give us your advice. We hope you come again.

On Prague Capabilities Commitments, that was the centerpiece in many ways of the Prague summit on the military side because we recognize that NATO as a whole does not now have the right mix of military capabilities to take on these expeditionary missions to places like Afghanistan in the future.

So what we have done is, we have built four consortia. There is an airlift consortium headed by Germany, which is seeking to purchase or release airlift for the future. There is a sealift consortium headed by Norway and Denmark. There is a precision-guided munitions consortium headed by the Dutch, and they have already made a lot of progress in replenishing NATO countries' stocks of precision-guided munitions. You have seen how important they are to the United States and to the United Kingdom in Iraq. And there is a consortium on air-to-air refueling headed by Spain.

We have focused on these four core military capabilities as the key capabilities that are currently missing from NATO's collective

arsenal and that are critical for the new missions that we anticipate will be the core of what NATO does, out-of-area missions, far from European garrisons in Europe itself in places like Central and South Asia, in the Middle East. We do not want to have an alliance develop where only the United States, the United Kingdom, and France and a couple of other countries have these full-scale capabilities. As I said before, we hope that when our Defense Ministers meet on the 12th and 13th of June in Brussels, that we will see some progress there.

We are involving the seven invited nations into our deliberations. They have been fully briefed on what we decided at Prague. I meet with the seven Ambassadors in Brussels every 2 weeks.

Senator VOINOVICH. So generally, you have discussed what their capabilities are and how they might ultimately fit into the overall picture. One of the things that I was worried about is that some of the countries were making decisions in terms of their own military forces and spending money and wondered whether or not those decisions would be in accord with what they might be asked to do in terms of their NATO responsibilities.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, we have tried to integrate them fully into this effort. So to give you an example, we have obviously counseled some of the smaller nations, the three Baltic nations, for instance, that if they can find a specialization, a niche military capability, that can be part of these multinational efforts, that will be the best addition they can make to NATO. And they have done that. As you know, they have formed the Baltic battalion that has been present both in the Balkans as well as Afghanistan, and we very much appreciate their willingness to think strategically in this fashion.

The Romanians have an unusual capability. They were able to use their own airlift to send a mechanized battalion to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan last July. Romania did what few current allies could do.

So we think the invited nations are on the right track. They are integrating into the military side of the alliance so that if the Senate gives its advice and consent, they will hit the ground running in May 2004 when they become members.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Biden, do you have additional questions?

Senator BIDEN. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel?

Senator HAGEL. No.

Senator BIDEN. Actually, I have one, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator BIDEN. Has France considered, in order to have greater influence, as they say, joining up fully with NATO, totally integrating in order to be able to impact on some of the decisions? If they had, you would not have been able to deftly move discussion of support for Turkey, as you did. I mean, is there any talk about that?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, there has been very little talk about France reintegrating in NATO's integrated military structure. It would be our hope that France would make that decision.

It was de Gaulle's decision in March 1966 to bring them out, and there has been in that sense kind of an ambivalence, if you will, about France's role in NATO ever since.

Our view is that NATO is always stronger at 19 and hopefully at 26 in the future. We would like France to come back and to make that decision, but it is clearly a decision that the French Government has to make. We cannot make it for them. But following these events in February, we very much hope that the French will support some of the issues that your colleagues have been asking about, NATO Response Force, a new command structure, new military capabilities, and new missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We hope France will be part of the solution on all those issues.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of course, Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. When I talked to the Ambassador last May, one of the issues I talked about was organized crime. I know that the OSCE is working in that area, that SECI is involved in that area, that the EU is involved. Is NATO involved at all in this consortium of groups that are coming together to deal with this problem that is very, very prevalent in that part of the world and really demands that there be some organized effort to respond to it?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, NATO has been involved in the Balkans very much in trying to help the local authorities combat organized crime because of our long-term presence in Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. So we have been active there. It is not the kind of issue where NATO would naturally take the lead because we are essentially a military alliance, but when we have a long-term presence, obviously we have got to be involved in all sorts of issues to try to be helpful.

What we have done with the seven invited nations is to review this issue very carefully with each of them, as well as the issue of corruption. I met with the seven Foreign Ministers last Wednesday in Brussels when they were there for the signing of the Accession Protocols. I raised this issue of corruption and organized crime with each of the Foreign Ministers of the seven invited countries. All of them acknowledged that there are problems in their countries. That is no surprise to us. We have some of the same problems sometimes even in our own countries among the NATO members. And all of them assured us that they are dedicated to working on this and to working with us to try to reduce it as far as that is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Ambassador Burns, we thank you again for your testimony. I would just extend the appreciation of all of our members for your articulate ability really to define what is occurring in each country, both those who are members of NATO, as well as the aspirants, and the particular contributions and ways that you personally in behalf of our government have been working with those countries, both old and new. It is a very impressive set of facts and your testimony has been remarkable, as always. We appreciate your coming.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thank you for inviting me today. Thank you for all the questions. I am obviously available to you

and to all the members, should that be necessary, by phone or fax or visit.

If I could just conclude on one point. I have very much appreciated, when I was Ambassador to Greece, but now Ambassador to NATO, the visits by Members of the Congress. It helps us to do our job and it helps us to receive the guidance and support that you have. I have seen each of you in those places, and I look forward to future visits as well.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for that invitation.

It is now the pleasure of the chair to call forward Mr. Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional Democracies in Washington, DC, and Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, senior transatlantic fellow, the German Marshall Fund, Washington, DC.

Gentlemen, I will ask you to testify in the order that I introduced you. As was the case with the previous witness, your full statements will be made a part of the record, and you may proceed in ways that you wish. Mr. Jackson.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For someone who has been a student of the leadership of this committee for 8 years, it is a great privilege to have an opportunity to testify before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. JACKSON. In the interest of time, I will just summarize the main elements and get to some of the points Senator Biden correctly raised in his questions to Ambassador Burns.

With regard to the candidates themselves, I would just like to state we are confronting a political decision, and the body of what I have written out makes two arguments. One, that these democracies have matured at different rates, but basically they have reached a point where we have all concluded they do, in fact, share our values and the basic principles of the Washington alliance.

As you look through them, they have defined their democracies in different ways.

Lithuania has been exceptional in its treatment of its past and Holocaust rissues.

Latvia has been extraordinary in the way it has reached out to Russian minorities and basically defined a whole new enlightened look at how we handle minority issues in Europe.

Estonia's commitment to market reforms has really led the way toward the European Union and created a model for how we work with Russia, the new relationship with Russia, which in a way answers Senator Chafee's questions, that were it not for the Baltics, we would not have the new relationship with Russia today.

In Slovakia, its triumph over the forces of Meciar and extremism has been profound, and what they have done in the last 5 years is extraordinary. And they are now the first center-right reformist government in Europe to be returned by an overwhelming mandate, which is a confirmation of the maturity of this democracy.

Slovenia was the first country to tell us that they could actually resist tyranny themselves alone in 1990 and 1991. Frankly, they

have done the most to educate their populace about the responsibilities of NATO, and the new results from their referendum is really quite extraordinary. This is the first of the Yugoslav states that have basically triumphed over their predicament.

In the south, Romania has showed us that reform of the military, very large militaries, while working with 23 million people, is possible.

Bulgaria's diplomacy continues to distinguish itself by its assistance to us and in the Security Council.

So all of these countries have basically chosen their own way after 1989 but have, indeed, defined themselves as democracies. Obviously, there is more work to be done and clearly Senator Voinovich is right that corruption is the most profound issue that we should continue to work on. We should continue to talk to our allies—frankly all of them—about this danger. Corruption is the one thing that can kill a new democracy.

With regard to their contributions, I think we should also take a wide view. I do not know how we calculate the military or strategic value of the solidarity of President Freiberga, or the non-governmental organizations of Slovakia in working to overthrow Milosevic. Frankly, Romania and Bulgaria have today forces in being twice what the European Union will have in 10 years. They already exist, already available, already committed to the alliance. So both in terms of their principles, in terms of their contributions, I think the committee members are right to say that these countries are very well qualified to enter the alliance.

Turning to the question of NATO's future that Senator Biden talked about, the road in front of us, I would just like to quickly review where these countries came from because I had the opportunity to write a briefing that became known as the Big Bang several years ago. The argument in that briefing was the inclusion of these seven countries confers certain strategic advantages to NATO and other moral benefits for the community of nations. There are five elements to this claim.

One, that the invitation to the Baltic countries would bring a comprehensive peace to the Baltic and Nordic region and set the stage for a new relationship between Europe and Russia. This seems to have occurred.

The inclusion of Slovakia would create a coherent center and close the door to transnational crime, making Europe safe for historic neutrals, and basically set up a situation where Ukraine could reconsider its relationship with Europe.

The inclusion of Slovenia would create a model for post-Yugoslav success and accelerate the democratization of the Balkans.

The invitations to Romania and Bulgaria would bring a southern dimension to NATO, which would limit transnational threats to the western Balkans, bring Turkey and Greece closer to Europe, and begin to set the stage for a security structure in the Black Sea.

Collectively, these invitations would signal the strategic integration of Southeast Europe within Euro-Atlantic institutions which could resonate as far away as Cyprus and the Caucasus.

So these initial hopes have been realized to a far greater extent than the founders of the Vilnius Group could have realized in the year 2000. And Dr. Brzezinski has begun to talk about this as the

third and final phase of European history. This transformation that began in 1989 has essentially completed two phases, and we are now beginning a final stage of transformation.

My argument here would be that in this final stage lies the answer to Senator Biden's question, that basically NATO has this key role, and has since 1989, in extending the peace. And we have an opportunity in this round of expansion to continue the extension of peace that Steve Hadley and others have talked about over the last year.

It seems to me we have excellent chances over the next 5 or 6 years to bring in countries in the western Balkans, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, to build an enduring peace as we have done in the north in the Baltic region and to use NATO as central in rebuilding our relationship with Turkey, developing a Black Sea system, reaching out to Ukraine. And it is all along these frontiers of freedom—these are the new missions for NATO which have implications for our security. So the mission of NATO should be nothing less than to set the stage for the completion of Europe in this next decade, and these seven countries in the alliance will improve our chances of success.

Taking the two questions that are topical and of the day, which may come up at the same time the Senate considers this treaty, we look at structural changes to the treaty itself. This is a case where I think one could argue that a good political case might make bad treaty law.

The first suggestion is on the majority voting system is an effort to constrain France by restricting decisionmaking. It seems to me that this would have the opposite effect. Majority decisionmaking would give rise to factions within NATO which would attempt to achieve slim majorities to the detriment of our leadership. The rise of factionalism would inevitably lead to the passage of half-baked schemes with the United States in the dissenting minority. And over time, the erosion of U.S. leadership in NATO would precipitate a decline in American political support for our security commitments in Europe. At present, the United States is the only country that can produce unanimous outcomes at the level of the NAC or, failing that, the DPC. It seems to me that the process of achieving this unanimity uniquely favors the United States. The countries whose ratification you are considering are aghast that NATO might consider weakening U.S. leadership in NATO, which is the very aspect of NATO they most admire and have drawn them toward us, just as their democracies have reached the threshold of membership.

The second suggestion is that we need an exclusion clause to protect the institutions from members who deviate from the principles of the alliance or fall short on human rights. One, we have not needed that standard for the last 54 years.

But in my view, this expulsion clause would invariably be employed against the vulnerable and never against the deplorable. It is easy to envision a 1930's NATO expelling Czechoslovakia for their mistreatment of the Germans immediately before an invasion or concluding that the abduction of Christian children, in quotes, by the Jews of Warsaw relieved the alliance of the obligation to defend Poland. And today, if Turkey were threatened by military at-

tack, I am certain there would be a motion to conclude that deteriorating human rights conditions obviated any obligation to honor Article 5 commitments. I have deliberatedly overstated all this, but the automaticity of Article 5 is the soul and genius of the Washington Treaty. A provision to expel would introduce a corrosive mental reservation in the commitment to defend an embattled democracy and would completely debilitate the alliance we have built so carefully.

It seems to me that this committee and the Senate have a far better option. The Senate can significantly strengthen the constituency, character, and resolve of the alliance by ratifying the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as NATO members. This affirmative action would improve the security of the United States, and I think more importantly strengthen the moral and political fabric of the alliance.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my summary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the case for NATO enlargement and the qualifications of the seven countries which have been invited to join the Alliance. I would also like to offer a strategic context for the decision the Senate is being asked to ratify and to suggest how this enlargement will further shape and strengthen NATO.

I.

The decision at the NATO Summit at Prague to invite seven countries to join NATO was a major step in the post-war strategy of the United States to build a Europe that is whole and free. Assuming we count the reunification of Germany as a *de facto* enlargement, the so-called "Vilnius States" whose ratification is before the Senate will constitute the sixth round of enlargement since the formation of the Alliance in 1949. A brief review of NATO's history suggests that there are several misconceptions about the current round.

Many people believe that this will be the largest round of enlargement in history since the Senate may consent to the ratification of seven states. But NATO has always been as much of an alliance between peoples as an alliance between governments so population may be a better guide. Next to Spain which entered in 1982 and East Germany during reunification, the combined population of the Vilnius States of 43 million constitutes one of the smallest enlargements to date. Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999 were all significantly larger in terms of population and physical size.

Many people believe that the seven Vilnius democracies are weaker militarily than their predecessors. This is also a misperception. In 1955, when West Germany was invited to join the Alliance, it had no army and no budget for defense. Today, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia have well-trained self-defense forces, regional security arrangements such as BALTBAT, and have achieved or are approaching defense budgets of 2% of GDP. The two larger countries, Romania and Bulgaria, can tell an even more impressive story. After downsizing and modernization, the end-strength of Romanian forces will be approximately 75,000 and Bulgarian forces approximately 45,000. Together, Romanian and Bulgarian forces in being are twice the size of what the European Union defense force might be in ten years. More importantly, Romanian and Bulgarian forces are deployable today to most of the contingencies the EU fictional force could not deploy to tomorrow.

Some critics have suggested that the quality of democracy in the Vilnius states is somehow more fragile and potentially reversible than the democracy in existing NATO states. While it is true that democracy in the Vilnius states flowered after the Revolution of 1989 making them some of Europe's newest democracies, their youth in an historical context does not indicate a weakness of civic society. In fact, the opposite is true. Few countries in recent European history have struggled longer for their freedom or worked harder to build democratic institutions than the countries under consideration by the Senate. Although these evaluations are highly subjective, it would seem to me that the democratic credentials of the seven Vilnius

states are superior to Greece, Turkey and West Germany at the time of their invitations and comparable favorably to where Polish, Czech and Hungarian democracies were at the time of the Senate's ratification in 1998. In some ways, the energy and enthusiasm of Europe's new democracies make them more robust than the older democracies of Western Europe and more resistant to extremism and political backsliding. This Committee should also be aware that there has been no instance where democracy has been overturned or reversed in Central and Eastern Europe since the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

Finally, some critics have argued that this round of enlargement is exceptional because of the absence of a Soviet threat and the appearance that the decision of the nineteen NATO Heads of State at Prague was motivated by political reasons, rather than presumably more legitimate calculations of military advantage. Here again, NATO's history conflicts with this view. There has been no Soviet threat during the last three rounds of NATO enlargement in 1982, 1991 and 1999. When the Senate ratified the accession of Spain in 1982 in a unanimous voice vote, there was no threat to Spain posed by Soviet tank armies. It is quite clear from commentary at the time that Franco and the last vestiges of Spanish fascism had finally died and that it was time for Spain to rejoin the community of shared values. Every decision to expand the alliance of democracies has been a political act in the finest sense of the term "political." Both German enlargement and German reunification were part of the great project of rebuilding a democratic Germany. Greece and Turkey were not invited because they were strong, but precisely because, if they remained isolated, they would remain weak and vulnerable. For the past fifty-four years, the central decisions on membership have been guided by the belief that there is a natural tendency of democracies to ally with one another in a collective effort to defend themselves and the values they share.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bradtke, in his testimony before you last week cited Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which speaks to the political question at the heart of the Senate decision on ratification. Article 10 permits the NATO allies to invite "any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." I would like to turn to the qualifications of the seven invited countries in light of these two criteria: democratic principles and the willingness to contribute to security.

II.

President Bush in his historic speech at Warsaw University said that he believed the community of European states which share our values and are prepared to share our responsibilities stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Let me begin with the Baltic States and focus on how each state has defined its democracy and where they stand on individual contributions.

Lithuania: Apart from the role Lithuanian freedom fighters played between 1989 and 1990 in regaining their independence, the signal achievement of Lithuanian democracy has been its handling of issues surrounding the Holocaust. For a nation that was itself brutally victimized by Nazi Germany and held captive by Stalin and his Soviet successors, the complicity of Lithuanian citizens in the destruction of the Jewish community in Vilnius and their nation's subsequent indifference to Jewish survivors came as an unwelcome shock to this generation of Lithuanians. Nevertheless, consecutive Lithuanian Governments made Lithuania's painful past their priority. As a result, Holocaust education is taught at all levels of Lithuania's educational system. Torah scrolls have been returned to the Jewish Community. The restoration of the Jewish Quarter in Vilnius is beginning and legislation is being prepared to enable the restitution of communal property. While more work needs to be done, Lithuania's commitment to come to terms with its past should give us great confidence in its future. Lithuanians have taken the time to build a foundation of religious tolerance and historical understanding for their democracy. These values are the core principles of the Alliance.

With regard to Lithuania's willingness to contribute to security, there can be no serious question. Lithuania is already contributing to NATO operations in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and is sending military medical personnel and logistics experts to Iraq. From the beginnings of the Vilnius Group in May 2000, it has been obvious why the new democracies chose Vilnius. Lithuania has been stalwart on security issues from the days of Popular Front and an advocate for solidarity with the United States throughout the Vilnius process. Lithuania and the six other countries I will discuss agreed in the Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries on February 5, 2003:

> Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are apart, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. . . . The clear and present danger posed by the Saddam Hussein's regime requires a united response from the community of democracies.

Latvia: Latvia has also distinguished itself in terms of the democratic transformation of its civic society. Possibly the greatest accomplishment of Latvian democracy has been the integration of Latvia's Russian-speaking minority. Despite 50 years of Soviet deportations and occupation, Riga has reached out to ethnic Russians who have come to regard themselves as Latvian by offering citizenship to tens of thousands, reducing fees and language barriers to naturalization, and removing bureaucratic barriers to political participation at all levels of elected office. There are many countries in Western Europe which fall short of the enlightened approach to the integration of minorities that Latvia has chosen. Secondly, the new government of Prime Minister Repse has launched a serious campaign to counter corruption. The Latvians have recognized that corruption is the single greatest threat to the growth and development of their democracy and taken steps to eradicate corruption at the governmental level. All the countries of the Vilnius Group have reached this same conclusion, and I will try to point out their different approaches.

Latvia is also a stand-out in its contributions to KFOR, ISAF and has authorized combat forces for deployment to support coalition operations in Iraq. Few Presidents in the history of the alliance have made a greater contribution to its political and moral leadership in as short a time as President Vaira Vike-Freiberga. Many believe (I think correctly) that the Latvian President has emerged as the moral and political successor to President Vaclav Havel. Consistent moral counsel and militant political solidarity may be the most enduring contribution a democracy can offer to the security of the Alliance.

Estonia: Estonia has focused its effort on sustained democratic and market reforms which have brought it to the forefront of EU accession in addition to the NATO invitation it secured in Prague. The Estonian model has not only resulted in significant economic success but also informs us of how market-oriented democracies can build cooperative and equitable relations with Russia. Estonia's role in leading the Baltic democracies into the European Union also serves to link NATO countries more closely with the Nordic states and will certainly influence Finland's decision in 2005 regarding a closer relationship with NATO.

Estonia's contributions to security compare favorably with its Baltic neighbors. Like Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia is supporting NATO operations in Kosovo and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and is preparing to deploy in support of peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The willingness of Estonians to contribute to the collective defense of the alliance is best illustrated by the oft-quoted remark of Prime Minister Sum Kallas to President Bush shortly before the war with Iraq:

> You don't have to tell us about Saddam Hussein. We have seen what happens when democracies are indecisive. That's when small countries like ours lose their freedom.

Slovakia: Because of its struggle for political stability since the Velvet Divorce, Slovakia's democratic credentials are, in many ways, the most impressive of all the Vilnius states. In the past five years, Slovaks have fought and won a hard fight with corruption, political extremism and primitive nationalism. The first anti-Meciar coalition elected in 1998 consisted of five disparate parties and ran the gamut of politics from left to right. Few thought it would survive for four years let alone succeed in major defense reforms and choose as its final act the enactment of funding for a Holocaust reparation program. As a result of the seriousness of purpose of this coalition of democratic parties, Meciar and other extremists were rejected conclusively in September 2002 and a second, stronger center-right coalition was reelected. The return of Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda's coalition is the first re-election of a center-right reform government in Central or Eastern Europe since the fall of the Wall. In itself, this is a huge achievement in a post-Communist electorate and a clear indication of the rapidly growing political maturity of Slovakia.

In addition to the sweeping reform of the Ministry of Defense I mentioned, the Slovak army has joint programs with the Indiana National Guard and has deployed peacekeepers to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Cyprus. Slovakia has also just deployed a company-size Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological unit capable of detection and demining to Kuwait to support coalition operations in Iraq. As impressive as these contributions are, this Committee should not overlook the political contributions of Slovakia to Euro-Atlantic security. In addition to a significant leadership

role within the Vilnius and Visegrad Groups, Slovak diplomacy and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) were at the forefront of the popular movement to overthrow the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Continuing the tradition of Charter 77, Bratislava is the center of activities for NGO's and human rights activists working for democratic change in the Balkans and in Europe's eastern neighbors.

Siovenia: In the last decade, Slovene democracy has faced slightly different challenges than the other invitees because of the difficult circumstances of Slovenia's independence. Whereas the Baltic States, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are all in some sense the children of 1989, Slovenia is more the oldest orphan of the death of Yugoslavia. In a remarkably short period of time, Slovenia has built a self-confident, coherent nation and an economic miracle in the ashes of Milosevic's first war of aggression. The greatest challenge faced by the Slovenes was to rebuild the trust of the people in governmental and Euro-Atlantic institutions, which had failed the Slovene people all too frequently in the past. The achievement in the recent referendum of 90% public support for EU membership and 66% public support for NATO membership is a watershed in the construction of Slovene democracy.

Sadly, the greatest contribution of Slovenia to Euro-Atlantic security is often forgotten. In 1990-1991, Slovene freedom fighters, such as Janez Jansa, met invading Serbian forces in the mountains of Slovenia and defeated them. The Slovene accomplishment can be compared with the heroic struggle of the Finns in the Winter War, albeit on a much smaller scale. Like the Finns, the fledgling Slovene state fought alone for its survival, without Western aid against a superior enemy, and years before the intervention of Allied forces. Quite without our help, Slovenia handed Milosevic his first defeat on the battlefield. In addition to its historical record, Slovenia has contributed humanitarian assistance and training to Afghanistan, military forces to NATO operations in Bosnia, and troops and equipment to SFOR and KFOR.

Romania: Romania is both the largest and most consequential strategically of the Vilnius Group. It is also widely regarded as the most dramatically improved democracy and economy in Central and Eastern Europe. The difficulties inherent in constructing democratic institutions after the civic devastation caused by the Ceaucescu regime were compounded throughout the 1990's by the recessionary effect of war in the Western Balkans and the sheer size of Romania's population. (More than half of the people whose countries may join NATO carry Romanian passports.) Against this forbidding backdrop, Romania has rebuilt a free and contentious press, multiple political parties, and a flowering artistic and literary community. While reforms often move too slowly in the Parliament and anti-corruption offices are still getting traction, the reform of the Ministry of Defense and Romanian security services has become the case study of success in bringing national security under civilian control and democratic oversight. On the economic front, former Prime Minister Isarescu, who now chairs the Romanian Central Bank, has instituted monetary reforms which have created the conditions for GDP growth rates of nearly 5% for the last three years. Moreover, this growth has been achieved organically, without significant foreign direct investment and in a recessionary European economy.

On defense contributions, Romania has been a stalwart even among contributors. Less than 48 hours after the September 11th attacks, Romania and Bulgaria granted blanket overflight rights, basing and port facilities, and full intelligence cooperation with U.S. forces. These contributions were approved by a unanimous vote of the Romanian Parliament despite the fact that the United States had not requested this assistance either formally or informally. Nevertheless, Romania and Bulgaria recognized that they had a responsibility to make assets and access available to U.S. and coalition forces. Romania has contributed military forces to every major NATO and coalition action in the last five years: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq to name but a few. Finally, Romania is the only country in Europe to deploy a battalion-strength combat force to Afghanistan using its own military airlift. Romania is already making concrete security contributions which exceed the military capabilities of some existing NATO members.

Bulgaria: Bulgaria has faced many of the same structural problems which Romania confronted and a few of its own. As one of the oldest nations in Europe, Bulgaria has a long tradition of religious and political tolerance and, in the post-Communist period, has succeeded in building robust political parties and a system of free and fair elections. Bulgaria's long history, however, is a mixed blessing. Bulgaria's natural conservatism and extended isolation from Western Europe have slowed the pace of market and judicial reforms and contributed to a sluggish economic environment, which, in turn, has contributed to an increasing alienation of the electorate.

Therefore, I disagree with the testimony given to this Committee on March 27th by Administration officials who suggested that the management of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is the greatest concern in Bulgarian democracy. I do not think

this analysis is correct. Despite the recent scandal of illegal arms sales, Minister of Defense Svinarov has held those responsible to account and continues to press for reform in the military services. The real threat to Bulgarian democracy lies in a profoundly corrupt judiciary system and the tolerance of corruption in the business community among the leaders of Parliament and Government. The greatest danger to Bulgaria's future is the penetration of the judiciary by transnational crime and the failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to investigate governmental corruption, organized crime or the manipulation of Bulgaria's media and political processes by foreign parties. Over the next 5-10 years, Bulgaria must devote a major effort to strengthening its judiciary and criminalizing corrupt business and political practices.

Although the pace of non-defense reforms has lagged other Vilnius Group democracies, Bulgaria's contributions to security, both militarily and politically, have been exemplary. Like Romania, Bulgaria has contributed troops and bases to all major NATO and coalition deployments. From the beginning, Bulgaria has steadfastly supported the United States in the war on terror and in coalition action against Iraq. It is also evident that U.S. diplomacy got as far as it did in the UN Security Council only as a result of the firm support and solidarity of Bulgaria in what must certainly have seemed to Bulgarians to be a thankless job. I think Americans should be immensely grateful for the loyalty of Bulgaria in this difficult and dangerous time.

I have tried to outline the specific challenges facing these seven democracies as well as their strengths and general willingness to contribute. I do not think we should expect every post-1989 democracy to develop at the same rate or to choose the identical path to self-definition. On balance, however, I believe that each of these countries is fully qualified in terms of democratic values and security contributions for membership in NATO. I would now like to turn to how these new members might shape a "New NATO" and contribute to its changing mission.

III.

Shortly after the Washington NATO Summit in 1999, I wrote a briefing which came to be known as the "Big Bang." This briefing proposed the inclusion of these seven countries in NATO and claimed for this enlargment strategic advantages for NATO and moral benefits for the democratic community of nations. On May 19, 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, these propositions were adopted by nine of Europe's new democracies as their own and became the objectives of the Vilnius Group. It might be useful to review these original claims in the light of NATO's new missions and continuing institutional adaptation.

There were five central elements to the argument for the "Big Bang."

1. The invitation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would bring a comprehensive peace to the entire Baltic Sea and Nordic region and set the stage for a new relationship between Europe and Russia.

2. The inclusion of Slovakia would create a coherent center in the alliance and close the door to transnational crime. This would make Europe safe for historic neutrals and allow countries like Ukraine the opportunity to redefine their relations with Europe.

3. The inclusion of Slovenia would create a model for post-Yugoslav success and accelerate the larger democratization of the Balkans.

4. Invitations to Romania and Bulgaria would bring a "Southern Dimension" to NATO. This "Southern Dimension" would limit transnational threats to the Western Balkans, serve to bring Turkey and Greece closer to Europe, and begin to create a security structure for the Black Sea.

5. Collectively, invitations to Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia would signal the strategic integration of Southeast Europe in Euro-Atlantic institutions and could bring states as far away as Cyprus and the Caucasus into a peaceful European system.

Surprisingly, these initial hopes for the Vilnius Group have been realized to a far greater extent than its founders had any right to expect. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed shortly after the Prague Summit that the invitation to the seven countries of the Vilnius Group marked the beginning of the third and final phase of contemporary European history. The transformation of Europe which began with the Revolution of 1989 has effectively completed two major phases. The first phase, the Visegrad, was marked by the integration of democratic nation-states with long European histories into modern Euro-Atlantic institutions. The second phase, the

Vilnius Group, saw European nation-states mature as democracies and integrate into the institutions of the West.

In the third phase, which began at the Prague Summit and whose conclusion will presumably mark the end of the period of Europe's post-war geopolitical transformation, states which are not adequately democratic, isolated from mainstream European history and, in some cases, still in the process of defining themselves as nations will attempt to become integrated European democracies. These states will define the borders of modern Europe. In my view, the mission of a new NATO is inextricably linked with these frontiers of freedom.

Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley defined NATO's strategy in a speech in Brussels on October 3, 2002. He said:

> The strategy has three pillars: We will defend the peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorist and outlaw regimes; we will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good relations among the world's great powers; and we will extend the peace by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe. As you can see from these three pillars this is a strategy that does not render NATO obsolete but rather envisions a central place for NATO.

The integration of the seven Vilnius states in NATO will create a stronger, more inclusive alliance which can turn its attention to the final stage of this defining period in European history. This third phase will undoubtedly be the most complex of this historical period and in some ways may be the most critical to long-term Euro-Atlantic security. Where we find ourselves politically five years in the future will be where we stand geopolitically for the following fifty years. Stephen Hadley is right to remind us that NATO is "the critical vehicle" for this task.

Therefore, we should not define the New NATO solely in terms of its capabilities, lest it become a tool kit without a purpose. Nor should we define NATO exclusively as an expeditionary force, which would only serve to create a Foreign Legion for out-of-area peacekeeping and garrison duties. The mission of the New NATO is to extend the peace.

Over the next five years, we have excellent chances to bring the remaining three Vilnius countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, into Euro-Atlantic institutions, thereby building an enduring security structure in the Balkans. In the few short months since the Prague Summit, these three countries and the United States have developed an Adriatic Charter which will serve to accelerate democratic reform and provide a roadmap to EU and NATO membership. NATO will be central in rebuilding our relationship with Turkey and, perhaps, developing a Black Sea security system linking the South Caucasus to their neighbors around the Black Sea. Ukraine is also seeking a new relationship with Europe and with NATO. All along the frontiers of freedom, there are missions for NATO which have major implications for Euro-Atlantic security. The mission of NATO should be nothing less than to set the stage for the completion of Europe before the end of this decade. An alliance with the seven nations of the Vilnius Group will improve our chances of success in this great endeavor.

IV.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to this Committee to consider the proposed amendment to the Washington Treaty on the merits of these seven democracies. Last week in the Senate Armed Services Committee, frustration with French diplomacy introduced two questions of structural change in the Washington Treaty apart from the question of ratification. These changes would be a great mistake and serve as a cautionary example of how a good political case can make bad law.

The first suggestion is that NATO might adopt a majority voting system in an effort to limit France's ability to obstruct prompt decision-making. Unhappily, this change would have the opposite effect. Majority decision-making would give rise to factions within NATO which would attempt to achieve slim majorities to the detriment of U.S. interests and leadership. The rise of factionalism would lead inevitably to the passage of half-baked schemes with the United States in the dissenting minority. Over time, the erosion of U.S. leadership in NATO would precipitate the decline of American political support for our security commitments in Europe. At present, the United States is the only country that can consistently produce unanimous outcomes at the level of the North Atlantic Council or, failing in that, at the Defense Planning Committee. The process of achieving unanimity is uniquely and, perhaps intentionally, to the advantage of the United States. The countries whose ratification is before this Committee are aghast that the Senate might consider weakening U.S. leadership in NATO, which is the aspect of NATO they most ad-

mire, just as their democracies reach the threshold of membership. I share their concern.

The second suggestion is even more pernicious. Some have suggested that NATO needs an expulsion clause to protect the institution from members who deviate from the principles of the alliance or otherwise fail to maintain accepted standards of human rights. Notwithstanding the fact that this clause has not been necessary for fifty-four years and that NATO membership has been the most effective mechanism for democratic reform we have found since 1989, advocates maintain we need to protect NATO from hypothetical bad actors.

In my view, an expulsion clause would invariably be employed against the vulnerable and never against the deplorable. It is easy to envision a 1930's NATO expelling Czechoslovakia for their "mistreatment" of ethnic Germans immediately before Hitler's invasion or concluding that the "abduction of Christian children" by the Jews of Warsaw relieved the Atlantic Alliance of the obligation to defend Poland. And, today, if Turkey were threatened with military attack, I am certain there would be a motion to conclude that deteriorating human rights conditions obviated any obligation to honor NATO's Article 5 commitment. Although I have overstated for the purpose of effect, my point is that no country could fully rely on Article 5, if the members of the Alliance harbored the option to expel. The automaticity of Article 5 is the soul and the genius of the Washington Treaty. A provision to expel would introduce a corrosive mental reservation in the commitment to defend an embattled democracy and would completely debilitate the most powerful military alliance ever created.

This Committee and the Senate of the United States have a far better option. The Senate can significantly strengthen the constituency, character and resolve of the Alliance by ratifying the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia as NATO members. This affirmative action would improve the security of the United States and strengthen the moral and political fabric of the alliance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson.

Now, Dr. Asmus.

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. ASMUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Voinovich. I, too, am going to briefly summarize my statement so we can maximize the time we have for discussion, particularly with Senators who I have had the honor to work with so closely in the past.

But first, I would just like to note that it's not only a pleasure to be here, but it is also a historical moment. The vision of Europe whole and free stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea is now truly within our reach for the first time. And I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the leaders and peoples of those seven countries that received invitations at Prague and whose Ambassadors and DCMs are sitting behind me. As we all know, this is a very special moment for them and a vindication of their hard work and perseverance over many years.

It is also a special moment for those Americans who helped make this day reality as well. In particular, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator Biden, for the leadership that you and this committee have shown over the last decade. Were it not for the leadership of this committee, I do not think we would be here today celebrating this particular round of NATO enlargement.

At the same time, we all know that we are meeting a time when NATO is in trouble. While we celebrate the extension of the boundaries of freedom and security eastward, we are also facing one of the biggest crises in the alliance's history. An alliance committed

to dealing with the problems of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction finds itself unable to do so in the real world when confronted with Saddam Hussein. NATO is probably more divided and marginalized at a moment in time when we, the United States, need that unity, solidarity, and support more than ever.

Indeed, in recent days as I was preparing to testify before the committee today, people have also asked me; why are we enlarging NATO when it seems to be in a process of decline? My answer is that we still need to do so but that we also have to address the question of where this alliance is headed. But let me first start with the three reasons why I think enlargement is still very important in spite of those larger problems we face.

First, let us not lose sight of what we set out to accomplish by opening NATO's door, namely to lock in a new peace order in Europe following the end of the cold war and, to make sure that the prospect of armed conflict in the eastern half of the continent became as remote as it has become in the western half. To a large degree, we have succeeded in doing that, and that is an historic accomplishment.

Second, as Americans, we wanted to enlarge NATO to help ensure that a future President would never again have to face the prospect of fighting a major war in Europe. And at a time when we are at war in Iraq, and may face a major crisis in Korea, I often ask myself: imagine what the world would be like if we also faced an unstable Europe. And I think it is a true vindication of this policy over the last decade that we can turn and pivot, as Nick Burns said, to face these new problems, knowing and being confident that Europe is at peace, stable and secure. Because if we had to face three major crises at the same time, we truly, truly would be in trouble as the United States.

But third, let us also remember that it was our hope that as Europe became more secure, our European allies would raise their geopolitical horizon and would become allies not only in securing the peace in Europe, but also in facing a new set of challenges from beyond Europe that we knew or sensed were headed our way. In other words, we hoped not only to lock in a new peace in Europe, but to gain new allies who would join us in addressing the new threats of the post-cold war era.

I think September 11 has validated each of these points. There is not a day that goes by where we should not be grateful that the U.S. President, for perhaps the first time in nearly a century, does not have to worry about a major conflict breaking out on the continent that could draw in the United States. And as has been said here today, we note that among those allies supporting us in Iraq today are those new allies of the last round and this round of NATO enlargement. That is why NATO enlargement still makes sense.

But this brings me to what I think is the key question we need to focus on. What do we do, apart from enlargement, to address the very real crisis we face today across the Atlantic? How do we revitalize NATO once the war in Iraq is over and the dust is settled?

The core question we face today is a simple one and, Senators, both of you alluded to it in your opening statements. What is NATO's mission in a world where communism is gone and Europe

is increasingly safe and secure? Should its job be limited to maintaining peace on the continent, a continent that is increasingly secure, or do we want to retool it to address the new threats, the Afghanistans and Iraqs of the future?

On paper, we have all—all of us, not just the United States, but our European allies—answered that question by saying we want to transform NATO to face the new threats of the 21st century. We have done so because we know that if NATO is not relevant to these central strategic questions of our day, it will not play a central role in our thinking.

The problem is that we have agreed to do it on paper, but we have not figured out how to do it effectively in practice. Indeed, NATO has thus far failed to find common ground on how to deal with these threats and that divide—which we see most clearly in Iraq today—now truly threatens the alliance. The alliance worked during the cold war because there was a shared sense of risk and responsibility. That was the glue that kept us together. During the nineties the glue that kept us together was the consensus that NATO had to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans and anchor Central and Eastern Europe to the West.

Today we do not have, or have not yet found, that same sense of shared risk and shared responsibility. Somewhere between Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. and many of our European allies lost each other. Moreover, the sad truth is that today there is no systematic strategic dialog taking place across the Atlantic to heal the rift that has emerged.

One day someone is going to write a great book about how this all happened. But the question we need to focus on today is not apportioning blame, but looking forward. And once enlargement is ratified, I believe the administration, as well as this committee, must focus quickly on how to pick up the pieces and rebuild the alliance. And we must do so with the same degree of intensity and commitment that the enlargement issue has received over the last decade. If 10 years from now, historians look back on today's hearings and conclude that we enlarged NATO only to have it fade into irrelevance, then we all will have truly failed.

Let me conclude by saying I think it is critical for the U.S. Senate to ratify this round of enlargement quickly and enthusiastically. It will help complete the work of the 20th century in securing a Europe whole and free. It will send a signal that we are still committed to our alliances in Europe at a time when people question that commitment.

At the same time, we need to start thinking now about how to repair the alliance once the war in Iraq is over, and to pursue that goal with the same degree of dedication and perseverance as we have pursued NATO enlargement.

In these moments of trouble across the Atlantic, I often ask myself: what would Harry Truman and that generation of leaders be doing today or want us to do today? As you may know, Harry Truman once remarked that the accomplishment he was most proud of was creating NATO. I think Harry Truman would be aghast if he could come down from the heavens and see the damage that has been done to the transatlantic relationship in recent months. And it would be the ultimate indictment of our leaders on both sides of

the Atlantic if, in the need to deal with Saddam Hussein, we were to undo Harry Truman's greatest legacy.

Sustaining this legacy is the challenge we need to face today in this hearing and as we look forward. I think it is doable. NATO enlargement was difficult, too. Rebuilding the alliance after Iraq is something that is going to require the same degree of creativity, of hard work that went into making NATO enlargement possible over the last decade.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden and Members of the Committee:

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the future of NATO and the accession of seven new Central and East European members to the North Atlantic Treaty. This is a historical moment. The vision of a Europe whole and free stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea set out a decade ago is now within our reach.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the leaders and peoples of each of the seven countries invited to join the Alliance at the Prague summit last November. This is a very special moment for them and a vindication of their hard work and perseverance over many years. While they have been part of the West in spirit for a long time, they will now join the West's premier military alliance to help us defend the territory and interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. As a result, Europe will be more peaceful, democratic and secure.

It is also a special moment for those Americans who have worked with these countries to help make this day become reality. I would like to congratulate the Administration as well as this Committee for its leadership and support of NATO enlargement. Many members of this Committee know how much work and heavy lifting was also required here in the United States to make this day possible. Were it not for the leadership, perseverance and skill demonstrated by Washington, including by the leadership of this Committee, I doubt we would be here today.

We are also meeting at a time when the Alliance is in trouble. While we celebrate the extension of the boundaries of freedom and security eastward, we know that the trans-Atlantic relationship faces one of the deepest crises in its history. The United States is fighting a war in Iraq and many of our key NATO allies are not with us. An Alliance that has committed itself to dealing with the problems of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as a core mission, finds itself unable to find common ground on how to confront that challenge in the real world in the form of Saddam Hussein. As a result, NATO is divided and marginalized at a time when Western unity, solidarity and support are very much needed.

One only has to read the newspapers to see the growing doubts on both sides of the Atlantic about NATO's future viability. Indeed, in recent weeks I have often been asked why we are even bothering to enlarge the Alliance further when many people consider it to be in a process of decline. My answer has been that it is still in America's interest to successfully complete this round of enlargement in spite of current trans-Atlantic differences. Let me explain why.

First, we must not lose sight of what we set out to accomplish by opening NATO's door to Central and Eastern Europe. From the beginning, the purpose of NATO enlargement was to help lock in a new peace order in Europe following communism's collapse and the end of the Cold War. We wanted to promote a process of pan-European integration and reconciliation that would make the prospect of armed conflict as inconceivable in the eastern half of the continent as it had become in the western half.

To a remarkable degree, we have succeeded in doing so. For much of the 20th century, Europe was the greatest potential source of conflict anywhere in the world. It was there where the great wars of the 20th century had started, and where we feared the Cold War could become a hot one. Today, the continent is more peaceful, democratic and secure than at any time in recent history. And strategic cooperation across the Atlantic between the U.S. and Europe through NATO is a big part of the reason why.

When I was in the State Department, I often told my staff that our goal was to integrate all the countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea within a decade of communism's collapse.

If the West failed to achieve this, I told them at the time, future historians were likely to condemn us as having failed to seize this moment of history—and rightly so. But today we can be proud of having achieved that goal on the timeline we set for ourselves—and we did so without the confrontation with Russia or any of the other dire scenarios so many critics predicted.

Second, America made NATO enlargement a top priority for moral and strategic reasons. The moral imperative was to help those new democracies who had liberated themselves from communism and turned to us to help them anchor their countries once and for all to the West. But the strategic imperative was equally important. Simply put, that imperative was to ensure that America never again had to fight another major war in Europe. We wanted to use the window that had opened after the end of the Cold War to lock in a durable peace in Europe. As Americans, we wanted to be able to face future security challenges elsewhere in the world knowing that security in Europe was assured.

Third, we also hoped and believed that as Europeans felt increasingly secure within their own borders, and no longer had to worry about conflict with Russia or ethnic strife in their own back yard, they would start to broaden their strategic horizons and focus with us on a new set of challenges from beyond the continent. In other words, we hoped that in addition to locking in a new peace in Europe, we could gain new allies who would join us in addressing the new threats of the post-Cold War era. And it is certainly no secret that it was also our hope that new allies from Central and Eastern Europe, having fought hard to regain their freedom and independence, would also bring fresh blood, ideas and enthusiasm to NATO and help us transform it for a new era.

I believe that events since September 11th have validated each of these points. Just imagine what the world would be like today if the United States—in addition to the war in Iraq and a budding crisis in North Korea—also faced an unstable Europe? There is not a day that goes by where we should not be grateful that today the President of our country—for the first time in nearly a century—does not have to worry about a major conflict breaking out on the European continent that could draw in the U.S. And I know it has not gone unnoticed in this Committee that among those European allies supporting us on Iraq today are many Central and Eastern European countries.

That is why, from an American perspective, this round of NATO enlargement remains strategically crucial. If the last enlargement round firmly anchored Central and Eastern Europe's core—Poland, the Czech lands and Hungary—then this round will achieve something just as historic: the resolving of the Baltic question in the north, consolidating democracy in the heart of Europe by bringing in Slovakia as well as Slovenia; and the anchoring of two key countries like Bulgaria and Romania in southeastern Europe at a time when that corner of Europe is playing an increasingly important role in the war against terrorism. There are objectives that are clearly in American interest.

Of course there is another side to enlarging NATO—the increased risk and responsibilities that we, too, are assuming. The United States is making the most sacred of all commitments—a pledge to go to the defense of these countries in a future crisis. Moreover, there are some potential risks in bringing a large group of countries like this into the Alliance. This enlargement round consists of a larger group of countries, some of which are smaller and/or perhaps weaker than those countries invited to join in 1997.

Let me be absolutely clear. I believe that each of the seven countries has earned its invitation through the combination of its domestic performance and its strategic cooperation. If one could quantify how much reform ground these countries have covered from where they started a decade ago, many of them have covered as much ground as their predecessors if not more. They have already acted as allies with us in conflicts ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to the war against terrorism. But we also know that none of these countries are perfect and that they, like their predecessors, still have a long way to go before they mature into full-fledged NATO allies.

I therefore support the Administration's decision to pursue what has become known as a "Big Bang" round of enlargement. I know there is some nervousness in the Senate about what one might call the "rotten apple" scenario—i.e., the danger that a country turns out to have real problems down the road that we do not anticipate today. While we have worked hard to ensure that is not the case, we cannot exclude that possibility with total certainty. Indeed, we all know that the several of the countries included in the last round have had a harder time integrating into NATO than many imagined. But this is not, in my view, an argument to not enlarge but rather a reason to take a close look at how we can update our policies to help them stay on track once they are in.

I mention this since some voices, in the Senate as well as in the academic community, have suggested amending the Treaty to allow the Alliance to sanction or even suspend a member should their performance be inadequate. This issue was debated in 1998 and I suspect it may be raised again. Let me just say that while I understand the intent of such efforts, I oppose such a step because I do not think it will work given how NATO works in practice, an issue we might be able to come back to during questions.

This brings me to the final issue I would like to address today: what do we do, apart from enlargement, to address the very real crisis across the Atlantic? We cannot ignore the reality that we have just witnessed a trans-Atlantic train wreck over the issue of Iraq. How do we revitalize NATO once the war in Iraq is over and the dust has settled?

Let me start with a small historical footnote. When this Committee, as well as the Senate as a whole, debated and ratified the past round of enlargement, many of the most lively arguments and discussions centered not only on the specific qualifications the invitees. Instead they revolved around the question of where the Alliance was heading and what it was becoming. That question is even more pressing today. I therefore think it is appropriate that our debate on the merits of enlargement again include the question of how to ensure that a larger NATO is a stronger alliance.

The core question facing NATO today is simple: what should be this Alliance's main mission in a world where Europe is increasingly secure and many if not all of the major threats we are likely to face in the future will come from new sources beyond the continent? Should NATO's job be limited to maintaining the peace on an increasingly secure content—a worthwhile objective but hardly America's only or most important concern? Or should the Alliance retool itself to address new threats to its members security irrespective of where they emanate from? To be blunt, do we and our allies want NATO to have a significant role in the future Afghanistan and "Iraqs" that we will inevitably face?

This question of NATO's missions was debated at length during the ratification of the last round of NATO enlargement. At that time, an overwhelming majority of Senators voted in favor of an amendment by Senator Jon Kyl that clearly stated that the Alliance had to face these new threats if it was to remain central in American strategic thinking. Since then the Alliance has, with increasing clarity, embraced that goal of being willing and able to meet the new threats of the 21st century. And it has done so because people realize that if NATO is not relevant to the central strategic questions of the day, it will cease to play a central role in our thinking or policy.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th were a watershed in this regard. They started to convince many previously skeptical European governments that such a strategic shift was necessary. In Reykjavik last summer, NATO Foreign Ministers crossed a Rubicon by finally ending the debate over the so-called "out of area" issue. And at the Prague summit, heads-of-state embraced a set of capability initiatives that, if successfully implemented, would help NATO turn the corner in terms of having some modest capabilities to play a larger role in such conflicts.

But that is all on paper. The divide across the Atlantic on Iraq now threatens to destroy that limited progress. NATO thus far has failed to find common ground on addressing these new threats. The Alliance worked during the Cold War because there was a shared sense of risk and responsibility across the Atlantic. That was the glue that kept the Alliance together. During the 1990s the common ground that brought us together was a consensus that NATO's new job was to stop bloodshed in the Balkans, anchor Central and Eastern Europe to the West and try to build a new partnership with Russia—all part of its new mission of stabilizing Europe as a whole.

Today we lack that common sense of risk and shared responsibility. Somewhere between Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. and much of Europe lost each another. The United States, NATO's lead power, feels more threatened than many of our allies in Europe. That sense of urgency about confronting potential new threats is not shared by many of our European allies, at least not yet. Some leaders understand this imperative—which is why Prime Minister Blair, Aznar and some other European leaders support us on Iraq in spite of considerable domestic political risk.

But it is clearly not shared across the continent as a whole, and especially not in France and Germany. Moreover, the sad truth is that today there is no systematic strategic dialogue taking place across the Atlantic that would enable us to reconnect and heal this rift. A growing number of Europeans, including some of America's closest friends for decades, believe the United States has or is in the process of giving up on the Alliance and Europe. Here in the U.S., many people are baffled

over European hostility to the war in Iraq and the depth of resentment directed against the Bush Administration.

I know some have suggested that a quick fix to get us out of the current crisis might be for NATO to revisit how it operates and to consider moving to a new system of decision-making to replace the current consensus system. Such suggestions have been fueled in large part by resentment over France's position on Iraq and its refusal, along with Belgium and for a time Germany, to support steps like prudent defense planning for Turkey. I very much hope that wisdom prevails on this issue. We need to be very careful not to do anything foolish that would damage NATO even more in the longer-term. There may well be ways in which we can streamline NATO decision making that we should explore. But the Alliance's commitment to consensus has, on balance, been a source of great strength over the years and it should not be abandoned. The answer to NATO's problems is to fix the current divide across the Atlantic, not to try to find some way to get around it.

One of these days someone is undoubtedly going to write a great book about how and why the Alliance has gotten itself into its current quandary. But the real question we need to focus on is not apportioning blame, but rather on finding a way out of the current crisis. Once enlargement is ratified, I believe the Administration as well as this Committee must focus quickly on this issue of how to pick up the pieces and rebuild the Alliance. And it must do so with the same degree of intensity and commitment that the enlargement issue has received over the last decade. If ten years from now historians look back at this round of Senate ratification and conclude that we enlarged NATO only to have it fade into irrelevance, then we all will have truly failed.

In conclusion, I would like to underscore that it is critical for the U.S. Senate to ratify this round of enlargement expeditiously and enthusiastically. It is a critical step in completing the work of the 20th century by securing a Europe whole, free and at peace. It will send a powerful signal that America is still committed to and cares about its friends and alliances in Europe at a time when many question that commitment.

At the same time, I would urge the members of this Committee to start thinking now about how to repair the Alliance once the war in Iraq is over—and to pursue that goal with that same degree of dedication and perseverance as you pursued NATO enlargement. U.S.-European strategic cooperation is one of the major reasons why the second half of the 20th century was so much better than the first half. And no one can doubt that the prospects for making the world—and the Greater Middle East in particular—a better place in the 21st century will be much enhanced if the U.S. and Europe once again find common strategic ground.

Can we still do it? My answer is yes. Will it be easy? No. But a common strategy across the Atlantic during the Cold War didn't materialize instantly like magic. It was created by far-sighted leaders who understood the strategic need to find common ground and who ordered their best and brightest to harmonize different views and needs. Unless we learn from the mistakes of recent months, come up with the right leadership and back it up with the kind of ties that successfully created common ground in the past, we may be destined to stumble from one crisis and train wreck to the next.

Former U.S. President Harry Truman once remarked that the accomplishment he was most proud of was the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and the transformation of former foes into allies. Truman would be aghast if he could see the damage done in recent weeks and months to the trans-Atlantic relationship today. It would be the ultimate indictment of our leaders on both sides of the Atlantic if the need to deal with Saddam was to undo Harry Truman's greatest legacy.

[From the Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2003]

COMMENTARY

WE NEED TO REPAIR THE RIFT

(By Ronald Asmus)

As the Bush administration conducts war against Saddam Hussein, one casualty of this conflict was evident even before the shooting started: the relationship with France and Germany. In the early months of 2003 we witnessed what future historians might well dub the Great Trans-Atlantic Train Wreck as Washington, London and Madrid clashed with what is known in Europe as the Franco-German Axis over how to deal with Saddam. That clash was, in turn, part of a broader battle within

Europe over who speaks for the continent and what kind of relationship with America it desires.

Can the relationship be put back together again once Saddam and his regime are gone? One can envision two very different scenarios.

The first would essentially be a continuation of the political guerrilla warfare we have seen between Washington/London and Paris/Berlin in recent mouths. It is likely to be a high stakes knock-down drag-out fight over how Europe is led and relations with America and the world are shaped. The other would include a serious attempt by both sides of the Atlantic to turn the page, close a sorry chapter in U.S.-European relations and to rebuild this relationship to face the challenges that still lie ahead.

There are very real reasons why both sides should aim for the second. Although some U.S. conservatives brush off the alienation of allies such as France and Germany as a cost-free exercise, America today bears a higher price in terms of blood and treasure due to the inability to find common ground in facing down Saddam. To be sure, the U.S. and British militaries, with help from others such as Australia and Poland, will win the war on their own. But the much harder battle may be to win the peace.

That is why the Bush administration should start thinking now about the day after in relations with France and Russia. Such a strategy has to start at the top. Magnanimity is a noble American tradition. Once victory in Iraq is clear, President George W. Bush should make clear his desire to rebuild this relationship. The president is scheduled to travel to Europe and Russia in just over two months, including for a G-8 summit in France. NATO foreign ministers meet in Spain in early June and a U.S.-EU summit takes place in Washington shortly thereafter. These meeting can set the stage for reconciliation.

In the case of Europe, those who opposed this war must now face the fact that they, too, have a shared interest in seeing the U.S. succeed in not only winning the war but in building a democratic and unified Iraq. For the consequences of failure to do so on Europe's own doorstep would surely be felt across the continent. Disarming, stabilizing and rebuilding a peaceful and democratic Iraq will be an enormous effort. While the U.S. will necessarily bear the initial burden, much of the longer-term security presence and resources will have to come from allies.

The U.S. and Europe may also have a chance to follow up on victory in Iraq with a push for progress towards Middle East peace. Washington knows it will never be seen as a champion of democratization and modernization in the Arab world unless and until it again puts it shoulder to the wheel resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Mr. Bush's embrace of the road map may be only the first step of what could become a top priority of his administration's foreign policy. But if France and Germany continue to fight Washington, they will have no influence in shaping this outcome.

Repairing relations with core allies is essential if we are to halt the marginalization of NATO and if the EU integration is to move forward. One thing that has become crystal clear in recent months is that French attempts to create splits across the Atlantic inevitably divide Europe as well—with a result that leaves all of us as losers. U.S.-European strategic cooperation is one of the major reasons why the second half of the 20th century was so much better than the first half for Western Europe. And no one can doubt that the prospects for making the world—and the Greater Middle East in particular—a better place in the 21st century will be much improved if the U.S. and Europe can once again find common strategic ground.

A common strategy across the Atlantic during the Cold War didn't materialize instantly. It was created by far-sighted leaders who understood the strategic need to stay together and who ordered their best and brightest strategists and diplomats to produce a strategy that harmonized different views. Unless we learn from the mistakes of recent months, we are destined to stumble from one crisis and train wreck to the next.

Former U.S. President Harry Truman once remarked that the accomplishment he was most proud of was the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and the transformation of former foes into allies. Truman would be aghast if he could see the damage done in recent weeks and months to the transAtlantic relationship today. It would be the ultimate indictment of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic if the need to deal with Saddam undoes Harry Truman's greatest legacy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Asmus.

Let me just comment, before I commence questioning, that I appreciate especially the contribution that you have made, Dr.

Asmus, in bringing a number of us together in a colloquy that has involved some Members of the Congress, but more importantly members of the administration, both current and past. Otherwise, persons such as Dr. Brzezinski, whom you have mentioned, offer a historical perspective, and who try to think through the past 2 years about the challenges of new members and who then move into new missions, into a Russian relationship with NATO, and now into the current troubles that you have described so well.

I appreciate your participation, Mr. Jackson, as a faithful attender around the table because the wisdom of both of you has enhanced all of our understanding.

The ranking member and I will indulge in whatever time we need, but we will set a time for my first round of 10 minutes so that I will not overstep and likewise, I know he will not subsequently.

Let me just ask these questions that sort of followup what both of you have talked about in very sophisticated ways for members of our body, the U.S. Senate, as we take up the treaty, as we will—I have no doubt—out of this committee, given the sentiment of our members for strong relations with European countries and for this whole idea of Europe whole and free and the very specific new entrants and this enthusiasm.

We will get to the floor of the Senate at some point, and we will find other Members who have not been a part of this colloquy and this enthusiasm who will ask how, really basically in a common sense way, does NATO work if in fact polling data indicates fairly large majorities in many countries that are members of NATO who not only have a very strong view about not participating in a war with Iraq, but even worse still, a growing anti-sentiment with regard to the United States in particular, which is more serious?

In other words, it is sort of hard to parse right now between the question in which countries would say, "after all we are democracies and this specific war we do not like but you have to understand that, but still our affection for the United States of America, our desire for solidarity, common defense, all the rest of it remains just as strong as ever." I do not hear that coming, at least from popular sentiment and from polling in many countries.

Now, second, this has led, I suppose, to two things that have been commented on, and I oversimplified problems in both France and Germany. In France, in fact, there is at least a group of statespersons who want to set up really a deliberate counterweight who would say essentially that the supposed hegemony of the United States in the world is a dangerous thing. Whether it is Iraq or whatever else it is, we want to offer leadership to make sure that these folks in Washington cannot go anywhere that they want to go. We want to make sure there are sufficient roadblocks, if not to slow it down, to stop it, and then to sort of jerk them back to reality and back to some other discussion.

Or the other problem in Germany in which a chancellor, in a difficult election campaign, finds the same polling data I just cited, namely that a large percentage of the populace does not like the way things seem to be heading with the United States and Iraq. Despite all the protestations of support, the strong solidarity with America for all these years, he comes out overreaching, at least in

my judgment, anything that needed to be said, scores a narrow election victory and is stuck with it. Having said that, Americans also note that German public opinion has not really changed, whatever the problems of the chancellor and the relationship may be.

So there you have two different situations, one representing democracy and sentiment that we respect, and another maybe a deliberate desire for a counterweight, all coming along at the time we discuss this treaty and expansion of the treaty.

So some of our members, not terribly misguided, will say what is going on here? Why are we even bringing this up right now? This is rather inappropriate. Why are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee people having a hearing today in the middle of this war, in the middle of all of this sentiment? In other words, are you folks on a different wavelength altogether from general common sense about our foreign policy? Do you have your own niche agenda of enthusiasm for Europe and these countries?

Well, in part, we do. That is one reason why the hearing is going on. We think this treaty is important. The entry of countries is important, and notwithstanding all that I have talked about.

But I simply want to get your general sentiment on how, in the long run or maybe in the intermediate run, we move ahead. Now, you have made some suggestions today. Perhaps Lord Robertson's volunteering effort to take hold in Afghanistan in a more substantial way—or perhaps through contributions—I noticed the distinguished columnist, Tom Friedman, yesterday has become enthusiastic about NATO playing a very large role in Iraq in the post-war situation.

[The article by Mr. Friedman follows:]

[From the New York Times, March 30, 2003]

NATO'S NEW FRONT

(By Thomas L. Friedman)

In this time of war, I find it helpful to step back a little. So I went last week to NATO headquarters in Brussels, and, I must say, the view from there was illuminating. What I think I saw were some huge tectonic plates of history moving. Here's how I would describe it: 9/11 was the start of World War III, a la Pearl Harbor; the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was the initial response, a la the North Africa campaign; the Invasion of Iraq was akin to D-Day (I hope it ends as well); and now we are present at the creation of some kind of new global power structure.

At this new historical pivot point, we're still dealing with a bipolar world, only the divide this time is no longer East versus West, but the World of Order versus the World of Disorder. But here's the surprise: the key instrument through which the World of Order will try to deal with threats from the World of Disorder will still be NATO. Only in this new, expanded NATO, Russia will gradually replace France, and the region where the new NATO will direct its peacekeeping energies will shift from the East to the South. Yes, NATO will continue to be based in Europe, but its primary theaters of operation will be the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and possibly the Arab-Israel frontier.

No, I haven't lost my marbles. Here's what's going on: Ever since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, individual countries—first Britain, then Turkey, then the Netherlands and Germany—have taken responsibility for providing the 5,700-man peacekeeping force in Kabul. It is a very expensive job for one country and it is very inefficient to be changing brigades every six months, but that was how the Bush team wanted it. It did not want NATO getting in the way of its combat troops or nation-building.

But in February, President Bush quietly told NATO's chief, Lord Robertson, that beginning in August, when the current Dutch-German force is supposed to leave Afghanistan, the U.S. would like to see NATO permanently take over peacekeeping

duties there and work alongside U.S. combat troops. If this is approved by NATO, for the first time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be operating outside Europe, in the heart of the Muslim world.

France is fighting this idea, because it wants to see NATO, the anchor of America's military presence in Europe, wither away. But many key NATO members favor the idea, and what's really interesting is that the Russians have said they would consider sending a platoon as well, under the NATO-Russia partnership. Even the Chinese have winked their approval. Both of these big powers feel threatened by the disorder coming from parts of Central Asia and the Middle East. If France stands in the way, NATO officials say they will just work around it.

What the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan is "internationalizing" the nation-building process there, because we found we simply could not pull it off alone. Eventually, we will have to do the same in Iraq. That is what Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain came over to tell President Bush this past week. The Bush team keeps arguing that this silly alliance it cobbled together to fight the war in Iraq is multilateral and therefore the moral equivalent of the U.N. Nonsense. Other than Britain, we bought this alliance. Almost every government in it is operating without the support of its people. Fighting this war without international legitimacy is hard enough, but trying to do nation-building without it could be even harder.

Yet, the Bush team is right about one thing. Nation-building in Iraq can't be done by the U.N. It can't be done by a committee. So what we will eventually need in Iraq is a credible peacekeeping force that is multilateral, legitimate and still led by the U.S. That will bring us back to NATO, possibly in partnership with some Arab and Muslim armies. This is not your grandfather's NATO anymore. That NATO patrolled the German-Soviet frontier. This one will be patrolling Kabul and Baghdad.

And while NATO is changing, it may just go all the way. NATO's chief, Lord Robertson, is retiring this year (a real loss). A favorite to succeed him is the Norwegian defense minister, Kristin Krohn Devold, a woman. So get ready for this CNN headline: "The NATO alliance, for the first time led by a woman and including a Russian platoon, took over peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan today, as a prelude to taking over peacekeeping in Iraq. France refused to participate."

Yes, we may be present at the creation of a very new world, and no, I have not lost my marbles.

The CHAIRMAN. So you might say, well, we have become immersed in the affairs of this world. There is work to be done. We want to make sure that we do not have failed states. As a result, we sort of lean into this and this requires obviously the United States being enthusiastic about the NATO role and both of us working out some modus vivendi in all of this, quite apart from the Government of Afghanistan and President Karzai and the warlords and all the rest out there and whoever we have to deal with in Iraq in the post-war situation.

Still, NATO could become busy. Maybe we could have a NATO commander generally in charge of sort of assigning roles so we do not have a pickup game each 6 months wondering who might show up and volunteer in Afghanistan.

This committee has been sort of ardent in our enthusiasm for making certain we do everything possible to help the Afghans have a successful state. I hope we will have the same commitment with regard to Iraq. Both Senator Biden and I have pointed out that this is probably going to be expensive and probably time consuming, and we are admonished that we may not have that much time, that for a number of reasons, what we are advocating may not work out.

This is a whole collection of things, but it gets to the heart of what I want to ask, which is essentially in this question, where goes NATO? In fact, where does it go if in fact the sentiment of European countries has turned south with regard to the United States?

That is not a unique predicament, and without being anecdotal, polling sentiment in South Korea, for example, at a time of tremen-

dous crisis in the judgment of most of the members of this committee, is very ambivalent about what is to be done there. A good number of South Koreans, we are advised, under the age of 40 feel that we are the problem, the United States, and that if trouble is going to come there, it will come because we are agitated about the building of nuclear weapons and their potential proliferation.

I ask finally, do we have here, for the time being, a split because of a perception of the world on our part that having been attacked in New York City with the World Trade Center and in Washington with the Pentagon, that we are vulnerable? We are vulnerable to people that are not nation-states, to sub-national groups, undefined, unknown, without agendas that strike and try to kill as many Americans and damage as much of our cities as possible.

In a way, the Europeans really do not get it, do not understand this. They are closer to the problem maybe in the Middle East or Iraq and so forth, but strangely do not really believe that somebody is likely to come through Westminster Abbey the Eiffel Tower, or the Brandenburg Gate and deliberately attempt to kill several hundred thousand people using nuclear weapons if they could get some aboard. Now, this may still be so far-fetched for our NATO allies that we are still arguing about mission.

My thought, I suppose, is that we do not know where the threat is coming from. How any European could feel secure today is hard for me to believe knowing what has happened in this city, what has happened in the Hart Building next door with an anthrax attack. It routed all of us out of there for 96 days, throat swabs, Cipro tablets for everybody. If you take them, you do not die. People in the Post Office died. I just do not conceive that many Europeans understand, despite lecturing to us that they have been through wars, that they have been through all sorts of things, exactly what this world is about.

So here the United States comes along and says, we are worried about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are worried if the North Koreans built a few more bombs and sold them to somebody to save the economy of their state, somebody might use them. They might use them in Europe quite apart from the United States or wherever else they thought they were going to get the greatest effect.

How do we bridge this gap really in understanding how the world works? Because if we can, maybe then we have an alliance that is relevant to what we in the United States believe is our existential threat, as opposed to a superficial one in which there may be wars here, there, and yon, and they are very tragic, but they are very limited in terms of the hundreds of thousands, millions, cities disappearing, other things that may be a part of our world that hopefully NATO perceives.

Do either one of you want to begin to comment on that basket of issues?

Dr. ASMUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, my answer—I would start by saying to those colleagues of yours who ask you why the hell are you holding this hearing and focusing on this issue, I would say, look, the U.S.-European relationship remains the single most important strategic relationship we have, and let us be honest. We may pay a price in terms of

blood and treasure today because of the rift that we have across the Atlantic. Does anyone doubt that we would not be in better shape if we had Turkey, France, and Germany fully behind us in this war, that casualties might be lower, that that united front may have led Saddam to calculate differently? This is not a cost-free exercise unfortunately.

Second, I believe this crisis actually was not inevitable. Many of us have read the Barbara Tuchman's famous book, the "Guns of August," where she shows how World War I was a war that no one wanted, but which became inevitable by a series of miscalculations by leaders on all sides. And I have been saying there is a Barbara Tuchman-like quality to this crisis.

Gerhard Schroeder did not want this crisis. George Bush did not want this crisis, and I contend that Jacques Chirac did not want this crisis either. But all of our leaders have made mistakes that have left us in the bind we are in. I think it could have been different had people behaved differently, but that is history.

The question now becomes, Senator, I think that we need to win the war, and then I think a window will open for us to think very carefully about putting this relationship back together. I believe that we can do it—and I listened very closely, Senator Biden, when you reminded me of all those "whither NATO" meetings and conferences you have been to and that I have sometimes attended with you. You can go through a spat like this for 6 months. You cannot do it for 3 or 4 years. Once the dust has settled in Iraq, a window opens to try to turn the tables and to change the dynamic to reframe the issue. I think the President has a huge opportunity here. As a Democrat, I am not in the business of giving a Republican President advice, but I would suggest that he needs to be magnanimous in victory. We need to win the war, win it decisively, and then he has to say to Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder, you know, that was terrible. I do not want to go through that again. It hurt us; it hurt you. Let us send our guys and gals to sit down with your guys and gals and have a very honest discussion about what we can do to put this back together.

And the President—let us not forget—he is going to Europe in 2 months. And if I was in charge of that trip, I might be slightly anxious at the moment about the reception he is going to receive in France as well as Russia. Now, that trip can either become a prolongation of our current fight. Or it can be turning a page to a new chapter in U.S.-European relations where he can come and say: I, as the President of the United States, want to fix this relationship. I want to do these things together. I want to restore the credibility of the alliance and this relationship and I am prepared to do a number of things. And imagine if he did. People do not believe he is capable of doing this, but I believe he is. If he were to do it, it would be the way to turn the page here.

Then you come to the substance, Senator. What do we really need to do together? Well, I think if we look at a map—and Senators Lugar and Biden, you both said this, so I know you agree—what is the big challenge we face? It is the Greater Middle East. It is the toxic combination in a region that is contiguous with Europe of terrorism, radical ideologies and weapons of mass destruction. And I actually think the Europeans too, are starting to recog-

nize that they have a strategic nightmare growing on their doorstep. They did not have September 11. There is a gap in threat perceptions. But if you go to Europe today, the debate is less about the problem. If Joschka Fischer was here, even Schroeder if he was here, they would agree with the problem. They would disagree with our solution on Iraq. But those are differences we need to move beyond.

And if you ask me, what do I want NATO to do? If you could get the President and European leaders to turn the page what do we want NATO to do? We do want it to take over ISAS in Afghanistan. I think we all know that some of us wanted it to do Afghanistan a year ago. I remember a dinner and I remember an op-ed that the two of you co-authored urging NATO to do exactly that. And we missed that opportunity. We also wanted NATO to play a role in Iraq. That was not possible. We will have a chance to revisit this once the war is over. If we could get NATO to take responsibility in Afghanistan, to have a role in Iraq that would be progress. I also believe NATO should be prepared, if it made sense and if we ever get a Middle East peace agreement between Israel and the Arabs, to be prepared to do peacekeeping there.

We need a success story. As you know, in this country we have the three strikes rule. And I often say, well, NATO is 0 and 2 because we have thus far missed two chances to go out of area, go beyond Europe. We all said yes in principle to the idea, but then Afghanistan came. I believe the Europeans were ready to go to Afghanistan, as limited and as crappy as their militaries may have been. But we fumbled the football because the U.S. said we did not need them.

Then we came to Iraq. I give this administration credit. It came back. Paul Wolfowitz went back to the NAC and said, here are four creative ways we could use NATO in Iraq. I think the Europeans blew it on that one.

We are not going to have that many more opportunities in the future. We have to get one of these right and get things right soon to turn around this dynamic that you are pointing to. And if we do so, Senator, I believe you will see a lot of those public opinion numbers start to change. But if we do not exploit this window, which will open up this spring after the war in Iraq, to change this dynamic, I think we really are in trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Dr. Jackson.

Mr. JACKSON. Sir, with your permission. I have maybe a little different analytical question here. One of the problems in evaluating U.S. policy is we tend, since we experience Europe through NATO, we tend to think every problem in Europe is a problem in NATO because it is a symptom. That is how we see the alliance.

One of the things we have not discussed is maybe it is Europe that is in crisis, not NATO. There may be a profound political problem that has been disguised through the Nice process and other processes over the last 2 years. So we may not really understand what is happening within Europe that is manifesting itself in the politics of Schroeder or Chirac, and it may be Europe is in crisis and not actually the institutions with which we deal with Europe. That would be analytical question one.

Second, we tend in a period when we are at war—actually in two wars or two fronts of the same war—we tend to perhaps interpret some of our foreign policy a little more broadly than it was intended. Article 5 and the Washington Treaty is not a contract that they have to agree on Rwanda, they have to agree on East Timor, they have to agree on the Middle East. There is nothing in the Washington Treaty that guarantees that Article 5 is a defense of democracy beyond the North Atlantic area. So we will always have a number of people that do not want to go, which is fine.

Frankly, many of the powers in Europe with which we have assembled this great alliance have defined their modern identity by withdrawing from Dien Bien Phu, withdrawing from Suez and Algeria and Kurdestan. And just because our view has changed of the world, theirs has not. They got out of that. That is how they became modern nations. Just because we want to go back to those same areas, does not mean they will come.

It will probably take us 10 years to talk them through this problem. So we are basically again in the period in 1956 when we disagreed in Suez until the French withdrawal, we had to talk about the foundations of the alliance. For the next 10 years, we are going to talk about what we think are the requirements. And frankly, a couple of them are going to decide they do not want to be members of the military committee because they did not sign up for it. And that is not bad because we have so many more people that want to come in and do share our values.

So that is why I think in addition or perhaps even as a precondition to this greater project of the greater Middle East, we really have to talk about the 170 million people that are actually close to Europe on Europe's borders that actually do want to have a relationship with this alliance, whether it be Turkey's relationship with the European Union or Ukraine's relationship with NATO or the Caucasus, or the western Balkans. These frontiers of freedom out of area missions. If you do not get Kiev right, you are not going to get Ouagadougou and Mogadishu and the difficult things right. In a certain sense, charity and security begin at home.

Now, the difficult test is when do we use NATO as an institution out of area. And I do not actually know the answer. I was hoping Ambassador Burns would supply it. But I notice that many of the people that serve in the Oval Office actually went to Yale, but I do not see anybody proposing that Yale University take over the Oval Office. Many of the countries who go to Afghanistan were educated in NATO. It does not mean that NATO goes to Afghanistan. Just so long as the education that they got carries us when we make the move to move NATO from an education institution to a management institution. I think this is a question this committee has uniquely raised. And I do not think we have the answer yet. I think how NATO responds in these defining issues will tell us when they are ready to make the move. But my guess is NATO will move a little more slowly than Americans would like them to because they are just not ready and they have not developed the skills.

Anyway, that would be my very preliminary answer to your discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you both for very comprehensive answers.

I would just add one final thought, and that is, on your point, Mr. Jackson, obviously we have not discussed today economic issues, the World Trade Organization, biotechnics, and food. Nor have we discussed all sorts of reasons why there are problems in terms of relationships that we have never commingled fortunately, we tried to keep security apart from trade, but that is not easy in our politics, nor in the politics perhaps of many European countries. I appreciate very much your answers.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My only regret is we do not have a couple hours to talk about—I mean that sincerely—to expound on some of the points made by you, as well as by our witnesses.

I agree with Ron that, to put it a slightly different way, the only war worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended, and I have been driving my staff crazy for the last 6 months talking about it in those terms. I think we have sort of three riverboat gamblers here, all on the boat at the same time, all being pushed by different domestic needs and internal instincts, in France, the United States, and Germany right now. It is not the time now in my view publicly for us to be analyzing how things got out of whack so rapidly with Germany or, as I facetiously said to one of my staff, someone is going to write a book, "How Bush Won the War and Lost the World," in terms of public opinion here unless we start to get something straight here. So it does make sense at some point for us to analyze how we got to this point so cattywonked here.

I agree with Bruce that I think the genesis here is as much a European crisis as a crisis in the institutions. But in practical terms, Bruce, I think it is a distinction without a difference. It may require a different remedy, but in terms of the impact, the impact is the same.

So at some point, Mr. Chairman, God willing this war ending successfully and quickly, and hopefully us doing the right thing, I hope there are enough minds out there in the foreign policy establishment in this administration and among us that are privately discussing what went wrong at the front end so in the next, God willing, week or two, if everything went perfectly, or the next couple months, we do not replicate the mistakes. I agree again with you, Ron, that I think that we should be looking at post-Saddam Iraq as an opportunity not only to generate the prospect of putting Iraq on a path toward democracy but remedying, repairing our situation in Europe with France and Germany, as well as others. We should look at this as an opportunity.

I again drive my staff crazy. I know my quoting my parents' sayings all the time gets old, and I begin to even sound foolish to myself. But my dad used to always say when you are a kid, it is much more difficult to be a graceful winner than a graceful loser. And another expression he had was, big men can bend further.

We are the big man on the block here. We should be able to bend. We should not be putting out press releases or letting the

word go out that we are serving freedom fries on Air Force One. That is not a very mature thing for a nation to do right now.

So I hope we get a little smarter about this because I, like you, Ron—you heard me say in the beginning. I said to my colleagues, picture a secure America with either no relationship or a mildly adversary relationship with France and Germany 10 years from now. I do not get it. When you put it in that context, I mean, people go, well, of course, you have got to. Well, you know, little things matter. Words matter. Actions matter. And as one of you said, we can be out of sorts for 6 months, maybe a year. We cannot be out of sorts here for 2 or 3 years, and this leads me to my question.

By the way, I think the President is capable. I trust the President's instincts. I disagree with the President profoundly on a lot of things. Obviously, I am a Democrat who has even every once in a while fantasized maybe that he should be removed electorally in the next election. But nonetheless, I have tried to be supportive, and I have faith in his instincts.

Two things I think are happening. You may not want to comment on this, but I do think it is related. Maybe I am the only one who thinks it is related. I think we operate at our own peril if we underestimate the degree to which there is legitimate and serious intellectual ferment in France and in Europe, in terms of a European crisis and their identity crisis, about American hegemony and the need for a more independent Europe, or to put it another way, for the United States not to be a European power. I think there are some very serious people, very serious intellects, very serious elements of the French body politic, as well as in other countries, who sees that in the long-term interest of France and the long-term interest of Europe and the world.

At the same time, operating here are what is, in a very oversimplified way, referred to as the neocons, who have been writing and saying things for the last 10 years that I always kid my Democratic friends. I say, you know, you are so used to saying things you do not mean, you do not understand that these guys on the right, when they say it, they mean it. There has been a consistent pattern among the intellectual right in this country and the so-called neocons for the last 10 years about their vision of the U.S. role in the world with an overwhelming distaste for multilateral institutions, a relatively high disregard for NATO, a very serious and genuine assertion on their part, not born out of anything other than what they view the self-interest of the United States, is that at the point of our being, relative to the rest of the world, at the most profoundly obvious apex of our power, that now is the time to exercise independently our force, our judgment, and even better, in the face of world opposition, to exercise it successfully, thereby leveraging our power, bringing the malcontents of the world—I do not mean Europe—the malcontents of the world, the axis of evil group, into compliance.

These guys mean it. They mean it. And I think we are kidding ourselves if we, in a partisan desire not to acknowledge it, think that there are not very serious, very bright, very skillful, and very patriotic Americans in this administration and in some elements of the Democratic Party who have the view of the world, who have that—my vast oversimplification—that neocon view of the world.

And when the President is presented with options, they usually are cast in sort of the mainstream, internationalist, Republican—I am going to get him in trouble—the Lugar view of the world, and this neocon view of the world. And he has some tough choices to make, some very difficult choices.

I do not know why we do not admit that that more unilateralist view, that serious and longstanding distrust for international institutions and multilateral associations is not—why we pretend that voice is not heard loudly in Europe and why it does not play into the hands beautifully of those, particularly within France, who have more of a de Gaulle view of the world in 2003. I think it is an incredibly combustible combination.

And so—as the chairman warned you all, we were going to indulge ourselves here a little bit with no one else around—that leads me to the following two questions. If you look at NATO enlargement in terms of the half-full/half-empty metaphor—what is that old expression? The wish is the father of the thought or whatever that is. I do not know which it is. But anyway, I do not know if I am kidding myself here or not. But I want to believe that the expansion of NATO will have a mollifying impact upon those institutional voices in Europe that view the United States' hegemonic influence, even if it is benign or benevolent, as negative and wish to somehow cabinet from their perspective that the Ambassadors sitting behind you—that their countries I want to believe along with, as you said, Bruce, the 160 million people that they represent, including the ones that have already been admitted—that they will have an impact upon those voices in the minority—I think it is still a minority voice in Europe—that says having the United States as a European power is not a good thing. They will have the impact of mollifying, of isolating not in a formal sense, but isolating that view of the world, most articulated now or associated with the Chirac government.

But then I ask myself the question, what is more important to Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania? Being a member of the EU or being a member of NATO? Now, obviously they do not want to make that choice, and hopefully they will not have to make that choice. But I wonder whether or not in a world where they may not feel the threat, the security threat, particularly if Russia decides to play a French card instead of a U.S. card, that they may not find themselves, if not directly pressured, indirectly not having that mollifying impact upon that school of thought I, in a very oversimplified way, characterize is in France and other places, but maybe will feel they have to succumb to that because they will choose at the end of the day it is better to have the relationship with the two major economic forces in Europe who determine more than anyone else their economic well-being in the near term.

Talk to me about that. Is that a false choice? Are those concerns—is that optimism or pessimism? Are they both misplaced? Am I way off here? Those are my questions, and I yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JACKSON. Let me respond to the question you posed at the end and then maybe say one or two words about the exegesis.

I think in the process of the last 10 years or more now, 13 years, since 1989, people have come to appreciate, even in Paris, that the

NATO and the EU are parallel and complementary institutions. Were it not for the success of Treaty of Washington, there would not be the success of the Treaty of Rome, that basically solving the fear and insecurity of these states is the predicate for setting up their political and market integration and other solutions that these countries look forward to. I think even in Paris they will admit that. A high degree of correlation between the Prague and Copenhagen selections shows that these institutions are talking to each other, not as much as we might like, but even the first hand-off between NATO and EU in Macedonia, does suggest they are trying to find models of cooperation.

I think it is a horrible political thing to take young democracies and say choose which part of the West you want to be part of. They should answer in the negative, we choose all of it, and there should be access to all the institutions and hopefully this is a temporary judgment of Paris that has been thrown at them because nothing confirms that that is either inevitable or desirable.

With regard to your larger question, it probably will not surprise you that I do not think the title of the book on this period will be "How Bush Won the War and Lost the World." I would hope for a more felicitous review of——

Senator BIDEN. Well, I hope so too. That is not my judgment. That is not my outcome. I mean, I hope it is temporary, and I think it can be temporary if we do, in the next 4 months, make some very important and seriously correct decisions here. But right now there is no place in the world—name me a place—where the populations, if any of the polling data is correct, are as favorable toward the United States as they were, including the aspirant countries, as they were before January of last year, for example. There is no place I have seen. I cannot think of a single one.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. I guess my observation would be it is hard to predict the post-war world when we are still in a foxhole at the Kasserine Pass. It is just hard to see that far into the future before we have come through this period.

I completely agree with your remark and what Ron said earlier, that the United States diplomacy really has to hit the ground running and with a positive message and go back on essentially our messages or ideas, and we have to get back on the offensive with our ideas.

I think we have learned something about wartime, though, that this country really did not remember, that wartime really has constrained our diplomacy not since the beginning of Iraq, but since the 9/11 attacks. It does exaggerate the effects of political opinion. It does basically cause ideology to overshoot its mark a bit in rhetoric which is dangerous because everything seems to be more inflamed in this period. I think these are temporary phenomena and that I hope do not obtain.

It seems to me—and probably not for this hearing but perhaps in the future—this committee actually should consider structural adjustments in American diplomacy because I am not sure we have a failure of ideas. There is a serious argument that we have a failure of instruments, looking at the amount of aid we have, the way we conduct public diplomacy, the way we organize our regions. The regions are not coherent. So I think that there is a lot of organiza-

tional stuff that perhaps we can discuss in some of these meetings outside this committee in talking about how to improve our ability to get our message out because they are not really hearing us overseas.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Dr. ASMUS. Thank you, Senator.

Well, there have been two rather spectacular food fights taking place in recent months. The one has been across the Atlantic, which we have discussed. The other has been within Europe, Senator Biden, over who leads Europe and who speaks for Europe. And it has been that fight between what you might call the Chirac-Schroeder group versus the Aznar-Blair group with the Central Europeans largely being on the side of Blair and Aznar obviously. We need to repair both of these rifts once this is over.

Like you, I too, sometimes worry about there being a kind of unholy alliance between our unilateralists and their unilateralists which feed off of each other. But I still believe—and I have spent a lot of time in Europe recently—that the vast majority of European governments, the vast majority of European peoples want a good, solid, healthy, strategic alliance with the United States. But just like many of us are on the edge of losing confidence in Europe; they are on the edge of losing confidence in the United States.

As a Democrat going to Europe trying to defend the President, the thing that is so frustrating is that the debate over Iraq is not about Saddam Hussein. It is all too often about George Bush. It is about America. And one reason why we have lost this debate in European public opinion is because we did not get it framed right. We did not really have a chance to make the case.

So when it comes back to fixing this problem, I believe—and I think the President is capable of doing this—we have to reestablish American credibility. Then we need to repair the institutions. And then we need very real common projects where we can succeed because the one thing that hasn't changed is that the problems are not going away. We can have these debates, these abstract discussions, but the need to rebuild Iraq is going to be upon us very soon.

Senator BIDEN. Do you think the administration wants to do it? I ask you both that question. That is the $64 question. Do you think the bulk of the administration wants to do it?

I do not know how you want to do it when, if the scuttlebutt is correct, there are means by which—trying to figure out how no contracts in the rebuilding of Iraq can go to the French or the Germans. I do not how you can say you want to do it when in fact you want no part of Europe participating in what a transition government will be, if that turns out to be the case. I hope that is not the position. But we hear the same scuttlebutt you hear. We get importuned by—every administration has divisions in it.

I guess my question is if you do not include Europe in the reconstruction, or make it incredibly difficult, if you do not include Europe having a say in what the transition government will be and what the makeup of it will be, if you do not have the U.N. having a resolution giving them the cover to be able to come back in, could you still say you really want to repair the lines? I mean, how can you do that if you do not do that?

Dr. ASMUS. You know, the messages that I hear, like the one you hear, are very mixed. And it is not clear to me which way the administration is going to go.

I think there has been a certain sobering. I think there is a growing awareness that we are at a historical turning point, and I very much hope that those people in the administration, understand that we too screwed up, that we have ended up in a Barbara Tuchman-like scenario where we could destroy the transatlantic relationship, and that we have a window in which we can turn this around and that we need to exploit this. But if those decisions come out the way you describe them, Senator Biden, we are only digging ourselves in deeper.

Senator BIDEN. Bruce, what do you think?

Mr. JACKSON. I spent a lot of time with this administration both during campaigns and at the platform and also in the last 2 years. I do not think this administration should bow to anybody in its transatlantic commitments and its recognition that the alliance is actually the foundation for how we act in world politics. You know many of the Zoellicks and the Wolfowitzs and the Hadleys and the Rices. They have been doing this for years. Actually they were students again of this committee. So I do not think anybody disagrees on the principles.

We have not actually seen diplomacy conducted under this kind of wartime threat perhaps ever, and it is obviously constrained outcomes in a way we did not expect. I think if we were just having an objective test, how many telephone calls, how many meetings, how many visits to Europe——

Senator BIDEN. Well, that is really not my question. I am sorry. I'm not questioning—what I am trying to get at is, if in fact we shut out NATO by whatever means and NATO members, particularly those who did not agree with us, from quote, the "rebuilding," however you want to characterize it, from playing some role a la Karzai, a la Kosovo, even a la Bosnia, which was not a success in my view, if we shut them out in those serious decisionmaking processes which relate to who and how are we going to get to a civilian control of Iraqis, the Iraqis controlling Iraq, if we shut them out from the rebuilding, if we shut them out from playing any part in the security, not dominant—we will play the dominant role—is it possible, Bruce, to say then that we really do want to repair this breach? Or does that say that the view held by some names I will not mention, that you know as well as I know, who do not want to see us as engaged with NATO as we have been—what does it say about our policy?

Mr. JACKSON. Sir, I agree with you. Obviously our NGO will be in there campaigning that this kind of stuff should not happen.

I think one of your colleagues mentioned that there will be an anger at Turkey and France and Germany. I think this is a dangerous character, and leadership is needed from you and the chairman to make sure this does not happen.

Senator BIDEN. Well, quite frankly, we are counting on guys as respected as you—I am counting on folks like you, men and women like you, who are respected, serious voices, who have relationships and alliances in the best sense of the word with the administration to weigh in. This is a time for all good men to come to the aid of

their party here. Far be it for me to speak for the Republican side of this. But I really mean it.

These decisions are going to be made in the next weeks. They may be made now. This is not something that is going to be made 3 months from now in my humble opinion.

Well, I have said too much already.

Mr. JACKSON. I think Ron said it correctly. Magnanimity is a quality of our democracy and it is a great thing in victory. So let us get victory and then we will have magnanimity.

Senator BIDEN. I am with you. All right. Well, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

We thank both of you. I would just add to the list of people that might be helpful, members of our committee, and Senator Biden and I will try to do our best too. I think each one of us has a responsibility. This is an important time of decision in which we are all not helpless in trying to intervene and to weigh in sincerely, at least, with views that we have. This is one reason why we have had this timely hearing today. It has been an opportunity not only to talk about the treaty and commend the seven countries that aspire to membership, as well as the organization, but to think among ourselves about the future and the importance of that future being a bright one for NATO.

So on that note, why, we will end the hearing. We thank you again for your testimony.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., April 3, 2003.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

CONGRESS OF ROMANIAN AMERICANS,
1000 GELSTON CIRCLE,
McLean, VA, April 1, 2003.

The Honorable RICHARD LUGAR,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR:

Romania should be embraced by the U.S. Senate as the "newest" member of NATO.

Its characteristics, both human and strategic, combine to underscore its importance as an addition to NATO. Romania has contributed hundreds of soldiers in peacekeeping efforts to Afghanistan and the western Balkans and recently has sent troops to Iraq, with additional troops ready for deployment on request.

There are numerous strategic, military, political and economic reasons for including Romania as a NATO member.

For military reasons:

Romania has a large and well-trained army, that has demonstrated its compatibility with other international forces in peace-keeping missions in Bosnia, Angola, Somalia and the Persian Gulf, and in joint military exercises with NATO forces.

Romania would be a bridge between the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO.

Romania has an active bilateral military cooperation with the United States.

Romania was the first country to join the Partnership for Peace.

Its Armed Forces have not been dependent on Russian training or military technology for over 25 years.

For political reasons:

In Romania, integration in NATO enjoys the largest popular and political support of all candidate countries. It is endorsed by a consensus of the major Romanian political parties and by over 80% of the population.

In a survey taken for the European Commission in Brussels, Romanians displayed the strongest pro-American sentiments throughout the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

Romania is an oasis of regional political and social stability in the Balkans.

Romania has a democratic administration, with a distinct Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Romania protects its minorities. It was showcased by the U.S. 2 years ago, as a model in its treatment of its ethnic minorities.

For economic reasons:

Romania is ready to bear its share of the cost of military restructuring and modernization to ensure compatibility with NATO forces through massive purchases of U.S. and West European military equipment.

Inclusion in NATO would protect the growing American investment in Romania and thus provide incentives for major projects currently being evaluated.

Romania's economy follows a steady upward trend.

Romania fulfills the basic requirements for inclusion in NATO.

- Civilian control over the military.
- Good relations with its neighboring countries (A treaty with Hungary was signed and ratified in 1996.).
- A democratic political system.
- Commitment to economic reform and free-market economy.
- Demonstrated potential of interoperability with NATO forces.

Romania is an asset to NATO.

Sincerely,

ARMAND A. SCALA, *President.*

NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS—PART III

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George V. Voinovich, presiding.

Present: Senators Voinovich, Lugar, and Corzine.

Senator VOINOVICH. The committee will please come to order. I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for scheduling this hearing to continue discussion on the merits of NATO enlargement. This is the third of a series of hearings dedicated to the subject which I believe is highly important as we continue to confront the challenges to global security and the changing world since September 11.

Now, the question of NATO enlargement is one that has long been close to my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of Ohio, I have worked closely with constituents in my State with ties to countries that once were subject to life behind the Iron Curtain. It is amazing to me how far many of these countries have come in a short time, rising to embrace democratic reforms after so many years under Communist rule. The fact that seven countries once part of the former Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact and one, Yugoslavia, have been invited to join the NATO alliance, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia is testament to just how much has been achieved since the collapse of the Soviet empire more than a decade ago.

Because of a commitment that I have to make, I am not going to read the rest of my statement, and I am going to have it inserted in the record so that I can have the opportunity to hear from our witnesses today, and I want to thank them for being here today, Dr. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND Corporation, who will discuss progress made by the Baltic Nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Mr. Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic International Studies will then highlight developments in Bulgaria and Romania, and Dr. Jeff Simon of the National Defense University will cover Slovenia and Slovakia.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

I would like to begin by thanking the Chairman, Senator Lugar, and Senator Biden for scheduling this hearing to continue discussion on the merits of NATO en-

largement. This is the third in a series of hearings dedicated to this subject, which I believe is highly important as we continue to confront challenges to global security in a changed world post-September 11th.

The question of NATO enlargement is one that has long been close to my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of the State of Ohio, I worked closely with constituents in my state with ties to countries that were once subject to life behind the Iron Curtain.

It is amazing to me to see how far many of these countries have come in such a short time, rising to embrace democratic reforms after so many years under communist rule. The fact that seven countries once part of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact or Tito's Yugoslavia have been invited to join the NATO Alliance—including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia—is testament to just how much has been achieved since the collapse of the Soviet Empire more than a decade ago.

While the seven countries invited to join the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Prague last November have met the political and economic qualifications for membership, it is also true that they bring to the table defense capabilities that will enhance the overall security and stability of the NATO Alliance. President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the highest-ranking member of the U.S. military, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, have all expressed this view. They maintain that in addition to niche military capabilities, these countries bring energy, freshness and enthusiasm to the Alliance.

While there are without a doubt disagreements within NATO that must be addressed, there is general consensus amongst the current members of the Alliance on the question of enlargement. This was clear to me last November, when I joined President Bush, Secretary Powell and other members of the Administration as a member of the Senate delegation to the NATO Summit in Prague. Our Allies, too, believe that these countries will make significant contributions, militarily and otherwise, to the Alliance.

On November 21st of last year, when NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced the historic decision to invite the three Baltic nations, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to join the Alliance, I listened as heads of state from our allied nations—including the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Great Britain, Poland, Canada, Turkey, and many others—praised the work done by the seven candidate countries and expressed their strong support for enlargement to include these new European democracies.

Secretary General Lord Robertson, after working with the NATO aspirant countries on comprehensive domestic reforms in preparation for membership in the Alliance, concluded, (quote) "We can therefore say with complete confidence that this round of enlargement will maintain and increase NATO's strength, cohesion and vitality."

I share this view, and I believe it is appropriate and timely that we now consider these candidates for membership in NATO. They have provided crucial support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against our country on 9/11, and continue to make significant contributions to the ongoing campaign against terrorism. They have shown their solidarity in our efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein and liberate the Iraqi people, and have pledged to work with the international community to promote security and reconstruction in Iraq following the end of military action.

The candidate countries have also moved forward with democratic reforms to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights. On a subject that remains of strong concern to me—the need to address a disturbing rise in anti-Semitic violence in Europe and other parts of the world—several of the candidate countries, including Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania, have joined with the United States, Poland and other countries to actively encourage the chair in office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to mount a serious and credible OSCE conference on anti-Semitism. Due in part to their efforts, the OSCE has agreed to conduct such a conference, and it is scheduled to take place in June. This is just one example, but it is indicative of important action that is taking place.

As was highlighted last week when an inter-agency team from the Departments of State and Defense testified before the Committee, the seven candidate countries bring nearly 200,000 new troops to the Alliance. They have also pledged to commit significant resources to national defense, with Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania all at or above the 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) mark in 2002. Slovakia and Latvia were just under 2 percent (1.9 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively) and Slovenia, at 1.6 percent in 2002, has committed to reach the 2 percent mark by 2008.

The average defense spending among the candidate countries was 2.1 percent for 2002, which is equal to the average spent by current NATO Allies countries for the same period. It is interesting to note that 11 of 19 members of the Alliance did not reach the 2 percent mark for defense spending in 2002. Clearly, there is room for improvement in this regard.

Last week, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman testified before the Armed Services Committee regarding the future of NATO. When asked about the benefits of enlargement, he said, (quote) "I believe, senators, that the accession of these countries are about the future of NATO, and will be good and directly benefit U.S. interests. Why? They're strong Atlanticists. They're allies in the war on terror. They've already contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul."

The list goes on. I agree with Marc's assessment. These countries already make significant contributions that strengthen the transatlantic relationship. They have acted as de facto allies, and I believe they will make important contributions as members of the NATO Alliance.

While much has been achieved, there is still work to be done as the candidate countries continue work on their Membership Action Plans (MAPs). As has been said before, Prague should be viewed as the starting line, not the finish line.

Efforts have continued since the Prague Summit, and I was very pleased to learn that the people of Slovenia—who have been engaged in discussion about NATO membership for many years now—voted overwhelmingly in support of Slovenia's membership in NATO during a national referendum on March 23rd, with roughly two-thirds of voters favoring accession to the Alliance. This was a crucial step for the country.

It is imperative that the candidates continue to address outstanding issues that require attention, including military reform, respect for human rights, and efforts to combat organized crime and corruption. It is this last piece that perhaps concerns me the most. These problems have the potential to undermine democratic reforms, respect for the rule of law and other core NATO values, and I believe they could be very dangerous if left unchecked.

After meeting with leaders from these seven countries and spending time in each country that has been invited to join the NATO Alliance, I am confident that reforms will continue. I sincerely believe that reforms will be swifter and more complete as these countries are brought into the Alliance, rather than left out.

As we consider enlargement today, it is clear that the world is a very different place than it was when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were brought into NATO. The world's democracies and multilateral institutions, including the NATO Alliance, face new threats to freedom, marked not by communist aggression but instead by the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations, and terrorists who shown their willingness to use them against those who value freedom and democracy, if given the chance to do so.

NATO has been challenged to meet these future threats and has embarked upon a course to identify the capabilities needed to confront new challenges to international security. This discussion was a primary item on the agenda at the Prague Summit, where NATO heads of state agreed that new challenges could require the Alliance to operate beyond Europe's borders. The Prague Declaration noted that (quote): "In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives."

To do so, NATO heads of state announced the creation of a NATO Response Force, which is envisioned to consist of approximately 20,000 troops who are ready and able to deploy anywhere in the world within 30 days. This is still a paper concept, and we look forward to learning more about efforts to turn this into a viable force at the June ministerial in Madrid.

The NATO Summit last November also produced the Prague Capabilities Commitment, replacing the Defense Capabilities Initiative (or DCI) that was initiated at the 1999 Washington Summit. It calls on allies to improve and develop military capabilities, focusing on defenses against weapons of mass destruction; intelligence; command, control and communications; and strategic air and sea lift, among other things.

If NATO is to meet future challenges, it is imperative that the capabilities gap between the U.S. and our European allies be addressed. The Prague Capabilities Commitment highlights critical needs within the Alliance. Without adequate capabilities, NATO's ability to respond to future security challenges will be seriously undermined.

As we discuss enlargement, we must also ask how the candidate countries will respond to these urgent challenges. We must ask what role the potential new members will play in the Alliance, and what contributions they are prepared to make as we assess whether they are ready to be part of a permanent, stabilizing force in Europe.

The Committee began an examination on the contributions and qualifications that the seven candidate countries bring to the table last Thursday, receiving testimony from officials of the Departments of State and Defense.

We will continue this discussion today, and I would like to welcome our witnesses. They include: Dr. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND Corporation, who will discuss progress made by the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Mr. Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies will then highlight developments in Bulgaria and Romania; Dr. Jeff Simon of the National Defense University will cover Slovenia and Slovakia.

I thank the witnesses to taking the time to be here today. I look forward to their testimony. I would like to recognize the ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening remarks.

Senator VOINOVICH. Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, and we will start with Dr. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND Corporation. Dr. Larrabee.

STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, RAND, ARLINGTON, VA

Dr. LARRABEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a great honor and privilege to be invited to testify before this committee on the qualifications of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for membership in NATO.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that membership of the Baltic States in NATO is very much in U.S. interests and will significantly contribute to enhancing the overall security in Europe. The Baltic States have made significant progress in meeting the economic, political, and military requirements for NATO membership since achieving their independence.

All three States have functioning democratic systems and viable market economies. Indeed, the growth rates in the Baltic States are among the highest in Europe. The Baltic States are also among the most pro-American countries in Europe. Public support for NATO membership is also extremely strong in the three countries.

All three Baltic States have made significant progress in modernizing their military forces and making their forces capable of operating with NATO forces. Moreover, unlike some other aspirants for NATO membership who inherited legacy forces from their membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States had to create militaries from scratch after achieving independence.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have time to go through the details of their modernization plans. Some of this is outlined in my written testimony, however, let me highlight a few aspects. Defense budgets in all three have been rising. Estonia's defense budget increased from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8 in 2001 and rose to 2 percent in 2002. Defense spending in Lithuania has also risen.

In 2001, all parliamentary parties signed an agreement reaffirming their commitment to devote no less than 2 percent of GDP in 2001 to 2004. To reinforce this commitment, the extension of the accord until 2008 is currently under consideration. Latvia has also pledged to raise its defense spending to 2 percent by 2003.

Given the small size of their armed forces and the strong financial constraints they face, the Baltic States cannot hope to build powerful armed forces that can match those of the larger and richer members of the alliance. Instead, they have sought to enhance their value to the alliance by developing specialized capabilities in certain areas, that is to say, niche capabilities. Latvia, for instance, is developing specialized ordnance and minesweeping units and is considering developing a chemical-biological defense unit. Estonia is also developing a minesweeping unit, while Lithuania is creating a medical unit.

All three Baltic States, moreover, have shown a willingness to contribute to the war on terrorism. Latvia deployed a special forces unit and demining team in Afghanistan, Estonia sent an explosive detection dog team, and Lithuania deployed a special forces unit and a medical team, as well as offered its air space and airfields for Operation Enduring Freedom.

In short, before they had even been invited to join NATO, the three Baltic States were already beginning to act like members of NATO and good allies. All three countries also have lent political support to the U.S.-led effort to disarm Iraq. All three signed a letter of the Vilnius-10 calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm. They have also contributed militarily. Lithuania, for instance, has sent a liaison officer to CENTCOM and provided overflight rights and transit for U.S. and coalition forces in the Iraq campaign.

The existence of a large Russian minority in the territories of the Baltic States has created some tensions with Russia, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. However, over the past decade the Baltic States have worked closely with the OSCE and EU to bring their citizenship and electoral laws into conformity with OSCE and EU norms and procedures. Both organizations have certified that the laws of the Baltic States today fully conform to OSE and EU norms. This has significantly reduced the credibility of Russian complaints about the treatment of the minority.

Some Western observers have expressed fears that Baltic membership in NATO could seriously complicate NATO's relations with Russia. I do not think this is likely. President Putin played down the Baltic issue in the run-up to the Prague summit. He also made clear that his main goal is to improve Russia's ties to NATO. Thus, he is unlikely, in my view, to make Baltic membership a major issue in relations with NATO in the future.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me say that the invitations issued at Prague are an important achievement. They help to anchor the Baltic States more firmly in the West and end the debate about their place in the post-cold war European security order. At the same time, NATO membership will create a new set of strategic challenges which the U.S. and the Baltic States need to address. For much of the last decade, ensuring the security of the Baltic States was an important U.S. priority. Indeed, the Baltic States issues spurred some of the most innovative security arrangements in the post-cold war period.

However, having succeeded in obtaining invitations to join NATO, the Baltic States now run the risk of becoming victims of their own success. There is a danger that once the Baltic States are

members of NATO, the United States may essentially regard the Baltic issue as fixed, so to say, and disengage from the region.

Indeed, there are signs that this is already happening. Momentum behind the Northern European Initiative, one of the most innovative policy initiatives toward the region, has begun to wane in the last several years. In short, the strategic framework that shaped Western policy toward the Baltic region is increasingly becoming obsolete and being overtaken by events.

That paradigm, that strategic framework centered around the integration of the Baltic States into NATO. With the invitations of Prague and Copenhagen, these goals have largely been achieved. Thus, the challenge in the post-Prague period is to develop a new paradigm or a new strategic agenda that can help keep the U.S. engaged in the Baltic region.

I would submit that this new agenda should include at least four elements, No. 1, enhancing cooperation with Russia, No. 2, helping to stabilize the situation around Kaliningrad, No. 3, promoting democratization of Belarus, and No. 4, supporting Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, with growing demands on government resources, some of the mechanisms of U.S.-Baltic cooperation may need to be revamped to give a larger role to NGOs and to the private sector. It is important, however, that the Northern European Initiative receive adequate funding.

The second key challenge is to assure that Article 5 is not a hollow paper commitment. While enlargement of the Baltic States is largely being carried out for political reasons, the military dimensions remain important. Thus, in the post-Prague period, the U.S. and its NATO allies will need to give more attention to the military dimensions carrying out an Article 5 commitment to the Baltic States.

Lacking any clear conceptual thinking about how to defend the Baltic States, NATO planners may be tempted to dust off the plans for defending Poland and Central Europe and use them as a model for defending the Baltic States. However, it is not clear that the Polish model, that is, large indigenous land and air forces, plus a robust NATO reinforcement package, is the right defense model for the Baltic region. The Baltic region lacks the strategic depth and large military forces that were available in the Polish case. In addition, Russian forces are closer, and Belarus does not provide a strategic buffer, as Ukraine does in the Polish case.

At the same time, to diffuse Russian concerns about the military impact of Baltic membership, NATO should make a unilateral commitment that it does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons or permanently station major combat troops on Baltic soil as long as there is not a significant deterioration in the security environment. NATO made such a unilateral statement during the first round of NATO enlargement, and repeating such a statement when the Baltic States enter the alliance would help to ease Russia's anxiety about NATO's intentions.

Finally, the third challenge is to enhance cooperation with Russia. Some observers have worried that NATO membership will have a negative impact on Baltic-Russian relations. The opposite, however, in my view is likely to be the case. Rather than leading to a deterioration in Baltic-Russian relations, as some fear, Baltic

membership in NATO is likely to lead to a gradual improvement of Baltic-Russian relations.

Now that the basic battle for long-term security orientation of the Baltic States has been resolved, Moscow is likely to stop its bullying tactics and show greater interest in improving ties with the Baltic States just as happened with Poland after Poland entered NATO. At the same time, NATO membership is likely to increase the self-confidence of the Baltic States and allow them to expand ties to Moscow.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. Thank you very much for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other committee members have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Larrabee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE,[1] SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, RAND, ARLINGTON, VA

THE BALTIC STATES AND NATO MEMBERSHIP

Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege to be invited to testify before this committee on the qualifications of the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—for membership in NATO.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the membership of the Baltic states in NATO is very much in U.S. interest and will significantly contribute to enhancing overall security in Europe. The Baltic states have made significant progress in meeting the economic, political and military requirements for NATO membership since achieving their independence in 1991. All three states have functioning democratic systems and viable market economies. Indeed, growth rates in the Baltic states are among the highest in Europe.

Public support for NATO membership is also strong in all three countries. In Latvia, a poll taken in December 2002 showed that 68.5 percent of the population supported membership in NATO. Polls in Estonia consistently show support for NATO running about 70 percent, while those in Lithuania indicate that over 75 percent of the population support Lithuania's membership in NATO.

MILITARY REFORM AND MODERNIZATION

Unlike some other aspirants for NATO membership from Central and Eastern Europe who inherited legacy forces from their membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic states had to create militaries from scratch after achieving independence. Given their small size and limited financial resources, this has not been an easy task. Nonetheless, all three Baltic states have made significant progress in modernizing their military forces and making them capable of operating with NATO forces.

Defense budgets in all three have been rising. Estonia's defense budget increased from 1.6 percent of the GDP in 2000 to 1.8 percent in 2001 and rose to 2 percent in 2002. Estonia is in the process of creating a small intermediate reaction force; a battalion-size rapid reaction force; and 2 brigades of main defense forces.

Defense spending has also risen in Lithuania. In 2001, all parliamentary parties signed an agreement reaffirming their commitment to devote no less than 2 percent GDP in 2001-2004. To reinforce this commitment, the extension of the accord until 2008 is currently under consideration. Lithuania has also taken important steps to modernize its forces and make them NATO compatible. It plans to have one NATO-interoperable Reaction Brigade by 2006. It has also formed a peacekeeping battalion (LITPOLBAT) with Poland.

In the future, Lithuania plans to have a slightly smaller but more easily deployable force and to move away from the concept of territorial defense. In line with this, it is planning to reduce the number of conscripts and increase the number of professionals in the armed forces as well as restructure the territorial units to provide host nation support, protection of key strategic facilities and assistance to civil authorities. The volunteer and active reserve forces will also be downsized.

[1] This statement is based on a variety of sources, including research conducted at RAND. However, the opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the agencies or others sponsoring its research.

Latvia's defense spending has been the lowest of the three. However, Latvia has pledged to raise defense spending to 2 percent by 2003. By the end of 2004, Latvia will be able to commit a fully professional Motorized Infantry Battalion, with some Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units, to the Alliance for a full range of NATO missions.

Given the small size of their armed forces and the strong financial constraints they face, the Baltic states cannot hope to build powerful armed forces that can match those of the larger and richer members of the Alliance. Instead they have sought to enhance their value to the Alliance by developing specialized capabilities in certain areas. Latvia, for instance, is developing specialized ordnance and minesweeping units and is considering developing a chemical/biological defense unit. Estonia is also developing a minesweeping unit, while Lithuania is creating a medical unit.

SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM

All three Baltic states, moreover, have shown a willingness to contribute to the war on terrorism. Latvia deployed a special forces unit and demining team in Afghanistan, while Estonia sent an explosive detection dog team. Lithuania deployed a special forces unit and a medical team as well as offered its airspace and airfields for Operation Enduring Freedom. While these contributions were small and largely symbolic, they were an important indication that all three Baltic states were prepared to contribute to the war on terrorism.

All three countries also lent political support to the U.S.-led effort to disarm Iraq. All three signed the letter of the Vilnius 10 calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm. Lithuania has also sent a liaison officer to CENTCOM and provided over-flight and transit for U.S. and Coalition forces in the Iraq campaign.

REGIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION

The three Baltic states have also taken a number of steps since 1993 to strengthen regional defense cooperation. The most important and successful initiative has been the creation of a joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT). Composed of a company from each of the three Baltic states, BALTBAT has been deployed in Bosnia as part of the Nordic Brigade. The joint peacekeeping battalion is an important expression of the Baltic states' readiness to contribute to international peacekeeping. At the same time, it has helped the Baltic states to gain valuable experience in working closely with NATO.

In addition, several other efforts have been undertaken to enhance regional defense cooperation:

- A joint Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) has been set up. BALTRON is composed of a combined Lithuanian-Latvian-Estonian staff and national ships from the navies of the three Baltic countries. It is based in Estonia. The long-term goal is to make the Squadron interoperable and compatible with NATO and able to conduct mine countermeasure operations.
- A Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), based in Lithuania, has been established. It is designed to improve international cooperation between civilian and military authorities in aviation matters and to increase operational effectiveness. The data distributed in BALTNET will be compatible with other European data systems.
- A Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) has been set up in Tartu, Estonia. Its primary function is to train senior staff officers and civilians from the Baltic states in NATO-based staff procedures, strategic planning and management. In addition to students from the three Baltic states, the first course of BALTDEFCOL also included students from Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Sweden and the U.S.

These initiatives have helped to promote a greater sense of cohesion and regional cooperation among the Baltic states. The three Baltic states are also cooperating in joint arms and equipment purchases in order to save money. In August 2001, Latvia and Estonia agreed to jointly purchase long-range radars from Lockheed Martin. The radars will form part of the Baltic states' joint airspace surveillance system (BALNET), which will be integrated into similar NATO systems in the future.

THE RUSSIAN MINORITY ISSUE

The existence of large Russian-speaking minorities in the territory of the Baltic states has created some tensions with Russia. Moscow has often accused the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia, of discriminating against the minority. How-

ever, over the past decade the Baltic states have worked closely with the OSCE and EU to bring their citizenship and electoral laws into conformity with OSCE and EU norms and procedures. Both organizations have certified that the laws of the Baltic states today fully conform to OSCE and EU norms.

However, overall Moscow has much less influence in the Baltic states today than it did five or ten years ago. Russia's influence over the Russian minorities in the Baltic states is declining. While many members of the minority continue to feel that they are second class citizens, few wish to emigrate to Russia. Today a growing number of the younger members of the minority see their fate tied to the process of European integration rather than to Russia's evolution. This has reduced Russia's ability to use the minority as a means of pressure on the Baltic states.

RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

The Baltic states have also taken steps to promote religious tolerance and address important historical legacies by creating Holocaust Commissions. Lithuania, for instance, intends to introduce amendments into the existing Law on the Restitution of Religious Property, which would provide a legal mechanism for Jewish property restitution and compensation for lost communal property. These amendments are being drafted in cooperation with the Lithuanian Government Commission, headed by the Minister of Justice, and the International Committee to Represent Jewish Property Claims in Lithuania. In Latvia, the subject of the Holocaust is included in the compulsory history curriculum as a component of general education.

IMPACT OF BALTIC MEMBERSHIP ON RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS

For a long time Russia strongly opposed Baltic membership in NATO, arguing that Baltic membership in the Alliance would cross a "red line" and lead to a serious deterioration of Russian-NATO relations. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Yeltsin tried to get a private oral agreement from President Clinton—a "gentleman's agreement" that would not be made public—not to admit the Baltic states into the Alliance. President Clinton flatly refused to make such a commitment.

President Putin, however, played down the Baltic issue. While opposing NATO enlargement in principle, he seemed to recognize that Russia had over-reacted to the first round of enlargement and appeared intent on not allowing the Baltic issue to disrupt his effort to deepen cooperation with NATO. In addition, the closer U.S.-Russian cooperation on terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks helped to defuse the impact of the Baltic issue on NATO-Russian relations.

Some Western observers have expressed fears that Baltic membership in NATO could seriously complicate NATO's relations with Russia. However, this seems unlikely. As noted, Putin played down the Baltic issue in the run-up to the Prague summit. His main goal is to try to improve ties to NATO. Thus he is unlikely to make Baltic membership a major issue in relations with NATO.

THE POST-PRAGUE AGENDA IN THE BALTIC REGION

Mr. Chairman, the invitations issued at Prague are an important achievement. They help to anchor the Baltic states more firmly in the West and end the debate about their place in the post-Cold War European security order. At the same time, NATO membership will create a new set of strategic challenges, which the U.S. and the Baltic states need to address.

The first challenge is directly related to U.S. policy. For much of the last decade ensuring the security of the Baltic states was an important U.S. priority. Indeed, the Baltic issue spurred some of the innovative security arrangements in the post-Cold War period. However, having succeeded in obtaining invitations to join NATO, the Baltic states now run the risk of becoming victims of their own success. There is a danger that once the Baltic states are members of NATO, the U.S. will essentially regard the Baltic issue as "fixed" and disengage from the region. Indeed, there are signs of this already happening. Momentum behind the Northern European Initiative—one of the most innovative policy initiatives toward the region, has begun to wane in the last several years.

In short, the strategic framework that shaped Western policy toward the Baltic region is increasingly becoming obsolete and being overtaken by events. That paradigm centered around the integration of Baltic states into NATO and the EU. With the invitations at Prague and Copenhagen, these goals have largely been achieved. Thus the challenge in the post-Prague period is to develop a new paradigm—a new strategic agenda—that can keep the U.S. engaged in the Baltic region.

The pre-Prague agenda centered around stabilizing the Baltic region. In the post-Prague period, the strategic agenda should shift from stabilizing the Baltic region

to stabilizing the immediate neighborhood. The new agenda should include 4 elements: 1) enhancing cooperation with Russia; 2) helping to stabilize the situation around Kaliningrad; 3) promoting the democratization of Belarus; 4) supporting Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, some of the mechanisms for U.S.-Baltic cooperation may need to be revamped to give a larger role to NGO's and the private sector.

The second key challenge is to ensure that Article 5 is not a "hollow" paper commitment. While enlargement to the Baltic states is largely being carried out for political reasons, the military dimensions remain important. Thus in the post-Prague period the U.S. and its NATO allies will need to give more attention to the military dimensions of carrying out an Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states.

Lacking any clear conceptual thinking about how to defend the Baltic states, NATO planners may be tempted to dust off the plans for defending Poland and use them as a model for defending the Baltic states. However, it is not clear that the "Polish Model"—i.e., large indigenous land and air forces, plus a robust NATO reinforcement package—is the right defense model for the Baltic region. The Baltic region lacks the strategic depth and large military forces that were available in the Polish case. In addition, Russian forces are closer and Belarus does not provide a strategic buffer as Ukraine does in the Polish case. Finally, Western reinforcements are not next door as is the case in Poland. Thus getting reinforcements to the Baltic states will be much harder and take longer.

At the same time, changes in warfare and technology—above all precision-guided weapons and network centric warfare—may give the United States and NATO new options for defending the Baltic states which don't require large reinforcements stationed on Baltic territory. Such options would also reduce the relevance of CFE since these options would not require large amounts of TLE (Treaty-Limited Equipment) on Baltic soil.

This is all the more important because Russia may try to use CFE to constrain the ability of NATO—and especially the U.S.—to carry out an Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states by limiting NATO's ability to temporarily station forces on the territory of the Baltic states. NATO's reinforcement capacity was a major issue in the first round of enlargement and it could be an issue in the second round of enlargement as well in regard to the Baltic states. Thus the Alliance will need to devise a CFE strategy that assures that the interests of the Baltic states are adequately protected.

Moreover, the Baltic states cannot be expected to announce their TLE levels until they know how they will be defended and how much TLE they will need. This highlights the need for NATO to begin to develop its plans for defending the Baltic states now. Otherwise, there is "a danger that the Alliance's CFE policy and its Baltic policy could operate at cross-purposes, leading to strains in relations with the Baltic states.

At the same time, to defuse Russian concerns about the military impact of Baltic membership, NATO could make a unilateral statement that it does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons or permanently station major combat troops on Baltic soil as long as there is not a significant deterioration in the security environment. NATO made such a unilateral statement during the first round of NATO enlargement and repeating such a statement when the Baltic states enter the Alliance could help to ease Russian anxiety about NATO's intentions.

These pledges could be accompanied by proposals for confidence-building measures. One idea worth considering would be to expand the German-Danish-Polish Corps in Szczecin (Stettin) to include units from the Baltic states and eventually perhaps even Russian forces from Kaliningrad. Initially, cooperation could begin with joint exercises on an ad hoc basis. But as mutual confidence increased, the cooperation could be expanded and institutionalized.

The third challenge concerns relations with Russia. In the pre-Prague period, the main challenge was to overcome Russia's opposition to Baltic membership. This was successfully accomplished. However, in the post-Prague period, the key challenge will be to improve cooperation between the Baltic states and Russia.

Some observers worry that NATO membership will make this task harder. The opposite, however, is likely to be the case. Rather than leading to a deterioration in Baltic-Russian relations, as some fear, Baltic membership in NATO is likely to lead to the gradual improvement of Baltic-Russian relations. Now that the basic battle for the long-term security orientation of the Baltic states has been resolved, Moscow is likely to stop its bully tactics and show greater interest in improving ties to the Baltic states—just as happened with Poland after Poland entered NATO. At the same time, NATO membership is likely to increase the self-confidence of the Baltic states and allow them to expand ties to Moscow.

Fourth, U.S. policymakers need to ensure that there is no backsliding away from democratic reform and social tolerance in the Baltic states. All three Baltic states need to continue to make an honest reckoning with the past, including the Holocaust. In addition, they need to intensify efforts to root out corruption.

Finally, U.S. policymakers should continue to encourage the Baltic states to promote the integration of the Russian minority more fully into Baltic political and social life. The social integration of the Russian minority is an important prerequisite for long-term political stability in the Baltic states as well as for maintaining cordial relations with Russia.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other Committee members may have.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Dr. Larrabee. I had the opportunity to visit the Baltic States and to see first-hand what they are doing militarily, and I was extremely impressed with what they are doing, and I think your comment about the issue of having a new vision after these new countries join NATO is very, very important, so that we have a broad vision of what their respective responsibilities are going to be, and look at the whole issue of how they would be protected in the event that they needed to be protected.

Thank you very much, and I have some statements here that I am going to insert in the record, there being no objection to them, from the Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., and also from the Baltic American Freedom League, Inc. Without objection, they are inserted in the record.

[The statements referred to follow:]

LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, INC.,
NATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
213 WEST LAKE SHORE DRIVE,
Cary, IL, April 1, 2003.

Dr. MICHAEL H. HALTZEL,
Senior Professional Staff Member,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Building,
Washington, DC.

Re: NATO Ratification Hearings

DEAR DR. HALTZEL:

Per our recent conversation, I am enclosing herewith the Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., position paper on NATO ratification now pending in the Senate. Please be kind enough to include our remarks in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing records. We would very much like to address the Committee conducting the hearings if that is at all possible. However, we understand the reasons that may make such an address not possible.

Thanking you in advance and wishing you our best wishes, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

REGINA F. NARUSIS, J.D., *Chairman,*
National Board of Directors,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, INC.,

NATO POSITION

Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. supports:

1. United States continued involvement and commitment to NATO and security in Europe.

2. The revitalization of the NATO Alliance.

3. The admission of all seven nations invited to join the NATO Alliance at Prague in 2002.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO has been since its formation in 1949 the most effective defensive alliance uniting North America and Europe. It was instrumental in winning the Cold War, in encouraging European nations to foster democracy, rule of law, free market economies and in preserving peace and stability. Pre-World War II non-engagement or isolationism has proven to be costly to us militarily, financially and in loss of life. History has taught us that the United States has been drawn into European conflicts of the 20th century because our vital interests are ultimately engaged there.

The world has changed both technologically and geopolitically since the end of the Cold War. Distances and oceans are no longer barriers to danger. Established democracies have grown stronger and more assertive, such as France and Germany. New democracies have emerged and are seeking their rightful place in world affairs. Our involvement becomes more crucial as does transatlantic cohesion to prevent conflict among its key members.

The Soviet Union no longer exists, but new threats have emerged. We have gone from the risk of nuclear exchange to multiple threats of global insecurity. The United States will not be able to sort out alone every international threat that now faces us, without depleting ourselves physically, mentally and financially. We need allies.

The countries that share our values and history are the NATO countries. The United Nations is an organization of nations that do not have the same common values and thus, as recently evidenced, are able to debate but not solve problems, much less act to correct them.

NATO has survived the test of time. It unanimously and for the first time in its history, invoked its founding principle of collective defense on behalf of the United States following the September 11th attacks. It did at first stumble when Turkey requested assistance in the event of an Iraqi attack, but it found a means to meet the Turkish request within the Alliance. The Alliance assisted Russia, the former adversary, to come to grips with reality. Moscow did sign a new cooperation pact with the Alliance in May of 2002 in Rome reaffirming the right of every nation to choose its own allies and alliances.

NATO is reorienting itself, but if it revitalizes itself by means of further expansion and restructuring of its military forces and establishing a new NATO Rapid Response Force that can be staffed and shared by all members, it will become only stronger and better.

NATO EXPANSION

The admission of the Czech Republic, Hungry and Poland was a success. The bulk of the actual costs of enlargement have been borne by the new countries. Their relationship with Russia has improved, rather than become a threat. These new members have been true allies. They have contributed to NATO operations: in NATO peacekeeping missions, sent specialized chemical warfare troops to the Gulf and hosted the Iraqi exiles for training to support United States forces. The largest NATO exercise involving 5,000 troops, "Victory Strike", was in Poland. These new members have given united support to the bond between. United States and Europe.

In 2002 in Prague the artificial Cold War division of Europe finally came to an end. NATO leaders approved the Alliance's largest expansion in its 53 year history. The expansion encompasses Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

NATO accession of these seven nations will change the way we perceive the region. With the support of the United States, these nations will take their rightful and equal place in a Europe whole and free. They are not second class countries. They will not let the Franco-German domination take root or the Russians exploit the effort to eliminate United States influence in Europe. These are the nations that understand the true meaning of freedom and democracy. Because of their enslavement and long struggle for freedom, their approach to foreign policy is different from those in Western Europe. They know that appeasement does not work and that dictators must be dealt with.

These nations have a relationship with the United States that has stood the test of time. In great part, thanks to the United States, Europe rid itself of two forms of tyranny—Nazism and Communism. They see America as the only real guarantor of their security. History has taught them, that neither France nor Germany can be trusted to put European interest ahead of their own. The supportive letter from the Vilnius 10 members proves their loyalty to NATO. These nations are dynamic,

full of new energy and most of all are becoming increasingly assertive. These countries are also entering the European Union and will change that organization from within. We all need a united Europe, not a Western Europe (so called "old Europe") or Central and Eastern Europe ("new Europe"), but a Europe where all nations are equal and are so treated. Continued United States involvement can help bring this about. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want NATO to be strong and to keep a United States presence. The American influence through the process of enlargement will only grow. Through enlargement of NATO all of Europe will be more balanced and reinvigorated. Enlargement makes strategic sense for the United States and will prove to be the greatest strategic and political gain for the Alliance.

Though not yet members of the Alliance, the seven invitees to NATO, have already contributed to NATO, thus have proven their commitment and worth. They all have sent troops to preserve peace in the Balkans, they all have supported the United States in the war against terrorism and made their airspace and bases available to the U.S.-led coalition. They have joined the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and are contributing highly skilled troops. These countries have issued a joint statement early on supporting the United States efforts to disarm the Iraq regime. Their governments have declared preparedness to contribute politically and with other means to the efforts of the United States led coalition against Iraq. Slovenia is contributing mountain units. Slovakia is contributing chemical and biological expertise, Romania sent a battalion of troops to the war zone. Bulgaria is sending chemical warfare specialists to the Gulf. The Baltic nations are contributing special units as well as cargo handling and medical teams.

Lithuania alone has sent 914 military personnel, maintained an infantry platoon with the Polish battalion in KFOR, provided An-26 transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel and contributed medical personnel to preserve peace in the Balkans. To the war in Afghanistan, Lithuania has offered use of its airspace and airfields, support for "Operation Enduring Freedom", deployed medical teams with the Czech contingent in ISAF in 2002 and German contingent in 2003 and deployed Special Operations Forces unit in support of OEF. To the war in Iraq, Lithuania has sent its liaison officer to CENTCOM, signed the V-10 statement compelling Iraq to disarm, offered overflight and transit rights to United States and coalition forces and offered cargo handlers and medics.

FOREIGN POLICY IS AND SHOULD NOT BE A PARTISAN MATTER

In 1993 the Clinton Administration made the decision to invite new members. The 1994 "Republican Contract with America" supported NATO enlargement. On April 30, 1998 United States Senate ratified the last NATO expansion by a 80 to 19 vote.

The Democrat and Republican Party Platforms of 2000 supported NATO enlargement, as did both presidential candidates.

On April 5, 2001 seventeen United States Senators, both Republican and Democrat leaders, wrote a letter to President Bush urging the Bush administration to "ensure" that NATO invites qualified European democracies to begin accession negotiations at the 2002 Summit in Prague.

NATO enlargement and ratification is and should remain a non-partisan issue.

For all the reasons aforesaid, NATO enlargement will support and increase the security and international interests of the United States.

REGINA F. NARUSIS, J.D.,
Chairman of National Board of Directors,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.

ALGIMANTAS S. GECYS,
President of National Executive Committee,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.

BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, INC.,
P.O. BOX 65056,
Los Angeles, CA, March 26, 2003.

The Honorable GEORGE VOINOVICH,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.

DEAR SENATOR VOINOVICH:

On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, I am submitting the League's statement recommending NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

We respectfully request that the statement be made part of the record of the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on amending the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

You have been a great and true friend to the Baltic American community and the Baltic countries, and we sincerely appreciate it. The Baltic American community believes that the Baltic countries are qualified for membership in NATO, and we hope that you will continue to support them in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

VALDIS V. PAVLOVSKIS, *President*

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VALDIS V. PAVLOVSKIS, PRESIDENT, BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, INC.

BALTIC MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, the Board of Directors respectfully request that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee support the membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in NATO and recommend their membership in NATO to the full Senate.

Since the Baltic countries regained their independence, Congress has supported the integration of the Baltic nations in western defense structures. In support, in 1994 Congress enacted the NATO Participation Act, in 1996 it passed the European Security Act, and in 2002, by an overwhelming vote, the Freedom Consolidations Act. In addition, last year the House of Representatives passed HCR 116 and HCR 468 recommending Baltic membership in NATO.

Congress has supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO by annually providing funding through FMF and IMET for the development of Baltic armed forces. For a decade, American military advisory teams have served in the Baltic countries training the Baltic military, and hundreds of Baltic soldiers of all ranks have graduated from U.S. military schools. Baltic military forces have participated in joint military exercises with NATO forces. Recent NATO inspection teams as well as visits by U.S. Congressional delegations have concluded that the Baltic countries are qualified for NATO membership.

In the short period since they regained their independence, the Baltic countries have developed strong and responsible democratic governments, viable free market economies and transparent and democratic armed forces. OSCE, the U.S. Department of State, and various international bodies have found that the Baltic countries respect and fully comply with international standards of civil and human rights.

The early fears that Russian opposition to Baltic membership in NATO would give rise to Russian nationalism and have a deleterious effect on U.S.-Russian relations have not materialized.

Today, the Baltic countries participate in the Partnership for Peace program and operation Enduring Freedom. Baltic troops are serving in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

The Baltic countries were one of the first to support U.S. action in Iraq, and they were the initiators of the Vilnius Ten declaration in support of the U.S., in spite of retaliation threatened by their larger neighbors France and Germany. All three Baltic countries are preparing to assist in reconstruction of a post Saddam Iraq.

The Baltic countries have demonstrated their willingness and capability to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership. They share our values and have proved to be loyal friends of the United States. As Americans of Baltic heritage, the Baltic American Freedom League is proud and confident to support Baltic membership into NATO. We hope that you will too.

We look forward to working with you to gain support for amending the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Janusz Bugajski.

STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EASTERN EUROPE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to offer my perspectives, both on

NATO's future, but more importantly here the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania. In the limited time I have, and I will try and be brief, I will simply present the core of my written testimony, which is brief to begin with.

Let me say this at the outset. America's national security doctrine issued in September 2002 declared that the NATO alliance must be able to act wherever common interests are threatened, create conditions under NATO's own mandate, and contribute to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, quote, "we must expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests," unquote. I think it is primarily in this context that the newly invited countries can be assessed.

If, indeed, the United States is determined to cultivate alliances with reliable partners, whether by reinvigorating NATO or bypassing its cumbersome decisionmaking procedures, then each NATO aspirant needs to be measured according to five basic standards, domestic stability and democracy, bilateral political cooperation, military collaboration, regional security, and commitment to the anti-terror coalition. I believe that in each of these cases, both Bulgaria and Romania have passed the test for membership. Let me just note a few examples.

Bulgaria has developed a stable democratic system with a functioning market economy. It has held several free and democratic elections, and the political transition between governing parties has been smooth and trouble-free. The policies of all major political forces has been pro-reform and pro-NATO. The Bulgarian economy has been stabilized through an effective Currency Board that controls State spending, and the country has registered a steady GDP growth in recent years. Substantial progress has been registered in the restructuring of the armed forces into a modern and combat-ready military tailored to NATO needs.

There is comprehensive political and public support for Bulgaria's NATO membership, despite the country's financial constraints, and there is a commitment to allocate approximately 3 percent of GDP to defense spending over the coming years.

Bulgaria considers itself a partner and ally of the United States, and there is overall agreement on major decisions related to Bulgaria's contribution to NATO and the anti-terror campaign. As a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2002–2003 period, Bulgaria has consistently supported U.S. positions, unlike several of America's NATO allies.

In terms of contributions to the U.S.-led anti-terror and anti-rogue State operations, Bulgaria has enabled air, land, and sea transit to coalition forces and the temporary deployment of U.S. aircraft for refueling and cargo-lifting purposes in both the Afghani and Iraqi operations. It has allocated military units to the International Security Assistance forces in Afghanistan, and dispatched an anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical unit on a defensive mission to a country neighboring Iraq.

Similar to its neighbor to the south, Romania has achieved a high level of political stability, it has held several free and fair elections, and created a democratic political structure. The country's

major political forces are committed to democracy, free markets, and integration into international institutions.

Romania has displayed economic growth and stabilized the most important macroeconomic indicators. In terms of military progress, Romania has established full civilian control, substantially streamlined its forces, and is intent on modernizing its military hardware. President Iliescu has asserted that defense spending will not fall below 2.3 percent of GDP in the next few years.

Romania itself, similar to Bulgaria, has made significant progress as America's strategic partner. Bucharest has provided diplomatic support for the U.S. positions in various international venues, such as the U.N. and OSCE. It has backed American immunity from the ICC process, and has on occasion taken pro-U.S. positions that were at odds with the European Union.

Romania supported the United States from the outset after September 11, and participated in the post-war mission in Afghanistan. Intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation has been growing. Bucharest has provided political support for U.S. operation against Iraq, and concrete assistance in the Iraqi campaign, including fly over rights, use of ports and military facilities. It has dispatched decontamination, medical, and demining contingents to the Middle East, and pledged to participate in Iraq's post-war reconstruction.

In light of the evidence, I believe that both Bulgarian and Romanian membership in NATO will directly assist U.S. national security interests and global strategies, and I cite five reasons. Let me briefly go through these. This is in conclusion.

First, NATO entry is a reward for Bulgaria's and Romania's proven record of reform in recent years, and their commitment to Western norms and objectives. It will help propel forward the reform process and enable further military development and interoperability with U.S. forces. Although neither country is presently capable of making significant military contributions, both can offer specialized support in particular niches.

Second, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a practical method for reinvigorating the Transatlantic link and creating a larger pool of interoperable countries with which the United States can construct coalitions for future security operations. NATO as an organization will remain divided into allies of various degrees of dependability for Washington. However, Bulgaria and Romania can be placed at the high end of the spectrum and their membership can serve to narrow the transatlantic divide or provide new bridges across existing gaps.

Third, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a valuable means for buttressing the U.S. position vis-à-vis the European allies. It will give Washington additional voices of support within NATO's decisionmaking process, and broaden diplomatic and political assistance in various international fora and organizations.

Fourth, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will enhance the shift of the U.S. security focus to the Black Sea-Caspian-East Mediterranean triangle. Located on the Black Sea, Romania and Bulgaria offer more direct routes to the Middle East across the Black Sea to the Caucasus or through Turkey. The strategic and economic significance of these regions is increasing, especially with the

development of oil and gas lines from Russia and Central Asia, and with ongoing regional conflicts that challenge America's security interests.

And fifth and last, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will encourage other southeast European countries to accelerate their reform programs. It will provide vision and direction to several States in the region that are preparing for NATO membership, including Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia. It will also help to place future contenders, including Serbia and Montenegro, on track for both PfP and eventual NATO accession.

Washington, I also believe, should support Montenegro's aspirations toward independent statehood if, indeed, the EU-sponsored link with Serbia proves untenable. The United States can also take a more active role in ending the U.N.-mandated status quo in Kosovo and moving that pro-American aspiring State toward independence.

It is plainly evident, Mr. Chairman, that the greater number of new European States, the bigger the pool of new American allies.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EAST EUROPEAN PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE FUTURE OF NATO: DO BULGARIA AND ROMANIA QUALIFY?

Before we can answer the question whether any European state qualifies for NATO membership, we need to determine how NATO has evolved and in what way it will be further transformed. The North Atlantic Alliance is in turmoil if not crisis and the reasons are plentiful: insufficient burden sharing by the west Europeans, inefficient decision-making in times of crisis, differing commitments to potential combat missions, and serious political disputes between leading Allies. The newly invited east European states need to reflect that the NATO they are poised to enter is very different to the one that they first petitioned for membership. For the United States, the most vital question is whether the entry of seven new democracies, including Bulgaria and Romania, into the Alliance will help or hinder America's national interests and global strategies

NATO PRESENT AND FUTURE

We have entered a turbulent era in trans-Atlantic relations that may drastically reshape the strategic map of Europe. While NATO may not disappear from the scene, it could increasingly: resemble the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) or a mini-UN with a more pronounced emphasis on crisis management, conflict prevention, and "soft security." Alternatively, in addition to promoting stronger bilateral ties with like-minded Allies, Washington may seek a revamped NATO structure that can more effectively intersect with U.S. interests. In this context, it is useful to highlight some of the fundamental questions that are not only troubling for current members but also for all NATO aspirants:

- Is NATO a coherent and effective Alliance or a fractured organization with multiple and diverse objectives? Can NATO act in unison or will it evolve into a looser structure in which certain members respond to specific crises by assembling smaller willing coalitions? How will NATO decision-making be modified to adjust to these new circumstances?
- Will NATO remain as a single and capable military alliance, as well as a security and political alliance? Or will there be a growing division of labor between combat missions and peace-keeping operations with an emphasis on smaller ad-hoc coalitions both within and outside of NATO?
- Is NATO largely superfluous for U.S. policy not only in terms of military capabilities and performance, but even in terms of collective political and diplomatic support? If France and Germany can block the United States on the UN Security Council and in NATO decision-making, will a different sort of trans-Atlantic Alliance emerge, one that bypasses some of Europe's older democracies?

- Will the United States severely diminish its involvement with NATO, both militarily and politically? Washington is increasingly disregarding NATO as an organization in its struggle against rogue regimes and terrorist networks and focusing instead on bilateral relations with more dependable allies. As a result, is NATO's significance declining regardless of its enlargement into the eastern half of Europe?

EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES

America's National Security Doctrine issued in September 2002 declared that the NATO alliance must be able to act wherever common interests are threatened, create coalitions under NATO's own mandate, and contribute to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this: "We must expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests." It is primarily in this context that the newly invited countries can be assessed:

- The east Europeans operate on two basic principles—to keep NATO united and effective and to maintain U.S. engagement in Europe. In their estimation, even if the former fails the latter must succeed to help ensure their own security. The obvious fear is that if France or Germany or any other power can block Alliance planning for assistance to a long-standing NATO ally, such as Turkey (and disregard NATO's Article 5), then an Alliance reaction to a potential Russian threat to Estonia, Lithuania, or Poland could prove even more timid.
- All NATO applicants view the United States as the preeminent guarantor of their security, freedom, and national independence. Both publicly and privately, east Europe's political leaders remain skeptical about west Europe's security capabilities and deliveries. Moreover, they are fearful lest some new French-German-Russian axis undermines American engagement in Europe and diminishes their own sense of security. East Europe's objective is not to choose between Europe and America but to help protect Europe by keeping America engaged in the "old continent."
- If Washington sees only obstruction and uncooperativeness in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, then it can redirect its resources and refocus its interests on more willing allies elsewhere in Europe. Reports that Washington may be planning to move military bases from Germany to Poland indicate that some of the older allies are no longer viewed as dependable or their positions are no longer perceived as strategically significant. Although at present the military potential of the new European democracies is limited, Washington can help invest in developing their military capabilities over the coming decade.

If indeed the United States is determined to cultivate alliances with reliable partners, whether by reinvigorating NATO or by bypassing its cumbersome decision-making procedures, then each NATO aspirant needs to be measured according to five basic standards: domestic stability and democracy; bilateral political cooperation; military collaboration; regional security; and commitment to the anti-terror coalition.

BULGARIA'S QUALIFICATIONS

Domestic Stability and Democracy

Bulgaria has developed a stable democratic system with a functioning market economy. It has held several free and democratic elections and the political transition between governing parties has been smooth and trouble-free. The policies of all major political forces have been pro-reform and pro-NATO, and even the post-communist Socialist Party has developed a Western orientation. Bulgaria has not experienced any significant ethnic conflicts although the social and economic position of the large Roma minority remains a point of concern as in several other east European states. The sizable Turkish minority is represented in the coalition government.

The Bulgarian economy has been stabilized through an effective currency board system that controls state spending and has registered a steady GDP growth in recent years. However, much of the population experiences low standards of living and foreign investment has been limited. The country still faces problems with corruption and the judiciary system is often ineffective and needs to be more resolutely restructured. Anti-corruption measures have been implemented, but more tangible results will be evident with more comprehensive judicial reform.

Substantial progress has been registered in the restructuring of the armed forces into a modern and combat-ready military tailored to NATO needs. Force Structure

Reviews have been completed in full compliance with NATO requirements. Democratic civilian control over the armed forces is being consolidated and the government needs to maintain its commitment to streamlining the armed forces in line with its Defense Plan 2004.

There is comprehensive political and public support for Bulgaria's NATO membership despite the country's financial constraints, and there is a firm commitment to allocate approximately 3% of the GDP to defense spending over the coming years. There is a high level of protection of classified information in compliance with NATO standards while controls over the export of possible dual use weapons and technologies have been tightened.

Bilateral Political Cooperation

Bulgaria considers itself a partner and ally of the United States and there is overall agreement on major decisions related to Bulgaria's contribution to NATO and the anti-terrorist campaign. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2002-2003 period, Bulgaria has consistently supported U.S. positions unlike several of America's NATO allies. The current center-right government has backed Washington in the Iraqi crisis despite some verbal criticism by the Socialist President Georgi Parvanov and the Socialist opposition in parliament. Although the Socialists are supportive of NATO membership, some of their leaders maintain close links with the Russian authorities, which seek to diminish America's global role. Such ties have weakened over the past decade and it is clearly in U.S. interest to limit Moscow's political interference in Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policy.

Military Collaboration

Bulgaria has supported U.S. and NATO military operations in both word and deed. It granted airspace for the NATO "Allied Force" operation in Serbia in March-June 1999 and the transit of NATO forces and equipment for the "Joint Guardian" operation in Kosova in July 1999. Bulgaria played an important role in avoiding a possible crisis in relations between NATO and Russia in June 1999 by denying Russian forces overflight rights during NATO's liberation of Kosova. Sofia interacted with NATO during the transit of KFOR contingents through Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria has also participated in two NATO-led operations: in SFOR (Bosnia-Hercegovina) and in KFOR (Kosova) and is the only NATO PfP state to participate with its own contingent in SFOR.

Regional Security

Bulgaria maintains good relations with all of its neighbors and has no outstanding disputes. It has played a leading role in a number of regional cooperation formats, including the multi-national South East European Peace-Keeping Force (SEEBRIG), and has hosted its headquarters in the city of Plovdiv. Sofia has participated in the regional security initiative SEDM (South East Europe Defense Ministerial). Bulgaria has played a constructive role vis-á-vis Macedonia and was the first country to recognize Macedonia's independence in 1992. It has also contributed to democratic developments in Serbia following the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000.

Anti-Terror Coalition

In terms of contributions to the U.S.-led anti-terror and anti-rogue states operations, Bulgaria has enabled air, land, and sea transit to coalition forces and the temporary deployment of U.S. aircraft for refueling and cargo-lifting purposes in both the Afghanistan and Iraq operations. It has allocated military units to the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and dispatched an anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) unit on a defensive mission to a country neighboring Iraq. Moreover, Bulgaria has consistently supported the U.S. position toward the Iraqi question on the UN Security Council.

ROMANIA'S QUALIFICATIONS

Domestic Stability and Democracy

Similarly to its neighbor to the south, Romania has achieved a high level of political stability, held several free and fair elections, and created a democratic political structure. One troubling element has been the parliamentary representation of a populist-nationalist party, which has exploited Romania's economic difficulties. Nevertheless, the country's major political forces are committed to democracy, free markets, and integration into international institutions.

Ethnic relations have remained reasonably stable in Romania although some disputes have been visible with the Hungarian minority. The persistent problem of

poverty with regard to the large Roma minority will require more intensive governmental and international involvement.

Romania has displayed economic growth and stabilized the most important macroeconomic indicators. With reductions in the public deficit, stabilized inflation, and strengthened foreign relations, both Romania and Bulgaria are pushing toward EU accession over the next few years. However, the IMF has stressed that Bucharest needs to maintain consistency in its economic policies to avoid lurching back toward the stagnant economic conditions notable in the 1990s.

In terms of military progress, Romania has established full civilian control, substantially streamlined its forces, and is intent on modernizing its military hardware. President Ion Iliescu has asserted that defense spending will not fall bellow 2.3% of GDP in the next five years. Romania still has some problem areas that need to be tackled more resolutely in the years ahead. In particular, official corruption needs to be combated, the judicial system overhauled, and the screening of ex-Securitate personnel staff continued in order to protect official defense secrets and NATO intelligence.

Bilateral Political Cooperation

Romania has made significant progress as America's "strategic partner." Bucharest has provided diplomatic support for the U.S. positions in various international venues such as the UN and OSCE. It has backed American immunity from the ICC (International Criminal Court) process and has on occasion taken pro-U.S. positions that were at odds with the European Union. President Bush's visit to Romania after the NATO summit in November 2002 highlighted the closeness of the bilateral relationship.

Military Collaboration

Romania and America have developed close military contacts, through joint exercises, educational programs, and arms contracts with U.S. companies. Romania is thereby becoming increasingly interoperable with NATO and with American forces. Bucharest has completed a new headquarters for SEEBRIG in Constanta on the Black Sea that will help ensure the unit's interoperability with NATO. Romania has also contributed one ship to the BLACKSEAFOR multinational naval patrol and will play an increasingly important role in this region.

Regional Security

Romania has endeavored to play a stabilizing role across several regions, including South East Europe and the Black Sea zone. It has participated in several Balkan peace-keeping missions, including in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosova, and Albania, and in several regional security initiatives such as SEDM (South East Europe Defense Ministerial). Bucharest has established a regionally focused anti-crime center in Bucharest under the auspices of SECI, originally an American initiative. It has helped to coordinate, together with Bulgaria, its approach on NATO accession through participation in the "Vilnius 10" group.

Anti-Terror Coalition

Romania supported the U.S. from the outset after September 11th and participated in the post-war mission in Afghanistan. Intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation has been growing. Bucharest has provided political support for the U.S. operation against Iraq and concrete assistance in the Iraqi campaign, including fly-over rights, use of ports and military facilities, dispatched decontamination, medical, and demining contingents to the Middle East, and pledged to participate in Iraq's post-war reconstruction. Seventy soldiers belonging to Romania's anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical unit (NBC) are stationed in the Persian Gulf region. The unit will intervene behind front lines "for decontamination actions" in the event the Iraqis use chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces.

U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO ENLARGEMENT

In sum, both Bulgaria and Romania together with the other NATO invitees have matured into self-sustaining democracies. As in Central Europe, American "democracy-building" assistance needs to be privatized and indigenized under competent local control. A self-standing civil society, a broad spectrum of political parties, and a professional free media can develop more effectively without unnecessary, inappropriate, and sometimes counter-productive outside oversight. Such an approach will send a strong signal of trust and commitment to America's new allies. In the light of the evidence, both Bulgarian and Romanian membership in NATO will directly assist U.S. national interests and global strategies.

- NATO entry is a reward for Bulgaria's and Romania's proven record of reform in recent years and their commitment to Western norms and objectives. It will help propel forward the reform process and enable further military development and interoperability with U.S. forces. Although neither country is presently capable of making significant military contributions, both can offer specialized support in particular niches.
- NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a practical method for reinvigorating the transAtlantic link and creating a larger pool of interoperable countries with which the United States can construct coalitions for future security operations. NATO as an organization will remain divided into allies of various degrees of dependability for Washington. Bulgaria and Romania can be placed at the high end of the spectrum and their membership can serve to narrow the trans-Atlantic divide or provide new bridges across existing gaps.
- NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a valuable means for buttressing the U.S. position vis-á-vis the European allies. It will give Washington additional voices of support within NATO's decision-making process and broaden diplomatic and political assistance in various international fora and organizations.
- NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will help enhance the shift in the U.S. security focus to the Black-Caspian-East Mediterranean triangle. Located on the Black Sea, Romania and Bulgaria offer more direct routes to the Middle East, across the Black Sea to the Caucasus, or through Turkey. The strategic and economic significance of these regions is increasing, especially with the development of oil and gas lines from Russia and Central Asia and with ongoing regional conflicts that challenge America's security interests.
- NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will encourage other Balkan countries to accelerate their reform programs. It will provide vision and direction to several other states in the region that are preparing for NATO membership, including Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia. It will also help to place future contenders, including Serbia and Montenegro, on track for PfP (Partnership for Peace) and eventual NATO accession. Washington should also support Montenegro's aspirations toward independent statehood if the EU-sponsored link with Serbia proves unsuccessful. The United States can also take a more active role in ending the UN-mandated status quo in Kosova and moving that pro-American aspiring state toward independence. It is plainly evident that the greater number of new European states, the bigger the pool of new American allies.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Bugajski. Dr. Simon.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY SIMON, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. SIMON. Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege to be here today. I have submitted a longer statement for the record. Due to the limited time I will make a few brief comments which I hope will help frame this afternoon's discussion on enlargement and NATO's future.

I want to state clearly that I support NATO's November 2002 Prague summit decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Council to 26, recognizing that NATO will be a very different organization from what it has been. After the December 2002 Copenhagen summit decision to enlarge to 25, the EU also will be a new institution. The dual enlargement will reduce institutional variable geometry in Europe with eight new NATO members overlapping in the EU in 2004.

The U.S. military footprint is also likely to change in Europe by the thinning of troops in Germany with a new presence shifting to the east and the southeast. Hence, a new EU-NATO institutional relationship will be needed, particularly with the EU now in Macedonia and perhaps soon in Bosnia, and NATO enlargement can play a positive role here.

Mr. Chairman, NATO enlarged during the cold war for purposes of defense and enlarged again during the post-cold war to incorporate producers of security. September 11, 2001 changed our perception of risk and the criteria for extending NATO invitations. I believe that the seven new members share common values, interests, and perceptions of risks, but they are weaker and smaller than the 1999 entrants. We need to remember some lessons suggested from the 1999 enlargement.

First, integration was more difficult and long term than anticipated, second, NATO had to alter its expectations in terms of performance, and third, when the new members joined NATO they still required assistance. The dual enlargement, coupled with the changing U.S. military footprint, will likely influence the course and evolution of the new NATO, new EU and European security in the northeast, in the southeast, and in the center.

In the northeast, with Baltic States in NATO and the EU, along with Poland in the EU in 2004, and with the U.S. footprint in Poland, we will likely see continued strong defense interests in support of NATO and U.S. political and military cooperation there.

In the southeast, greater institutional variable geometry will result, with Romania and Bulgaria in NATO and delayed EU entry. The U.S. footprint here will be important, because the EU assumed the NATO mission in Macedonia and plans the SFOR follow-on in Bosnia, and because U.S. presence will reinforce Romania and Bulgaria's strong support of NATO and U.S. political and military cooperation.

In the center, why Slovakia and Slovenia, which is what you asked me to focus on. Both will be in the EU in 2004. Both provide a land bridge, although this is of diminishing importance to Hungary, but evince weak support for NATO. If the September 2002 Slovak elections, or the 23 March 2003 Slovene referendum went differently, I would not be defending their ratification today.

Let us look at Slovakia. With 5½ million people, it started late. It started on 1 January, 1993. It had the dual curse of on the one hand having to build a new defense establishment from scratch, but it also inherited large forces from the former Warsaw Pact, so it had the worst of both worlds. Public confusion on NATO existed due to two failed referenda that were basically pushed in 1997 and 1998 under Vladimir Meciar.

What progress has Slovakia made? On the government level, they have, in fact—this is under Dzurinda's government—engaged in very significant educational initiatives to build popular support for NATO. The government also supports the United States in the war on terrorism with overflights, they have sent troops to Afghanistan and Kuwait, and they support our Iraq operations.

Second, the U.S. defense assessment which we provided for Slovakia in 2000 provides the conceptual basis for their army 2010 program. They presently have a total active force of 30,000, 14,200 professionals and 15,800 conscripts of 12-month duration. Implementation of their reform, I can report, is going well. Their recruitment should lead to 20,000 professionals by 2007. They have maintained since 2002 1.9 percent of GDP for defense, and they are effectively planning a niche capability.

The one cloud on the horizon is the fact that there could be, though not very probable, a referendum on NATO that some elements are presently pushing in Slovakia.

Let us go to Slovenia, a country of 2 million. Here we find weak NATO support. We did have, as you well know, a referendum recently where 66 percent of the populace turned out in support of NATO. We were all very relieved, if not surprised. And 89.6 percent supported the EU One could argue that this was somewhat of an aberration in that it was response, I think, to the Djindjic assassination, which reminded many Slovenes that they live in a rough neighborhood.

What progress have they made? They have a stable economy and a stable polity, probably the most stable of all the seven entrants. Our U.S. defense assessment in 2000, which we also worked with them, helped to establish some realism in their defense planning. In 2003, right now, they have got a total active force of 7,800. That is 4,640 professionals and 3,160 7-month conscripts who are not terribly useful.

Let us look at implementation. Frankly, if I compare their implementation to others, some of their implementation is worth questioning. They plan an all-volunteer force by the end of 2004, and they hope to have 7,800 professionals by 2008. They still have a way to go. They have attempted to promise NATO one battalion across the board, but frankly, this is unrealistic. Defense expenditures are presently 1.61 percent of GDP, and they claim a goal of 2 percent by 2008, which frankly, with low social support, like Hungary, this may not come to fruition.

They have provided weapons to the Afghan National Army. They have managed the demining fund, but they remain hesitant on Iraq. The Prime Minister has criticized Foreign Minister Rupel for signing the V–10 declaration but, to their credit, they have sent as a substitute 100 troops to Sector North in Bosnia in January of this year.

Why Slovenia? Its accession to NATO and EU provides, really, a symbolic segue for FRY successor States to Euro-Atlantic institutions. This is picking up on Janusz' point. Hence, Slovenia's incorporation in the list enhances the security and stability in the southeast quadrant of Europe.

For these reasons, I support the ratification of the seven Prague summit invitees to join the alliance, but based upon lowered, more sober, and realistic expectations. First, we need to recognize new members are smaller and have weaker military and institutional capacities than NATO's 1999 entrants, and they will find it difficult to meet NATO's staffing requirements. Hence, we should not terminate eligibility for certain U.S. programs like the Warsaw Initiative funds as we did in 1999.

Second, after accession, NATO leverage will diminish. How can we keep them on course with defense budget and force goal commitments? All except Romania will become ineligible for FMF for not signing Article 98 of the ICC. Perhaps we should reassess their FMF eligibility on a case-by-case basis and provide waivers, as we have done for other NATO allies, but link waivers to performance.

Third, since the United States has already performed defense assessments for all the 2004 invitees, after accession we might focus

on the means to assist their development of niche capabilities and encourage forging cooperative links between the NATO Response Force and the European Rapid Reaction Force of the EU.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions and comments.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Simon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY SIMON,[1] SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATO, the core institution defining the transatlantic relationship, stands at a crossroad. Now that the Alliance's 21-22 November 2002 Prague Summit has passed into history, NATO will need to focus on implementing its decisions that include the adoption of transformed command arrangements, a NATO Response Force (NRF), a Capabilities Commitment to deal with post-September 11th security challenges, and substantial enlargement of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to 26 members in 2004. The "new" NATO will be a very different organization from what it has been. On balance, integration of the seven new members on NATO will make a modest but generally quite positive contribution to this transformation of transatlantic security affairs.

The European Union (EU)'s decision at Copenhagen on 12-13 December 2002 to enlarge from 15 members today to 25 by mid-2004 will similarly challenge and transform that organization. In 2004 eight of NATO's new members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) also will be in a "new" EU.

The dual (NATO and EU) enlargement will further reduce the "variable geometry" that has existed between the two institutions in Europe and result in "mingling EU and NATO cultures" with unknown, but potentially significant consequences. However, the EU's eight new NATO members, who have recent historical memory of Soviet domination, joined the Alliance because they see it as the best vehicle to guarantee their security and defense concerns and strongly support the active U.S. political and military engagement on the continent that NATO helps assure. For these reasons, one hopes and expects that they will exert their influence to support greater EU-NATO cooperation on security and defense issues, and therefore have beneficial effects on both institutions by helping to bridge the transatlantic gap.

The United States' military "footprint" is also likely to change in Europe not just by thinning of its presence in Germany, but also by acquiring a "new presence" and shifting in the direction of Europe's east and southeast. If the U.S. and Europe are to be successful in working together, a new EU-NATO institutional relationship will be needed, in part, due to the overlapping responsibilities that have become evident with NATO's involvement in western Balkan international border security. Additionally, both sides of the Atlantic need to work to ensure that the EU ESDP and emerging European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) are complementary and does not become competitive.

This is particularly important now since the EU on 31 March 2003 has assumed responsibility for NATO's "Operation Allied Harmony" in Macedonia and would be more so if the EU were to assume leadership of a follow-on force to NATO's SFOR in Bosnia. After the 2004 dual enlargement, the resulting "variable geometry" of the EU and NATO in the Balkans could likely have security repercussions there. Hence, there will be a greater need to maintain NATO for defense and reassurance and in deepening cooperation between the two institutions.

WHY NATO ENLARGEMENT?

NATO during the Cold War (1949-1991) maintained a consensus on the USSR/Warsaw Pact threat as defined in Military Committee 161 threat assessments. While we knew our opponent's capabilities, we did not know his intent. Defense of Europe remained a central U.S. priority as embedded in NATO's MC 14/3 "flexible response." Hence, when NATO enlarged during this period it was for the purpose of defense. In the midst of the Korean War, Greece and Turkey were added in 1952 to contain the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany with its newly created *Bundeswehr* in 1955, and Spain in 1982 for strategic depth.

[1] The opinions expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the INSS, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other governmental agency.

The post-Cold War (1991-September 11, 2001) period was marked by the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and with their eclipse, the perception of common threat. When NATO enlarged it was for enhancing stability and security. The July 1990 London Summit stressed openness to cooperation and willingness to break down former dividing lines in Europe. The November 1991 Rome Summit deepened this cooperation and created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the January 1994 Brussels Summit clarified the Alliance's openness to enlargement (Article 10) and launched Partnership For Peace (PFP). When invitations were extended at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined on 12 March 1999, enlargement was justified as incorporating "producers" of (political, economic, social, and military) security as defined in the September 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement.*

What lessons should we have learned from the 1999 enlargement?

- First, the three new allies found integration to be a more difficult and long-term process than they anticipated. Promised Target Force Goals and defense commitments had to be renegotiated, extended, or changed.
- Second, the Alliance had to alter its expectations in terms of performance and found it more difficult to gain compliance once the new allies were members.
- Third, we assumed that upon "graduation" to becoming a full member, they could stand on their own feet. They were excluded from many programs that had been put into place to help prepare them become the allies they wanted to become, and that we wanted them to become. In the end, we might conclude that the overall enlargement was "successful," though to date Hungary's performance has not been as satisfactory as that of Poland and the Czech Republic.

The events of 11 September 2001 changed our perception of threat *and* the criteria for extending NATO invitations. Although the 1994 Brussels Summit issued a declaration "to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery" and the 1999 Strategic Concept referred to terrorism in an Article 4 context, terrorism remained in the background during the post-Cold War period. But when NATO invoked Article 5 on 12 September 2001, the issue was raised to the forefront of NATO's post-Cold War agenda and the divergence in transatlantic risk assessments became more apparent.

Clearly the United States perception of risk *has* changed, and the huge increase in defense expenditures reflects this. Although European NATO allies invoked Article 5 and *some* have provided defense assistance in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and to Operation Iraqi Freedom, risk assessments remain diverse, especially when searching for any increases in defense expenditures. In a total reversal from the Cold War, where we knew our opponent's capabilities but not his intent, in the war on terrorism we know our opponent's *intent,* but not his capabilities. While NATO remains a "defensive" Alliance, the U.S. war on terrorism requires "offensive" operations (e.g., pre-emption) often far beyond the territories of NATO members. This mentality shift strains the transatlantic relationship, particularly for those European allies who do not share the same perception of risk and had come to see NATO's main role as providing reassurance and stability, rather than in defending Europe.

If 11 September had *not* occurred, it is likely that the Prague invitation list would have been smaller. The Prague Summit invited seven Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners from the Baltic to Black Sea to join the Alliance because we believe they share common values and perception of risk. Will enlarging the NAC to include 26 members sharing common values and interests be sufficient to help NATO to deal with these risks or will enlargement only make them worse?

The seven new members' physical and institutional capacities are substantially weaker than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, whose performance as allies has been "mixed," though can be judged as successful. However, some of their demonstrated deficiencies suggest "lessons" for us as we pursue the integration of NATO's seven new 2004 allies. Certainly, the MAP introduced at the April 1999 Washington Summit has witnessed the evolution of a defense reform process that should ease some post-accession challenges for the new invitees, but their weaker capacities suggest the need for greater patience and further assistance as they prepare to assume the obligations of full membership.

The 2002 Prague Summit's invitees have substantially weaker capabilities than NATO's three new 1999 members (Poland with a population of 38 million, and Hungary and the Czech Republic with 10 million) because they are smaller and have less developed institutional capacities. Each of the seven invitees has significant strengths and deficiencies, and in light of their support after September 11, 2001, it was more difficult to make "credible" distinctions among the seven. They were

clearly "more viable" than Albania and Macedonia whose fundaments of statehood have been in question and who have been "consuming" NATO's security and defense resources, and Croatia, who had just joined the MAP in 2002 and is only beginning its reform. Omitting any of the seven invitees would have raised credibility issues because the "strengths" of any excluded partner would have been weighed against the "weaknesses" of the invited. An invitation list of seven made credible NATO's Article 10 commitment to openness and prevented "drawing lines" in Europe.

DUAL ENLARGEMENT AND THE CHANGING U.S. MILITARY "FOOTPRINT"

With the challenge of the war on terrorism, the Prague Summit Declaration has addressed the question of what capabilities it needs by creating a "NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements . . . [with] full operational capability by October 2006. The NRF and EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organizations." It approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of an effort to create minimal necessary capabilities to deal with a high threat environment. Individual allies have made firm commitments to improve capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBNR); intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; C3; combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support elements.

The PCC and NRF will allow NATO's new European allies to operate with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. For some allies, their contribution would consist of small *niche* units (e.g., police, engineering, de-mining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special forces) with secure communications, ample readiness, and capable of deployment. The NRF is to comprise up to about 21,000 personnel including land, sea, and air components capable of being deployed within 3-30 days of a NAC decision and conduct operations for up to 30 days. On the positive side, it provides NATO's new small allies with the theoretical capacity to focus on niche specialization as a way to "extend" national and multi-national capabilities and "fill" (not close) the gap.

The 2004 dual enlargement coupled with the likelihood of a changing U.S. military "footprint" in Europe will likely influence the course and evolution of the "new" NATO, "new" EU, and (Northeast, Southeast, and Central) European security.

Baltics. After the three Baltic States enter NATO and the EU (with Poland) in 2004, there will be greater institutional geometric congruence in Europe's northeast quadrant. If the U.S. military footprint shifts from Germany to include Poland, it should likely have a substantial impact on Baltic political and military cooperation (e.g., on the future of the North-East Corps and Baltic Brigade—BALTBRIGADE). The three Baltic MAP partners—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (with respective populations of 1.5, 2.55, and 3.6 million) are very small, have real defense interests arising from lingering concerns about Russia, have been willing to support the U.S. and NATO farther afield, and are likely to seriously focus on developing NATO *niche* defense capabilities with the U.S and Poland.

Romania and Bulgaria. Europe's southeast quadrant will witness greater institutional "variable geometry" with the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO in 2004, because of their delayed 2007 EU accession schedule. If the U.S. military footprint moves toward Romania (and Bulgaria), it likely will have a substantial impact on Balkan political and military cooperation particularly since the EU has just assumed responsibility for the Macedonia operation and has expressed its willingness to take over the Bosnia operation after the SFOR mandate ends. It could also influence the evolution of the Southeast European Brigade—SEEBRIG. Romania and Bulgaria, the two Balkan invitees, are relatively large (with respective populations of 21 and 7.9 million), and have provided substantial military support during Kosovo, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, and now Iraq. Their NATO membership strengthens their governments by undermining the agendas of domestic nationalists and populists and contributes to southeast European stability and security.

WHY SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA?

The Committee has asked me to focus my remarks on Slovakia and Slovenia, the two Prague and Copenhagen invitees, in Europe's center. Both provide a land bridge of diminishing importance to NATO's "island" of Hungary and, for different reasons, have traditionally registered stronger support for the EU and lower public support for NATO. Indeed, had the 20-21 September 2002 elections in Slovakia or 23 March 2003 referendum in Slovenia gone differently, I would not be defending their ratification today.

Slovakia, a country of 5.5 million population, started later than the other MAP invitees in that it only acquired independent statehood after the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's "Velvet divorce" on 1 January 1993 and had to build its defense establishment from scratch while having to cut its inherited Warsaw Pact armed forces. It also had the disadvantage of Vladimir Meciar's tumultuous rule that had a disruptive impact on the Slovak public's understanding of NATO membership obligations and benefits. The two failed NATO referenda during Meciar's rule on 23-24 May 1997 and 19 April 1998 contributed to Slovak confusion by asking if they wanted nuclear weapons and foreign troops deployed on their soil, rather than informing and educating the populace. Indeed, Slovakia would not likely have received an invitation *if* Meciar had returned to power in the recent September 2002 elections.

Slovakia has made substantial progress in overcoming these early problems. First, the Mikulas Dzurinda (1998-2002) government launched a significant NATO educational campaign that did raise public awareness of, and support for NATO. Although public support for NATO has recently eroded (as in many NATO countries) in the build-up to the Iraq war, the Slovak government has fully supported the war on terrorism, has provided overflight and transit rights to Afghanistan and sent an engineering unit to ISAF in Kabul, and publicly supported the U.S. in Iraq. In fact, at the moment 69 Slovak soldiers are in Kuwait as part of the Czech Chemical unit participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Second, the U.S. has provided Slovakia with a defense assessment in 2000 that provides much of the conceptual basis for their defense reform, and ever since Slovakia has been implementing its Army Model 2010 program. Though Slovakia is experiencing many of the "normal" problems associated with such a complex endeavor, their strategy is realistic. With a total force structure of 30,000 (14,200 professionals and 15,800 12-month conscripts) in 2003, Slovakia is doing well in implementing a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) on a government-wide basis, maintaining defense expenditures at 1.9 percent of GDP since 2002, meeting recruitment objectives to build an all-volunteer army of 20,000 by 2007, and planning a NATO *niche* capability.

One over the horizon concern has to do with the possibility of a NATO referendum. The political opposition is attempting to gather the necessary 350,000 signatures to hold a referendum that could become problematic in light of depressed public support for NATO. Though possible, the probability remains low.

Slovenia is a small country with a population of roughly two million. Though starting from a very weak position regarding its low public support and limited physical capacity to integrate with NATO, it has made substantial progress of late. First, Slovenia's popular support for NATO has been perennially weak. Their 23 March 2003 referendum that resulted in a vote of 66 percent support for NATO (89.6 percent voted for the EU) pleased and relieved many who had concerns that Slovenia's low public support might result in a negative vote. Why did this occur? Some have speculated that the recent split within NATO over Iraq may have confirmed for Slovenes that other NATO members have a voice on security and defense matters. Also the 12 March 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic in Serbia and Montenegro may have reminded many Slovenes that they live in an unstable region and being a member of NATO provides some benefits. But whatever the reasons, the referendum has put to rest earlier concerns that the government had not been doing enough to convince its public to support NATO.

Second, Slovenia has a stable political and economic environment that some of the other NATO invitees do *not* enjoy. It has been active in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and MAP and has put most of the necessary NATO membership legislation in place. The U.S. has also provided Slovenia with a defense assessment in 2000 and ever since Slovenia has been implementing its army reform program. With a total force structure of 7,800 (4,640 professionals and 3,160 7-month conscripts) in 2003, Slovenia is striving to build an all-volunteer force by the end of 2004 with plans for 7,800 professionals by 2008. Former DSACEUR General Mackenzie has helped engender greater realism in Slovene defense planning (e.g., total wartime strength plans have been reduced from 73,000 to 43,000 to 26,000, and should be 14,000—8,000 professionals and 6,000 wartime reservists in 2010), but they still have a way to go. The Slovene objective to provide a battalion to "the full range of alliance missions" by the end of 2004 is probably unrealistic. While the 2003 defense budget of 1.61 percent of GDP is to increase to 2.0 percent by 2008, with low social support, potential economic constraints, and less NATO leverage after they join, this goal (as we have seen in Hungary) may not come to fruition.

Third, Slovenia has provided assistance in Afghanistan by providing weapons to the Afghan National Army and managing the de-mining fund, but has evinced hesitation on Iraq. Prime Minister Anton Rok wanted a UN resolution before commence-

ment of operations in Iraq and criticized Foreign Minister Rupel for signing the V-10 declaration in February. Germany has substantial influence due to the fact that it was first to recognize Slovenia's independence in January 1992 and remains Slovenia's largest trading partner. Despite Slovenia's position on Iraq, on 15 January 2003 Slovenia added a company of roughly 100 troops to Bosnia's Sector North to the two platoons of Military Police and the medical unit that it maintains in Sarajevo.

Fourth, and perhaps the most important reason for Slovenia's ratification is that its accession to NATO (and EU) provides a symbolic segue for the former Yugoslavia to euro-Atlantic institutions. In this way, Slovenia's accession contributes to stability and security in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia (and non-Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania), who remain quite distant from both institutions.

AFTER NATO RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION

In closing, I believe that seven new members will make modest contributions to Alliance defense, provide valuable political and strategic support to the Unites States in the advancement of our interests in Europe and more globally, and help bridge the transatlantic gap. I support ratification of the seven Prague invitees, but based upon lowered, more sober and realistic expectations.

First, we need to recognize that NATO's seven new allies are smaller and have weaker military and institutional capacities. The 1999 NATO members, who are generally much larger, have found it very difficult to fill civilian and military staff positions at NATO, even four years after accession. NATO's seven new members will find this task particularly challenging and continued support will be necessary. For this reason, we should *not* repeat the mistakes that we made in 1999 when we terminated eligibility for many U.S. programs under the assumption that the new allies could stand on their own feet. Hence, we should think about extending the eligibility of new NATO members for some programs (e.g., such as Warsaw Initiative Funds).

Second, since lessons of the 1999 enlargement suggest that once in NATO most leverage is lost, we need to ensure necessary adherence to the completion of reforms *after* actual accession. We need to prevent repeating the past experience of promises made by aspirants before accession on defense budgets and force goals then remained unfulfilled after becoming members. Most of the new NATO allies (except Romania) will become ineligible for FMF because they have not signed Article 98 of the ICC. Since the U.S. has extended waivers to many old NATO allies, we might review and consider the possible granting of waivers to the new allies on a case-by-case basis linking assistance to performance.

Third, NATO's new members have found it very difficult to finance their military participation in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. All new members have had to finance their operations abroad by either increasing defense budgets, postponing modernization, increasing debt, and/or borrowing funds by floating government bonds. Among the "lessons learned" by the three new 1999 NATO members were that: (1) the process of developing capabilities involved "severe bumps," (2) NATO did not increase common support funds; (3) and the anticipated "savings" from cutting armed forces did *not* materialize for modernization. (This third factor is only relevant to Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, and not the three Baltic states and Slovenia who had to build armed forces from scratch). These "lessons" have relevance to NATO's seven new members, who have different capacities to develop *niche* capabilities. Since the U.S. has already performed defense assessments for all MAP partners, after accession we should focus on the means to assist the new NATO members, based upon performance, in developing *niche* capabilities and encourage the eight new NATO members in the EU to forge cooperative links between the NRF and ERRF.

In summary, this round of enlargement can be successful and contribute to a revitalized NATO if we recognize that the new allies are smaller and have weaker capacities, that we continue certain U.S. programs on a case-by-case basis in tandem with progress on meeting NATO commitments, and are successful in improving EU and NATO cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Simon. I appreciate very much each one of you coming to testify today, and I appreciate Senator Voinovich chairing the hearing for the first period this afternoon.

I want to ask each one of you as a practical matter, and you have touched upon this, Dr. Simon, in your final paragraph, after the treaty is ratified by the NATO countries, you suggest that leverage with regard to the applicants may diminish. It may not be lost altogether. After all, they signed up to obligations, have some sense of their own defense and destiny in these situations.

More specifically, with regard to their relations with the United States of America, it is significant that they are among the nations who have been most enthusiastic about our foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq currently, and that has been noted and appreciated. Is that likely to diminish? Leaving aside the Iraq situation, but other foreign policy issues that may come along the trail in the war against terrorism, how grounded would you characterize, for instance, Slovenia and Slovakia, which has been—especially for you in your testimony, and other witnesses may want to address other countries, what is the vision that these applicants have with regard to the overall war against terrorism, or do they have a sense such as we do in this country of where that may go?

Dr. SIMON. I guess I will respond.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will start, and then I will ask Dr. Larrabee.

Dr. SIMON. As I pointed out, I think that on the one hand there is a fundamental disconnect, I think, as in my longer testimony, we in the United States psychologically are at war, and I am not convinced that many of our NATO allies have that same psychological framework.

We have, if you look at the 1999 class, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, I think one can assess and say that, No. 1, it was a successful enlargement, and that Poland and the Czech Republic specifically have done a very successful job in their support of our activities.

It is a little more mixed when you look at Hungary, and you can go into that fairly closely. If you look at the seven that we are presently intending to bring in on this enlargement, I think for some of the reasons that Steve Larrabee alluded to, although it was in my testimony as well, that you have an overlapping in the EU and NATO, a very strong ally, bilateral relationship between Poland and the United States, and I think that what you will probably see is a fairly strong support for the U.S. position, but I caveat this. It depends upon how the war in Iraq ends and how credible the weapons of mass destruction that we find there will be in justifying the positions of those States.

But in my part of the world it is very clear that Slovakia has been very much leaning forward and out there, and they are in Kuwait right now with the chemical decontamination unit, so there can be no quarrel, and as I say, the Czechs are there, so there is no reason to suspect that their support may, in fact, diminish.

I am still personally not convinced about Slovenia, but as I mentioned, I think the main reasons for Slovenia are this strategic direction and location, and I think this is the incorporation of Romania and Bulgaria and the shifting U.S. presence, and I think we have to look at that southeastern direction from that perspective.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Larrabee.

Dr. LARRABEE. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the Baltic States are among the most pro-American countries of the aspirants within NATO. They know the meaning of freedom. They had to fight for it themselves, so I think that their contribution to the war on terrorism will continue.

They have already made, for their small size, I think, substantial contributions. Latvia, as I mentioned in my testimony, has deployed a special forces unit and demining team in Afghanistan. Estonia has sent an explosive detection dog team, and Lithuania has deployed a special forces unit, so they are already contributing. Indeed, I think that is one of the most important aspects that even before they were invited to join NATO, the three Baltic States were already beginning to act like NATO allies even if they were not already pro forma officially NATO allies, and I think you have a population, as well as a leadership, which, as I said, is pro-American, which understands the meaning of freedom, so I am not particularly worried that they are not going to contribute to the war on terrorism.

I think also that they understand that they are moving into a new environment, strategic environment where the agenda is changing, and that there will have to be some effort to harmonize their strategic agenda with the American strategic agenda if they want to continue to keep the United States strong and engaged in the region.

The CHAIRMAN. On the subject of the Baltic States, you have been a scholar of this for many, many years. I remember maybe 10 years ago that in visiting even with our diplomatic personnel in the capitals of the Baltic States, they would point out to me sort of in a tutorial fashion that essentially these States were tied to Finland or to Sweden or to others geographically, that Americans would have to understand we were going to have limited commercial ties with those States, maybe limited ties of other sorts.

Now, that point of view, I think, in terms of our own diplomacy has changed dramatically over the years. At least I hope that is the case. What has been your tracing—leaving aside their views toward us, our views toward them, how more robust has that grown, in your judgment?

Dr. LARRABEE. Well, I think the interest, and I have to say something in favor of the previous administration which I think took a very forward-leaning view toward the Baltic States and, indeed, without the strong American commitment under both administrations, the Baltic States might not have been invited to join NATO as soon as they have, so I think the American commitment and the American engagement in the Baltic States is very important, as I tried to say in my testimony.

One of the important things after Prague—it is not over. There is now emerging a new strategic agenda. The old one essentially revolved around trying to get into NATO. The new strategic agenda revolves around maintaining, making sure the United States stays engaged, finding ways in which to develop a credible Article 5 commitment, and also move from trying to prevent Russia from blocking NATO membership to developing a cooperative partnership and more cooperative relations with Russia, and all of this will require, in my view, strong, continued strong American engagement.

The danger is, in my view, that with the United States now focusing on many other issues beyond Europe, and particularly in Iraq and the Middle East, may tend to look at the Baltic issue and say, well, it is fixed, let us move on, let us do something else, let us leave this to the EU I think that this would be a mistake.

These are countries which are small, but they are very committed to democratic and Western values, and they are particularly strongly pro-American, and if we could try to get a consensus, if they were to work with their Baltic and Nordic neighbors and also expand ties with Poland and with Germany, you could have a Baltic coalition which would consist of seven or eight countries, that is, the Nordics, the Baltics, as well as Germany and Poland which also have Baltic interests, which could be quite a strong—I do not want to say a lobby within the EU and NATO, but nonetheless share common strategic interests with the United States, and we should not forget that. That is not just the three Baltic States, but it is the larger Baltic region that we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very important idea. I thank you.

Dr. Bugajski.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Thanks very much. My two countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the two countries I am covering, are absolutely committed to the American relationship. In fact, I would say that it is not so much NATO membership that is leverage with them, but the bilateral relationship with the United States is the leverage. In other words, they value that relationship above all others, and I would go as far as to say for them NATO is the United States, because it is the United States that ultimately guarantees their security, their independence, their freedom, and I think they well understand this, as do some of the central Europeans.

On the terrorism front, both Romania and Bulgaria have already contributed to the best of their abilities. I have outlined this in my testimony. But in addition, I would say because they are much closer to the front lines in the Middle East and the Caucasus, the potential trouble spots, the breeding grounds of terrorism, if you like, which pass from that area into Europe, I think they feel much more vulnerable as a result, and they are more likely to participate much more closely with the United States than maybe some of these smaller central European countries. So I have no doubt that that relationship will strengthen, because it is in their interest for that relationship to strengthen and for them to fulfill the criteria that they are supposed to with NATO entry.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question, not to provoke comment, but simply for the benefit of the stimulus of this hearing. Outside the Senate Chamber, for a variety of reasons, say in the last hour, I have been asked by a number of press people about NATO. One question was, why is this committee so active in holding hearings right now with regard to the NATO treaty and discussing this subject, the implication of one questioner being that for the moment it appears that there are motions, some are coming or going, and hopefully going in my judgment, that is, withdrawn, censuring various countries for their activities vis-à-vis our feelings about Iraq, some of them NATO members.

So in essence they were wondering, is there a disconnect, are you folks over in the Foreign Relations Committee busy on one agenda

and people in various Departments of our Government working another agenda.

Now, I will just try to be reassuring. We are all on the same agenda, and Secretary Powell's presence in Brussels now is important. It made the visit longer by going past Turkey on the way, but that was important, too. The point that I have tried to make, without diminishing any amendments by my colleagues, is that our committee is on an affirmative course. We are trying to think about the future.

The future, at least for most of us in this committee, strongly includes NATO, likewise, the United Nations and other valuable international organizations, and almost any future that we can envision in Iraq or elsewhere requires the cooperation of a lot of nations, and my guess is that Secretary Powell in Brussels now has been suggesting ways that NATO can be very helpful in the post-Iraq situation in the same way that Lord Robertson has made vital suggestions, I think, with regard to the future of Afghanistan, so that we do not have failed States, incubators for al-Qaeda or anybody else for that matter who organizes that way.

Having said that, the fact is that the nations, the seven applicants listening to all of this may wonder if the prize has been diminished. In other words, if membership in NATO, which looked very, very important a while back, remains that important.

Just advise me for a moment from your own ties how the prize looks, and second, is there a perception on the part of the seven applicants that in any way United States enthusiasm for NATO has been diminished, or is likely to be by this situation, because that is important. We were talking about the bilateral ties, about the way in which the United States participates in Europe through NATO and gives assurance to individual countries as well as the collective whole, but if you can, give some vent to your own feelings presently about, whither NATO and how the applicants look at it.

Dr. LARRABEE. Well, perhaps I could begin just to address that. I think in all of the NATO-aspirant countries there is some concern, and not only in the aspirant countries but in some other parts of Europe about the U.S. commitment and the way we handled Afghanistan obviously reinforced that, although there are some good reasons for why we did it, but nonetheless it certainly has caused some questions, but I think as we look at the post-Iraq situation, one of the things that is clear is we are going to need allies. We are going to need them.

We may not need them so strongly in the military campaign, but we are certainly going to need them in terms of the reconstruction, and that if you think of the war on terrorism, this is not something the United States can carry out alone. It requires wide cooperation, lots of partners in many areas beyond the military, particularly, obviously banking, counterterrorism, intelligence, border controls, many of these things, for all of these things looking even beyond NATO we are going to need partners, so I think that the steps that Secretary Powell has taken beginning today to try to rebuild these relationships is extremely important.

Let me just say, though, that when we talk about NATO it is well to remember that if you look at the letter of the 8, and you add that to that the letter of the Vilnius-10, you have 18 members

of NATO, or 18 out of a prospective 25 or 26 that supported the United States, and I think that is an important element.

Here we see that the newer members of NATO and the prospective members of NATO have a slightly different perspective on some of the security issues than some of the traditional members, but I think it would be a mistake, I have to emphasize, if the United States tried to play one part of Europe off against the other. I think this will provoke resentment not only in the old Europe, but even among some of the newer members.

After all, they are going to become members, most of them, of the European Union. They do not want to have to choose between Europe and the United States. They are Europeans, and they want to be a strong part of Europe themselves, so I do not think it would be a good idea to try to drive a rift between old and new Europe, but just the opposite, to try to rebuild this relationship after Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a comment, sir?

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Just to add to that, Mr. Chairman, obviously they see the NATO they are entering is very different from the NATO they first petitioned in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, I think two important principles are still there for them. No. 1, NATO means permanent security, and always will according to Article 5. No. 2, it means American involvement, not only in Europe, but direct American involvement in their security, and that, too, is absolutely crucial for them.

They do feel, I believe, in talking to some officials, that they can contribute to reinvigorating the NATO alliance, which they feel one way or another, because of the transatlantic rift, seems to have diminished, and I think through their contributions, however small, but collectively, they will carry some weight.

They can help to reinvigorate and change the alliance to confront the sort of challenges that we will be facing in the future, which is not a Soviet threat, but it will be terrorist threats, it will be threats of neighboring and unstable regions, and I think above all they are very much intent on rebuilding that transatlantic relationship and rather than, as Stephen said, creating rifts within Europe their intention is to heal those rifts in Europe by rebuilding a stronger relationship with America.

In other words, may seek to reverse current trends, and I do believe that they are committed to that, because that is in their national interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Simon.

Dr. SIMON. As in my remarks, the fact that if you look at the 10 new members of the EU in 2004, 8 of them are basically NATO members as of 1999 and 2004, and the key here is, I think, in terms of the future of the alliance, is that they, in fact, successful in hammering out cooperative linkages between the EU and NATO, and I think frankly these 8 overlapping members have that role to play and want to play that role.

Just being up in the Baltic States talking to a number of key people there, one thing stuck in my mind that is quite pertinent to this, and it supports my two colleagues. They said basically—and this is key in all three countries—we want to love Mother and Father, meaning the EU and NATO. We do not want to have to make Sophie's Choice, and in that sense I think we are going to

see those 8 members taking an active role in forging that cooperation, which is very much in our interest and in the interest of the future of the alliance.

Dr. LARRABEE. They do not also want to be treated as disobedient children.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, just taking a look at the future, what role are the States that are now on the threshold of coming into NATO likely to play in future expansion of NATO? What is the unfinished business of the concept of Europe whole and free, and what contributions could the applicant States make in fulfilling that destiny?

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Let me go first, because it pertains, I think, more directly to my two countries, Bulgaria and Romania, whose neighborhood is not still absolutely secure and stable, as we know. I think that their entry would signal to the other aspirants, particularly Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, that they, too, can become members over the coming years if they fulfill specific criteria, if they stay on track, conduct the sort of military reforms that Bulgaria and Romania have conducted, build a close relationship with the United States and so forth.

So I think it is in our national interest to have them in because they will then project the same sort of criteria to other neighboring countries coming out of a very bad neighborhood who do want to joint NATO, who do want to have a close relationship with the United States.

Second, I would say eastward, and Romania actually is the most interesting in this regard because it faces both the southern, still-to-be-fully stabilized region, and also the eastern post-Soviet territories, in other words, Moldova and Ukraine that it borders, I do believe those two countries also eventually have to become NATO members. How long it will take I could not tell you at this point. Obviously, it depends a lot on domestic politics.

The CHAIRMAN. Both Moldova and Ukraine.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. And Ukraine, and eventually Belarus as well, but that is another matter at the moment.

Romania obviously can play a very stabilizing role vis-à-vis the former Soviet space. Its relationship with Ukraine has improved vastly. It now is beginning to establish a better relationship with Moldova.

Once Moldova sorts out its own separatist movement in Transnistria, I think Romania can play a very positive role eastwards. In other words, as a NATO member, as a future EU member it can serve as a positive example, economic, social, political, military, toward its eastern neighbors. In both regional directions I would say Romania is very important.

Bulgaria is also very important. It has played a very positive role in the south Balkans over Macedonia. It has not played any nationalist cards. Its ethnic relations have been probably the most stable in the region and it, too, can serve as an example throughout the region.

Both of those countries coming into NATO would immediately, be read in those other countries that they too can make it, if they stick to it. If they stick to the program, to the criteria that have been laid out, they, too, can become permanently secured.

Dr. SIMON. To pick up on that, I think the key prize here is Ukraine. It is a very large country, and you can approach Ukraine from both the southeast—Janusz was talking about—particularly if you do see some kind of a changed true presence in Romania and a very strong Romanian support for the future of NATO.

Up in the northeast we have a very close relationship, as you know, with a newer but old member of the alliance, Poland, who has very close ties with Ukraine, combined units operating in Kosovo, et cetera, and I think with the U.S. presence perhaps evolving in Poland and working with what is now the Northeast Corps, becoming a Baltic Corps, you could have very positive impact on Ukraine.

I think you will see from the three Baltic States and from Poland very strong pressures in NATO over the coming years to basically project, and radiate that stability, and it will be something that, on the one hand, can be very helpful in moving in that direction as well as from the direction of Romania, but it is also something that we may have to curtail in light of the dilemma that we have with the current situation in Ukraine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any doubt in the minds of any of you three, as our witnesses today, that the sharing of the basic ethical and moral values, what-have-you, of NATO by the seven applicants would have any reason to terminate? That is, they would move off in some other direction?

One of the profound aspects about NATO and consensus is that we all believe in human rights and democracy and freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and that is one of the most attractive aspects of that, and it would appear apparent that the seven applicants share those values, but the question always is raised whenever we have a NATO discussion, what if somebody has a change of heart with regard to the way that the politics in the country goes, and suddenly we have a member State that does not share these values, that for reasons of economic crisis or a charismatic figure or whatever, suddenly something happens.

Now, there is no way of ever guaranteeing that, I suppose, with regard to all the current members, but what is the stability factor of the seven that we are now talking about today? Would you give any opinions about that?

Dr. LARRABEE. Maybe I will start. In my case, in the case of the three countries that I have been asked to testify about, I have to say that I have very few doubts, particularly because these countries have fought very strongly for their own freedom. They know what it is like not to have lived under freedom. They have begun to build very strong democratic systems, so I am not too worried.

If I could though, however, I would like to go back to the last question you asked, because I think it does pertain particularly to the Baltic States. That is, thinking about what may come after Prague, in my remarks, in my testimony I raised the question that these invitations issued to Prague are obviously an important achievement, and they help to anchor the Baltic States into the Western community and the debate about their security orientation.

At the same time, the invitations do create a new set of strategic challenges, and one of those challenges will be, first of all, to keep

the United States engaged in the region and second to find a new strategic agenda that will do that. Now, in my discussions in the Baltic States over the past 6 or 8 months, I have found that there is a willingness to think about a new agenda there, and this new agenda—if the old agenda in some way was to try to fix the Baltic problem, that agenda has now been basically achieved.

The question then becomes, what is the new agenda that could kind of bind the United States together with the Baltic States, and here, as I suggested in my testimony, the new agenda could include four elements, enhancing cooperation with Russia, helping to stabilize Kaliningrad, promoting the democratization of Belarus, and supporting Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

That is an agenda in which it seems to me the United States shares many strategic interests with the Baltic countries as well as many Nordic countries, and including Poland, and perhaps even Germany and some countries in the Vilnius-10, so there is a core, it seems to me, around which the Baltic States can move from stabilizing the region to helping to stabilize the immediate neighborhood.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Mr. Chairman, just to answer your question, as you know, democracy is always a work in progress. It is never absolutely complete, but in the case of my two countries—I will not address the others because my colleagues can probably better do so. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, I do believe they have passed the point of no return, in other words, no return to some kind of authoritarian system, whether Communist or nationalist.

There is always a danger of some sort of populist figure appearing on the horizon, but I have not seen it, and even when one has appeared, as in Romania, the vote is still fairly restricted, or let us say on the level of some of the West European countries, if you look at some of our allies.

I would say all these countries do have marginal groups or extremist groups of both left and right, but then they would not be democracies if they did not. I do not see, unless there is some major economic catastrophe, I do not see a populist nationalist figure coming to the fore, and this is why I think NATO membership would help them on the way, not only to security but also to prosperity and avoidance of extremism.

But the EU has to step in also, and the accession process to the EU is going to be absolutely critical, because even though I outline in my testimony that they have achieved macroeconomic stability, there is still a lot of poverty, there is still a lot of very bad economic conditions in some parts of these countries, and this is why I think the onus is on the EU to assist, to help them get over the hump and to join the club.

Dr. SIMON. I guess first, looking at recent events, we did have some problems, at least on the issue of Turkey and the NAC, but it was not from new members. It happened to be some very old members, France, Germany, and Belgium, and we were able to at least get around that by moving it down to the DPC. France is not in the integrated military command, and we were able to make that work.

The nightmare which a lot of us have thought about with our seven new entrants as well as the other three is, what happens if

things do go bad? Can you not develop a penalty box, or some concept like that, and there are notions that are in some of the things I have laid out. Let me say on the penalty box notion, it is probably impossible to implement for political reasons, but it does make a lot of sense in theory.

On the other hand, on being able to engage in decisions when a government does not want to cooperate, there are notions perhaps of different ways of developing consensus or making decisions in the alliance. I do not think that a strategy will necessarily get us there. It will probably be, as we saw in the recent case with France, Germany, and Belgium, through actions and having to respond accordingly, but some notions would be extending the principles of not breaking silence to Article 4 implementation, and then having only those countries in the coalitions of willing that would be engaged in the military operation basically provide the military guidance.

In effect, this is sort of a combined joint task force within NATO, not a combined joint task force to the EU, as we did at the Brussels summit in 1994, but I think it is a critical issue. I think that no matter what strategies we have, we will probably bump into it when the situation arises and grapple with it at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I raised it because at our last hearing, one of our witnesses I felt gave very constructive testimony to the question that arises, should we, given the recent problem with Turkey, move toward a majority vote, or supermajority, two-thirds, or something of this sort, as opposed to the consensus, and his advice was no, we should not do that, for reasons I do not want to reiterate, but I thought it was an interesting discussion, and it is not entirely academic.

Having participated now in several expansions of NATO debates and votes and treaties on the floor, not all of our Members in the Senate have always been enthusiastic about NATO. Some have simply argued it is a burden and some, perhaps not many now, were more isolationist and protectionist in the past than I suspect the current membership of the Senate, and I am grateful that is the case, but some have seen a lot of expense for the United States, and commitments, and with the passing of the cold war what may have been one reason why people wanted to sign up in Europe, but likewise was one reason why the United States was engaged with Europe.

But the Soviet Union is over, so the issues in this country are, what kind of involvement do we want to have in other countries, and after Somalia, the answer was not very much. It was a long time before we got into Bosnia, for example, and the struggle to take care of human rights conditions in Kosovo, and there we had a veto on the Security Council with the Russians, or at least opposition resulted in that, so we had an ad hoc situation of sorts, a coalition of the willing at that time for humanitarian reasons.

So these are not totally academic issues and I suspect, when we have our debates on this treaty, that some of this will rise again, although I do not anticipate in majority form, but we are trying in these hearings—really we appreciate your specific testimony—to be very thorough so that all of our Members would say that this committee has discharged its responsibility to ask the whole gamut of

questions about the qualifications of the members, their attitudes toward Europe, toward us, toward peace, toward democracy, as well as creativity as to what the new missions, goals of the organization ought to be.

So I thank each one of you for contributing really remarkable papers, as well as your forthcoming responses to these speculative questions and I am going to ask on behalf of the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, and myself that we keep the record open for 24 hours so the Senators who were not able to be present might participate in that way. Conceivably they might have questions to the three of you, and if you could respond promptly, that would be helpful in completing our record and making it available to our colleagues.

Unless you have further testimony, I will adjourn the hearing, and thank you very much for coming. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., April 8, 2003.]

NATO ENLARGEMENT—PART IV

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Sununu, Biden, Boxer, Bill Nelson and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

We are especially pleased today to welcome Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He will be followed by William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard and General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; they will address the committee as a panel following Secretary Grossman.

Today the committee is holding its fourth hearing on NATO Enlargement. We have undertaken this review of NATO in preparation for a floor action in May. And I would say parenthetically that in visiting with the majority leader, Senator Frist, he has assured me that the week of May 5 is still on target, at least given all the problems that come to majority and minority leaders in scheduling the Senate agenda, but that is our objective. And that is one reason for proceeding vigorously with these hearings in a timely manner now.

At that time, we will have this review of the NATO situation and the Protocols of Accession to the Washington Treaty for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. I am most hopeful the Senate will pass the Protocols of Accession for all seven candidates prior to President Bush's scheduled trip to Europe late this spring.

Even as the committee works to fulfill this legislative duty, our review of NATO has an additional purpose. With U.S. forces heavily engaged in Iraq, this committee and the Senate must consider what role NATO can and should play in a global war on terrorism. NATO has to decide if it wishes to participate in the security challenge of our time. It has to decide whether it wants to be relevant in addressing the major threat to the safety and economic well-being of the citizens of its component countries. If we do not prevent major terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the alliance will have failed in its most fundamental mission of defending our nations and our way of life.

And this reality demands that as we expand NATO, we also retool it so it can be a mechanism of burden-sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. America is at war, and we feel more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the cold war and perhaps since World War II. We need and want allies to confront this threat effectively. Those alliances cannot be circumscribed by geographical boundaries.

Many observers will point to the split over Iraq as a sign that NATO is failing or irrelevant. I sharply disagree. But as we attempt to mend the alliance's political divisions over Iraq, we must go one step further and ask: If NATO had been unified on Iraq, could it have provided an effective command structure for the military operation that is underway now? And would allies beyond those currently engaged in Iraq have been willing and able to field forces that would have been significant to the outcome of that war? In other words, achieving political unity within the alliance, while important to international opinion, does not guarantee that NATO will be as meaningful as a fighting alliance in the war on terror.

Now for more than 50 years, NATO was uniquely able to forge consensus among the allies, maintain political will, gather resources, and coordinate action to defend Europe from military attack. The alliance stated its desire to remain relevant at the Prague summit last November, when NATO heads of state approved the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitment as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve capabilities for waging modern warfare. The alliance also declared it would tackle the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

In our previous committee hearings on NATO, we have heard encouraging testimony that our allies are taking promised steps to strengthen their capabilities in such areas as heavy airlift and sealift and precision-guided munitions. We have also heard that the seven candidates for membership are developing niche military capabilities that will be useful in meeting NATO's new military demands. But much work is left to be done to transform NATO into a bulwark against terrorism.

An early test will be NATO's contribution to peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in the aftermath of combat in Iraq. A strong commitment by NATO nations to this role would be an important step in healing the alliance's divisions and reaffirming its relevance for the long run. While the immediate aim of our hearings has been to debate whether the seven candidate countries have met NATO membership standards, I would observe that the dominant concern of the committee in the hearings has been NATO's relevance and cohesion. This focus would seem to indicate confidence among committee members that the aspirant nations are ready for membership.

I anticipate an overwhelming vote in favor of NATO enlargement. The affirming message of the first round of enlargement led to improved capabilities and strengthened transatlantic ties. I am hopeful and I am sure the committee joins me in wishing that the second round will do the same.

We look forward now to hearing from the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for these hearings and the quality of the witnesses you have had in this and all the hearings, particularly this last hearing.

I am anxious to hear from Secretary Grossman, who I think is one of the most talented people with whom I have served in my years here in the U.S. Senate. And as well as from General Clark for whom I have an incredibly high regard; and Mr. Kristol, for whom I have an equally high regard, although I do not always understand him. But he can explain some things to me.

I am delighted that they could join us today to discuss the future of NATO. This hearing is not a parenthetical exercise in dealing with pressing issues in the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula, and matters elsewhere in the world. We are talking about the future, as you and I agree probably as much or more than any two Members of the Congress, of our most vital strategic partnership.

NATO is not just a bedrock of transatlantic relations. It is the most successful political military alliance that has ever been assembled. NATO's members, though they may disagree on tactics as we have recently seen, share the same objective of securing and protecting the freedom of the North Atlantic area. And now the question is—and again as we say in this body, it sounds awfully artificial, but I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my friend from Indiana, the chairman—on the expanded or altered responsibility that I think it must step up to now.

This hearing is the last in this series connected with our consideration of the next round of NATO Enlargement, agreed upon last November at the Prague summit. The Accession to NATO of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia can, I believe, in the long term result in a qualitative strengthening of the alliance's military capabilities. But even to achieve that result will require energetic efforts on the part of all seven of these countries.

But more importantly in my view, this round of enlargement represents an important step in what those of us, like you and I who have been here a while and many of the witnesses, in what we used to talk about. And that is the zone of stability extended for a Europe that is free and whole, an objective that I think is still very, very much in our interest.

When I am occasionally accused of being too—how can I say it? Well, I am occasionally criticized for thinking NATO has a value that some think exceeds what I suggest it is. Well, I always say to people: Imagine our foreign policy interest in the future, our interest around the world being secure without a free and whole and stable Europe. I cannot imagine it, quite frankly.

This round represents that enlargement; that is, moving that zone of stability. Above and beyond enlargement though, NATO is facing several fundamental choices, one of which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. and its allies can choose to fulfill the capability commitments made in Prague, which is sort of Senate and NATO speak for saying they are going to spend more money and upgrade their military capability, and to reshape NATO to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century, or to continue to demur.

Specifically, we can realign national defense planning, increase and better prioritize defense expenditures, and make the new NATO Response Force fully operational by 2006. We can disprove doubts about the irrelevance of NATO in the new security environment by acting now to expand NATO's role in Afghanistan and, in my view, to plan for NATO's engagement in post-war Iraq, which I happen to think is vital for a number of reasons I will not bore anyone with right now.

Or the members of the alliance can take, as they say, the other fork in the road, a dramatic but no longer far-fetched, centrifugal option. And that is, an alternative that would permit political differences to paralyze NATO's decisionmaking bodies and bar the alliance from providing collective defense. NATO's institutions would become more a fora for routine consultations and training grounds for military exercise and its forces eventually cannibalized in favor of coalitions of the willing, or a separate EU security arrangement.

If I sound unduly pessimistic, please let us consider several recent events: The Bush administration's initial decision in the fall of 2001 to decline the offers of most allies to participate in combat operations in Afghanistan; the rancor and dissension in the NAC this past January and February regarding Turkey's Article 4 request for assistance; the Belgian call last month for a summit of selected European Union members, i.e., not including the British, to develop an EU-based Security Alliance outside of NATO, which as I understand it is very different than what we were talking about up to now, of having this European force within NATO; and in my view, the denigration of NATO by some very, very important, bright and serious intellectuals in this country, many of whom people this administration, about the lack of relevance of NATO generated by what is referred to as the neo-cons.

Regarding this new grouping that the Belgians were talking about last month of a European Union, EU-based Security Alliance, Mr. Prodi suggested this would be a different path, and he is the President of the EU's Commission.

I do not believe that these events, either individually or collectively, as yet represent an irreparable break in Alliance solidarity. But for all the conferences over 30 years you and I have attended about whither NATO, I think they are the most serious, the most serious challenges to NATO. And they exist at this moment in my view, and they convey a stark warning for the future unless we get this right in the very near term.

The way forward is not just a decision for the United States. All of our allies, as well as prospective new members, must decide how best to shape NATO's strategic agenda and make it operational. American leadership can have a tremendous influence in this process, but only if we demonstrate a concrete commitment to remaining engaged on the ground in Europe. And as I said earlier, by supporting a role for NATO in Afghanistan, and I hope in post-war Iraq, I hope that we will make these cases not just in Brussels and other European capitals, but home as well, here in the United States as well.

For that reason I greatly welcomed Secretary Powell's decision to go to Brussels last week and discuss with members of the NAC a substantive role for the alliance in post-war Iraq. Although no deci-

sion was taken, the discussion was undertaken. I look forward to hearing in the days ahead the response from our allies on exactly what form a NATO role might take.

Marc, I know you share our desire to see a stronger, more vibrant NATO that is both capable and willing to confront security challenges wherever they arise. And I would particularly welcome your views on how the seven aspirant countries can help NATO adapt to the new security challenges that we face.

We are also extremely fortunate, as I said at the outset, to have General Clark and Bill Kristol here to contribute to this critical strategic discussion. General Clark, whereas the last time we invited you here in May of last year, we engaged in a similar debate about NATO's future. Although we are dealing with many of the same questions today, the run-up to the war in Iraq, and the war itself, have changed the context of the debate and, in my view, not for the better.

So I welcome your uniquely qualified prospective on how the alliance can and should move forward.

Bill, we may not always agree, but I have an incredibly high regard for you, both through your magazine and your own commentary you have done as much as anyone to shape the foreign policy debate in this country and influence the Bush administration. I also appreciate your longstanding commitment to the alliance as a member of the U.S. Committee for NATO, and I am anxious to hear what you think about the future here beyond the seven aspirant countries.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am delighted that you have these three witnesses, and I look forward to having a discussion with them about some of these issues that I have raised, and others.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

As a point of personal privilege, let me mention that in our audience today are 73 eighth grade students from Bremen Middle School in Bremen, Indiana. And I just want to note for the record that in Indiana we take foreign policy seriously and early.

And I am very grateful that these students that are led by their teacher, Jan Reed, have come to Washington and have chosen to make this hearing a part of their trip.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse me, as a point of personal privilege: I want those students to understand that my alma mater, Syracuse, won the National Championship last night in basketball that you, Indiana, the last time we were there, in the last second robbed us of.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, yes.

Senator BIDEN. Not "robbed" us; that is the wrong choice. Defeated us on the playing field very well.

So I congratulate you on having defeated us in the past, and I want to note that we have finally prevailed, not over Indiana, but over Kansas.

The CHAIRMAN. The Hoosiers congratulate the Orange.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I congratulate my colleague.

I want to mention also that Secretary Grossman has participated for the last 2 years faithfully in roundtable discussions that Ron

Asmus at the Council on Foreign Relations really was most responsible for bringing together. A number of those in the room today have been participating in these meetings. Marc participated as an administration official, who really has a strong policy set of options here, and we really appreciate that participation. I mention this because many of the questions that he will be responding to today have been raised by other colleagues around the table for the last 2 years. It has been an informative experience for all of us trying to think through the challenges and the opportunities.

With that, Secretary Grossman, we would be pleased to hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. It is an honor for me to be here today. Thank you all very much. I hope, Senator, you might allow me to put the longer statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GROSSMAN. If I might just make a shortened version of it, I would appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Published in full.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me first of all say how grateful we are for your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and for Senator Biden's, on the issue of enlargement, on the issue of NATO and on the issue of the future of NATO. I also want, as I do before this committee, to thank you very much for your support for the men and woman of the State Department. And as a point of my personal privilege, if I could have one: I hope many of the people who are here in the eighth grade will consider careers in the Foreign Service and in the Civil Service, and in the service of their country in the great Department of State and join us in that endeavor. So we are very glad that they are here as well.

Mr. Chairman, as you said, you have offered opportunities over the past 2 years to have a conversation about the future of NATO. I can tell you that these meetings have always been of value to me. When you say that I am likely to answer some questions that came out of those discussions, I hope they are not questions that I posed and then could not answer myself, but we will do the very best that we can.

As Senator Biden said, Secretary Powell was at NATO last week, and I thought if I might just give you a short report about what transpired there because I think it is very important about the adaptation of our alliance. As you saw, the Secretary met NATO and EU Foreign Ministers both together and then separately. He met Secretary General Robertson, the EU Presidency and Commission leadership, Ambassadors from the Vilnius-10 countries, 9 other Foreign Ministers; 21 meetings in all.

And the Secretary's message in Brussels were really two fold and very clear: First, that we value NATO and the transatlantic partnership it anchors; and second, that it is time to look to the future, to the future of what this alliance can do and, as Senator Lugar

said, to look to future threats and to look also to the future to include the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.

Senator Biden, the Secretary there reminded all of the NATO Foreign Ministers of the presentation made last December by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, where he suggested that NATO roles could be important in Iraq, should be important in Iraq and could include peacekeeping, weapons of mass destruction security and destruction, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

We remain open to a NATO role in Iraq. As you said, no commitments were made. But no ally raised objections to these proposals. And the Secretary said that we would followup on these suggestions and see what, if anything, can be done.

Mr. Chairman, as you say, the committee has heard testimony on NATO enlargement from people both inside and outside of the administration. I would say that there is broad support in this country and in the alliance for this next stage of enlargement because, as you both said, for fifty years NATO has been the anchor of Western security. And as Senator Biden said, this issue and these hearings are not a parenthesis. This expansion of NATO is extremely important to the security of the United States.

The end of Soviet communism did not diminish NATO's importance. The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in the Balkans. In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. NATO's just-completed mission in Macedonia has also brought order to that new democracy.

And as we have discussed on a number of occasions in this committee, NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article 5, an attack on one member considered an attack on all. And in the aftermath of September 11, NATO sent AWACs to patrol U.S. airspace, logging almost 4,300 hours, 360 sorties, 800 crew members from 13 nations. And 13 nations now contribute to help in Operation Enduring Freedom.

NATO allies lead the International Stabilization force in Kabul. German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish troops who, in turn, replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our other allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF, and so would we.

As Secretary Powell said at NATO last week: "NATO should look at how the Alliance could play an even greater role in Afghanistan, up to and including a NATO lead for ISAF."

NATO is the central organizing agent for transatlantic cooperation. It represents, as you both said, not just a military alliance but a political military alliance, a community of common values and shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the rule of law.

NATO is key to the defense of the United States. And so therefore, as you both said, NATO must continue to lead and to adapt.

The November 2000 NATO Prague summit launched a transformation of NATO with a three-part agenda: New members, new capabilities, and new relationships.

The job you have given me today, Senator, is to discuss enlargement, which is key to that transformation.

At the Prague summit, NATO leaders invited the seven new democracies—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slo-

vakia, and Slovenia—to join NATO. And in Brussels on March 26, NATO Ambassadors signed the protocols to begin the formal process of admitting the invitees into the alliance.

The President expects to forward the Accession Protocols to you and to the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification in the coming days. And I respectfully ask this committee to act swiftly and positively on that request. And I appreciate the report you have given about the conversation you have had with Mr. Frist.

Enlargement, I believe, will strengthen democracy and stability in Europe, revitalize an adapted NATO and benefit the United States. Enlargement will encourage and consolidate reforms in the seven invitees, expanding NATO's geographic reach and including seven committed Atlanticists, who already act as allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The invitation to these seven States followed an intensive program of preparation under NATO's Membership Action Plan. And I know that you have held two hearings on this particular issue. And as you heard at that time, the alliance worked with the aspirants to encourage political, economic and military reform. Be clear: There is still work to do in all of these areas, but we are working with the aspirants on a daily basis and they are committed to further reform in all of these areas.

These seven are also committed to the transatlantic alliance. They are allies in the war against terror. They have contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security and Stabilization Force in Kabul.

And since we do not mean this hearing to be an eye test, I would just invite you to look at the charts [1] that I have handed out—this is the large version of it—which shows across the board, by the seven aspirants in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the Balkans, what all these countries have already contributed. And as you both said, a real military contribution.

Mr. Chairman, all of these countries have also joined in strong statements of support for U.S. policy and, in some cases, have lent physical military support to the United States and Coalition military mission in Iraq. All of the invitees have committed to spending at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. And as you can see from this chart or the small one that I have handed out, all seven already spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defense than almost a third of our current NATO membership.

We are also greatly benefited because publics in these countries strongly support NATO membership. On the 23rd of March, in a referendum I know you all watched, Slovenians went to the polls to support NATO membership. And the "Yes" vote won with 66 percent. In Romania and Bulgaria and the three Baltic States, support for NATO consistently stands at above 70 percent.

Together these allies will contribute as many as 200,000 troops to the alliance; approximately equal to the number of new forces that came in the last enlargement of NATO in 1999.

What of future enlargement? I believe that the door to NATO should remain open. In his speech at Warsaw University in 2001,

[1] The charts referred to can be found beginning on page 161.

the President said that, and I quote, "all of Europe's democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all that lie between should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe, as Europe's old democracies have." So we welcome the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and will continue to consult closely with these nations on their membership action programs, as well as others who may seek membership in the future.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Biden, you both mentioned the question of new capabilities, the second major outcome of the Prague summit in 2000. And because you give me the chance here today to talk about new capabilities, I would like to do that because I believe that the most important challenge facing NATO is building its capabilities to face the modern threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And as Senator Biden said, NATO has some fundamental choices to make because the gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO.

As the chairman said, at the Prague summit NATO's leaders decided to close this gap, and Europeans committed to spend smarter, pool their resources and pursue military specialization. For example, Germany is today leading a consortium to get more airlift. Norway leads a consortium to get more sealift. Spain is leading its consortium to get more air-to-air refuelings. And the Netherlands is taking the lead to get more precision guided munitions.

This is a good start. And although you have heard testimony that has been optimistic, I believe that followup and actual spending and the success of these consortia will be absolutely critical.

NATO's leaders also created at Prague, as you both mentioned, the NATO Response Force. We need NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. And I believe that NATO can and, in appropriate circumstances, should undertake military operations outside of its traditional area of operations, as you have both called for.

The NATO Response Force will be a force of approximately 25,000 troops, with land, sea and air capability, deployable worldwide in 30 days. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO Response Force should be ready for exercises by October 2004 and mission-ready by October 2006. It also needs to streamline its command structure.

The third area, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Biden, that Prague talked about was new relationships. As you and I have discussed in the past, and I have testified, this third area of adaption and transformation is the growing web of partnerships that NATO has. And who could have imagined 10 years ago, when we worked so hard on Partnership for Peace, that when it came time for U.S. Forces and Coalitions Forces and NATO Forces to fight in Afghanistan, that all of these countries that had worked so closely with us in partnership for peace, would play such an important role in dealing with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden?

In May 2002, President Bush, President Putin and other Allied heads of state and government inaugurated the NATO-Russia Council. And since then NATO and Russia have been working on

projects in key areas such as combating terrorism, in peacekeeping, and non-proliferation. And in fact, the Council sponsored an unprecedented civil emergency exercise in Russia, simulating a terrorist attack involving toxic chemicals, which brought together 850 first responders from more than 30 allied and partner nations. And we will continue to develop and expand our partnerships with willing States like Ukraine or others in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member both referred to what I consider to be the bruising debate in February about defense for—support for Turkey under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty. The alliance in the end did arrive at the right answer. The Defense Policy Committee directed military assistance to Turkey to address a threat of attack from Iraq. And that military assistance is now in place. NATO deployed AWACs, Patriot missiles, nuclear, biological and chemical defense teams.

And I think that we should not be in any doubt that that debate and that disagreement did damage the alliance. I think that Secretary General Robertson is right though, that it was a hit above the waterline and that NATO would recover. And Secretary Powell's visit last week to the alliance is part of that recovery.

Because it is essential that NATO continues to knit together the community of European and North American democracies as an alliance of shared values and collective security, I believe it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address these new threats. Indeed, I believe that we should redouble these efforts. For, at the end of the day it is to NATO that we return to seek common ground and cooperation on the issues facing the transatlantic community.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to make that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Grossman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senators, it is an honor for me to be before you today.

We are grateful for your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and for Senator Biden's, on the issue of enlargement.

You have offered opportunities for discussion on enlargement over the past several months. These meetings have been of value to me and to other Administration officials. Also, I would like again to thank Senator Voinovich for his participation in what was an historic NATO Summit in Prague in November.

Let me begin by reporting on Secretary Powell's April 3 meetings at NATO.

The Secretary met NATO and EU Foreign Ministers together and later with just NATO colleagues. He also met Secretary General Robertson, EU Presidency and Commission leadership, Ambassadors from the Vilnius-10 countries and separately with nine Foreign Ministers. Twenty-one sessions in all!

The Secretary's messages in Brussels were clear: first, we value NATO and the transatlantic partnership it anchors. Second, it is time to look to the future, including the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. The Secretary reminded NATO ministers of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz's presentation to the North Atlantic Council last December, when he suggested that NATO roles could include peacekeeping, WMD security and destruction and delivery of humanitarian assistance. We remain open to a NATO role in Iraq. No commitments were made. No Ally raised objections to these possibilities. We will follow up with allies and see what, if anything, can be done.

The Committee has heard testimony on NATO enlargement from people within and outside the Administration. There is broad support here and in the Alliance for this next stage of enlargement.

For fifty years NATO has been the anchor of western security.

The end of Soviet Communism did not diminish NATO's importance.

- The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in the Balkans.
- In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
- NATO's just-completed mission in Macedonia has also brought order to that new democracy.

NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article 5; an attack on one member will be regarded as an attack on all. NATO sent AWACS to patrol U.S. airspace, logging 4300 hours; 360 sorties, with 800 crewmembers from 13 nations.

Thirteen Allies now contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom.

NATO Allies lead the International Stabilization force in Kabul.

German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish troops in ISAF, who replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our Allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF. As Secretary Powell said at NATO last week: "NATO should also look at how the Alliance could play an even greater role in Afghanistan, up to and including a NATO lead for ISAF."

NATO is the central organizing agent for Trans-Atlantic cooperation. It represents a community of common values and shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the rule of law.

NATO is key to the defense of the United States. And so NATO must continue to lead and to adapt.

The November 2002 NATO Summit at Prague launched a transformation of NATO with a three part agenda: new members; new capabilities and new relationships.

NEW MEMBERS

My job today is to discuss enlargement, which is key to this transformation.

At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders invited seven new democracies—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—to join NATO. In Brussels on March 26, NATO Ambassadors signed the protocols to begin the formal process of admitting the invitees into the Alliance. The President expects to forward the accession protocols to the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification in the coming days.

I respectfully ask this committee to act swiftly and positively to this request.

This enlargement will strengthen democracy and stability in Europe, revitalize NATO and benefit the United States.

Enlargement will encourage and consolidate reforms in the seven invitees, expanding NATO's geographic reach and inducting seven committed Atlanticists, who already act as allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The invitation to these seven states followed an intensive program of preparation under NATO's Membership Action Plan. The Alliance worked with the aspirants to encourage political, economic and military reform. There is still work to do in these areas and we continue to work daily with the aspirants on these issues. They are committed to further reform.

These seven are committed to the trans-Atlantic Alliance. They are Allies in the War on Terror. They have contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security and Stabilization Force in Kabul.[1]

At Burgas, Bulgaria provides basing for U.S. transport aircraft supplying Operation Enduring Freedom. Bulgaria also sent an Nuclear Biological and Chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan.

Estonia sent a team of explosive experts to Afghanistan.

Latvia has contributed medical personnel to ISAF in Kabul.

Lithuania deployed special operations forces to Afghanistan last year, and this year provided a team of medical personnel.

Romania has an infantry battalion serving in Kandahar and military police unit and transport aircraft serving Kabul.

Slovakia deployed an engineering unit to Kabul.

Slovenia has provided assistance with demining in Afghanistan.

They have all joined strong statements of support for U.S. policy and in some cases have lent support to United States military mission in Iraq.

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[1] See charts, "Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries," on page 161.

All of the invitees have committed to spending at least two percent GDP on defense, and as you can see, all seven already spend a higher percentage of their GDP than almost a third of the current NATO membership.[2]

Their publics strongly support NATO.

On March 23, Slovenians went to the polls to support NATO membership. The Yes vote won with 66%. In, Romania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic states, support for NATO stands at above 70%.

Together the invitees will also contribute as many as 200,000 new troops to the Alliance—approximately equal to the number added by NATO's last enlargement in 1999.

What of future enlargements? The door to NATO should remain open. In his speech at Warsaw University in 2001, the President stated that, "all of Europe's democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea all that lie between should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe's old democracies have".

We welcome the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. We will continue to consult closely with these nations on their Membership Action Plan programs as well as with others who may seek membership in the future.

NEW CAPABILITIES

Mr. Chairman, enlargement is only one aspect of a much broader transformation launched at Prague and now being undertaken in Brussels.

The most important challenge facing NATO is building its capabilities to face the modern threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO.

At the Prague Summit in November, NATO's leaders decided to close this gap.

European Allies agreed to "spend smarter," pool their resources and pursue specialization. For example:

- Germany is leading a 10-nation consortium on airlift.
- Norway leads a consortium on sealift.
- Spain leads a group on air-to-air refuelings.
- The Netherlands is taking the lead on precision guided missiles and has committed 84 million dollars to equip their F-16's with smart bombs.

This is a good start. Follow-through will be critical.

NATO's leaders also created at Prague the NATO Response Force. We need NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world.

NATO can and, in appropriate circumstances, should undertake military operations outside its traditional area of operations.

The NATO Response Force will be a force of approximately 25,000 troops, with land, sea and air capability, deployable worldwide on thirty days notice. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO Response Force should be ready for exercises by October 2004 and mission-ready by October 2006.

NATO also needs to streamline its command structure for greater efficiency.

NEW RELATIONSHIPS

The third area of transformation is the growing web of partnerships. Who could have imagined ten years ago, when we conceived Partnership for Peace that this program would repay such dividends in Central Asia, when the United States found itself at war in Afghanistan?

In May of 2002, President Bush, President Putin and Allied heads of State and Government inaugurated the NATO-Russia Council.

Since then NATO and Russia have been working on projects in key areas such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping, and non-proliferation. The Council sponsored an unprecedented civil emergency exercise in Noginsk, simulating a terrorist attack involving toxic chemicals, which brought together 850 first responders from more than thirty allied and partner nations.

And we will continue to develop and expand our partnerships with willing states like Ukraine or those in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Mr. Chairman, in February, the Alliance went through a bruising debate about defense support for Turkey under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty.

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[2] See chart, "2002 Defense Spending," on page 165.

The Alliance did arrive at the right answer. The Defense Policy Committee directed military assistance to Turkey to address a threat of attack from Iraq. That military assistance is now in place: NATO deployed AWACs planes, Patriot missiles, and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical defense teams.

This disagreement did damage the Alliance. It is my view, however, as Secretary General Robertson himself said afterwards, that this was a hit above the waterline and that NATO would recover. Secretary Powell's visit last week is part of that recovery.

Because it is essential that NATO continues to knit together the community of European and North American democracies as an Alliance of shared values and collective security, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address these threats.

Indeed, we should redouble those efforts.

For at the end of the day, it is to NATO that we return to seek common ground and cooperation on the issues facing the trans-Atlantic community.



Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Bulgaria	• Provides 185 personnel to SFOR • Provides 42 personnel to KFOR • Provides one transport AN-26 aircraft	• OEF: Hosted deployment of six US KC-135 aircraft and 200 support personnel at Burgas • OEF: Granted blanket over-flight rights, ports/bases access, refueling assistance and increased law-enforcement cooperation • ISAF: Deployed nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan • Donated and airlifted arms and ammunition to Afghan National Army	• Sent three Liaison officers sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • The National Assembly approved the Government of Bulgaria's decision to support possible coalition action • U.S. using Burgas Air Base to base transport aircraft and move troops, cargo, fuel and vehicles from Germany • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Deployment of Bulgarian NBC units (up to 150 personnel) to theater of operations; possible deployment of other specific units
Estonia	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of some 100 personnel to KFOR; an Estonian company just deployed and will be there until July 2003. (Similar deployment previously in SFOR) • Maintains a Military Police Platoon of 23 personnel with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR • Staff officer in SFOR MNB HQ • CIMIC officer in KFOR HQ	• Deployed two explosive detection dog teams of the Interior Ministry in July 2002 to assist with airport security; offered overflight and landing rights • Deployed a 6-man EOD team with the German contingent of ISAF in March 2003	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• The Government is ready to consider concrete U.S. proposals for Estonian force contribution in the event of military action in Iraq; exploring the operational readiness of a light point defense platoon, EOD team, and cargo handling team for post-conflict Iraq if requested

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Latvia	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of some 100 personnel to Danish forces assigned to KFOR (Similar deployment previously in SFOR) • Maintains Military policy and Medical Teams, 13 personnel in all, with the UK contingent in KFOR • Maintains an EOD team of 5 personnel with the Norwegian Contingent in KFOR • Until May 2002, rep involved with border observation in FYROM • In 1999 Latvia deployed a Medical Team in Albania as part of the Belgian contingent in AFOR • In 1999, sent 6 observers to the Kosovo Verification Mission	• Offered overflight and port clearances • Offered combat and special forces for OEF • Deploying two Medical Teams totaling 8 personnel with the Netherlands Contingent in ISAF in March 2003	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq • Parliament approved allowing forces to deploy to Iraq for peace enforcement and humanitarian operations	• Possible contributions under consideration: Latbat infantry company, military police platoon, medical unit, EOD, cargo handlers and specific purpose units as well as contributions to advance democratic change in post-conflict Iraq
Lithuania	• Contributes, for six months out of every 18, a company of 100 personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR (Similar deployment previously in IFOR and SFOR- will maintain a few officers in SFOR.) • Maintains an infantry platoon of 30 personnel with Polish battalion in KFOR • Maintains AN-26 transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel of 7 in support of NATO • Contributed 10 medical personnel to NATO humanitarian mission "Allied Harbor" in Albania in 1999	• Offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and other support for Operation Enduring Freedom • Deployed a Medical Team of 4 personnel with the Czech contingent in ISAF Oct - Dec 2002 Redeploying this team with the German Contingent in ISAF in Mar 2003 • Deployed Special Operations Forces unit of 37 personnel to Afghanistan in support of OEF in November 2002	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq • Parliament voted March 25, 2003 to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support Operation Iraqi Freedom	• Government has declared preparedness to contribute politically and with other measures to the efforts to the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq, e.g., 10 cargo handlers, 6 medics; also considering humanitarian aid

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Romania	• Contributed 122 personnel to SFOR in Bosnia • Contributed 222 personnel to KFOR • Contributed personnel to all regional OSCE missions (total of 38 people) • Deployed 115 gendarmes and 70 civilian police to UNMIK • Contributed 18 civilian police to UNMBIH • Hosts the SECI center in Bucharest for combating transnational crime	• Contributed a 411-man infantry battalion in Kandahar • Sent a 25 man military police platoon in support of ISAF in Kabul • Deployed a C-130 Hercules aircraft, including crew and maintenance personnel, to ISAF HQ in Kabul • Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted • First country to donate and airlift arms and ammunition to Afghan National Army • Provided humanitarian aid totaling $3.2 million	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Provided an NBC Unit. • Providing basing for U.S. forces at Mihail Kogalniceanu • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Willing to provide post-conflict peacekeepers and gendarmes • Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces
Slovakia	• Provided troops to KFOR and SFOR (These troops have been integrated into the Czech units) • Per US and NATO suggestion, increased commitment to KFOR in February 2002, from 40 man Engineer unit to 100 man Mech Infantry Company (as part of Czech-Slovak Battalion) • Increased SFOR contribution in August 2002, from 8 staff officers to 21 personnel and two Mi-17 helicopters under Dutch Command • Granted blanket overflight clearances at the outset of the Kosovo crisis	• Offered NBC defense and engineering forces • Sent 40 person engineering unit to Kabul. Extended stay of troops, at U.S. request, until August 2003 • Immediately granted overflight, landing and refueling rights • Has maintained two Liaison Officers at CENTCOM • Budgeted for and initiated preparation of Afghan Assistance Program	• Liaison officer sent to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Deployed a 75 person NBC unit on February 26. The unit will be integrated into the Czech unit • Agreed to be an Intermediate Staging Base for commercial carriers carrying US troops and materials to and from CENTCOM AOR • Approved all requested rail and road transit rights • Joined the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq	• Overflight and transit of U.S. and coalition forces • Offered public support for all US-led initiatives in Iraq

Political and Military Contributions by NATO Invitee Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

	Contributions in the Balkans	Contributions to the War in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)	Contributions made to the Coalition to Disarm Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom	Potential contributions Post-Conflict and Reconstruction
Slovenia	• Contributed troops and equipment to SFOR, and KFOR • Runs International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) which managed over $100 million in successful demining and victims' assistance programs • Sent motorized infantry company to SFOR, replacing NATO troops in January, 2003 • Allowed NATO overflight for bombing missions against Serbs and allowed NATO troops to rotate through port of Koper • Active in democratic and economic reform in the region, member of Stability Pact and SECI • Contribution to the Humanitarian Operation "Sun Rise" in Albania (May 14-July 27, 1997) and Humanitarian Operation Allied Harbor" in Albania (May 29-July 14, 1999) • Government decided (March 6, 2003) to send an officer to the EU HQ "Allied Harmony" in Skopje	• Provided humanitarian and demining assistance, the latter also in conjunction with UNDP, a $50 million program • Has sent one liaison officer (who will rotate in March) to OEF (CENTCOM, Fla) • Slovenia has donated three battalions worth of AK-47's, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the appropriate ammunitions to the Afghan National Army Training Project • Overflight, landing and refueling rights were granted • Government decided (March 6, 2003) to send a police officer to the ISAF Mission (for training and assisting the Afghan Police)	• Sending Liaison officer to CENTCOM • Feb 5, 2003: Joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm • Asked its Parliament to approve overflight clearance, and intelligence sharing in support of UNSC resolutions	• Indicated its willingness to look for ways it could contribute to post-conflict reconstruction • Willing to prepare specific humanitarian aid packages

2002
Defense Spending
(Percentage of GDP)

NATO	
Turkey	4.9
Greece	4.4
United States	3.4
Bulgaria	3.1
France	2.5
United Kingdom	2.4
Portugal	2.3
Romania	2.3
Czech Republic	2.1
Estonia	2.0
Lithuania	2.0
Poland	2.0
Italy	1.9
Norway	1.9
Slovakia	1.9
Hungary	1.8
Latvia	1.8
Netherlands	1.6
Slovenia	1.6
Denmark	1.5
Germany	1.5
Belgium	1.3
Spain	1.2
Canada	1.1
Luxembourg	0.9
NATO Average	**2.1**
Invitee Average	**2.1**

1. Sources - 2003 USG estimates; President's Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement.

2. Yearly data has been rounded to one decimal place. Averages and % Change calculated using non-rounded data

3. Does not include data for Iceland

The CHAIRMAN. Let me mention again as you have, that the intensity of effort has proceeded with each of the seven applicant countries, in what might be called a perfection of their defense arrangements and their contributions to the whole and likewise, in some cases, sort of a tidying up of history.

Without reference to the current seven, I remember in the case of the three States that came into NATO before, there were border disputes and ethnic problems and political leftovers. And it was a very good time, at least for both Europe and for the applicant States, to address these issues which the politics internally of those countries might not have permitted for periods of time. That has been the case again.

The idea of Europe whole and free is a great deal more of both, it seems to me, through the process that has been undertaken. At the same time, one of the things that is most interesting, I believe, about the world currently is the failed State syndrome, or the situation in which States do not perfect what they are doing, or become more cohesive, democratic. Reference has been made critically of the United States as we assisted the Afghan tribes, Pakistanis, others, in war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As victory was assured and the Soviet troops were withdrawn, our troops were withdrawn fairly shortly thereafter. Not a great deal of interest was paid for a period of time. Some might argue that Afghanistan was never a failed State, but others would say, in fact, it had many of the symptoms.

Among these were the ability of the al-Qaeda camps to set up operations. They could have appeared in various other places, but they sought a place that was more hospitable. Afghanistan proved to be that point and, therefore, suffered a war as they were pushed out and still continue to be pushed out in that case.

As the situation in Iraq comes to a conclusion, one of the dawning issues is: Will Iraq be a successful State, or will it in fact take on some of the symptoms of a failed State? If the latter occurs, it is a much larger situation in both terms of geography, as well as population in Afghanistan.

On the one hand, NATO, through Lord Robertson's initiative, has been attempting to address how NATO allies could be more effective in Afghanistan, a place that is some distance from Europe but clearly a part of the War Against Terrorism. The success of that State and all the intersections of life that come within the surrounding area are very important to our security. I applaud Lord Robertson's initiative in this respect. I am hopeful that that general idea will be adopted, as opposed to anxiety in 6 months as to which a European country, or whether any country, will step up to leadership in ISAF, including the United States. It seems to me that is an unfinished agenda, but an important one in which NATO's role could be very, very important.

Now, I agree with the ranking member that in Iraq NATO's role could be very important. I do not want to engage in a huge argument that is off stage at least with this one about the future governance of the country. Nevertheless, the contribution that NATO might play seems to me to be fairly obvious. That may be true of some other places, which brings me to my question to you. The applicants as they approached NATO saw NATO, maybe as all of us

did a while back, as a very strong alliance that defends Europe, a way in which the United States participates vigorously in that defense, having gone through two world wars, but now having had the success of 50 years of peace.

Yet here we are in a world in which the threats may not always and maybe increasingly will not be, in the War Against Terrorism, nation States with return addresses, with responsible parties. The question of how that transition is made by NATO to the threat that each one of us have as transatlantic alliances, is absolutely critical.

In the discussions that you or others in the State Department have had, or in our government with the applicable nations, what sort of discussions have proceeded about this new world in which we live? By this I mean, the world of terrorist cells, or organizations, subnational groups, the kinds of threats that seem to be obvious in the War Against Terrorism. What sort of preparation has come with any of the seven? Quite apart from the incumbent membership back in Brussels, I focus on the seven because this is an area in which, as you say, there has been a shaping of values, a strengthening of values and abilities. Can you comment on these preparations?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, Senator, I would be glad to. First let me say in response to your opening comments, that I could not agree more that this goal and philosophy of a Europe, whole, free and at peace, has been a great magnet for people who want to join this alliance. And when I think back 10, or 11 years ago with people who had said, "Well, the Warsaw Pact will break up. NATO has to break up as well," and of course, we are still having people want to join this club. And I think it is a very powerful tool for reform, and it is a very powerful tool for people to have goals.

And as you say, if you look at the applicants, what they have done in the areas of Holocaust assets, Holocaust remembrance, dealing with their border, dealing with their neighbors, all of these things have been part and parcel of their desire to get into NATO.

Second, I think that the issue of the failed States and the system around, and dealing with failed States is an extremely important one. NATO does not have the only responsibility there, but there are important things that our country can do in terms of your support, for example, for the Millennium Challenge Account, for dealing with HIV/AIDS, for making sure that we are supporting democracy and good governance around the world because those are important parts of dealings with failed States as well.

I think, Senator, in terms of what these seven are getting into and know they are getting into, I think that anybody who realizes for NATO what the implication of the 11th of September was; when a terrorist operation can be planned in Afghanistan, refined in Hamburg, and then carried out in the United States, I believe that the out-of-area debate is over forever.

And these States did not just turn up to be NATO members. They were in MAP. They were in Partnership for Peace. They knew what they were getting into. And the other reason I think they knew is because they watched the three earlier new members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. And you will recall in April 1999, we signed them up, and as General Clark will remem-

ber, 2 weeks later they were at war. And so anyone who joins this alliance today I think realizes that this is serious business.

The final thing I would say is that each of them have looked for a way to contribute to this future war against terrorism. Again, I would refer you to the chart and follow down the contributions to the war in Afghanistan, where each of them has brought some capability to this war. So our conversations with them about future threats are complete. Our conversations with them about future threats are honest, and I think that they have really stepped up, not only in niche capabilities, but in answering the call from this political military alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make just a comment before I conclude my questioning about some of the values that have been helpful for us in the United States. I use once again maybe parochial anecdotal examples, but I was aware at the Indianapolis Speedway 3 years ago that Indiana had a strong tie with Slovakia. I was aware of this because the Commander of the Slovakian Armed Forces was there with some of his staff members. During the Armed Services celebration back in the infield, he wanted to have what amounted to a summit conference and literally set up a table in which we were there talking about the relationship between Indiana and Slovakia.

At that point we did not have a strong relationship. As a matter of fact, many people in Indiana had not traveled to Slovakia, and were not aware of the virtues of the country; but not for long. With the National Guard units, hundreds of Hoosiers began going to Slovakia perennially, and some staying there for fairly large periods of time. They became strong advocates for Slovakia at a time in which the politics of the country were much more troubled than during the current situation. They demanded that the Members of Congress and others take an interest in the country, and also visit it.

Now, it is a two-way proposition in which there is a learning curve on the part of the American public. Our support for NATO, our support for involvement of the countries, takes place in large part because of the missionary work of others.

I cite just one more situation in a visit to Lithuania. It turned out that the hotel in which I was staying abutted to a very large facility, which I went next door I discovered was a huge basketball academy. It was founded by one of the NBA stars who comes from Lithuania and started this enterprise. That is very congenial for a Hoosier to begin with, to find productivity and hundreds of young people involved in it.

Senator BIDEN. I knew that you would get basketball back into this somehow.

The CHAIRMAN. So we have not forgotten. In any event, what I found also in the course of those conversations, was that a number of people, who were sort of hovering about the scene, were going to Florida that weekend. They were going to be in training with members of the National Guard of that State, and I think some people from Michigan were coming down. It was very sophisticated training. You know, the fact that people would be commuting from there to Florida over the weekend for Guard training and so forth, struck me as new. Nevertheless, I found that it is not, that the

amount of interoperable situations going on here with our State organizations, our local people, are extraordinary.

This is one reason why NATO has legs. The idea really is infectious when you have freedom and you have this kind of cooperation and the extension of the ideals and the training.

I note that once again the Ambassadors of each of the seven States are with us today. I have spotted you as you have come in at various times, and we appreciate that. We acknowledge that and are delighted that you are a part of this hearing and have been, really, in all of our hearings as we have had these conversations.

I yield now to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

I have a lot of questions and I will, I guess, submit some of them in writing. But this notion of NATO and Afghanistan or in Iraq, out of area, in your view do most of our NATO allies believe in order to make that decision, they need, in effect, an umbrella resolution from the U.N. authorizing that?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator, I would say for Afghanistan the answer to that is no. For Iraq, yes. I would say that if they were lined up here, to a person, they would look for some kind of legitimacy from the United Nations.

Senator BIDEN. Now it seems obvious on its face why they would make that distinction, but explain to me, if you would for the record, why you believe they make that distinction.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think that they would make the distinction because in their perspective what has happened in Afghanistan has legitimacy. Clearly around the world there is some involvement of the United Nations. There is continuing involvement of our forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. And ISAF has been going on now for 18 months, so people I think have accepted this.

Iraq is something new and although we might not see it exactly that way, and I do not speak for obviously all the other governments, my assessment is that most of them would seek some United Nations legitimacy.

Senator BIDEN. How would they explain Kosovo? There was no U.N. I mean, we went with a coalition of the willing and essentially NATO——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Into Kosovo. And I must admit as General Clark will remember, I recommended to the President, among others—I was not the only one—to, since we could not get a resolution, just bypass it and go straight to go.

How would they explain that they were willing to do it where they did not have the U.N. approval? That was—is it because it was in area?

Mr. GROSSMAN. That is part of it, I think. Part of it is, of course, that at that time, for them anyway, this was a much closer issue. But as you say, I mean, a number of countries, a large number of countries went with us into Kosovo, and I think we should remember that a large number of countries are with us in Iraq as well.

Now I know that Senator Smith, when he was chairing the European Affairs Subcommittee, gave me a sentence that I have never forgotten, which he said, "You know, the whole point of the lesson of World War II was never again, not never again unless there is

a Security Council Resolution." And I think that is right, and that is the position of the United States. Security Council Resolutions, I believe, are important but they are not necessary if you have to take action.

Senator BIDEN. There is a good deal of debate in the foreign policy community and among intellectuals in this country about whether or not the neo-conservative view, and I am not trying to—in the interest of time, I realize that is a generalization—that there is a significant difference in the threat perception on the part of NATO members, Europe, the EU—they are different, I acknowledge—but from the European perspective about what threats are immediate and real in this world, and the U.S. perception of those threats. And a thesis that is emerging and gaining some significant credibility and adherents, is that it is a consequence of an imbalance in capabilities; that the Europeans, lacking the capability to meet these threats, are inclined to conclude that they are not real threats. We, having the capability because we have kept up at a considerable pace our military spending and modernization, are prepared to meet these threats and so we are prepared to acknowledge that they are imminent.

And Mr. Kagan goes on to write in his book, he said, "There is more to the transatlantic gulf than a gap in military capabilities. And while Europe may be enjoying a free ride in terms of global security, there is more to Europe's unwillingness to buildup its military power than confront"—excuse me. Let me start this over again. "There is more to Europe's unwillingness to buildup its military power than comfort with the present American guarantee." And it goes on to say, "Europeans over the past half century have developed a generally different perspective on the role of power and international relations. This perspective strings directly from the unique historical experience since the end of World War II. Consider again the qualities that make the European strategic culture; the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, commercial ties, international law over the use of force, the seduction over coercion, multilaterialism over unilateralism. As German Foreign Minister Fisher put in his speech outlining his vision of Europe, 'The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was, and still is, the rejection of the European balance of power principal and hegemonic ambitions of individual States that have emerged following the peace of Westphalia in 1648.'"

This treatise goes on to expand that notion that there is essentially, as I understand and to read it—maybe Mr. Kristol will clarify this for me if I am wrong—is that "there is a genuine divergence of interest, perception and willingness to exercise force and the tools needed to deal with whatever threats are available. That it is"—because they go on to say it is "ideological, beyond just the difference in threat capabilities."

So it leads me to this question: How do you explain the unwillingness, thus far, of the significant and most powerful nations in NATO to meet their commitments that they have made to modernizing and upgrading their capabilities, not just since Prague but actually since the late 1980s? Do you view it in these terms, that they view the utility of the use of force and power as somehow dangerous? Or I mean, if that is the case, then it seems to me that

there is a fundamental problem that we have in NATO. Can you talk to that or speak to that a little bit?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I will do my best. First, Senator, I think it is important that, from my perspective anyway, that we not generalize too much about Europe and what Europe thinks and that Europe might be moving down a path that is——

Senator BIDEN. Germany.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, but I think it is important, because I will come to that at the end. But you do have the eight countries, very important countries, who signed a statement in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. You do have the V–10 countries. And so I think that there is a lot of public ferment in Europe, and a lot of difference in public opinion in Europe, but I would not generalize too much.

And in a sense, one of the good things about this enlargement, that I hope that you all will be for, is we are bringing in countries who, I think, see the world very much in the way that we do and wish to act. I think the big distinction here is between countries who are not prepared to act, and countries who are prepared to act, and we need to have as many countries in the alliance as possible who are prepared to do something.

Senator BIDEN. If I can stop you.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. But if you can define for me, by "act"—I believe acting is in part made up of the willingness to spend a larger portion of their GDP in order to have capabilities.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I agree with you completely.

Senator BIDEN. Then why have we not—I mean, do you anticipate that that will—that it is likely to change? What I worry about, quite frankly, is: With some of the larger, more powerful nations in NATO thus far refusing to act in building their military capabilities and the disparity widening between us and them, that the aspirant countries, although committed to act, once in will find it very difficult to be sort of the odd-man-out in terms of actually, with their more limited capability, increasing their defense budgets in the face of what are growing domestic needs and concerns. I mean, a little example here, I am worried about which example they will follow.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think for all of the reasons that you cite. First, I think that some countries do not want to spend more money. Second, there are countries who have different priorities and do not wish to invest further in defense. Third, I think, and you would have to ask them, is a lot of energy right now, of course, is going into this creation of the future of Europe. And you mentioned yourself, Senator, in your opening statement, this idea of the Belgians getting together with a few countries to have a defense capability.

I think work outside of the NATO-EU relationship, work that tears down the alliance is greatly negative to us. So I do not think that these countries—and if you look at France for example, France is not a pacifist country. France is involved around the world militarily. France is a country actually that has increased its defense spending.

And so what we need to do, all of us, as we have been trying to do, is make sure that people see the threats as we do, as trans-

atlantic threats, and then work through NATO and through this NATO-EU relationship to get these challenges met.

I think Germany—and again they would have to speak for themselves. Germany is a different question because it comes from a different history. But if you look at what the Germans were prepared to do in the Balkans, help in Afghanistan, continuing efforts in NATO, I think we can work our way through this and have an alliance that is prepared to meet its responsibilities.

Senator BIDEN. With your permission, may I ask just a short followup question, with the permission of my colleagues?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Have all of the eight countries that signed the declaration on Iraq met their NATO capabilities commitments? Or have any of them? In other words, you know, you made the point, and it is accurate——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. That we had eight NATO countries sign on to a declaration supporting the effort in Iraq. I am just curious: Who among them, and if you want to do it for the record, has met their NATO capabilities commitments?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I would do it for the record. I mean, obviously some of them—I know off the top of my head, the answer to some of them is "no," because they fall below a 2 or 3 percent GDP defense spending ratio; for example, Denmark, for example. But people are making contributions in other ways, and I would be very glad to take that question for the record.

Senator BIDEN. Good. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Nice to see you, sir.

Senator CHAFEE. I saw one former administration official refer to NATO as the "Mother of all Coalitions." Is that what is envisioned? And what are the dynamics vis-à-vis the United Nations if that is the administration's direction?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well I think that NATO is the greatest of all Coalitions. As both Senators said in their introductions, this is the greatest alliance that we have ever been involved in and the greatest political military alliance.

And so I have always thought of NATO as the place you go to consult with your closest friends, the place you try to act with your closest friends, the place you try to put together military capability with those others who are prepared to act. And as I said to Senator Biden, my view is U.N. Security Council resolutions, the blessing of the United Nations, action with the United Nations are always desirable but not, in the end, necessary. And so I believe that if we have to act as we did in Kosovo, or if we have to act in a Coalition as we are today in Iraq, we will do that. And that is a very, very important part of the NATO alliance.

For example, sir, who could have thought on October 7, 2001, when we needed to act militarily with our allies in Afghanistan, that we would be knocking on the door of all kinds of countries in Central Asia, who, what do you know, had been with us in the

Partnership for Peace for 10 years? Think how much harder that would have been to convince countries to join us had we not made that investment. And I think that investment pays off every single day.

Romania, for example, is a country that deployed its own forces, with its own airplanes to Afghanistan. There are a number of allies, our present allies, who could not do that. The Bulgarians have let us stage out of Borgas in Bulgaria. The three Baltic States have each provided niche capabilities, but important capabilities, in Afghanistan and are prepared to in Iraq. So this is a tremendous organizing principle that we believe in, in NATO.

Senator CHAFEE. Am I correct to assume, then, that there is a minimizing of the United Nations relationship that we have traditionally——

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Had as we empower NATO further?

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir. All I was trying to say was that, in the end, when a decision has to be made by our President and our Congress, I think the rule that we would live by is that United Nations sanction, United Nations resolutions are desirable but not necessary.

Senator CHAFEE. And now, how do you envision the rising influence of, in particular, India and the People's Republic of China, and as you look to the relationship with NATO?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, certainly NATO is not a threat to either of those countries. Very interestingly, the Chinese Ambassador has been reaching out to colleagues at NATO because they see, as PfP countries, that Central Asian States which are important obviously to Chinese security, are having this relationship with NATO and they would like to have a conversation, too.

So I believe—I cannot speak for Lord Robertson. I think the alliance would be prepared to speak to anybody on any subject, but certainly the alliance is not a threat to either of those countries and we would welcome a conversation with either of them.

Senator CHAFEE. I guess it comes back to my original question. It seems as though the United Nations, a traditional body after World War II for resolving our disputes, is slipping in stature as NATO rises. Disavow me of that thought if——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, with respect, sir, if you think of what President Bush did on the 12th of September of last year, we went to the United Nations General Assembly and made a speech about Iraq. And we spent 8 weeks then trying to bring together Resolution 1441, which I think was a great triumph for the United Nations and for the United Nations Security Council.

But then when it comes to the inability of the Security Council then to act on 1441 which calls for serious consequences, then the United States and its Coalition partners felt the need to act. I believe, sir, that if a second resolution would have passed and the United States and its Coalition partners would have had that second resolution, we would have welcomed it. But it did not pass. Our President felt the need to act and I believe that was the right thing to do, sir.

So I do not think these are in competition. I just want to be absolutely honest with the committee and not ever be in a position of saying that NATO would have to ask the United Nations' permission to act. I think that would be something that, I believe as I have understood this committee and certainly that I believe personally, would be a mistake.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, I understand what you are saying. My difference would be that the UN's failure to act—I would dispute that; I think they were acting. Resolution 1441 certainly was stricter and the inspections were continuing and the President took a different course, decided not to go through the United Nations, and I just have a difference of opinion on that, of course.

One more question as we look at the changes of—see more emphasis on NATO, where were the great failures of the United Nations? Post-World War II, you could argue that our great adversaries Russia and China are now our friends and allies with relative loss of bloodshed, some peripheral battles and skirmishes, conflicts if you will, but no great battles. We won the cold war through a policy of working the United Nations, working through nuclear deterrence and the bad word, "containment." Where were the failures?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, sir, first of all, I think the United Nations for the United States has been a wild success since the end of World War II. I am not here to bash the United Nations. I am not here to criticize the United Nations. All I was trying to do is be honest and say that there are circumstances in which I would not seek the permission of the United Nations if the United States or NATO had to act.

And with respect, sir, I think part of the, not disagreement but the dialog that we are having, is that I do not believe the one organization was responsible for the total outcome of the cold war. It was a combination of those things. For example, you very rightly cited the very important impact of the United Nations on ending the cold war.

I might say, sir, that in addition, there was a 50-year commitment of NATO to spend money on defense, to say that they would deter an attack by the then Soviet Union on the then divided Europe. I would say, for example, that the decision of NATO countries, a courageous decision and a very controversial decision at the time, to deploy INF missiles was one of the reasons that the Soviet Union gave it up.

And so I think that the United Nations was an important part of this. I do not dispute that, sir. But I think that NATO played an important, a very important role in winning the cold war, as did the commitment of the United States and other counties to year, after year, after year, spend money on defense.

I would say one other thing, if I could. We are today—imagine it, we are today considering bringing into the alliance the three Baltic States, the three Baltic States whose incorporation into the Soviet Union, I think, was one of the great illegal acts of the last century. And for 50 years this country, our country, had a non-recognition policy and we stuck to it, and it was the right thing to do. And here we are now, the Soviet Union is gone, and we are going

to bring these three countries into NATO. I think it is a remarkable achievement.

And so, with respect, sir, the United Nations plays a role. Absolutely. But it was the determination of the United States, its allies and NATO, that also played an important role in winning the cold war.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

I am supporting expansion of NATO. My own view has been since the day the Soviet Union ended that it would be great to have everybody in there, everybody including Russia eventually. How is Russia coming along?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, in its relationship with NATO, actually, Russia is coming along pretty well. As I testified——

Senator BOXER. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I am sorry. That is good because that is the one thing that I know about today.

It is actually coming along pretty well. You will remember, Senator, that we signed the NATO-Russia Council Treaty.

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Every week now, NATO Ambassadors, at 20, meet together. We are working with the Russians on issues of civil emergency planning, airspace management, weapons of mass destruction, and anti-terrorism. And as I testified, actually we just had a very big civil emergency planning exercise based on the release of a toxic chemical weapon in Russia in which 850 first responders from 30 countries participated. And so I think this is going pretty well.

We need to have some successes and then if we can, take this up to the next level. But as I testified here a year ago, we want this at–20 arrangement to be good for NATO and to be good for Russia as well.

Senator BOXER. I wanted to support something you said about not making generalizations about Europe, like putting them into old Europe and new Europe. That is a generalization; it does not make sense. I never thought it did when the statement was made, and I think it is destructive.

I also think it is important, whether you are talking about NATO or the United Nations, to realize that there are times when people do not see the issues exactly the way we do. We do not see the world the way they do either. So what is the problem?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, from my——

Senator BOXER. I mean, what is all the angst? The fact of the matter is: Every single nation is going to see an issue in a different context given their relationship with a particular part of the world, given the views of their people, et cetera, et cetera. Why the vitriol when you are trying to live in a world where we have to work with our colleagues all around the world?

This war on terrorism is with us forever and we cannot resolve it alone. So in this case of Iraq, we have got to be very careful, it seems to me, to respect other countries. We may not agree with

them at all, but to go down a path of saying, "Well, we do not really care what you think," you know, I think is very destructive and I just would like to hear your comments on it.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Sure. Let me make two comments, if I could. First, in terms of NATO and Iraq: The first thing I say is, of course, the NATO Council is not the Politburo, and we sit around the table with 19, and we hope some day with 26, other democracies. And so I think it is right for you to point out that if you believe in democracy, you have to believe in democracy. And these people come and they represent their governments and their people. Fair enough.

Senator Lugar said in his opening statement that for 50 years, you know, there really have not been that many controversies. But when I think back to NATO being thrown out of France in 1966, or the pipeline issues in the 1980s, the INF disagreements, people said, "Oh, this is the end. It is all over. We cannot get through this," but I believe that we will get through this because we are a community of democracy.

The second thing, Senator, on Iraq in particular, is that we have actually gone to the alliance now for 4 or 5 months and we have said, first in December and then last week when Secretary Powell was there, and we have said, "Look, we think there are four or five ways that NATO could, could participate in Iraq. It could participate in weapons of mass destruction destruction. It could participate in peacekeeping. It could participate in humanitarian issues."

But we are not going to demand, or dictate that NATO do this because as the Chairman and the Ranking Member said, NATO has a choice to make. So when Secretary Powell was there last week, he said, "These ideas, these possibilities are still on the table. We would like to work with you on them."

But the choice really is for NATO to make because we can do this without NATO. We would rather do it with NATO, but we are not here to dictate to NATO. NATO is a community of democracies. My own view is that I hope that NATO will say, "Yes," to these ideas because it would be good for us, good for NATO and put NATO clearly on the side of meeting future threats.

Senator BOXER. Well, I think that it would be good if the whole world helped us in Iraq, to be honest. They owe $60 billion in debt. That is a little lower than ours, but that is a big burden. Somebody has got to figure that one out. And given the destruction on the ground, et cetera, and given the fact that our people could be targets, I am very hopeful that NATO takes a role and I am very hopeful that the U.N. takes a role. I am very hopeful the whole world takes a role because I think it is better for us, frankly, and better for the Iraqi people in the end. So I think that is true. I have just one more question for you.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Please.

Senator BOXER. And that is, I have for a long time been concerned, along with my colleagues on this committee, about the stability of in Afghanistan outside the main cities. And have we asked for NATO's help in taking a lead role in expanding the peace force there? Because, you know, clearly after September 11, NATO was so strong and so wonderful in invoking Article 5 of the treaty, and looking at September 11 as a war against them. And it just seemed

to me since this stability in Afghanistan is so important—if I said "Iraq" before, forgive me. I meant Afghanistan.

Mr. GROSSMAN. You said Afghanistan.

Senator BOXER. I did? Good, because I am still a little jetlagged from coming back from California and the time change.

So I just wonder—I know that they are studying the issue. But wait until you see it because I think, I have always said Afghanistan, we just cannot afford failure there. And with Iraq, we cannot afford failure there.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Agreed.

Senator BOXER. I think the best way to protect against that is to get the largest number of nations to help us in these areas. So where do you see that peacekeeping force going and NATO's role in it?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I see it in two parts, Senator. First, that what we are trying to do today is to encourage the NATO alliance to take on, kind of, the core headquarters organizing mission of the International Security Force in Afghanistan. We have had over the last 18 months British Forces, followed by Turkish Forces, followed by German Forces, Dutch Forces, and we hope the Canadians will take over in the future.

And of course, everyone said, "Well, why reinvent this wheel very 6 months? Why have new headquarters and new arrangements when NATO could do this?" And so one of the things that Secretary Powell really supported last week at NATO was NATO playing a larger role there at the core of the International Security Force in Afghanistan.

The second part of your question though, since I want to be totally honest with you, the question of enlarging the role of ISAF is not yet a question for NATO. We are going to take this one thing at a time and see if we cannot get NATO to be the organizing principle. And then at some point in the future, who knows what will happen? There might be some expansion, but for the moment we have always said we are not opposed to this expansion, but so far there have not been very many volunteers to do it.

Senator BOXER. Well, let me just take you on, on that. You know, I am so tired of hearing that, "We do not oppose it."

You do not support it. I mean, that is—you know, you are just playing with words here, "We do not oppose it." If we do not support it, it is not going to happen. I mean, let us face it; that is a fact.

And the fact is that we have seen reports from all the folks there who talk to me all the time, they are banging down my door, and they are very worried about this long term stability. And I just—you know, this business of "We do not oppose it," what does that mean? Do you support it? Do you support expanding it?

Mr. GROSSMAN. We would support it. I think we would support it if there were also other countries who were also prepared to do it.

Senator BOXER. NATO.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, maybe that comes. But as I say, I do not want to—I want to stay within what we are doing here because the first step is to get NATO organized to keep the ISAF mission as it is, so that we do not waste a lot of energy reinventing this wheel

every time. I really—I do not know how to speculate about the future. But I take your point and I would be glad to report it back and talk to Ambassador Burns about it. Fair question.

Senator BOXER. Yes. I mean, I think to say that you do not oppose expansion, it just—I think we ought to support it and get that country in a safer mode——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Because we cannot afford that country to explode.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think there are though, Senator, just—and I do not mean to be in an argument with you, but there are other ways that we are trying to expand security. For example, we and the French are together trying to train the Afghan National Army, and battalion after battalion of that Army is being trained. And they will, I think, go out and bring the writ of the central government in Afghanistan farther and farther.

Senator BOXER. I know that is coming along very slowly, but I understand that.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have an issue, or at least a first question, about some of the language that was used. And I think it was used in the exchange between you and Senator Biden and I am not finding fault with either of you, but I want to clarify the language.

You each talked about a willingness to act, a refusal to act, as if acting were somehow an arbitrary or subjective choice of the NATO members within the alliance. Now, it would seem to me that alliance members ought not to be making an arbitrary choice whether or not to act or not act, but they ought to be making their decision within the context of an alliance framework that explicitly states circumstances and conditions, and opportunities under which alliance members would be expected to participate. And certainly there may be disagreements about level or type of participation, strengths and weaknesses. And all of this discussion about changing the role of a specific alliance member is part of that.

But as NATO is constructed, does it not make sense to call for action under a consistent set of terms, a consistent framework that is applied from circumstance to circumstance?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. That said, NATO is also flexible enough to recognize that, for example, when in February there was this challenge over NATO support for Turkey, when it could not be done in the North Atlantic Council at 19 members, NATO had the capacity to then meet in the Defense Planning Committee at 18 members, and take this decision. And so there was a country in that case that chose not to act, and I have to let them explain why they did not do that, but we did not let the alliance be frozen in that case.

Senator SUNUNU. I understand that, and it would seem to me—I am not asking you to speak for them. But in that circumstance the argument against action would, or certainly should be that a country does not believe that a specific action is in keeping with the framework the alliance, the charter that is again applied con-

sistently from time, and not that it just does not want to act in this particular case. It is not just refusing to act; it is making a coherent argument that a specific action is not in keeping with the alliance's charter.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. Are those the arguments that were put forward? I do not claim to have followed the discussion and the debates over that authorization so closely that I know the specific arguments put forward by France.

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, and I am not here to speak for France. The French Ambassador, I know, would be glad to visit with you all.

But I think in this case it goes back to the conversation that I was having with Senator Chafee, which is: The argument that France was making is that it was not time for NATO to act in defense of Turkey because it presumed what might or might not happen at the United Nations. And here, sir, is a particular case where it was not an argument about NATO. It was an argument about the relationship between NATO and the United Nations.

Senator SUNUNU. And that is precisely my next point. Again, you are not speaking for France, but that is a different point, a different argument than arguing that this is not in keeping with our alliance. You are suggesting an argument that said, "This may be keeping with our alliance, but we want the U.N. to go first."

And I have an even greater problem with that argument because to suggest that U.N. authorization is ever required as a precondition to NATO action is to suggest that, by virtue of their veto in the Security Council, China and Russia who are partners of ours in a number of areas—but that is to suggest that China and Russia should always have veto power over the choice of NATO to act. Is that a fair characterization?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I believe that the United Nations should never have veto power over the capacity of NATO to act.

Senator SUNUNU. But, well, if they have—if the Security Council, though, is called on to be asked to authorize any NATO action, that is by definition, because of the way the Security Council operates, giving veto power to those countries.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. But it is the position of the United States, and I believe very much backed by most members of this committee, that United Nations Security Council resolutions are desirable but not necessary, and they——

Senator SUNUNU. I understand your position, and I understand the position and I agree with it.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. I am just trying to clarify that we have a situation where, if these characterizations are fair we have members of NATO arguing——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. That it is no longer the charter and the framework of the charter, and even the interpretation of the charter that should govern actions and choices for actions; but that in addition to that, we should be providing members of the United Nations Security Council with a vote and, specifically non-NATO members, with a veto power of the authorization of those actions.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think—I am sorry.

Senator SUNUNU. I think we are in agreement, but——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. I think that is a very important distinction and I think that is an issue that—and obviously, I suppose, to state the obvious, needs to be resolved within the NATO membership as we move forward. And it is an expectation, and it needs to be resolved because it is part and parcel of the expectations for action that those who are being asked to join NATO will have.

And I think the expectations for action in-area or out-of-area are critical here. The framework for those actions are critical because you need to set expectations and be clear about expectations when they join and that will help us avoid internal conflicts later on. Any comment?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, I would like to comment. I just want to repeat again that it is our policy that we would not seek the—we would not feel the necessity to seek authorization of the United Nations for NATO action. Desirable but not necessary is our policy.

And I will say, sir, that this of course is not a new issue. And, in fact, with a very strong backing of this committee when we walked up to the NATO summit in 1999, this was "the" main issue in the drafting of the New Strategic Concept. And I can remember testifying in front of this committee, and the committee saying to me that "If you allow any language in that Strategic Concept which says that it was a must for NATO to be authorized by the United Nations," I think a number of Senators here said that they would sponsor the resolution to have me fired, and us to walk away.

So this is a very strongly held position certainly of me personally, I believe of the administration, and I would say, I think, of the leadership of this committee.

Senator SUNUNU. A second question in my mind flows out of the importance of setting these expectations, is then to define the circumstances under which we undertake out-of-area operations. In your testimony you say that in appropriate circumstances—we should not have to take military operations outside the traditional area of operations.

Can you describe in a little bit more detail, with a little bit more clarity, what those circumstances are, or how you would define them on a consistent basis, what test you would apply? Because I do believe it is important that new members understand what those tests will be in the future.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I believe the most important test is the test that is in the NATO Treaty, which is a threat to the territory, the integrity, the system of a NATO member.

And for example, I would go back to the conversation that I was having with Senator Boxer. I believe that the fact that we are here in 2003 thinking about a NATO role in Afghanistan, a NATO role in Iraq, defines what this new NATO is going to be all about. I mean, I have either the benefit or the lack of benefit, as you look at it, from having lived in this alliance for a very, very long time. And people, you know—it was unimaginable that NATO would act outside a very strict area, but as I say——

Senator SUNUNU. I am sorry. When was it unimaginable that NATO would act outside of a certain area?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Up until the middle of the 1990s. And again——

Senator SUNUNU. And how and when did that perception change?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I believe, sir, that it changed as we headed—well, first, it headed—it changed because of the failure of the international community in the Balkans, and then the return of the international community to the Balkans. And General Clark can speak to this much better than I, but the readiness of NATO to act to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999. And I also believe that the debate over the new strategic concept of NATO in 1999, which put in, what, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, are all transnational issues. And if you are going to attack them you have got to do that outside of the area.

Senator SUNUNU. But is it not fair to say that even prior to the middle of the 1990s, that out-of-area action would certainly be, not anticipated, but understood to be a potential by the NATO members? And out-of-action in Eastern Europe, out-of-action in the former Soviet Union, at a time and a place—if there were a defense threat, if there were an attack on a NATO member, that could certainly lead to out-of-area action in Eastern Europe and Russia. It would seem to me that it is not that it was never contemplated before 1995; it is that that is a particular area in which NATO action was not previously contemplated. I do not see anything necessarily new about the concept of out-of-area; it is just the concept of these particular areas, which prior to the early 1990s, were not necessarily viewed to be a direct national security threat to NATO members.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Fair enough. I think that it is both geography and the threat. These weapons of mass destruction, that is not necessarily a threat from a certain geography. Terrorism, as I said, you have something planned in Afghanistan, refined in Hamburg, carried out in America, that is not a geographic question.

When I think back on it—you know, memory is always a tricky thing. When I think back on it, I think if I had been testifying here 10 years ago, the question of out-of-area would have been much, much more controversial, Senator, and I think that it is a good thing that it is not.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, maybe I am putting too fine a point on it, but the question of out-of-area would have been a much more complicated question, or controversial question?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Controversial, yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. Or the question of acting in Iraq, or Afghanistan? Because I do not think the question of NATO acting in Eastern Europe at the time, you know, in 1989, or 1985, or in 1980, would have been very controversial or the question of NATO acting in the Soviet Union, or the question of NATO acting in various parts of the Pacific. I do not think those necessarily would have been controversial.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I would have agreed with your comment all the way up to the Pacific. With respect, I think anything out—15 years ago, 10 years ago, anything that was out of a very strict definition——

Senator SUNUNU. You do not think that if China in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, posed a significant security threat to, say, the United States?

Mr. GROSSMAN. It is hard to look back. It is hard to speculate, but I do not—no, I do not believe that would have been a NATO——

Senator SUNUNU. Fine. I will withdraw the point about the Pacific. But you understand my point, that this—the out-of-area concept, I do not see as being that new, or dramatic, or different. It is the areas and the new threats that have emerged in the last 10 years that are new and different.

And the distinction here, I think, is somewhat important because when you start talking about out-of-area, people think that you are radically changing, or reinterpreting the charter, or coming up with some totally new role, or responsibility for NATO, when the core mission remains a defensive security alliance of like-minded Nations.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely correct.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just intervene temporarily without getting involved in the discussion. But I just remember giving a number of speeches and papers in 1993, and the idea that routinely, or even at all, NATO would act out-of-area was very controversial. As a matter of fact, most countries simply did not believe it at all. They were adamant about the question. And in fact, it was so controversial, that it really did not arise as a point of changing the doctrine, even as we moved toward the first tranche of new members. And we had had that experience already in Desert Storm before, in which we had sort of a pick-up of volunteers, coalition of the willing of sorts, in those days.

But in any event, it is an important discussion because clearly the statement you have made today is: The issue is pretty well passe. We are out-of-area, at least if we are serious about terrorism and the rest of the world. But a lot has changed in 10 years and you have been testifying right throughout that period of time.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the Secretary being here.

Let me follow on in this context of the community of democracy which you stressed. Are these expectations that we have been talking about which I guess are a proxy for the mission of NATO—do you believe that they are fully established?

Is there a consistent understanding of what those expectations of all members, are or is it to be debated in each individual circumstance, out of area being one of those issues or the nature of preemption as opposed to defensive responses? Is it understood in all of those various areas that the Secretary talked about last week, whether it is weapons of mass destruction destruction, or humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations, nation-building operations? How does this community of democracies have a solid set of expectations in all of those various areas if we are dealing with generalities?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Two points, sir. First, I think in terms of the expectations of the seven countries we are talking about now, their expectations are very clear. And the reason is that we did a better job this time than we did the last time because we had what was

called the membership action plan, and so countries have very clear goals in terms of their political, military, economic reforms programs. And so you would obviously have to ask them because they are represented here, but I doubt that any Ambassador to Washington from any of these countries or any Foreign Minister or Defense Minister has any misunderstanding about what the deal is here.

If you talk though, second, about these future issues, "What do you do in Iraq? What do you do in Afghanistan?" the way this particular community of democracies sets its expectations is the way that you would want us to, which is through the debate of these things.

I mean, as I answered Senator Boxer, the Secretary went to NATO last week. He did not demand or say, "You have to participate in Iraq." He said, "Here are four or five ways that this alliance could become involved. These issues are on the table. Let us debate this thing and decide what NATO wants to do."

So once these countries are in, they are full partners in the conversation about what future expectations might be like.

Senator CORZINE. And what checks and balances are there to any individual or group of nations inside the coalition with respect to judgments they take with respect to any of those difficult choices that may be on the agenda?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I do not know if I would describe it exactly as a check and balance, but I believe that for over 50 years the consensus principle has worked at NATO to bring decisions rather than to deny them. And in a sense, you think maybe that is counter-intuitive. But I think people who sit around that table have made their commitment to the alliance, have these moral and political commitment to one another, are looking for ways to come to some agreement. Does it always work that way? No, sir.

Senator CORZINE. Is there a commitment to defense, or is it commitment to all of these other extensions? I think this gets at that question about where we were with out-of-area actions. People may have felt that they had a commitment that was different 15 years ago than they do today with regard to those.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Maybe so. But I think, sir, that people felt that they had a commitment that was different when the alliance was formed in 1949. I think one of the great things about NATO has been how it has had the capacity to adapt. I mean, the threat today is not the same threat that it was in 1949, and yet, we do not have members bailing out and saying, "Hey, I signed up to fight the Soviet Union. No more Soviet Union, I am out of here."

We have countries, in fact, wanting to join this alliance because the new threats that we have are key to them as well. So we are not holding anybody there at that alliance in chains. And I think if it ever came to it—I cannot imagine, but if it ever came to it, that someone would say "This alliance no longer fits my world view," we are not going to strap them to their seat. But again, I believe that the consensus principle and the solemn commitment people make to collective defense and this community of values—because community is actually what it is—holds people together. It keeps them at the table. It keeps them trying to come to make a solution, and that is right.

Senator CORZINE. And you find no grave risk of that community of values fraying and breaking apart in the current circumstances and debate about preemption.

Mr. GROSSMAN. On the contrary, Senator Corzine, I think the fact that over the last *x* number of years, ten new countries have wanted to join this alliance as actually a reinvigoration of that community of democracies. I know when I sit around the NATO table and I look at countries who 20 years ago were dictatorships and 20 years ago were Warsaw Pact members and 20 years ago were run by somebody else and the fact that they are today making their own decisions, that is a huge reinvigoration of the alliance and also I think a great reflection on the alliance's importance in the future. So I would see it exactly the opposite, sir.

Senator CORZINE. I am not necessarily claiming one view or another, but I do believe that you could make the case that Senator Chafee did, that other strategic principles led to the evolution of these democracies and changes that were brought about and, therefore, one might argue that there are principles at work that have worked that may be effective in the future.

I appreciate it very much.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.

We much appreciate your testimony, Mr. Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, as always, for your strong advocacy and leadership. We look forward to your reappearances before our committee.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Anytime. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to now call Mr. Kristol and General Clark.

As both the ranking member and I have mentioned in the introduction of our hearing today, we are especially fortunate to have both of you before us. You both have distinguished records of public service and important ideas on the subject in front of us. I would like to ask you to testify first, General Clark, and then followed by Mr. Kristol. In the event that you wish, your full statement will be made a part of the record in full. That will be true for both of you. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, USA (RET.) FORMER SACEUR, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, WESLEY CLARK & ASSOCIATES, LITTLE ROCK, AR

General CLARK. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It is a real pleasure to testify before you today. I really appreciate this opportunity, and I want to thank you for all of the support that you have given me and the members of my commands during the time that I served in uniform.

I came here several times and I remember the very strong support this committee gave for the previous round of NATO enlargement, the depth of your questions, your concern and I think it was much appreciated by those of us who served in the alliance at the time.

For those of us who served in the alliance the prospect of adding these seven new members is a dream come true. We watched as

these nations of Eastern Europe shook off the legacies of communism and struggled to find their way to the West. In that struggle, the prospect of NATO membership, and its promise of a security association with the United States, was a very strong motivating factor. And so we are moving to fulfill their hopes.

I want to congratulate and applaud the work of both administrations, the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, in making this day possible. And I especially want to congratulate the Armed Forces, the governments and the peoples of the seven prospective new members of NATO, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Your hard work and dedication to the principles of democracy and liberty has made NATO membership—the prospect of NATO membership possible.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the full statement that I submitted put in the record, but if I could just summarize some key portions of it now.

We are meeting at a time of both great hope for these seven new members but also a time of great danger for NATO because NATO today is at risk. It is an organization in search of a mission, actually in despair at the lack of a mission.

It was excluded from intimate participation and support of the United States' war on terror in 2001. It was apparently, although I was not on the inside, excluded from early planning and engagement in the war against Iraq, despite the fact that its member nations could clearly see the planning moving ahead.

It became an afterthought, an organization to which we turned at the end. It was a kind of resource bank from which the United States could draw support from the under-committed or unprepared or those who were not on the inside, a sort of clean-up organization, to follow on after the United States did the hard work of protecting its security.

As one official told me wryly last year, "NATO, Keep the Myth Alive." Recently, as NATO members have quarreled publicly and angrily about matters of war and peace, it is brought back to the fore again, what many in this country have concluded about the alliance, that it is an organization whose time has passed, that the issues which divide the United States from Europe are too broad to be bridged by an old treaty and an experienced bureaucratic process.

This group charges that the old allies contribute too little, our respective attitudes are too different, and the focus of American security interests lies elsewhere. Mr. Chairman, this is not a dispute about NATO; this is a debate about the nature of America's interests abroad and how we should pursue them.

This is a question about American leadership, not about the alliance. In this debate, one group apparently believes that with the end of the cold war, our purposes in Europe were essentially finished, that the countries there have no real choice but to support the broad outlines of American policy and that, therefore, our most important work is now centered on the Middle East and Asia, where we are most likely to fight.

They have looked to there, rather than the old countries of Europe, as the vital areas of engagement. They see troop deployments oriented toward potential theaters of war as critical. They are pre-

pared to use military power in coercive diplomacy and preventive conflicts. And they would reduce much of our half-century-old military presence in Europe. This is not a strategy that emerged in response to the terrorist strikes on New York and against the Pentagon, but rather it took advantage of those events to gain ascendancy.

I see greater promise in a different approach. I love the men and women in the Armed Forces. We have got the greatest military in the world. I am very proud to have been able to wear our country's uniform for 34 years. But I believe our security as a Nation and the safety of every American is best enhanced by a broader and more visionary leadership which enlists capable and committed allies in support.

I believe we are safer when we are liked than when we are hated, when we are respected, not when we are feared. I think American power should remain a wellspring of inspiration, not become a source of concern. At the end of the Second World War, when the United States was producing 50 percent of the world's gross domestic product and we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, President Harry S Truman addressed the founding of the United Nations with this thought, that without new security structures we would never move beyond the philosophy of our enemies, namely, "might makes right."

And he said to deny this premise, and we most certainly do, we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute it. Words are not enough. He said we must, once and for all, reverse the order, and prove by our acts conclusively that "right has might."

And that was the logic behind the founding of the United Nations as the cornerstone of the international institutions of the post World War II world. And while it is certainly clear today that the American military is unchallengeable, we do not know what the future will hold. For all of our military strength, we are only 5 percent of the world's population, and other larger nations, particularly in Asia, are developing their own strength economically and their military potential.

And we must conduct ourselves with the aim of not only dealing with immediate challenges but also establishing the precedents, procedures and institutions that we need for decades ahead. One of my predecessors in NATO, General Eisenhower, warned in his farewell address as President in 1959 that "America's leadership and prestige abroad depend not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment."

And those of us who have served in the Armed Forces have a full appreciation of the ultimate limitations of military power, no matter how capable and benignly led and directed. America's strength was really built on the strength of our economy and our values.

Our economic strength has been the basis of our success in building allies and friends, opening markets, winning investors' confidence, and encouraging peace and stability worldwide. And that is the process that we must continue. We should be focusing our security efforts on how to prevent war, not on preventive war. Deterrence and containment are still largely valid concepts, even in the post-cold war world.

This means focusing on ending both conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation, encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes, and improving opportunities for all nations around the world to achieve some of the security, democracy and prosperity that Americans enjoy today. We should be seeking to prevent the emergence of frictions and tensions that might lead to conflict.

When problems do arise, we should use diplomacy and economic measures first, and force only as a last resort. If fighting is necessary, we should aim to work multilaterally with strong allies if we can, and unilaterally only if we must. And in each of these tasks, we should expect the greatest potential for support from our friends and allies in Europe.

These European nations reflect our values, share our heritage, and understand our culture and interests more than any others anywhere. Together, we are more than 600 million people, depending on where you draw the lines, half the world's GDP, and three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Working together, we can assure prosperity and security for our people.

Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation may change the nature of the threats we face, but they do not fundamentally alter the nature of the responses we should undertake.

The U.S. military response against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was essential, but there are clear limits to the role of military force in attacking terrorists as many of the terrorist cells have been embedded within our own allies, where we must work with information sharing, law enforcement, and their judicial systems to break up terrorist planning and activities.

Doing this requires the closest harmonization of law, standardization of procedures, and a deep-seated trust that can only be built by unshakable bonds of collective security among allies. And when the Nation is in imminent danger, every American President has always had the authority and responsibility to consider the use of force preemptively, and many have done so.

But this has not changed the broader pattern of international affairs with which we must be concerned, our interests in promoting trade, travel and commerce abroad; encouraging the free flow of capital and ideas; sustaining international institutions to end the burden of leadership, working difficult issues like trade and development, economic growth, environment and security.

American leadership has traditionally sought the support and assistance of international institutions to spread the burdens and increase the legitimacy of necessary security measures, and to promote our broader interests as well.

Mr. Chairman, NATO is one of these international institutions that has a critical role to play in assuring our collective security. It is a "consensus engine." It reflects not only common interests between nations; it creates them. These member nations of NATO are our closest friends in the international world.

It is the engine that binds us, converting national perspectives and issues into agreed alliance positions. Yes, for all of its multinational character, NATO is an American institution. It looks to us for leadership. It is effective only if it is diligently worked by Amer-

ican leadership, respected by our officials, and tended to carefully by our staffs.

Much of that work is time consuming, inconvenient, and difficult and, some would suggest, out of all proportion to the military contributions of the alliance. But here is the point: NATO has never been a purely military alliance. It has always been fundamentally political, aiming at heading off war through deterrence and resolve and adding to the legitimacy of American efforts throughout the world.

It has been the foundation for much of America's success. I believe that today, as we are moving beyond the Balkans and out of area with NATO, we should be putting NATO as the centerpiece of our efforts to deal with the issues of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peacekeeping beyond the borders of Europe.

NATO could be "multifunctionalized." It should serve as a consensus engine, not only for military diplomatic policy, not only focusing on a 25,000 man rapid reaction force, but helping us to harmonize laws and procedures to counter international terrorism, establishing common procedures for information security to strengthen efforts against proliferation of WMD and, of course, dealing with military requirements even beyond Europe.

It was a great and very painful experience for me to go to one of our government offices not too long ago and be briefed on our efforts in the war against terrorism and find that our government considers two of our greatest problem countries to be Germany and Spain in dealing with the real problems with al-Qaeda. I think we should be asking ourselves why that is and what we can do to strengthen their responses against al-Qaeda.

The vision of NATO, I believe, remains to be achieved, but I think it presents the most important opportunity for this Nation and our leaders in forging international consensus and an effective effort against international terrorism.

And I believe that enlarging NATO is an essential step in this direction. It will help us deal with the security threats that we face today. This enlargement, of course, began with fears of Russia. But fundamentally, NATO's enlargement is in Russia's interest as well.

And we have helped Russia come to terms with the new NATO, and we are very appreciative that Russia does accept the concept of this enlargement. But NATO has proved itself a bulwark of stability for Europe as well. Each of the countries now under consideration for NATO membership has already played a crucial role in military operations and peacekeeping in the Balkans that I experienced when I was the NATO commander. And I want to particularly recognize the leadership and the courage of Romania and Bulgaria during the Kosovo campaign when they denied Russian air over flight requests during the crisis at Pristina airfield.

It was the first time that these nations had ever been able to actually stand up to Russia or the Soviet Union and say "No," and they did. They said, "No, you shall not pass." And they did not. And they kept their pledge.

Gratitude, of course, is not a sufficient rationale for admitting these and other candidate nations into NATO. But I do believe that each of the nominated States has met NATO's criteria for member-

ship in terms of stability, economic reform, democratic governance, civilian control of the Armed Forces, resolution of border disputes and lingering ethnic problems, and commitment to the rule of law and human rights. They have worked their military structures.

They are embarked on a process of transformation that may take a decade, but they are ready to join the alliance, just as the first three were ready. Some have cited the relatively modest forces that the new members could contribute as cause for concern. But I have watched them move forward.

I think they are making important steps. I think the costs are relatively insignificant of bringing them in in terms of financial burden on the United States, and I think they will be very strong members and supportive members of NATO's decisionmaking process.

So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ask your support of NATO membership for these seven nations. I hope that you will not only support them but also report out your support for greater American efforts in the transformation of NATO, seeking to take NATO and move it forward to a new level as an institution central in the American effort to combat the threats in the world we deal with, not just a link between the United States and Europe, but the central international institution to take us forward to a new level of American security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Clark.

[The prepared statement of General Clark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, (USA RET.) FORMER SACEUR, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, WESLEY CLARK & ASSOCIATES

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you today. Thank you also for the support you have given to me and to other members of my commands during the time I had the privilege of serving in uniform. I have enjoyed working with you over the years, and I sincerely appreciate your inviting me back to testify here today on such an important matter as the future of NATO.

It is truly a privilege to testify on the subject of NATO and its enlargement. For those of us who served in NATO command and policy positions over the past decade, the prospective addition of these seven new members is a dream come true. We watched as these nations of Eastern Europe shook off the legacies of Communism and struggled to find their way to the West. In that struggle, the prospect of NATO membership, and its promise of a security association with the United States, was a very strong motivating factor. Now we are moving to fulfill their hopes. I also applaud the work of both Administrations—the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration—in making this day possible. And, I especially want to congratulate the armed forces, the governments and the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania; your hard work and dedication to the principles of democracy and liberty has made NATO membership possible.

Unfortunately, NATO is once again at risk. It is an organization in search of a mission, excluded from intimate participation and support in the U.S. war on terror, excluded from early planning and engagement in the war against Iraq. For many, it has become an after-thought. As one official told me wryly last year, "NATO—Keep the Myth Alive." Recently, as NATO members have quarreled publicly and angrily about matters of war and peace, some have looked at this organization and concluded that its time has passed, that the issues which divide the U.S. from Europe are too broad to be bridged by an old treaty and an experienced bureaucracy. They have charged that the old allies contribute too little, our respective attitudes are too different, and the focus of American security interests lies elsewhere.

But this is at bottom not a dispute about NATO; rather, it is a debate about the nature of America's interests abroad and how we should pursue them. This is a question about American leadership. In this debate, one group apparently believes that with the end of the Cold War, our purposes in Europe were essentially finished, that the countries there have no real choice but to support the broad outlines of

American policy, and that therefore our most important work is now centered on the Midddle East and Asia, where we are most likely to fight. They have looked there, rather than the old countries of Europe as the vital areas of engagement. They see troop deployments oriented toward potential theaters of war as critical; they are prepared to use military power in coercive diplomacy and preventive conflicts; and they would reduce much of our half-century-old military presence in Europe. This strategy did not emerge in response to the terrorist strikes on New York and the Pentagon, but rather took advantage of those events to gain ascendancy.

I see greater promise in a different approach. I believe our security as a nation, and the safety of every American, is best enhanced by a broad and visionary leadership, which enlists capable and committed allies in support. We are safer when we are liked, not when we are hated, when we are respected, not just feared. American power should remain a wellspring of inspiration, not become a source of concern. As President Harry S Truman stated at the founding of the United Nations in 1945 [without new security structures] . . . "we will be forced to accept the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that Might Makes Right. To deny this premise, and we most certainly do, we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute it. Words are not enough. We must, once and for all, reverse the order, and prove by our acts conclusively, that Right Has Might."

And while it is certainly clear that today, the American military is virtually unchallengeable, we cannot know what the future will hold. For all our military strength, we are only 5% of the world's population, and other, larger nations, particularly in Asia, are developing their own economic strength and military potential rapidly. We must conduct ourselves with the aim of not only dealing with immediate challenges but also establishing the precedents, procedures and institutions that we need for decades ahead.

One of my predecessors in NATO, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned in his farewell address that "America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment." And those of us who have served in the Armed Forces have a full appreciation of the ultimate limitations of military power, no matter how capable and benignly led. America's strength was really built on the strength of our economy. And our economic strength has been based on our success in building allies and friends, opening markets, winning global investors' confidence, and encouraging peace and stability world-wide, even as tens of thousands of American manufacturing and service jobs continues to flow overseas to lower cost areas.

We should be focusing our security efforts first on how to prevent war. Deterrence and containment are still largely valid concepts, even in the post-Cold War world. This means focusing on ending both conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation, encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes, and improving opportunities for all nations around the world to achieve some of the security, democracy and prosperity that Americans enjoy. We should be seeking to prevent the emergence of frictions and tensions that might lead to conflict. When problems do arise, we should use diplomacy and economic measures first, and force only as a last resort. If fighting is necessary, we should aim to work multilaterally with strong allies if we can, and unilaterally only if we must. And in each of these tasks, we should expect the greatest potential for support from our friends and allies in Europe.

These European nations reflect our values, share our heritage, and understand our culture and interests more than any other country. We are together more than 600 million people, approximately half of the world's GDP, and three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Working together, we can assure prosperity and security for our people as well as most of the world.

Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction may change the nature of the threats we face, but they do not fundamentally alter the nature of the responses we should undertake. The U.S. military response against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was essential, but there are clear limits to the role of military force in attacking terrorists; many of the terrorist cells have been embedded within our own allies, where we must work with information sharing, law enforcement, and their judiciaries to break-up terrorist planning and activities. These activities require the closest harmonization of lows, standardization of procedures, and deep-seated trust among allies.

When the nation is in imminent danger, every American President has always had the authority and responsibility to consider the use of force preemptively, and many have done so. But this has not changed the broader pattern of international affairs with which we must be concerned—American interests in promoting trade, travel and commerce abroad: encouraging the free flow of capital and ideas; and sustaining international institutions to ease the burdens of leadership in working dif-

ficult issues like trade and development, economic growth, the environment and security. American leadership has traditionally sought the support and assistance of international institutions to spread the burdens and increase the legitimacy of necessary security measures, and to promote our broader interests as well.

NATO, one of these international institutions, has a critical role to play in assuring our collective security. NATO is itself a "consensus engine" able to convert disparate national interests into common NATO policy. It not only reflects common interests between nations, it also creates them. These member nations of NATO are our closest friends in the international world. NATO is the engine that binds us, converting national perspectives and issues into agreed Alliance positions through a proven system of issue papers, council meetings ministerial meetings and summitry.

Each nation in NATO is represented by an Ambassador, who brings national perspectives and concerns, into a formal and informal system of consultations and meetings to calibrate differences, seek compromises, and build consensus. International staffs analyze national issues and positions to help formulate policies to achieve consensus and govern implementation. Alliance military headquarters, with very strong U.S. participation and leadership, are available to provide military advice, and to conduct military operations with the forces that nations provide.

Yet for all its multinational character, NATO is essentially an American institution. We not only took the lead in organizing and sustaining it, we also are its largest stakeholder and major contributor. Organizationally it looks to us for leadership. NATO is effective only if it is used diligently by American leadership, respected by our officials, and tended carefully by their staffs. Much of the work is time consuming and inconvenient, and many would suggest, out of all proportion to the military contributions that the Alliance can add to U.S. capabilities.

But here is the point: NATO has never been purely a military alliance. It has always been fundamentally political, aiming at heading off war through deterrence and resolve. It has been the foundation for much of America's success in promoting our economy and our values not only in Europe but throughout the world.

Even after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO served a vital purpose in support of American diplomacy in Europe and the Balkans, and in establishing the common understandings there that enabled agreement on a host of other issues elsewhere. Today we should be engaging NATO as the centerpiece of our efforts to deal with the issues of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peacekeeping beyond the borders of Europe. NATO could be "multifunctionalized," to serve as a consensus engine helping us harmonize laws and procedures to counter international terrorism, establish common procedures for information security to strengthen efforts against weapons proliferation, and of course, to deal with military requirements even beyond Europe.

This is a vision of NATO that remains to be achieved, but it offers an important opportunity for this nation and our leaders. Enlarging NATO is an essential step in this direction. It will strengthen the alliance, promote greater stability in Central and Eastern Europe and allow us to deal more effectively with many of the new security threats facing us today.

During the 1990's NATO membership offered hopes to Eastern European countries that the cycle of threat and conquest which marked Europe in the 20th Century would never be repeated. At first, to be candid, NATO membership was seen as protection against repeated Russian domination. As one foreign minister remarked to me several years ago, "Today Russia is weak, but someday she will be strong again, and before that day, our country must be a member of NATO." Another minister, from a different country explained, "Distrust the Russians? There are many reasons. In 1878 . . ." he began.

While we may discount such fears today, these concerns are very much alive in Eastern Europe. As one President told me, "In Europe, you must think forty years ahead in planning security . . ." Indeed, our recent disagreements with Russia, despite the highest hopes and most cordial relations between the heads of state, should warn us that all states have their own interests—not necessarily ours—in their aims.

But fundamentally, NATO's enlargement is in Russia's interest as well. Stability and peace in Eastern Europe is essential if Russia's own economic and human potential is to be realized. And the Baltic States, in particular, may have vital roles in providing, Russia with access to Western ideas and cultures, accelerating the economic and political development of Russia itself. While many in the Russian power ministries may yet oppose the entry of the Baltic States, Russia has nevertheless acquiesced, in part due to the diligent efforts of NATO's political leaders, and in particular, Secretary General George Robertson, to offer an improved mechanism of consultation and engagement for Russia.

The new mechanism has enabled Russia to overcome the legacy of its resistance to NATO's operation in Kosovo, and Russia should now feel that it has an opportunity to have its interests fully considered by the Alliance before final decisions are made on critical issues. On the other hand, from my own experience, I would second the warning that many have given over the years, that Russia must not have a veto on NATO activities, either formal or informal.

Beyond the issue of Russia, though, the decade of the 1990's proved that NATO had a role in promoting the stability of southeast Europe. Engagement in the Balkans defined NATO's purpose for a decade, and still dominates NATO activities today. NATO in Bosnia ended a war that had claimed perhaps 150,000 lives and displaced more than 2 million people. And in Kosovo, NATO actions rectified an emergent ethnic cleansing campaign which threatened to throw a million and a half Albanian out of their homes.

Each of the countries under consideration now for NATO membership played crucial roles in military operations and peacekeeping in the Balkans. I would like to thank especially Bulgaria and Romania, who, at considerable risk, accepted NATO over flights, isolated Serbia from resupply, and refused Russian air over flight requests during the crisis at Pristina airfield. They helped NATO achieve victory in that vital campaign and establish a peaceful occupation of Kosovo afterwards. It was NATO's first—and hopefully, last—war, and we should be grateful to them.

Gratitude itself, however, is not a sufficient rationale for admitting these and other candidate nations into NATO. Each of these nominated states has met NATO's criteria for membership in terms of stability, economic reform, democratic governance, civilian control of the armed forces, resolution of border disputes and lingering ethnic problems, and commitment to rule of law and human rights. Their military structures have been reduced and reorganized from the legacies of the Warsaw Pact and Cold War experience. And they have each worked on their Membership Action Plans, a series of measures to ready them for integration into NATO military structures, though completing the military transformations may well take up to a decade to complete.

Some have cited the relatively modest forces that the new members could contribute as reason for concern. Yet as I watched the evolution of their capabilities during my tenure in Europe, I was impressed with the quality of their emerging leaders, their willingness to work together in forming collective capabilities, like BALTBAT, and their determination to live up to their resource commitments in funding their security needs. I also appreciated the geography and facilities they offered to the alliance—vast training opportunities, unused airstrips, port and refurbishment facilities, and of course, an increased zone of stability to add to the protection of existing NATO member states. In sum, these are substantial contributions.

As far as costs are concerned, these should be relatively insignificant. During discussions of NATO's first round of enlargements five years ago many in our Congress voiced objections on the basis of costs. Figures ranging into the billions of dollars were cited. In fact, the overall cost has been virtually nil, since the new entrants are obligated to pick up a share of NATO's infrastructure and administrative budgets, thereby reducing our own expenses. And if some modest costs do arise, such as from redeployments of U.S. troops or training ranges, I believe we should evaluate these in terms of the benefits of the prospective changes.

A third area of concern sometimes raised has been in NATO decision-making procedures. Many have suggested that somehow these additional members might render ineffective NATO's decision making process of unanimous consent. I believe the politics and the records of these prospective members refutes that concern. As is clear from the diplomacy preceding U.S. actions in Iraq, these states are very strongly pro-U.S., and are likely to side with us in facing the issues ahead. Certainly in the Kosovo campaign, the three new members proved the most loyal of allies, often at great risk to their support at home. In any event, it has always been the case that those with the most resources at risk have the heaviest weight in deciding the issues at hand. I would urge that NATO's decision making process not be altered or abridged.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I ask your support of NATO membership for these seven nations. They have the long term commitments to be part of the West, they have met the democratic standards essential for NATO members, and they have positive and tangible contributions to make to our own security. Bringing them in will strengthen the Alliance and allow us to respond more effectively to the new security threats facing us today.

Finally, and perhaps more importantly as we look ahead, I also ask that you report out your support for their membership with a view for further transformation of NATO to serve as the clearing point and focal point for increased efforts against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our allies are crit-

ical to our success in these areas. And, as you do so, I would hope that you would call for greater commitment from American leadership in the further transformation of NATO, that our nation may energize a new era of collective efforts to strengthen our security abroad, reduce our burdens at home, prepare the institutions and procedures we will need to guard American interests decades into the future, and make every American safer and more welcome at work or at leisure anywhere in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kristol.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDITOR, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, AND CHAIRMAN, PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KRISTOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee.

It is a pleasure to testify on the future of NATO. I should say that the Project for the New American Century, which I chair, and Weekly Standard magazine, which I edit, have always supported an American foreign policy that is grounded on strong alliance ties. That is why we supported the original enlargement of NATO and we support the current enlargement of NATO.

I applaud the President, actually, for being bold in pursuing a big enlargement of NATO at this time. One forgets that just 2 years ago, it was considered unlikely by most people that you would be meeting here today to consider accepting seven new nations into the NATO alliance.

And I think the President has shown real leadership in that respect. Indeed, if you look at the founding document for the Project for the New American Century—I say this for Senator Biden, since he is interested in neo-conservative thinking——

Senator BIDEN. I am. I am.

Mr. KRISTOL. I know. So I am trying to be of some assistance here as a witness, you know.

If you look at the original statement of the Project for the New American Century, its founding statement of principles—now famous, I should say—signed by people like Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld who both probably spent about 40 seconds looking it over in their busy jobs and figured that they did not see anything they disagreed with so they signed it without knowing it was going to cause so much heartburn around the world 5 years later.

One of the four founding principles, actually, one of the four essential tasks we set before us if we were to correct what we saw as a drift in American foreign policy is to strengthen our fundamental alliance ties. So I do speak as a strong supporter of our alliances, of the importance of allies in doing what we have to do in the world, and in particular of NATO. And so I think on that, there is probably considerable agreement.

Now, what about the future of NATO? I think Senator Boxer asked the right question, which is a sensible question, which is, "What is the problem," in a way, and in some respects there isn't that much of a problem. Or the way I put it is this: There is not much of a problem with about 15 of the 19 current members of NATO and there will not be much of a problem with 23 of the 26 members when NATO enlarges.

But the problem is that NATO works by unanimity, and we have a pretty fundamental disagreement with a couple of rather impor-

tant NATO members; France, in particular I would say, and Germany. And I guess for the sake of honesty, I would simply say that we need to be concrete and straightforward about this. We can say nice things about NATO as an institution without mentioning the names of any countries that are in it, but at the end of the day, if we have a fundamental disagreement—if Iraq is going to be a model for the future and not an exception for the future in the sense that we are going to continue to have fundamental disagreements about threats and about what to do about certain threats with nations like France and Germany, or more precisely with France and Germany, then the utility of NATO becomes a question. It does not mean it cannot still be very useful, and I would so argue that it would be useful. We would just have to disagree on certain things and do certain things outside NATO as, in fact, Iraq is being done.

I very much hope, incidentally, that the reconstruction and the democratization of Iraq could be done in part through NATO. In fact the Project for the New American Century played a role in getting bipartisan signatures on two letters, which I ask to be submitted, along with my statement, for the record, from senior Clinton administration officials and conservative Republicans outside the government endorsing a strong role for NATO in the reconstruction of Iraq.

So I think we can agree to disagree on certain things and then agree to agree and work together on many other things. But the disagreements are not trivial and we should not pretend they are. And the question I really do think comes down more to France than to Germany. I am not an expert on each nation, and it would be foolish to sit here and predict the internal domestic political prognosis of either nation, but I think at the end of the day, Germany is still committed to a strong transatlantic relationship.

They are very averse to use of force, which is understandable and, frankly, fine. They do not need to participate in things that we might believe we need to do. I do not think that they would necessarily go out of their way to stand in the way of our doing what we believe to be in our national interest. They might stand aside, and that is fine.

I think France is a different issue. One really has to be honest and just ask: Is France committed to NATO as we understand a traditional commitment to NATO? This is not a silly question. I mean, France itself of course has not been simply committed to NATO. They pulled out of the military alliance in 1966.

One had thought in the 1990s that they were coming back in fully to NATO, but I think it is fair to ask after the last few months what the future of U.S.-French relations are and to ask it, not in the spirit of recrimination which would be silly, and not in the spirit of punishing anyone which would be silly, but just in an honest way in looking forward and trying to sensibly evaluate and make foreign policy. What do we anticipate?

Well, my basic view would be we do not know what to anticipate, so we should do our best to work with the major nations of NATO. But we also need to be open to the possibility that we will turn out to have disagreements in the future as we have had in the last few months with France.

Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility of having to do certain things without U.N. Security Council sanction and/or without NATO support since unanimity remains presumably a principle of action for NATO. I think in a certain way it is that simple. Nostalgia cannot be a guide, obviously, to foreign policy.

In fact, it was never so easy in the past, as we now think it was. I really do think that we need to resist that sort of partisan point scoring and pretending than better diplomacy would have fundamentally changed the outcome in the U.N. Security Council or French or German views with regard to Iraq.

There were, of course, failures of diplomacy by this administration. There were failures of diplomacy by the previous administration. I am sure General Clark would agree that in the Balkans, at the end of the day, Milosevic had to be stopped and it would not have mattered whether the U.N. sanctioned NATO intervention. We had to go to war to stop Milosevic's ethnic cleansing.

And the truth is in this instance it would not have mattered in this sense that France and Germany fundamentally do not agree with our rationale for the war in Iraq. And they were not going to change their mind if Don Rumsfeld was nicer to them. These countries deserve to be taken more seriously than that in a sense. Their leaders deserve to be taken more seriously.

They have a fundamentally different view of the threat, a fundamentally different view of the agility of inspections, a fundamentally different view of whether containment and deterrence would have worked in this case. They are certainly entitled to that view. I do not think that we ever asked them to really abandon that view.

We never asked them to help in the military action. We simply did ask them—and here is where I think that the rub comes in terms of France. We did ask them, I would say, to step aside if they did not agree and not to positively obstruct our both diplomatic efforts that were preparatory to the military action and, of course, the military efforts themselves.

I would say there that one has to really raise a question about France in particular. It is one thing not to agree. It is one thing to make public one's disagreement. That is perfectly legitimate. It is another thing to really go out of one's way, I would say, to make it harder to build—for us to include other nations in a coalition, including nations like Turkey which were quite important to actually helping militarily and not just symbolic help from the outside.

And I would just contrast that with Kosovo. Kosovo was not a direct, vital national security interest obviously of the United States. I say this as someone who supported the intervention in Kosovo.

Kosovo was a direct vital interest to NATO and certainly to the European nations in NATO, and we stepped up when we needed to. Maybe we could have done it a little bit more quickly and a little more elegantly, but we stepped up when we needed to, when our European partners in NATO needed us.

All we asked of them in this instance regarding Iraq was to stand down in a sense. And I think Germany did, in fact, basically stand down and was perfectly happy to simply stay out of the whole thing. France did not. And so if France really wants to try,

not only to step aside when we are pursuing fundamental foreign policy goals, but actually to obstruct them, it is going to be a problem.

And it is going to be a problem no matter how much we all like NATO and it is going to be a problem no matter how much the administration tries to work with NATO. It is going to be a problem because they are part of NATO and NATO operates by unanimity, and probably will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

I very much hope NATO can remain strong. I think it can remain strong. I am not sure it can remain quite as central as General Clark suggests to American foreign policy, but it can certainly remain a very important part of American foreign policy, especially I think in dealing with the European theater and some of the security tasks in a place like Iraq, where you do need a serious security force as part of the nation-building effort.

I do not think that we can put all of our eggs in that basket, on the other hand, for the obvious reason that we have two major participants in the institution with whom we may end up having some fairly fundamental differences. So I would say that the future of NATO is important, but it cannot preclude coalitions of the willing and I do not think it should preclude some creative thinking about other institutional arrangements with other nations, sub-groups of NATO, obviously nations outside of NATO, outside of Europe, India—relations with other democracies in Asia.

I think this is a moment like the late 1940s, a present-at-the-creation sort of moment, and it is not enough to simply say these institutions worked well for 50 or 60 years. Let us just assume that they will work well for the next 50 or 60; I hope they will. But even so they should be reformed, as you all are, I think, are going to reform NATO by enlarging it to work better for the future.

But it may just be that we need to look seriously at some new possibly institutional arrangements in addition to ad hoc coalitions of the willing for the future. NATO does not preclude having separate arrangements in certain respects with countries of Eastern Europe or other countries in Europe as the occasion warrants.

I do not have any well-developed ideas on this. I just think this is a very fluid and pregnant moment really for American foreign policy, and it may well be that some creativity is called for in addition to reiterating our commitment to older institutions like NATO and, for that matter, like the United Nations.

So I think the challenge to NATO is not from neo-conservatives. It is not from anyone in the Bush Administration particularly. It is not from people in the U.S. Senate. It is from the real world. And we have to deal with these real problems. And the question is—is NATO a means to deal with these real problems? NATO is also an end in itself in certain ways because it is an institutional embodiment of a relationship, of an alliance that has some worth in its own right.

But it also is obviously a means to dealing with real threats like terror and weapons of mass destruction. And we should make NATO deal with those threats as well as we can, but we should not close our eyes to its deficiencies and failures and to the need to find other mechanisms where necessary.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kristol.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kristol follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KRISTOL, CHAIRMAN, PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to testify once again before this august committee, on such an important and timely subject: the future of NATO. The Project for the New American Century, which I chair, has always supported an American foreign policy that is grounded on strong alliance ties. Indeed, in the Project's founding "Statement of Principles"—found at: *http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm*—we argued that strengthening those ties was one of four essential tasks before us if we were to correct the drift we perceived as existing in American foreign policy.

More concretely, we supported the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO. And we support the pending one. I am pleased that we are so close to seeing that bipartisan vision become reality. And just recently, the Project helped organize two bipartisan statements proposing a key role for NATO in post-Saddam Iraq. (Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit the two statements for the record. They can also be found at: *http://www.newamericancentury.orci/lettersstatements.htm.)*

In general, we continue to believe that the goal of maintaining peace and prosperity in the world is best accomplished by working with our democratic allies both to protect existing democracies and, where necessary or possible, to expand liberty's reach to other nations.

But what of the future of NATO and, more generally, of the trans-Atlantic relationship? Obviously, there are questions about the health of the alliance. The first thing I would say is that it is too late to paper over these questions and pretend all is well. We need, as my colleague and Project co-founder Robert Kagan has argued (see his "Of Pardise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order"), to be honest about the differences in world view between some in Europe—especially in France and Germany—and many in the United States. Within the U.S., we need to avoid cheap partisanship that casts blame unfairly either on the last administration or the present one. Undoubtedly, both administrations have made diplomatic mistakes. What administration hasn't? But the problems with the alliance go beyond European preferences for the charm of President Clinton over the directness of President Bush' and beyond the American preference for the policies of Chancellor Kohl over those of Chancellor Schroeder.

In general, I would argue that the Bush Administration has been quite responsible with respect to the trans-Atlantic alliance. When President Bush came into office, common wisdom held that, if NATO did expand again, the expansion would be quite limited in scope and number. But it was the president's vision of a "Europe, whole and free" that has led NATO to this day. Moreover, this past summer, at Prague, the administration put forward a number of constructive proposals for reforming and reenergizing NATO. And, finally, and principally at the behest of our European allies, President Bush went to the United Nations in September 2002 and secured U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. The Bush Administration is not responsible for the current crisis in the alliance.

Who, or what, is? The answer to "who" is France—and secondarily, Germany. The answer to "what" is the new post-9/11 world to which the U.S. has reacted in one way, and France and Germany in another.

This is not the place for France-bashing. But it is the place to tell the truth. At best, the government of France is uninterested in the trans-Atlantic alliance. At worst, it wants to weaken it. France's priority lies with the European Union and/or the UN—not NATO. And there is no question that many in Paris desire to see a France-led European Union as a counterweight to U.S. power. Germany, a troubled nation with economic and demographic difficulties, and an understandable aversion to the exercise of military and nation-state power, has followed France's lead. The European Union as a whole has embraced a view of the world that is post-nationalist, post-historical, and extremely reluctant to use military force even in a just cause.

The United States is different. The "distinctly American internationalism" the president has articulated in speeches and in the White House's National Security Strategy—and with which I am in basic agreement—is quite far removed from the "European" view of the world in both the nature of the threats we face and certainly what strategies to employ to deal with them. How do we bridge the gap?

We won't entirely. Washington and the capitals of Europe cannot help but have some differences of perspective on interests and threats for the simple reason that

the U.S.'s role in the world is far different from theirs. America has global responsibilities no other nation has, or will have, and that is bound to create differences in strategic outlook. That said, we cannot abandon our basic convictions because they make some Europeans uneasy. We cannot fail to confront the threats we face, and we cannot fail to carry out our historic purposes in defending and expanding freedom, because some Europeans balk. We can agree to disagree where we must, and agree to work tougher where we can. There are many such occasions—the reconstruction of postwar Iraq being one conspicuous one.

We should seek new or improved institutional arrangements through which to work together. Coalitions of the willing are fine, and sometimes necessary. But, where possible, longer-lasting organizational arrangements would be preferable. Does this mean re-vitalizing NATO? I hope so. Does it means reforming NATO? I think so—perhaps, for example, by moving to a super-majority vote to authorize action, binding of course only on those who choose to contribute, but still under the NATO umbrella. In a sense, this would institutionalize the coalition of the willing. It would also increase Washington's interest in using and working with NATO. And, finally, it would give our allies a healthier say in these decisions.

We also might want to explore new institutional arrangements that allow us to work in particular ways with our new allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and our friends elsewhere in Europe, as well. We can't confine ourselves to Cold War structures. Institutional creativity is needed for a new world. There may also be ways to institutionalize our friendship, and common interests, with democracies like Turkey, Israel, and India, in conjunction with NATO or outside of NATO.

No one thinks it a good thing for the U.S. to go it alone—though, at times, we may have to act with fewer friends than one might wish. Nor, I trust, do we want to hand over U.S. interests or decision-making to the United Nations—an organization that seeks to speak for the "international community" but actually reflects the particular state interests of its Security Council members. At its best, NATO represents a healthy multilateralism, a multilateralism that rests on shared democratic principles and a shared history of meeting the challenge posed by Soviet communism. The challenge in the days ahead will be to see whether NATO, as presently constituted, is up to meeting the new threats we face. Some positive steps have been taken: NATO's intervention in Kosovo was an important precedent. The contribution made by our allies and soon-to-be allies to the military effort in Afghanistan and Iraq are also significant. The question we have to ask is whether such efforts will be the exception rather than the rule in the future.

I think the Bush Administration is off to a good start in moving NATO in the right direction. The world is a dangerous place and we need help in dealing with these dangers. Accordingly, we need to do as good a job as we can in creating an alliance that has the military and institutional capabilities to confront these dangers effectively. But, at the end of the day, our priority has to be dealing with these dangers, not placating allies who are more concerned with the exercise of American power than the threats we face.

[Attachments.]

STATEMENT ON POST-WAR IRAQ

MARCH 19, 2003

Although some of us have disagreed with the administration's handling of Iraq policy and others of us have agreed with it, we all join in supporting the military intervention in Iraq. The aim of UNSC Resolution 1441 was to give the Iraqi government a "final opportunity" to comply with all UN resolutions going back 12 years. The Iraqi government has demonstrably not complied. It is now time to act to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.

The removal of the present Iraqi regime from power will lay the foundation for achieving three vital goals: disarming Iraq of all its weapons of mass destruction stocks and production capabilities; establishing a peaceful, stable, democratic government in Iraq; and contributing to the democratic development of the wider Middle East.

To enhance the prospects of success, American efforts in the weeks, months, and years ahead must be guided by the following principles:

- Regime change is not an end in itself but a means to an end—the establishment of a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of all weapons of mass destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and that is fully committed to upholding the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its people.

The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be integrally involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of the region.

- The process of disarming, stabilizing, rebuilding, reforming, preserving the unity of, and ultimately democratizing Iraq will require a significant investment of American leadership, time, energy, and resources, as well as important assistance from American allies and the international community. Everyone—those who have joined our coalition, those who have stood aside, those who opposed military action, and, most of all, the Iraqi people and their neighbors—must understand that we are committed to the rebuilding of Iraq and will provide the necessary resources and will remain for as long as it takes. Any early fixation on exit strategies and departure deadlines will undercut American credibility and greatly diminish the prospects for success.
- The United States military will necessarily bear much of the initial burden of maintaining stability in Iraq, securing its territorial integrity, finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction, and supporting efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to those most in need. For the next year or more, U.S. and coalition troops will have to comprise the bulk of the total international military presence in Iraq. But as the security situation permits, authority should transfer to civilian agencies, and to representatives of the Iraqi people themselves. Much of the long-term security presence, as well as the resources for reconstruction, will have to come from our allies in Europe and elsewhere—suggesting the importance of involving the NATO Alliance and other international institutions early in any planning and implementation of the post-conflict stage.
- American leadership—and the long-term commitment of American resources and energies—is essential, therefore, but the extraordinary demands of the effort make international support, cooperation, and participation a requirement for success. And just as a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is in the region's and the world's interest, it is important that the American-led stabilization and rebuilding effort gain the support and full involvement of key international organizations in the work of rebuilding Iraq.

The successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq can contribute decisively to the democratization of the wider Middle East. This is an objective of overriding strategic importance to the United States, as it is to the rest of the international community—and its achievement will require an investment and commitment commensurate with that. We offer our full support to the President and Congress to accomplish these vitally important goals.

[Signatories:]

Ronald Asmus, Max Boot, Frank Carlucci, Eliot Cohen, Ivo H. Daalder, Thomas Donnelly, Peter Galbraith, Jeffrey Gedmin, Robert S. Gelbard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Charles Hill, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce P. Jackson, Robert Kagan, Craig Kennedy, William Kristol, Tod Lindberg, Will Marshall, Joshua Muravchik, Danielle Pletka, Dennis Ross, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, Walter Slocombe, James B. Steinberg, and R. James Woolsey.

SECOND STATEMENT ON POST-WAR IRAQ

MARCH 28, 2003

We write in strong support of efforts by Prime Minister Tony Blair to "get America and Europe working again together as partners and not as rivals." While some seem determined to create an ever deeper divide between the United States and Europe, and others seem indifferent to the long-term survival of the transatlantic partnership, we believe it is essential, even in the midst of war, to begin building a new era of transatlantic cooperation.

The place to begin is post-war Iraq. There should be no question of our common determination to help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and fully committed to the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its people. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of the region.

The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be fully involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Consistent with security requirements, our goal

should be to progressively transfer authority as soon as possible to enable Iraqis to control their own destiny. Millions of Iraqis are untainted by service to the Ba'athist dictatorship and are committed to the establishment of democratic institutions. It is these Iraqis—not Americans, Europeans or international bureaucrats—who should make political and economic decisions on behalf of Iraq.

Building a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is an immense task. It must be a cooperative effort that involves international organizations—UN relief agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other appropriate bodies—that can contribute the talent and resources necessary for success. It is therefore essential that these organizations be involved in planning now to ensure timely allocation of resources.

Of particular concern, the effort to rebuild Iraq should strengthen, not weaken transatlantic ties. The most important transatlantic institution is NATO, and the Alliance should assume a prominent role in post-war Iraq. Given NATO's capabilities and expertise, it should become integrally involved as soon as possible in the post-war effort. In particular, NATO should actively support efforts to secure and destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and production facilities (a task that should unite the United States, Canada and all European allies committed to peace and non-proliferation), ensure peace and stability are maintained in postwar Iraq, and assist in the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure and the delivery of humanitarian relief. The Atlantic Alliance has pledged to confront the new threats of the 21st century. No current challenge is more important than that of building a peaceful, unified and democratic Iraq without weapons of mass destruction on NATO's own borders.

Administration of post-war Iraq should from the beginning include not only Americans but officials from those countries committed to our goals in Iraq. Bringing different nationalities into the administrative organization is important because it allows us to draw on the expertise others have acquired from their own previous peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts. It will also facilitate closer and more effective ties between the security forces in post-war Iraq and those charged with administrating the political and economic rebuilding of Iraq.

International support and participation in the post-Iraq effort would be much easier to achieve if the UN Security Council were to endorse such efforts. The United States should therefore seek passage of a Security Council resolution that endorses the establishment of a civilian administration in Iraq, authorizes the participation of UN relief and reconstruction agencies, welcomes the deployment of a security and stabilization force by NATO allies, and lifts all economic sanctions imposed following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a decade ago.

[Signatories:]

Gordon Adams, Ron Asmus, Max Boot, Frank Carlucci, Eliot Cohen, Ivo H. Daalder, James Dobbins, Thomas Donnelly, Lee Feinstein, Peter Gaibraith, Robert S. Gelbard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Philip Gordon, Charles Hill, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce P. Jackson, Robert Kagan, Craig Kennedy, William Kristol, Tod Lindberg, James Lindsay, Will Marshall, Christopher Makins, Joshua Muravchik, Michael O'Hanlon, Danielle Pletka, Dennis Ross, Randy Scheuneman, Gary Schmitt, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, James B. Steinberg.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden has mentioned to me the desirability of having perhaps two rounds of questioning now and with the permission of the witnesses and your endurance and likewise the Senators, we will attempt to accommodate the members who wish to do that. But we will have a 7-minute time limit on the questions.

And I will begin by asking you, General Clark: I am intrigued by your comment that we are in a safer world where we are better liked by nations. And likewise, you mentioned that sometimes even NATO's role with regard to Afghanistan was considered an afterthought in search of a mission.

Let me just ask two parts on this, one of which is: If, in fact, NATO develops this ready force of 25,000 people that Secretary Grossman was mentioning, 25,000 armed forces with sufficient lift capacity to go really anywhere all over the world, one of the problems with Afghanistan, which many of you pointed out, is that the

British had some lift capacity, other countries virtually none, so that in order to play a quick role, someone had to lift them there, and there are problems in this.

One can say that they would have developed this lift capacity in due course if their budgets had been greater and so forth, and maybe they would, but at least I understand the 25,000 force contemplates somebody having lift capacity so that NATO could be theoretically involved anywhere.

There is new relevancy sort of built in maybe to these discussions, but the other point, however, leads me to wonder: In the event that popular opinion in Germany and France had been different in this period of time, would it have made a difference in their democratic dialog with regard to the support of the United States or the support of NATO? And if so, what could we have done, say, not in the last year, but in maybe years prior to that time? Public opinion in those two countries, quite apart from most of the rest of Europe—as you take a look at the public opinion polls, people just asked starkly, "Are you in favor of the United States action in Iraq or not," and the overwhelming majority say "No." We have problems now in Russia and Russian public opinion. Very adverse trends have set in maybe in the last year or so.

Now, we can say that success breeds success and so forth, but maybe so, maybe not. I want you, sir, to discuss to what extent is Mr. Kristol's point valid that even if, let us say, French public opinion strongly favored the American position, that the French might have acted otherwise. Or was it more the fact that the chancellor in his reelection campaign in Germany—and even Mr. Chirac enjoying finally at some point in his career a surge of popularity—sort of latched on to this and thus supported a rather perverted view, in my judgment, that the French ought to stand up against the Americans.

To that extent, I think Mr. Kristol is absolutely right, if that becomes French foreign policy. They may see their mission as frustrating us, and leading a vanguard of some other willing group to make sure that we are not hegemonist, that we do not get our way, that in essence something else happens, and that is very serious.

Was that actually a doctrine formulated in France, or was it not circumstantial maybe coming from the popularity of a position that Chirac found? Can you comment on all of this?

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I think as usual, you put your finger really on the sort of heart of the issue. Let me see if I can address it from several different azimuths. In the first place, I think there is enormous goodwill for the United States and for Americans in France, in Germany and throughout Europe.

Second, for some long period of time, there has been a thinking in the French political class that with the end of the cold war, that the United States should play less of a dominant role in the alliance, that there might be other perceptions of ways to reach interest.

And during this period, the United States was focused essentially internally. We did not create a new vision in our own country of what our role in the world should be after containment of the Soviet Union passed away as our greatest national obligation. And so there was a period, a decade of drift in which we reacted epi-

sodically. And as you know very well, it was a decade also in which this country was split by partisan disputes.

I want to say that I very much appreciate Bill Kristol's perspective and the support that his organization has always brought to NATO enlargement, because many in the conservative movement were on the other side of that debate. They saw the issue as one of burden sharing. They represented a penny-pinching America that wanted a pound of support for a pound of commitment, rather than a broader vision which would have seen American leadership as needing the endorsement and legitimacy of other sovereign States. So during the 1990s when we could have built a broader vision, we did not.

I was especially disappointed after the Kosovo campaign in which, despite efforts that some of us made to have lessons learned really developed and acted upon, no lessons learned were ever acted upon inside NATO so far as I can determine. Instead, we went off on this pursuit of military capabilities as though adding a few strike bombers and precision strike capacity were going to change the alliance, when the real problem in the mechanism was intelligence sharing, common decisionmaking, common perceptions of the threat and building a system that would let NATO run military operations rather than being a sort of adjunct junior partner to the Americans with a window in to some of the video teleconferences when that was permitted.

And that is the way we had to run Kosovo. We could have gone forward but we did not. Because of the frictions generated both here and abroad during the Kosovo campaign, we turned our backs on reforming NATO. Instead, we defended NATO from the challenge of the European defense program rapid reaction force.

We essentially wasted 2 years with the alliance in arguing about a 60,000-man commitment and how it would interface or not interface with the NATO planning process and whether or not it would duplicate NATO. We did not put forth, as the leaders of the alliance, a broader vision. That is our obligation. I see the red light. I probably cannot go forward here. But it was our——

The CHAIRMAN. Keep going.

General CLARK. It was our obligation to put forward that broader vision. We have to communicate not only a like of Americans in Europe, but an appreciation for why we see our security interests as we do. There are legitimate disputes about why the United States felt it was necessary to go against Saddam Hussein. When it was time to address and lay the groundwork for that, we did not. We could have used NATO to build that groundwork. We did not. As a result, it sort of sprung forth to the Europeans. They could not see it. So when we needed to carry popular opinion in Europe, we did not. We made it available as a political issue to be used in European election campaigns.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that answer very much. Without extending it, I think the issue we have been discussing of public diplomacy with regard to the Near East or the Middle East sort of comes into view at this point. In large part many of us now recognize an absence from the field for quite a while in terms of giving an American view that might have been more attractive, and dismay that we are so disliked; and it is improbable in the course of

this current conflict that we are going to turn that around by public diplomacy.

Still, as you say, there will be a lessons learned period again, where we are going to be in that stage. Our ability not to simply withdraw, come back home and forget about it, deal with other issues for 10 years, you know, might lead to a different aftermath.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me pick up where you just left off, Mr. Chairman. I noticed both witnessed nodded their head, as well as I nodded my head, when you said in terms of the Middle East if we had laid out more of a vision of what we anticipated, what we thought, what we wanted, what our foreign policy goals were, that it just may have been or turned out a little differently.

And it takes me—and I hope I am connecting the dots accurately here—to Mr. Kristol's point that it is not the alliance, it is several within the alliance with whom we may have a fundamental disagreement on, for lack of a better phrase, "the world view," that constitutes the security interests of each of those countries, relative to ours. I would argue that or posit in the absence of our laying out our view as it relates to how we see the Middle East emerging, not just the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that a motive was ascribed to us in France and Germany and elsewhere that may or may not be the President's view.

Someone just handed me a Newsday article of March 16, 2003, that I had not seen before, where it starts off, entitled "Pushing U.S. Toward War, A More Aggressive Military Stance Despite" or—excuse me—"Desire to Help Israel Among the Factors." The byline of the story was reported by Ann Hoy and Timothy Phelps and Ken Fireman of the Washington Bureau. It starts off and it says, "In 1992, two civilian officials drafted a document called Defense Planning Guidance for the Pentagon, a blueprint for the Department's spending priorities in the aftermath of the first gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both the document and the authors were relatively obscure, but not for long."

It goes on to say, "The document argued that the United States should seek such a degree of military and strategic preeminence that potential rivals would be deterred from ever trying to compete with it. America should be prepared to use," I am quoting, "military forces unilaterally to further its interests, and when acting with others it should expect to do so mainly through ad hoc assemblies, rather than establish international institutions."

It goes on to say, "The draft specifically envisioned employing preemptive forces to deny nuclear weapons to countries such as Iraq and North Korea. The draft touched off a storm of controversy when it became public. One senior Democrat"—that is me—"denounced it as advocating literally Pax Americana that would be unsustainable and counterproductive. President George Bush, the first, apparently agreed and the document was quickly disavowed."

And it goes on to talk about how it reemerged as a policy. Now whether it really is the policy of this President, in my experience, you have equally as much or more than I do with our European friends, my impression is that they think it is, that the essence of that document and rationale written in 1992 has become the policy of the United States. Now, I have argued even with my own caucus

that I do not—I think the jury is still out on that and the President has not made a decision although I am becoming even skeptical of my own assertions.

The more I read of—and I have been devouring every so-called neo-con document I can find, Bill, trying to educate myself, because much of what—the premises laid out I think are pretty accurate from the place from which they start.

Now, so the reason I raise this is that, Mr. Kristol, you seem—not "seem." You have indicated that this fundamental disagreement may—and you imply that it may be more permanent than transitory with France and less likely with Germany, but let us stick with France for a moment. And if this fundamental disagreement on the view of the world is irreconcilable, or at least in the near term, irreconcilable, and I am not trying to put words in your mouth, but if it turned out to be that, then it seems pretty important that we understand or I understand what it is that our policy is in the Middle East. There are many with whom I have spoken in Europe who really do not think, reading much of what has been written in the last decade by some incredibly accomplished individuals and intellectuals, yourself included, in this country that this really is not about Iraq in the Middle East. This goes beyond Iraq, that the next target is Syria, that Syria is on, not the watch list but on the hit list, and that what is expected to happen is that we are just merely going to pivot from Baghdad and head to Syria and this notion of this split among neo-cons, as I call them, folks like you who follow through and are more idealistic in terms of—I hope you are not offended by that—nation-building and those who are the more so-called realists, who I would put Cheney and Rumsfeld more in that school, who seem united on the notion that this notion of democratization of the Middle East is something that will be led at the tip of a bayonet rather than with the projection of ideas and other institutional constructs that may be put in place.

So the bottom line question I have is: Our European friends that I have quoted without naming, are they right that we are about to go into Iraq? What is the logic of—excuse me. I mean, into Syria. What is the logic of the arguments put forward by Mr. Wolfowitz and others whom I respect? Would it be inconsistent to fail to go to Iraq now, particularly if Iraq—excuse me; I keep saying "Iraq"—to go to Syria now, particularly if there is any proof that Syria has allowed the Iraqi regime to harbor or to hide any weapons of mass destruction or—and if you listen to Condi Rice, and I am starting to listen very closely to what everybody says these days, when I met with her recently, or not so recently, within the month, indicated that Hezbollah was the real problem. It was not al-Qaeda that was a problem, but the real serious threat was that Hezbollah has sanctuary in Syria.

So what is our policy in the policy you and others are proposing? Would it be inconsistent not to follow on to Syria, or is it consistent to internationalize the reconstruction and the nation-building in Iraq and basically find other institutional means to deal with our concerns about Syria? What is necessitated for there to be a consistency in this new American century?

Mr. KRISTOL. I will try to answer a little bit of that very challenging question.

Senator BIDEN. The bottom line is Syria.

Mr. KRISTOL. First, obviously, I do not speak for the Bush administration. I do think they have been tolerably clear incidentally though, the President in the national security document that they issued in September, in his major speeches about his general view of the world. One can agree or disagree with these views. They obviously are not going to tell everyone ahead of time exactly what their policies are, which I am sure are in flux with respect to every nation and a lot depends on how these different nations behave, I gather.

For example, people in the administration, and you may share this judgment, thought Syria was behaving quite responsibly until about 2 or 3 weeks ago, heartened by the fact that Hezbollah seemed to have been pulled back, that there was no trouble on the northern border of Israel, that Syria did not seem to be exploiting the situation. And then I gather, and I know no more than I have read in the papers about this, that there were worries that Syria was unfortunately not behaving so responsibly in the last couple of weeks, in assisting Iraq in certain ways.

But you know, I will let the Bush administration speak for itself. I would simply say, look, the President said, you know, we have a real problem with terrorist groups, we have a real problem with States that support terrorist groups, and we have a real problem with dictators developing weapons of mass destruction, especially if they have connections with terrorist groups.

That implies a policy that would view with concern developments in Iran, some developments—some aspects of government policy in Syria and, of course, other parts of the world, North Korea most obviously. That does not mean that you invade any or all of them. It does not mean military force is the first option or even an option at all in some cases. It does mean that one's policy toward these nations is not just sitting back and accepting the status quo.

I do think it means one's policy toward these nations is not saying stability trumps everything and we cannot do anything because God knows that the situation could be worse if we push or pressure or use diplomatic or political means to try to push these regimes to change so much. I also think it is the case that history shows that the deal we made with a whole bunch of dictators in the Middle East, understandable though it was at the time it was made or over the period it was made in a totally bipartisan manner by Republican and Democratic administration—maybe now it is not such a great deal, which is why Saudi Arabia become a big question.

I mean, we turned a blind eye toward the Saudi export of Wahabi Islam which has destabilized large parts of the Islamic world and of course has been in some ways a breeding ground for terror. I think that is a problem. It does not mean that we can go in and change the Government of Saudi Arabia overnight. I think it changes in my mind the costs and benefits of taking a very passive hands-off almost approving policy toward the Saudis and never putting pressure on them——

Senator BIDEN. Well, we should be——

Mr. KRISTOL [continuing]. And never putting pressure on them to change, at least to export Wahabi Islam regime.

Senator BIDEN. But that is kind of——

Mr. KRISTOL. So that is just one——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. A harder nut.

Mr. KRISTOL. Well, it is a little easier to take on Syria.

Senator BIDEN. Because we benefit there, but——

Mr. KRISTOL. Right. Right. If you want my predication we are not going to go to war with Syria in the next 6 months. That is my prediction. But it is based on only reading the papers. I do not think that the troops are going to pivot either right or left.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I guess what I am trying to say——

Mr. KRISTOL. I imagine that they are mostly going to try to stabilize the situation in Iraq and then come home. But let me just make one quick comment and then—we are up to the Wolfowitz document from 1992. Most people can agree or disagree with that document, I guess. I read it at the time. I think it still remains part of the original document.

Was the problem of the 1990s that we were too assertive or that we were the opposite, I think that I agree with General Clark here. We tried to take a bit of a holiday from history. We did not show the kind of leadership that we could have shown. We were too slow to act in the Balkans.

Wolfowitz, to his credit, in 1992 was fighting a losing fight in the Bush administration to get serious about Milosevic. And the Secretary of State at the time, Jim Baker, said, "We do not have a dog in that fight." The mood after the gulf war and at the end of the cold war was very much, "Let us come home, enjoy the peace dividend. Let us not get involved in messy situations."

Somalia intensified that mood obviously after Mogadishu and then Rwanda happened and that was another failure, in my view on the part of the United States and in that case on the part of the U.N. And then we were even slow, I would argue, in Bosnia and Kosovo, though we certainly did the right thing there. We did not deal in a very straightforward, in a very forthright way with Saddam in spite of a lot of threats to do so in the mid to late 1990s. Of course, with respect to terror itself, we were very slow, I think, in the response to Osama. So I would argue that the basic—the error of the 1990s was that we were too timid, not that we were bullying our way around the world too much.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting otherwise. I do not mean this as a criticism of Mr. Wolfowitz. I am trying to find out what the——

Mr. KRISTOL. Implications.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. The philosophic underpinning of this policy is. And that is I guess to say very bluntly if, in fact, knowing that Hezbollah, Hamas, the Jihad to some degree is in, around, given cover by the Syrian Government, if, in fact, they did sell, you know, material or give material to the Iraqis, would the present Bush policy be viewed as inconsistent if after it was made to Bashir Assad saying, "Have them cease and desist, get rid of them," and he did not do it, would it be inconsistent in terms of a coherent policy if, in fact, they did not use military force? It seems to me, if I follow the logic, there would be an inconsistency.

Mr. KRISTOL. Well, use of military force is a practical judgment and there are huge costs associated with doing so and one has to

be cautious before just cavalierly supporting it. I think that, in fact, that—)

Senator BIDEN. I would not suggest that it is cavalier. I think it would be fairly well thought out. I am not sure that——

Mr. KRISTOL. But if it is, I would not rule it out. And I guess my only point of view would be that it seems to me if you really look back, the President came to a certain decision after 9/11 and a decision I very much agree with and I think most probably do, which is our previous sense of what U.S. policy should be toward the Middle East in general was flawed, that we had made a big bet on, let us call it stability, and that it turned out that the stability had certain side effects like producing Osama and the like, and that we have to have a different attitude toward terrorists and groups and toward the nations that supported and hosted and harbored those terrorists groups and supported them, and it is particularly dangerous to have dictators developing weapons of mass destruction.

So a lot depends on Syrian policy, but yes, I think that sitting back and accepting a Syrian, sort of passively accepting Syrian sponsorship of terror, sitting back and passively accepting a North Korean race to get—to establish a nuclear assembly line, those are inconsistent with what the President has articulated. It does not mean that military action is the first or the preferred option, or maybe it will never be an option in those cases, but I think—let us say an active American foreign policy as opposed to a passive one I think is required.

Let me just add one more thing, just from a diplomacy point of view, though, which is what Senator Lugar and General Clark discussed. I just noticed this compared to when I was in the executive branch 10 years ago, one side effect of the centrality of the EU and of NATO in some respects in Brussels is that we do not do enough public diplomacy in the nations themselves.

You know, Secretary Powell—and I do not blame him for this—goes to Brussels all the time to meet with all the Foreign Ministers. It is a very cost effective way to have 15 bilateral meetings. They are all right in Brussels. The truth is, for that reason he has almost never been to Berlin or Paris. That is literally true, I believe, incidentally, as Secretary of State. I think he has been once maybe to each of these two capitals, which means that you do not get the effect of being able to influence public opinion directly in those countries, and being able to meet with leaders in those countries beyond the very narrow circle of literally Foreign Ministers and people who are in government.

I think it has been a big failure and this is of public diplomacy. It is not at all partisan failure, but almost a structural failure. We need to spend much more time speaking to the actual opinion leaders and peoples of those countries instead of going to the U.N. to meet with Foreign Ministers or Brussels to meet with Foreign Ministers. So one odd side effect of our commitment to these multi-lateral institutions—and obviously, I am not saying that we should not be committed to these institutions—but one odd side effect is that we do not do the kind of more direct public diplomacy that we used to do much more of.

And I think we have paid a big price with the European public opinion. I am shocked when I go to Germany and France and talk

with people there and try to make the case as best as I can for what I think, which obviously is not the administration exactly, but how often they just say, well, regardless of whether they agree with me or not, or whether I am quite where the administration is—and I am not in some cases—they just have never even had this conversation. You know, there are a few of you Senators who do try to go, but they really rarely see senior policy officials directly, in the capitals of these major nations, and as a result, I think we have paid a price with public opinion.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, it may not be an appropriate time now, but I would either like the general to respond, if he could to my question and what Mr. Kristol said or if he can remember—if he can hold it until when others get finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just take the second course, so that in fairness to our other colleagues——

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But I hope that General Clark has not forgotten the dialog with the distinguished ranking member and will be able to contribute.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Chairman, and welcome witnesses. I do want to clarify one thing.

In the first panel, I made a statement, peripheral conflicts after World War II and certainly in the context of superpowers colliding, may be the peripheral, but certainly for the many tens of thousands of lives lost, they were not considered peripheral, so I would like to correct that.

And gentlemen, as we look at the two conflicting points of view here, certainly I think our present foreign policy you might argue is one of a Curtis LeMay approach, "might does make right," and I would like to ask Mr. Kristol to comment and critique the General Clark doctrine of foreign policy. To me it is quoting Truman and Eisenhower and laying out a sane course of action that does not alienate our many friends around the world and working with the chief goal of stopping terrorism. Can you comment on the Clark doctrine?

Mr. KRISTOL. I am not actually sure that Wes and I differ quite as much as you say, but I do not want to ruin any possible future chances he has by saying that though, so I will——

General CLARK. I would welcome your support.

Mr. KRISTOL. I doubt that. But the—anyway, no, look, I am not sure how much we differ. But I really strongly differ, with all due respect, Senator, with the notion that the Bush administration has some sort of "might makes right" doctrine. The Bush administration has used military force twice in its 2 years, in Afghanistan where there is no, I take it, dispute that they were right to do so. Maybe they could have involved NATO more. I am not sure about that. And in Iraq, where I believe they did receive appropriate support from both bodies of Congress and I believe will have fought what will be viewed as a just and necessary war, a war of liberation and a war where we are going to discover weapons, probably have already, maybe discover weapons of mass destruction, which I think would pose an unacceptable danger to us. That is it.

I mean, they proposed in my view rather modest increases in the defense budget to accommodate this world of new challenges after 9/11 and that is basically the great militarization of American foreign policy that everyone is talking about. They are committed to the reconstruction of Iraq.

Senator Biden and I talked a year ago and I think that, you were worried understandably that they would hold to their older view, I think that we shun nation-building. And I think to their credit, actually, they have moved pretty far off of that.

We can quarrel a little bit about exactly what role the U.N. should play and exactly how internationalized the nation-building should be, but ironically the criticism almost now is that they are doing too much unilateral nation-building, not too little. But that is a much better debate to have, of how exactly to do the nation-building and the democracy building than the opposite.

I guess I just do not agree that that is a fair characterization of the Bush administration foreign policy.

Senator CHAFEE. You recognize, you said, in your trips abroad the rising anti-Americanism. I think even in Canada they are booing our national anthem. Certainly, that is the negative ramification of our present foreign policy. Where have we gone wrong there and how counterproductive is that, again, to what General Clark said is the goal of fighting terrorism?

Mr. KRISTOL. Well, you know, look, it is a very big question about the—especially about Europe, I think, and especially really about France and Germany and that has been addressed by various people in interesting books, like my friend Bob Kagan, about how much of this is due to different world views, how much of this is due to diplomatic blunders by us, how much has this been due to sort of opportunistic political maneuvers by various leaders in those countries. And I think it is hard to tell, and let us see what happens after Iraq. Let us see what happens in terms of cooperation in the rebuilding of Iraq. Let us see what happens in cooperation in other parts of the world.

I would not exaggerate the crisis. I mean, I come back to Senator Boxer's question of "What is the problem?" I mean, there are real problems, but we are also working together with these countries all over the place, including in Afghanistan and in Kosovo and in Bosnia and to some degree in East Timor. I mean, it is not as if the U.S. Government and the European governments are not doing an awful lot of things together. So I guess I am not—this is a big war, the war in Iraq. It was a big decision obviously, by the Bush administration.

Senator CHAFEE. Do you dispute that, as Senator Biden quoted from the 1992 Defense Planning Guide, that generally it has been a radical departure from foreign policy of the past?

Mr. KRISTOL. I do dispute that.

Senator CHAFEE. You do dispute it.

Mr. KRISTOL. I think it is a continuation of precisely the Truman through Reagan foreign policy. No one can really dispute that—I do not think it is a big departure from Reagan. I guess we could have a quarrel about whether Reagan himself was in the tradition of Truman or not. That was argued in the 1980s.

Yes, I do dispute it. Look, it is better to be—as General Clark said, it is better to be liked than hated, but it is also important to be feared by one's enemies. And the problem of the 1990s was not that we were not liked enough. The problem of the 1990s is that we were not feared enough by those who hated us. Osama bin Laden said that, you know, we are a "weak horse."

Somalia in my view, and again, this was—there is plenty of blame to go around on this because they were Republicans in the Congress and, I think, right after Somalia who particularly pushed for the quick withdrawal which, we paid a huge price for. And so I do think that the problem with the 1990s was more about weakness than strength. In terms of European public opinion, you know, we will see what happens after Iraq.

Look at British public opinion. It has changed an awful lot in the last month apparently, partly rallying to Tony Blair's leadership, and I think partly rallying to what we are discovering in Iraq. Are people really going to say after we discover the extent of Saddam's brutality and torture that it was a mistake, that it was so simple as they thought, so crudely and simply a mistake to have gone to war to liberate the people of Iraq? Are they really going to say that this is just about might making right?

If we do do a good job on the reconstruction of Iraq—and that is awfully important—and if Iraq has a decent government and the Iraqis are beginning to be able to govern themselves in the easily near future and we show that we are willing to stay and work with other countries to help them reconstruct that nation, is it going to be that easy for people in Britain and Germany and France to just continue to complacently assume that this was a kind of crazed doctrine of the President and a few advisors and it was not a benefit to the Iraqi people and to the world? I am doubtful about that.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, that may be. I am just having difficulty in what to me seems like just radical differences from the point of view of the neo-cons which you so articulately represent and General Clark's traditional point of view, but as Senator Biden, forgiving ad hoc assemblies, the whole notion of preemption, which we saw in Iraq essentially, "We are going and whether it is weapons of mass destruction evidence or not, this is—we want regime change. We are going." So it is a completely new direction in our foreign policy.

I know my time is up, so thank you.

Mr. KRISTOL. President Clinton said in February 1998, that we cannot accept Saddam with weapons of mass destruction. The implication of that was that preemption would have been justified if we could not depend on the inspectors to go ahead and, in fact, the inspectors could not have been depended on to go ahead. So I guess I would differ on that—I do not deny that the President has adjusted foreign policy in certain ways post 9/11. I guess I would deny that the break is quite as radical as you suggest.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, and General Clark made a good point about using 9/11.

Mr. KRISTOL. And I do not know. General Clark I think supports the use of——

Senator CHAFEE. Whenever you are in trouble, I see you use 9/11. It was before 9/11. It was a foreign policy before 9/11. General Clark said it.

Mr. KRISTOL. I am not sure that is right. I myself supported removing Saddam from power before 9/11. Obviously, we have supported it since 1997. The Congress in certain respects supported regime change in Iraq way before 9/11 by passing legislation in 1998.

I do think that, my personal view—and this is just an outsider looking in, is that the President was much more possessed of the urgency of this after 9/11, but that is an empirical question. But I mean, I should let General Clark speak for himself.

I am not so sure that we disagree on the use of force, since we both support the use of force, supported the use of force in Kosovo and I take it he supports the use of force in Iraq. I think he would have done the diplomacy a little differently. But I do not think he quarrels with where we came out.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Yes. Mr. Kristol, I just have to say a couple of words about some of the things you have said. In terms of the resolution in 1998 which I voted for for regime change, it had nothing to do with preventive war at all. If you read it, what it talked about was helping the people in the opposition to make the changes there. So that is No. 1.

If someone voted for that, I can tell you, I was not voting to go to war. That is No. 1. I was trying to do what General Clark suggests, which is prevent war, prevent war by supporting those folks who would in fact overthrow Saddam.

Now, I also, I could not believe when you said that it was stability in the Middle East that created Osama bin Laden. It was in fact instability in Afghanistan which allowed him to move in there, into that void. And the weapons that were obtained by the Taliban that eventually found their way into al-Qaeda and the rest were remnants of that war and the fact that we walked away.

I just do not like when history is rewritten since I have lived through a lot of it as a Senator or a Member of Congress. I also remember being stunned when Donald Rumsfeld went to sit across from Hussein, Saddam Hussein and tell him the good news that the Reagan administration was taking them off the terrorists list.

And when we found those weapons of mass destruction, and the inspectors as you know destroyed more than were destroyed by all of our bombs, the components came from this country to a great degree. They had the stamp of our companies on them. So I do not think that we should rewrite history. I think that we need to look at it in an honest way.

I also appreciate your point of view, Mr. Kristol. I have a great deal of respect for you. But I do not think that you and General Clark have in any way come out with the same vision, because I took the notes of what you said and when General Clark talked, he did not just say "It is better if the world likes us." That is trivializing what he said.

He said, "We are safer when we work with the world." That is serious. Maybe you think we are safer when we have so much of

the world right now having attitudes toward us which are, let us say, way beyond disrespectful. I do not think so.

I think you are right when you say that we need to talk to the people. I have supported anything we can do to get to the people and tell them about America and what we are like and what our people are like. And when General Clark said we should prevent war, not wage preventive war, that is very different than your statement which is Iraq—if Iraq is to be a model, not an exception, we are probably going to have to have more of these coalitions of the willing.

So I think, Mr. Chairman, the juxtaposition of these two fine people here who are so smart and can articulate their positions so well is just a brilliant stroke, because as I look at my State, a lot of the arguments that are coming right out here are the arguments that we are hearing back there.

And needless to say, knowing me, as you all do, I do believe we are safer when we work with the world. And it is hard. Diplomacy is hard. But war should not be an instrument of foreign policy. It should be a last resort.

Now, everybody says that. In due respect, Mr. Kristol did not. He basically said, look, Iraq may be the model. And that leads to Senator Biden's point. Well, what is next? What is the next in these great models? And maybe if I did not have to eulogize every single day more and more Californians who are dying here—and I am up way beyond 20, and a lot of them are leaving spouses and little kids and the rest, maybe this could be an interesting abstract conversation.

I just want to read from candidate George Bush and ask General Clark to comment on it. He said, "Let me tell you what I am worried about. I am worried about an opponent who uses nation-building and the military in the same sentence. See, our view of the military is for our military to be properly prepared to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place." And I think that in many ways is what General Clark has said here today.

And I wonder if, General Clark, you could comment on those thoughts.

General CLARK. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I think that many things have changed as I look at this administration's foreign policy from the prescriptions that were offered by then Governor Bush during the campaign. He did speak of a humble America then and one that was respectful. And he was concerned about nation-building and to some extent, some of these changes have been the essential changes of a group of people who stayed out of government during the 1990s, watched from the sidelines and did not understand the actual demands on the U.S. Government. I am talking about the criticism of national building.

In fact, dirty word or not, it is something that the United States has to do and this administration was dragged reluctantly into the problem of resolving the dispute in Macedonia in June 2001. U.S. reluctance to use NATO and let NATO get involved in that period deepened the conflict and cost lives, even in Macedonia.

I remember getting calls at the time from this. This was before the terrible events of 9/11. Something happened after 9/11. We do

not know what that was. No one can clearly understand it. It may be as Senator Chafee said, all along there was a desire to get Saddam. I have read books in which this was apparently discussed inside the administration, "Let us get him."

I have heard it was discussed in the campaign, although I do not remember. I never personally heard it discussed during the campaign, but I think you can find records of people talking about this. I do not know what happened, but what I know is that in life and war and diplomacy, there is sort of two kinds of plans. There are plans that might work, and there are plans that will not work. And when you are trying to protect America's role in the world and you line up all of the things that are important to us in priority order, if you set this Nation of nearly 300 million people against the rest of the world and take away the legitimacy that our values, our rule of law, our 225 years of history has given us, you are setting us on a course that will at some point, despite the power of the American military, despite the courage of the young men and women in uniform, despite the incredible competence we have seen displayed on the battlefield in Iraq, at some point, it is going to run into the weight of other people's interests, concerns, their notions of legitimacy, and it will bounce back against us.

So it may not be in Iraq. It may be in Syria. It may be in whatever comes after that, if there is anything after Iraq. We do not know. But I do think that the logic that was in Governor Bush's statement about the need to prevent war is the right logic.

The problem with war as an instrument of foreign policy is that it is usually counterproductive to try to change people's minds by killing them or their relatives. And so in occasion twice in the 20th century against two separate adversaries, we defeated their Armed Forces, we changed their governments, and it worked out great. And these two countries are allies and have been staunch allies against an outside threat. But in most cases, it leaves lingering hatreds and resentments and problems that later generations of diplomats and, unfortunately, soldiers have to clean up.

That was the record after World War I. That is the persistent record in Europe. It is the record after any number of conflicts in the Middle East. And I pray that it will not be the record after the work that we are trying to do in Iraq. I just want to address one more thing, because I do not know if I will have the chance to come back to it.

Mr. Kristol said that we probably ended up fundamentally in agreement on Iraq. I am not sure about that. I could never personally see—I always felt that we would have to deal with Saddam Hussein in one way or another. I was never convinced that an improved program of sanctions and containment would not work, although eventually such a program might leak and we might have to deal with him. I could never see quite the sense of urgency for going after Saddam when we did.

If you are inside an administration that does these things, you view it as leadership. When you are on the outside and look at it, you view it as something that is more or less not—it is not understandable, totally understandable. You cannot quite grasp it. I could not quite grasp it. I could not quite see the connection with Saddam Hussein and the war on terror because, of all the Arab

States, he was the least likely, it seemed to me, to actually be working against al-Qaeda, and that is what the Agency testified up here on the Hill and said, unless we posed a critical threat to him. That, on the other hand, I mean, we are in it.

I support, you know, our total and complete success and the men and women in the Armed Forces. And I am concerned about the aftermath. And if that is where Bill Kristol comes out, I hope he will associate himself and his magazine with me.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. General Clark, I know you have some urgency to leave us shortly and I do not want to impose longer. I would like to, if I may, to recognize Senator Corzine and then get back to Senator Biden's——

Senator BIDEN. You do not have time.

General CLARK. No, I want to take time for that, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate that.

Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. I will cede most of my time to Senator Biden's question, because I think the application of the concepts of "axis of evil" and preemption and how this pivots is one of the most important questions we could ask with regard to all of these things.

But I do want both of you to comment briefly on one of the lessons learned, which I think is reflected not so much in how governments have acted, but how the populations of countries have acted. Spain has an overwhelming opposition in its population and may end up undermining our coalition of the willing through the fullness of time because populations have not been convinced of what it is and there are others, Italy and other places, where public opinion is not necessarily where the leadership is.

But I think that one of the problems that I think has consistently been shown here is that we have not had a consistent argument about what it was that we were trying to accomplish in Iraq and it is almost parallel to what is the mission of NATO. We started out with regime change and then the prosecution of war on terrorism, and then the elimination of the distribution of weapons of mass destruction and democracy and stability in the Middle East, tyranny and oppression. The sequence of those arguments was made out over 6 months, not at a given point in time, not in a coherent way.

So I wonder if one of the lessons we learn, not only with our allies, but also in how we present these cases here at home to build-up the common support for policies—is not one of the lessons that we need to be able to articulate these missions, these goals in a much more direct way? Or otherwise, we have a fall back to, "you are with us or against us," "might makes right," "axis of evil" kinds of propositions with regard to policy. I think I will leave it there, both of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corzine. Do either of you have a comment on it?

General CLARK. Well, if I could answer that. I think I understand the question as you were going through this. Senator, what struck me was that Iraq is, in many respects, it was the toughest case if you take the idea that you need an active foreign policy in the Mid-

dle East, because even though—in some respects it was the easiest case because you had a U.N. Security Council resolution and you could say he has defied it for years.

Now, Syria is not in active defiance. Iran is not in active defiance. Libya is not in active defiance, the same way. Each of these countries has weapons of mass destruction. Each of these countries to one degree or another supports terrorism. Each of these countries to one degree or another would like to take on Israel and defeat Israel and run the Israelis off the continent.

So Iraq was in one sense the toughest case because it was least active in support of terrorism, and probably least connected to 9/11 although we will not know that for sure and we may be disproved because after we are into Baghdad we will probably find all kinds of information if we can find the papers in those burned out ministries. There is no telling what Saddam may have been up to.

But that is true of the Middle East. Having once gone into Iraq, then I think the chain of logic is actually more clear after that. It is now an easier step to go to the Syrians and say, "Now, look, you got the message from Iraq, right? You understand that weapons of mass destruction make you less secure from us, not more secure. You understand that you will not deter us. We understand that you have Iraq weapons hidden here in Syria. We understand that you are supporting terrorism through Hezbollah. Now, please change or else."

I think that is a pretty clear and convincing argument. The problem with it is it is a suboptimization of what we as the United States should be seeking. As bad as the Syrian regime may be or the Iranian regime, we have higher interests in the world. The question is: How do you line up those interests and pursue them? And this where I come back to one of the things that Bill Kristol said, among many that I agree with. We have not done enough in public diplomacy. Instead of pursuing public diplomacy, we killed it because we cutoff the funding for the State Department's public information programs, their libraries, their outreach abroad, their consular staffs. We have shrunken embassies and taken away their resources, something I know this committee is very familiar with, but it happens even in countries like France because it is gone to we have opened up embassies in Belarus, or we tried to at least before it was pushed out.

And the result of this has been that we have failed to build the bridges of understanding that I think are desperately needed in the world. We should be having a deep debate with our allies about Syria right now and Iran. Do they constitute threats? What measures would we like to see to ensure that they do not constitute a threat? Because the alternative to that is we continue to move forward with an active policy and we end up with responsibilities with more and more nation-building and taking care of people in a culture which has not been conducive to outside engagement in the past and which diverts important resources from other domestic priorities, which forces us to divert our Armed Forces, which causes us to lose legitimacy in the world in light of our broader pursuits.

So I think there is a clear chain of logic if you follow this. And Iraq may have been the toughest, but having crossed Iraq, I think the other dominos could fall. The question is: Do we want them to?

What are our broader priorities in the world, and what is the best way to achieve those priorities? And is it through this chain of knocking down some of these regimes who have historically harbored and supported terrorists and simultaneously gone after weapons of mass destruction?

To me, it is a very pragmatic set of issues that need to be explored and they need to be explored with our allies fully in our confidence, and we need to agree on jointly what we are going to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, would you like to renew your——

Senator BIDEN. I will not renew it at all. Knowing the general, he remembers what I said. I would just add an addendum here.

After 9/11, it seems to me that after 9/11 and in the face of, not connected, but in the face of Iraqi disregard for the U.N. resolutions that had been passed starting after the first gulf war, it seems to me we had an opportunity to not only threaten and ultimately use military force in Iraq, but an opportunity to unify the West, at least, including I would add—this sounds counterintuitive—including Russia in a new set of standards for what constituted appropriate and inappropriate international behavior on the part of people who transferred weapons of mass destruction.

Let me give you one example. I cannot imagine why we did not spend any time trying to work out with our NATO allies, first the Russians and the Chinese, as well a new international regime, if you will, as to what is appropriate behavior in transferring weapons.

For example, here we were, the President of the United States had to suffer the ignominious requirement of releasing a North Korean shipment to, we think—we think we know where they are going to—we do not know where they are supposed to transit from because we made no effort. We made no effort after 9/11 to focus on as those kinds of international, if not regimes, agreements. As the kids used to say 10 years ago, we " dissed" the International Criminal Court, which I do not think we should have belonged to in light of the way in which it was written and other international agreements. It was sort of counterintuitive.

And what confused me was I thought we had a legitimate rationale—although I agree with you, general. I never felt that Saddam was a clear and present danger. He was a long-term danger. If we let him go for another 3 to 5 years, he would get a nuclear capacity, in my view, which would fundamentally alter the relationships, not intercontinental, but probably theater and it would alter relationships. I thought we would eventually have to deal with him.

But I was put in a position, like many were, of we either do nothing or we support doing something now. And I thought that was a pretty easy choice, quite frankly.

But the point I want to make is that what confused me was every time Secretary Powell would go to make a case based upon existing international law and existing international agreements, you would have the Vice President show up, at the Veterans of Foreign War and say, "By the way, inspectors do not matter anyway," or you would have Rumsfeld talk about preemption. It was almost as if it was a deliberate attempt, if we are going to proceed, to not proceed with the aid, assistance, underpinning of international or-

ganizational structures which we created, we, the United States created after World War II.

So if you can factor it, this takes me to my fundamental question. The Europeans seem to have read—and maybe they were intransigent no matter what. Maybe no matter what we did we have a neo-Gaullist who now is the king of Europe in terms of popularity after having been—having the scare of his life with Le Pen getting 20 percent of the vote or whatever, in his newfound popularity.

But it seems to me that there is an incredible distrust for this administration's motives or its agenda, its policy. So if you can wrap that into this notion of the disagreement relating to what constitutes a threat to security, what motivates the Europeans and NATO versus what—or France in particular and what motivates us. I probably confused you.

General CLARK. No, I think there is a, you know, broad center to the many different elements you are raising, Senator. And if I could, I would start with the general perception that—and I think Bill Kristol put it very clearly. He talked about differing interests between the United States and France. And the question I would ask to unravel this is: Why are the interests different?

We are interested in security. They are not interested in security? We are interested in fighting against terrorism. They are not interested in fighting against terrorism? We are interested in being able to pursue international trade and development. They are not?

So what are the—oh, I know. French farmers, French farmers each like to keep their own—OK, so we have a different view on agricultural policy.

But when you go past the sort of narrow economic differences which are inevitably reflected in democratic political systems, I think there is a broad core, a very strong common interest.

I think what happened is that there is a certain opaqueness to the direction of American policy, and that opaqueness is here today in the issue you are raising about Syria. And since you raised it, let me just respond to it. I think, as I was just saying to Senator Corzine, there is a very clear chain of logic that could take us into Syria. There is probably no decision to have done that yet.

And it is probably asking too much for a government to come forward and say, "Look, here is what we have been thinking about. Here is what we have been worried about. We do not want to do this, but you need to understand that this is where we are going."

And yet that is clearly the warning that has been given. And even, you know, some of these countries have not been as clear on the uptake as they might have been after 9/11, but it should be unmistakable now that Syria and Iran are both in the gun sights. The question is—they know it. Our allies know it, but are we dialoguing and building a relationship around the best way to deal with this?

It comes to the second major point that I would like to make. Foreign policy should be about problem solving. It should not be about taking an ideological or non-ideological template and imposing it.

The process of foreign policy is to protect your nation's interests, all of them. And to do that, you face a series of challenges and obstacles and problems, and you have to deal with those problems.

The difficulty that the nations in Europe had was they could not see the Iraq campaign as a pragmatic next step in dealing with the problems of terror partly because, as Senator Corzine said, there were many different explanations given, partly because there was never a clear connection, partly because our public diplomacy did not provide them the information that we had available in the United States, partly because our media did not raise in the United States the question that they themselves were raising about our policies in Europe.

And so as I look at the whole thing, I believe that what we need to do is we need a pragmatic foreign policy. There is no reason to either accept stability in the Middle East, per se, or activity in the Middle East per se as essentials.

The question is: How do we solve—how do we meet our goals of a safer, more secure America in which we can live the way we want to live and enjoy the prosperity and travel and global interconnections that have made us the Nation we are?

And I think that is the debate that needs to be held in a pragmatic way, not based on fear and threat and alert conditions and so forth. But I think Americans have to come to terms with this and we need to bring our allies onboard with us in this debate, because ultimately, if we stand—and this is, I guess, the third major point.

This is not about NATO. And this is not me as an old NATO commander going out and trying to put everything in the template of Kosovo, although certainly it was personally an important experience for me. I was privileged to sit inside the top councils of deliberation for some time during the 1990s, and what I recognized was that there was two distinctive views of the world. There is one view of the world in which you build your allies and your alliances and you worked your friends. And with those friends together, you dealt with your issues. And there is another view that says all you have to do is deal with your enemies, and the only reason you have your friends is to help you deal with your enemies.

I reject the latter. I support the former. In other words, I think that if the United States stands with Europe, together with 600 million people and half the world's GDP, we can pragmatically deal with all of the challenges to European and American security with the right approach, the right leadership, the right public diplomacy, the right dialog. Whereas, if we isolate ourselves and focus only on going after what we see as the most immediate threat, we will take this Nation down a blind alley, whether it is in the next country or the country after that or the country beyond that, from which we will find ourselves in debt, in trouble, in trouble with our volunteer force, in trouble with our budget, in trouble with domestic priorities, in trouble in terms of international agreements and elsewhere that will result ultimately in a set back to the achievement of American aims abroad.

Senator BIDEN. It is a lot of hard work, though, is it not? It is hard.

General CLARK. It is hard. It is exactly what you said: Diplomacy is difficult and demanding. But I really do believe the answer to the question you are asking is: Let us get a pragmatic foreign pol-

icy. Let us use the institution of NATO, enlarge it, bring it together as a focal point for U.S. efforts in the world.

Mr. KRISTOL. If I could just add a word. Yes, look, I accept the standard of a safer and more secure America if you expand it, as I think General Clark would too, to a safer and more secure world for friends and allies, if the people are seeking democracy and liberty around the world. And let us just judge the war in Iraq by that standard. I am perfectly happy to be judged by that. Let us see how it plays out. Let us see whether we think we have not made ourselves more secure and the Middle East actually more secure as a result of removing Saddam Hussein and dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction and liberating the people of Iraq.

In terms of people, I would just say that we have talked a lot about the French people and the German people. People all over the world are unhappy about us, but I would like to mention the people of Iraq. I think the people of Iraq deserve some mention. We let them—we encouraged them to rise up in 1991. I was in The White House then.

We let Saddam—we stood by as Saddam slaughtered them. If you ask me, why we are unpopular—the genuine grievance against us in the Arab world was a legitimate grievance, I would say, was that we intervened in 1991, saved the Amir of Kuwait, saved the Saudi royal family, stabilized oil supplies, which was important. You could not let Saddam obviously control all of that oil wealth.

But then we stood back as actual Arab people rose up seeking freedom. And that, if you want to start talking about why we have problems in some respects among Arab populations as opposed to Arab governments, I think that was a problem and I think, conversely, the liberation of the people of Iraq will be a benefit.

Syria, look, we do need to talk to our allies and friends about Iran and Syria. I think Secretary Powell spent an awful lot of time actually talking about Iran with various countries, Russia for example, where we have not been as successful as we had hoped in persuading them to help on the proliferation problem.

We have argued with our allies about commercial dealings with Iran. Syria is not something that we have paid a fair amount of attention to but, look, at some point you may end up with a different analysis of the problem.

It is not so much that France and we have different interests. We clearly have a different perception of how to deal with some of these problems, and we should do a better job of persuading them that our perception is right. But there may come times when one has to make a decision and I think that the President did have to make a decision in this case.

I do not think delay would have fundamentally changed it, Chirac would not have changed his mind 6 months later. And I think we would have been at greater risk. So I am perfectly happy to be held to the pragmatic standard of judgment. But I would just say: Let us be serious about that standard. But Syria seems to be suddenly—I do not know quite why—in everyone's mind. But yes, if the Syrian Government feels pressured to cut down on its support for terror or be less irresponsible in some of its dealings in the Middle East, that would be a good thing as a result of Iraq and

that does not mean successful diplomacy only involves being liked by people. It also involves pressuring nations that do not make their decisions based on whether they like you so much or not.

There are an awful lot of dictatorships in the Middle East, I think, that respond to—where it is important to be respected and even a little bit feared. And I think, in fact, we will be better liked by the peoples of those nations if we are a little tougher on the dictatorial regimes that they are saddled with. I think the evidence of that is actually there in Iran.

Senator BIDEN. I can tell you why we are concerned about Syria. There is a sense that there is an evolving rationale that is going to justify a decision that has already been taken. I may be wrong about that, but that is why we are concerned, why, I speak for myself, why I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just make a couple of comments——

Senator BIDEN. Could I ask unanimous consent to strike——

The CHAIRMAN. You have permission to strike that from the record.

I just want to announce that tomorrow, in fact, the committee will have an opportunity to expand American diplomacy. We are going to have the markup of the reauthorization bill for the State Department. I think it is an important juncture. And the markup we started with provides more money in about five ways for the State Department and for diplomacy than the State Department asked for officially. We think that is important, both the broadcasting and the embassies and a number of things many of you would have commented on.

I would say that our hearing today was, of course, about NATO and really the expansion of the treaty. But one of the things that has come to my mind is that one reason why perhaps things are moving well with the seven States that are coming in is that the United States has spent a lot of quality diplomacy on those seven.

Secretary Grossman himself, quite apart from Ambassador Burns and others and Members of Congress and whatever, have visited the seven probably with greater frequency than a good number of major countries throughout the world that are outside those seven. So there is something to be said for having more diplomacy.

It leads me to wonder, however, and I just say this with the ranking member present, that we do not have, for example, an Assistant Secretary for Latin America. We have not had for several months.

Now, here we are prior to the U.N. vote—granted, that is not the best time to begin starting public either or private diplomacy as the case may be. But I received calls from the administration, and the ranking member may have, too, asking for intervention with President Vicente Fox and/or others that I might know in Mexico, Chileans, who are also there.

Now, for a long while, we left Chile standing by the telephone waiting to be invited into NAFTA. This has gone on for years through several administrations, I fear, by this time. Likewise, with the Mexicans, they had some expectations that have not been fulfilled. Their Foreign Minister resigned. And here we are. It is a bit late at this point because even then we are not prepared to

remedy the situations. We might show some acknowledgment that we are there.

I am hopeful that we are able to expand our vision, able to handle more clients simultaneously, because I suspect that we might be more successful if we can.

Let me just call now upon patient Senator Chafee. Do you have a final valedictory comment?

Senator CHAFEE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank both of you very much.

Mr. KRISTOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, gentlemen.

General CLARK. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair .]

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